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

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L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.
AND
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still survives and flourishes. That may be so; none the less, the struggle for bodily immunity has not been in vain. It has always been going on; it is in process now. And "by the toll of a million million deaths" partial success has been secured. It is, I repeat, a parable of the upward struggle of man in all things, and not least in the things of the mind and the spirit. Our race has achieved plain and tangible moral and spiritual as well as material gains. The problem lies not in the admission of the fact, but in the consciousness of what it implies. The consciousness of the immeasurable hardship and suffering, through which these things have been secured, has penetrated the thought and feeling of humanity to-day as it never did before.

We have said in effect that the fact of Progress is beyond dispute. It is necessary, however, to indicate precisely what is affirmed and what is denied by this statement; and we have referred to a powerful address given by a brilliant thinker and keen critic of his age, in which *The Idea of Progress* is subjected to a merciless analysis which was much needed.[1]

The aspect of the question raised by Dr Inge is not the same when we look at it from the point of view which faces the future, and when we look at it from the point of view which faces the past. If we accept as sufficient an ideal of progress which makes it consist of a gradual accumulation of small increments of advance through the ages, completing itself in a certain form of specifically earthly life, then we are not only untrue to the mind of the Founder of Christianity, but also untrue to the inexorable logic of history and fact. History tells of victories that were defeats, of defeats that were victories. The Cross on Calvary, the death-agony of the secular power of Rome, the fierce life begotten by the young Northern nations over the ruins of the ancient world, the resurrection, as from the grave, of the spirit of that old world with power to mould in countless ways the mind and heart of the new,—these things are not exceptional, but typical of the stuff of which "progress" is made. And through it all there sounds the message of the Master, that the issue of all these ages of storm and stress cannot be found on the field of time.

The various Utopias, from the pictorial visions of the sixteenth century to the ideal constructions characteristic of some kinds of nineteenth-century socialism, are indications of a conviction that a perfect state and a perfect social order are conceivable, that their general structure can be imagined, and that they are consistent with human nature as realised on this earth. The goal is an earthly civilisation, based on scientific knowledge, and secured by perfect political institutions. Crudely conceived, as it often is, this becomes a purblind faith in man as a "progressive animal" whose progress is essentially a thing of years. In a thousand years, for example, he will have made a great advance over his present state. And in a million years, mental and physical facts will be so organised that no one will have any experience of pain or evil. It may be freely admitted that in such ideas there is something which calls for sympathy; at the same time it must be affirmed that they are destitute of any basis in our knowledge of the actual or the possible. But what exactly does this admission imply?

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[1] Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 27th May 1920, by W. R. Inge, C.V.O., D.D., Hon. Fellow of Hertford College.

We admit that the reformer may be defined as one who creates the problems of the future by endeavouring to solve the problems of the present. We may even admit that every reform undertaken by man is a desperate venture: that the future of mankind on this earth is encumbered with darkness: that no faculty of calculation we possess, no instrument we are likely to invent, will enable us to map out its course or penetrate the secret of its destiny. But these seemingly gloomy admissions are only another way of stating the obvious fact that our human powers of insight and foresight are limited. And legislation and political action, even when moving in the light of the most assured results of sociological investigation, must necessarily move largely in theoretical uncertainty and deal with the practical problems one by one as they arise.

The main force of Dr Inge's argument confessedly relates to the past; and the importance of his warning seems to us to lie in its emphasis on the fundamental fact, namely, that the *things* by which men usually estimate Progress are at once *the creation and the tools* of the spirit which uses them, and therefore that real progress must be spiritual progress.

The secular tendency—weakened, indeed, by the experiences of the war—to identify Progress with the advance of Science, is a dangerous delusion. Science consists in the discovery of what exists; she seeks to go on adding fact to fact for ever, connecting them into a vast system to which no limit can be imagined or conceived. What, then, can Science do for us? The answer is threefold. She can, and she actually has, set the human mind free from an accumulation of superstition (though even this, if done too hastily, may be a doubtful benefit);[1] she can also proceed to an ever more victorious ascertainment of fact upon fact; and above all she can provide mankind with the means of realising all kinds of human purposes. But she can supply no clue for estimating the value of the purposes which she may serve.

Hence the fallacy of assuming as "scientific facts" that, for example, the process of natural evolution is good, or the stability of society good, or the increase of human life good, or the happiness of the greatest number good. Good means good for some kind of human purpose. Science is limited to the ascertainment of what *is*; and human purposes deal with what *is to be*, and introduce us to the world of what *ought to be*. If we widen the meaning of the word "Science"—or rather, change its meaning—and make it mean systematic knowledge in the widest sense, then we may inquire into the possibility of gaining "systematic knowledge" of what ought to be; but that would be quite a different question.

When all this is said, however, and due allowance made for whatever truth it may contain, there remains a question which does not appear to be adequately met by Dr Inge's argument. Let us turn to Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte Roms*, allowing for the occasional tendency, even in this classical work, to blacken what was dark and darken what was grey. We are shown an appalling panorama of a dying civilisation. Outwardly, there is wealth and power, splendour and greatness; inwardly, there is emptiness and desolation. Along with increasingly successful achievements in the externals of the structure of civilisation—political organisation, public finance, criminal justice, roads and transport, and the like—we find a deep disillusionment and despondency taking hold of the mind of the Empire. All thoughtful men were labouring to find a remedy for what seemed like a mortal sickness. With a true diagnosis, men turned to the problems which arise immediately out of the two great primary instincts—self-preservation and reproduction. The old civilisation had been recklessly wasteful in both these matters, attaching very little value to human life, and permitting every kind of abuse in the indulgence of appetite. The result was a gradual depopulation of the Empire—on the one hand by infanticide, suicide, gladiatorial shows, military massacres; on the other, by the discovery of unnatural means of satisfying natural instincts.

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[1] Cp. Sir J. G. Frazer in *Psyche's Task*.

Now, when we compare the civilisation, say, of the second century after Christ, with the civilisation of to-day, including all its tragedies and dangers, is it true to say that "neither science nor history gives us any warrant for believing that humanity has advanced except by accumulating knowledge and experience and the instruments of living"?[1] I venture to think that it is a mistake to make too sharp a distinction between the two things. Knowledge and experience and the instruments of living cannot be accumulated without changing human nature, because their very accumulation is the work of the mind and spirit of man. Just so far as these accumulated results are of value—and Dr Inge affirms that they are of great value—human nature has changed for the better in the making of them.

The relation between a progressive accumulation of results achieved and a progressive improvement in the human nature which achieves them, is seen to be extremely close and intimate when we refer it to those historic achievements of the human spirit which result in *the development and deepening of moral ideas.* One of the most suggestive and valuable chapters in Thomas Hill Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* is that in which he shows—in the case of the most prominent personal virtues recognised by the Greeks, courage and "temperance" (self-mastery or self-control)—that in modern times both the range of their application has been extended and the conception of the principle on which they rest deepened.[2] With regard to self-mastery, says Green, "we present to ourselves the objects of moral loyalty which we should be ashamed to forsake for our pleasures, in a far greater variety of forms than did the Greek, and it is a much larger self-denial which loyalty to these objects demands of us. It is no longer the State alone that represents to us the *melior natura* before whose claims our animal inclinations sink abashed. Other forms of association put restraints and make demands upon us which the Greek knew not." We are moved by ideas of common good which could not have been made intelligible in the ancient world. "Society was not in a state in which the principle that humanity in the person of everyone is to be treated always as an end and never merely as a means, could be apprehended in its full universality; and it is this principle alone, however it may be stated, which affords a rational ground for the virtue of chastity as we understand it. The society of modern Christendom is far enough from acting upon it; but in its conscience it recognises the principle as it was not recognised in the ancient world."[1]

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[1] Romanes Lecture, p. 24.

[2] Cp. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 1915, III. vii. § 5; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, 1910, V. ii. § 98; Green, *Prolegomena*, III. v., especially §§ 258 ff.

We may, however, admit that there has been a development and deepening of moral ideas, and yet leave a serious consideration to be met. We must distinguish the two questions: (i.) Are our ideas of duty wider, deeper, and truer than those of previous generations? (ii.) Do we live up to our ideas of duty better than the men of previous ages lived up to their (possibly inferior) ideas? I answer that the distinction is most true and important. Our last quotation from Green suggests it. I admit, further, that the second question is the really vital question about progress; and that it is very difficult (from the nature of the case) to verify, in the detail of history, the improvement in human nature which an affirmative answer to the second question implies. Yet, even so, I urge that while we must not confuse the two questions, we cannot separate them. The wider, deeper, and truer ideas of duty are not simply dropped into human nature like meteorites falling from the sky to the earth beneath. They are the product at once of divine inspiration and human activity. In a real sense of the word they are our *creation*; and in the process of creating a new and true moral idea our nature does itself change for the better.

There is no need to question the fact of the "ascent of man," properly understood. The trouble is that to see it we have to take very broad views of life and history; we have to detach ourselves from our own world—sometimes even from our own age altogether. And then we see the pathway of advance; but as we discern it, we see also how painfully slow the movement has been, and at what a cost it was achieved. We see it as we see on a distant mountain-side the silver lines made by a stream, but not its troubled progress in the channel wrought out by itself through thousands of years; or we see it as Tennyson's eagle saw the wild fury of ocean waves beating out their never-ending battle with the rocks: to the eagle, gazing down from a summit thousands of feet above, it was a *wrinkled sea* beneath him crawling. We are in the storm. It is no "wrinkled sea" that surrounds us now.

Before the war, there was hardly anything which many of us seemed to think about less than the price at which the material and moral gains were won which have come to us without any effort or personal sacrifice of our own. Not many had the insight which enables one to realise the almost immeasurable hardship and suffering through which nearly all these material and moral gains have come. The result was a prevalent temper to accept as its legitimate due the result of ages of toil and sacrifice; or to take it as a matter of course, as we take the light of the sun or the air we breathe. Men did not deny the mysterious background, dark, sinister, unexplored, against which the path, by which the human race has slowly moved onwards, stands out in the twilight. But it passed out of notice. It was best forgotten. So most men seemed to think: until some quite concrete event or personal experience awakened imagination to it.

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[1] Green, *op. cit.*

What this event or experience would be, seemed, very often, a matter of personal temperament, or even of accident. In one case, it might be the sufferings of a single child, awakening as it were suddenly, a consciousness of the age-long burden that bears hardest on the innocent, and threatening with shipwreck a man's faith. In other cases, it might be such calamities as those at Martinique and St Vincent in May 1902, or at Messina in December 1908.[1] Or it might be something of a totally different kind, as in the case of the man who brooded over the sufferings of rabbits which he had observed caught alive in wire gins, until he was moved to go and break the windows of some Government offices in Downing Street, as a protest against the civilisation which sanctioned such cruelties. And the present writer well remembers a conversation, in a great Government Department in Whitehall, between himself and a level-headed man of the world, who had not appeared to be much affected by the sufferings caused by the war, but who was now profoundly moved by his personal knowledge of the position of a mother who had had four sons fighting on four different fronts: they all perished in action, and the four messages all reached her on the same day. "It's too cruel," he said; "*it's too cruel.*"

The war has appealed to the imagination of all. This is no matter of temperament, mood, or accident. The dark background can pass out of notice no more. We see all the epochs of human development full of gloomy and horrible passages of suffering and strife. Just as every coral island lifts its head above the sea because countless myriads of creatures have laid down their lives and left their remains unnoticed below, so, by the toll of a million million deaths, mankind has achieved his foothold on this earth and begun to be conscious of what he really is. What is to be the reaction of the modern spirit to the vision of this background? That is the question of questions for us all.

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[1] Cp. the striking contributions in vol. i. of this JOURNAL (pp. 114 ff., 360, 570) in reference to the West Indian catastrophes, and the argument of the late Richard Armstrong that "the problem of catastrophes is not a separate problem loaded with special difficulties, but only one small part of a universal and enduring problem" (*ibid.*, p. 124). The disaster at Messina led to a correspondence of several weeks' duration in the London *Nation*, under the title "Why?" Some of the contributors wrote as if such a question had never occurred to them before. *The Nation*, Jan. 9 to Feb. 16, 1919.

Our first reaction is inevitably to ask once more the ancient question, at bottom the same question which the child asks at his mother's knee: "Why did God *let* it happen?" Why this fearful price to be paid, not only for the great victories of the spirit—their very greatness throws a sombre glory on the agonies through which they were achieved,—but even for the smallest gains? To what purpose is this waste? We know that such questions can be and have been answered, in part: and the answers are accessible to all thoughtful people. It is not my purpose now to dwell upon these. But the force of the child's question "Why?" is unexhausted, for the answers are only in part.

Let us be willing to learn something more from the same child. When he is really suffering or in trouble, all such questions vanish. There is no longer any thought of why anyone let it happen. All the longing of his little soul is concentrated in the one cry: "Mother!" It is the cry for *some one who cares*. This is the elemental hunger of the human soul. This created all religions throughout the ages. And when all that the historian and the student of religion knows has been told, this remains: we hear it, rising from the great deep from which humanity came, penetrating every stage of historic culture; the cry for Some One who cares: the feeling after a Great Heart to respond to the moving of our hearts: the listening for that word, "It is I; be not afraid!" borne by a deeper voice across the storm: the longing for a Love so wide yet so intimate that all our love is only part of it—even your love for your child only a part of the love with which God loves that child, now and for ever.

Let there be no mention of "proof" or "demonstration" here. This thing is far too high, too deep, to be measured in such terms. That from which the soul and its deepest hunger came can and will satisfy it to the uttermost in the end. A great Scottish preacher has spoken of "the unit of Power in the world." Even so we may speak of the "unit of Love in the world": it is "not God isolated from man, and not man isolated from God; but God and man united, working purposely and continuously together: God quickening and inspiring man, and man opening his life to be part of the Divine Life of the world."[1]

All our questions are concentrated in the Cross of Christ. *Ecce Homo!* There was a being pure and true in body and soul, unique in moral power and insight, suffering the worst shame and agony at the hands of a few scheming priests and Roman executioners. The very things that were best in him they took advantage of, in order to wreak upon him their worst. It might indeed seem as if the worst things in the world were there, working unrestrained, and doing their worst. And as men watched that scene in imagination, they might have said—as they have said of many lesser Calvaries of human suffering and sacrifice,—"There is no God, there is only the devil," only a malignant or a blind and purposeless power. Yet an instinct in the heart of the world has judged otherwise. As men have watched that scene in imagination, they have said, "There is no devil, there is only God." They have perceived something more than the shame and agony, more than the short triumph of policy and priestly intrigue; they have perceived the highest thing in humanity, gaining through seeming defeat its perfect victory: the Love which means the entire willingness of a human soul to give the uttermost for the whole. The priests, the executioners, and the wondering crowd have gone; but that Cross dominates the ages still, because Love, thus triumphant, is the divinest thing the world has known. And now, the Cross has become a symbol, a type—no longer of some mysterious interchange of pain for mercy, between the Victim and the Almighty; but a symbol of something universally ennobling in human life; an elemental thing, at once human and divine—the unit of Power in the world.

It is related of Saint Thomas Aquinas that, towards the end of his life, worn out with study and thought, and with labour in practical affairs, he was seen contemplating the familiar Figure on the Crucifix, and was heard to murmur to himself—"Thou hast done all this for me: what have I done for Thee?" And we, as there rises before us a vision of the price which mankind has paid for progress—and above all else in this hour, as we contemplate, in reality or in imagination, those fields in France with their lines upon lines of still white stones,—we, too, will say, deepening the meaning of the old Latin hymn, *Tantus labor non sit cassus!* All this suffering and sacrifice shall not fall to the ground in vain. For now we see, in the dark background of our human story, a vision of the fidelities and sacrifices of men and generations of men—a vision which is no longer a problem but an inspiration, even a consecration, that we too may give ourselves to the creation of the life and light, the liberty and joy, which mark the dawn of the kingdom of God.

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[1] John Hunter, *De Profundis Clamavi*, p. 234.

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MALTHUS'S DEVIL.

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"Before the eighteenth century mankind entertained no false hopes. To lay the illusions which grew popular at that age's latter end, Malthus disclosed a devil. For half a century all serious economical writings held that devil in clear prospect. For the next half century he was chained up and out of sight. Now perhaps we have loosed him again."

With these words Mr Keynes prepares his readers to meditate on the calamities of the peace, and sets himself to dispel the perfumed optimism which fondly supposed that a war-stricken continent would shortly blossom as the rose and smilingly transform itself into a garden fit for heroes to dwell in. And it is not surprising that Malthus's sombre note should seem very near and very menacing to the present generation. Malthus wrote at a time when mouths were very difficult to feed. "The way in which we are going on at present, and the enormous increase in the price of provisions"—to choose a phrase almost at random—makes very modish reading in these days, when even a trivial fall in the price of wool is written in scarlet letters on the hoardings, and when every American magazine is stuffed with advice concerning the H.C.L. The high cost of living, and the actual and prospective scarcity of fuel and foodstuffs, have kept us thinking in these islands more than we like doing; and the horrors in Austria show Malthusian principles at their devilish work. Now that want and misery have put the Emperor Tuberculosis on the empty throne of the Habsburgs, it is time to ask whether our ideas in the later nineteenth century were more than foolish dreams, the spawn of a temporary surfeit.

As most people know, Malthus set out to prove to the world that Godwin's ideal of the perfectibility of mankind and Condorcet's triumphant optimism were only a will-o'-the-wisp. The poor, he argued, *must* always be with us, because population always presses upon the means of subsistence. The few who are powerful may be able to obtain enough, and more than enough, for themselves and their retainers; but the many who are weak must live from hand to mouth in every age. In any conceivable state of society, therefore, it is quite certain that most human beings must live miserably; for misery is only another name for want, together with the prospect and consequences of want. Precisely because the population always grows too fast for its food, vice and misery step in to check it. And this is a law of Nature as ruthless and inevitable as an earthquake, though not so spectacular.

In the later editions of his essay Malthus modified his pessimism to some extent, because he laid emphasis upon the "preventive check" of moral restraint. Indeed he suggested that if marriages were delayed until the prospective parents were able to support a family in comfort, and if celibacy were endured in default of this ability, poverty would be enormously reduced, if not abolished altogether. And he hoped that the spread of education might achieve this desirable result. "I indulged," he said, "in the contemplation of a considerable degree of *possible* improvement, that I might not absolutely shut out that prime cheerer hope." It was this part of Malthusianism that appealed most strongly to those "serious economical writings" of which Mr Keynes speaks. Mill, for example, presses this lesson home in his *Political Economy*, maintaining that incontinence in the size of families should be detested and punished in the same way as any other dangerous and reprehensible incontinence; and he hoped, like Malthus, that education would provide the remedy.

This ameliorative addendum to the theory, however, only permitted what Malthus called a very "chastised optimism." Malthus supposed, it is true, that the postponement of marriage, and even celibacy for the few, were slight evils in comparison with the certain and monstrous evils of overpopulation, but his "moral restraint" was only prudence based on the fear of misery, and it would be intolerable for those who practised it if any considerable portion of mankind refused to be educated out of its zeal for begetting. Even Mill, therefore, must have felt relieved when he, in his turn, came to revise his opinions in later editions of his book. "I have left the preceding paragraphs as they were written," he says, "since they remain true in principle, though it is no longer urgent to apply their specific recommendations to the present state of this country."

That is the point. The matter was urgent when Malthus wrote, and it did not seem to be urgent in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The discovery of new lands to plough and of new berries to eat seemed to have banished the devil, and to have left him to gibber with other nightmares. The population of America and Australia, and in a lesser degree that of England and Germany, was able to increase prodigiously without any obvious and imminent peril of bare cupboards and fireless hearths. Indeed, the other party had its innings. Prelates and imperialists thundered anathema on race suicide, and a distinguished American President, his hands dyed with the blood of lions, came over to Europe in order to advise the young men and maidens of that decadent continent of their duty in this important matter.

The motives of these crusaders, to be sure, were very mixed. Some felt the need of large white armies to preserve the balance of power, or to hold the yellow races to ransom. Some were anxious that the proletariat should be kept in check by a reasonably large number of superior persons. Some argued, on moral and æsthetic grounds, that small families were the worst kind of selfishness, forbearing to test womankind in the salutary discipline of nursery and childbed, and resorting to the ugliest devices for gratifying unruly appetites without undertaking the duties of Nature. These arguments were answered by socialists, pacifists, humanitarians, and decadent æsthetes, sometimes well and sometimes ill. But nobody quoted Malthusian principles, because no one felt them to be really serious.

To-day the question is urgent again, and the tone of controversy has changed. Malthus's devil has returned, and has gracefully taken his seat in outspoken essays. He seemed to be toothless, and now he looks stronger than ever. Indeed, the Dean of St Paul's is more Malthusian than Malthus. He might find authority in Malthus, it is true, for his assertion that "if our physicians desire more maternity cases, they must make more work for the undertaker," but he makes short work of Malthus's "preventive check" by arguing that conscious intention has very little to do with the matter, and that "children will come somehow" (by the storks, perhaps!) "wherever there is room for them, and go when there is none." If that were true indeed, there would be no room for Malthus's "chastised optimism," and there would be no hope whatever, according to Malthusian principles, of defeating want and misery in the long run, although fresh fields and new inventions might delay the evil hour for a few centuries beyond the limits which Malthus foresaw.

It is timely, therefore, to consider Malthus's principles closely; and no one can deny the enormous importance of his problem from the larger standpoint of social philosophy.

Malthus's essay is disappointing in many ways. It makes a great parade of exactitude, and it is laboriously lucid; but its lucidity and its exactitude are often more pretentious than solid; and many of its arguments beg the question most flagrantly, especially at the critical points where Godwin and Condorcet are supposed to be finally vanquished.

His general thesis is that population, if unchecked, increases in geometrical ratio, while "the means of subsistence, under circumstances the most favourable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio." It follows, therefore, that population has been checked, and must always continue to be checked, since the numbers of the human race at any time are manifestly reduced to the level of subsistence available at that time. These checks to population are either preventive (moral restraint) or else positive; and the positive checks are vice and misery. "Under this head may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine."

The several parts of this argument have very different degrees of cogency. Everyone, of course, admits that men cannot live if they cannot be fed, but a cheap and hasty optimism may easily forget to inquire how many calories a healthy man consumes and how much food is available for him. Malthus, therefore, deserved a hearing precisely because he refused to believe with Godwin or Condorcet that this practical problem had only a remote and speculative bearing on the chances of human progress. Again, his detailed and systematic account of Nature's methods in this work of prevention is painstaking and, on the whole, informing, although it cannot claim to be exceptionally original or overwhelmingly acute. It may be doubted, however, whether these portions of Malthus's essay (and they comprise the bulk of it) would have impressed his contemporaries so profoundly as they did if they had not been prefaced by the celebrated formula concerning the geometrical and the arithmetical ratio, and this mathematical argument is obviously untenable in the form in which Malthus stated it.

The means of human subsistence consist ultimately of food, fuel, clothing, and shelter; and fish and fowl, cattle and grain, *if unchecked*, also increase in geometrical ratio. Coal and stone, it is true, do not, but there is no question of an arithmetical ratio of increase in their case. From one point of view, the supply of these commodities is gradually exhausted (or, at least, diminished) without any possibility of increase. From another point of view, the available supplies of them depend upon machinery and transport; and these may advance much more rapidly than the lingering generations of men.

The abstract argument, therefore, which Malthus dangled carrotwise before his readers, is only a mathematical figment. His "arithmetical ratio" was a mere guess, and, as it happened, it was a bad one, at least for the time being. Believing, as he did, that the wealth of a country is found in its agricultural produce, Malthus was naturally afraid of the legions of manufacturing parasites that were springing up; and he did not see any reasonable prospect of a great advance in agriculture. He could not foresee the day in which a poor harvest in Britain would become indifferent to the British people, and although there was waste land in these islands at the time when he wrote, the law of diminishing return robbed him of much hope from that quarter. Moreover, he thought that cow's dung was the only suitable manure for farmers, and grazing is obviously more wasteful than ploughing. Malthus, therefore, saw nothing better in prospect than the law of nature and economics, according to which the demand for labour attracts a stream of labour which, in its turn, is sustained, for the time being, by intensive cultivation and by reclaiming waste lands. From this narrow watch-tower he concluded, reasonably enough, that if manufacturing England doubled her agricultural output within a generation she would succeed excellently well, and that a further doubling in the next generation would be utterly impossible. That is the whole of the "arithmetical ratio." It is a beautiful instance of pretentious reasoning which seems precise and is not.

Even the "geometrical ratio" of organic reproduction has not precisely the significance which many writers suppose. Given eternity to breed in, any living species would find the world too small for its needs if it continued to increase in any ratio, or, for that matter, in no determinate or periodic ratio. The importance of an increase in geometrical ratio is really a question of time. It shows that rat or rabbit, mammoth or chickweed, would overrun the earth and finally choke for want of air in quite a short time if their populating tendencies were never checked. The human race, therefore, has to face a prospect of disaster which is uncomfortably near; and we might even *feel* it to be near if we cared for posterity half as much as we pretend. That is the first lesson we can learn from Malthus, and we should not forget it simply because it is so very obvious. Moreover, we should do well to reflect on some other truisms which he labours for our benefit. Although his "arithmetical ratio" is a figment, it is clear that if the impulse to procreate retains its present strength and is not drastically controlled, population, in the long run, would overtake any conceivable increase in food supply, and, in the short run, is perpetually encroaching upon the available means of subsistence. Nature steps in *whenever* there is too little food and fuel, and misery comes with her. The dream of a smokeless rural England, "after London," seems kindly only when the prelude is forgotten. Our novelists may hide the prelude by devising some sudden catastrophe and burying it in antiquity, but Nature is cruel and slow. The restriction of the race by preventive methods might have been a crime ten years ago, and it might be a duty to-day. Accordingly, whether we take a long or a short view of this complicated and fundamental problem, the vital question at issue is whether the human race can control the growth of population, relatively to the available supply of the means of subsistence, by some kindlier and more rational agency than poverty, famine, or pestilence.

It would be utterly unreasonable to expect that accident will abolish the need for design by weakening the force of the reproductive impulse. All the evidence is against this supposition. These appetites need to be controlled. Even hunger and disease do not quench them, and they can bear the enervating atmosphere of luxury. They are so stubborn that they suggest the truth of the theory that the race is the enduring root, and the individual only the ephemeral leaf. This reflection may bring comfort to some of those who deplore a decline in the birthrate. Even if a deluge engulfed the human race, a few stragglers, male and female, might emerge from some ark or crevice and people the earth once again within a period that geologists would consider short. The decline of a nation or of an aristocracy, to be sure, is quite another thing, for the nation or the aristocracy must keep pace with their neighbours if they are to retain their power; but the human race itself can recuperate so rapidly, that a stationary or declining birthrate during many centuries need not alarm anyone who reckons values by counting heads.

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We are faced, then, with the problem of control, and surely it is possible that the world might be a very much better place if the human race learned to govern itself in this fundamental affair. I do not mean, of course, that *any* sort of deliberate control is necessarily better than Nature's method. The world's population would be controlled for a time if a conquering people exterminated its competitors, and enslaved those races which could work where it could not, with periodic shootings to temper their fecundity; and when the conquerors, in their turn, became too numerous, a faction among them might repeat the cure. This devil would be worse than Malthus's, and some other possibilities might not be better. Those who object to the eugenists' ideals do not usually reason very clearly. They dislike the methods of the stud-farm and prefer the methods of the prairie. That is not an argument, and if it were, there would be no romance in the methods of a hungry, overcrowded Babylon, although there might be a pardonable, if sightless, romance about the prairie. Eugenic control, therefore, might be the best thing for mankind, but it might also be very bad indeed. Our knowledge of these affairs, it is true, is so flimsy at the present time, that eugenists could scarcely venture to go further than to advise the sterilisation of a few imbeciles and degenerates; but if they had the power and a little more knowledge, they might be very dangerous indeed. Human beings are so marvellously complex that scientific breeders would have learned a very great deal if they discovered how to eradicate a few palpable defects and to strengthen a few desirable tendencies. If the eugenists took control armed with this knowledge only, they might easily do infinite harm. They would breed according to the demand of the time, and so perpetuate the time's inequalities, and they might permanently destroy many human capacities just because they could not appreciate their value or discern them in the germ. Nature's methods might be far better than these.

On the other hand, rational control of the population might be a worthy province of man's dominion. True, it would not be a perfect thing, for it would have to impose much restraint; and we know that evils lurk in this restraint. The psycho-analysts, indeed, are sure to open their chamber of horrors at the bare suggestion, but then they assume that man is as lecherous as the ape, and they may be wrong in this, since, if they were right, every human being would be a hopeless neuropath long before reaching man's estate. In any case, the lesser evil must often be chosen that good may come;

and the evils of restraint may be endured. I would gladly avoid unsavoury matters if I could, but it is clear, I suppose, that artificial restraint does the same work as moral; and its wickedness is a matter of opinion. To be sure, the morality of infanticide or the procuring of abortion can scarcely be defended, but artificial prevention is another thing, and it is debatable. The chief argument against it is, that it would completely separate the sexual appetite from the desire for offspring if it were universally practised; and the consequence might be that the desire for offspring would, by itself, be too weak for the welfare of the human race. Our repugnance towards this alternative, then, may have an excellent basis in human nature. On the other hand, the desire for offspring, by itself, may really be very strong, and nobody knows precisely how strong it is.

The prospects of an immediate change in the voluntary control of the birthrate are, of course, exceedingly poor. From the nature of the case, the determining circumstance is the general practice of mankind; and the majority of mankind, at the present time, are impervious to argument in this matter. I do not mean merely that we might as well expect to find Tamerlane in the Salvation Army as expect to affect the practice of Bantus and Berbers, negrilloes and pre-Dravidians. I mean that public opinion and private practice in civilised countries are not likely to alter suddenly and profoundly even if every elementary teacher were armed with a diploma in civics. The more prudent and thrifty portions of civilised folk, to be sure, ponder this problem quite as much as is good for them, wondering whether they can afford to marry and, if they marry, whether they can support more than a very few children. These grave and prudent persons, however, form quite a small minority in the community, and it is the number of mouths that counts, not the motives which have created the mouths. During the immediate future, then, poor men will continue to be rich in children; and they will continue to look for support from the State and from private charity.

The principal hope for the moment, therefore, is that vastly increased supplies may be found. If they are not found, Nature will restrict the populace by her clumsiest and most brutal methods, and medical devices for increasing longevity will be counteracted by new diseases attacking a weakened people. Moreover, as long as economic conditions remain as they now are, the poor will suffer more than the rich, and the scarcity of foodstuffs will drive those whose economic power is least to work at a miserable wage in order to delay the hour of their miserable death. Even if economic power were transferred from the capitalists to powerful combinations of skilled labour, it is very unlikely, at present, that the proletariat would cease to be the slave of the most grinding and the bitterest necessity. The composition of the proletariat would change, and there would be no other change.

It is quite possible, of course, that greatly increased supplies may be procured in the near future. We seem to be living in an ugly epoch, just as Malthus did, but these appearances may be as deceptive now as they were then. The war has exhausted our margins and imperilled many sources of supply, but, on the whole, it is reasonable to suppose that the supplies and the possibilities of increased supply which were available before the war will shortly be available after it. The earth is rich enough, and there is enough labour. Perhaps, even, Governments may be more likely to undertake extensive irrigations than they were before. It is arguable, of course, that the smiling plenty of the later nineteenth and of the early twentieth century was very largely illusory. The enormous growth of population in some of the new countries and in the new manufacturing towns was not a world-phenomenon. The huddled millions in India and China did not quadruple themselves, and the old Tasmanians and the Guanches disappeared altogether. Still, on the whole, there was great abundance, and in many ways the prospect of greater.

The problem changes if we look some centuries ahead, but, even then, it need not be utterly transformed. As we have seen, the ultimate necessities of life are food, fuel, clothing, and shelter, and there is no proof that supplies of these, sufficient for a vastly larger population, are beyond the limits of reasonable possibility. As long as a man has standing room on the earth the materials for shelter are beneath his feet, and if he is driven into catacombs the problem of shelter solves itself. The materials for clothing, again, are so much less bulky and perishable than foodstuffs, that the problem of supplying them is really a minor one. Fuel, to be sure, is a much more serious difficulty, and if coal and oil and wood were the only possible fuel, the collapse of our present civilisation would not linger. For coal and oil are exhaustible, and timber is wasteful and bulky, even granting that a good climate often depends upon afforestation. These deficiencies, however, might be remedied by electrical and other discoveries; and pessimism consequently cannot prove its case. The present generation, it is true, is making a huge gamble in these matters, and it is running appalling risks. It is gambling on the mere chance of future discoveries of other fuel, instead of cutting its coat according to the cloth which it knows to exist. The gamble may succeed, however, and, if it does, food is the only critical problem for the future. Here also the omens are not wholly unfavourable. As long as frost-bound lands can grow wheat in a short summer, as long as Africa and South America luxuriate, as long as Mesopotamia is feebly irrigated, it is possible to point to new fields for agriculture; and the possibilities of intensive cultivation, as Kropotkin has shown, have scarcely been tapped in the present year of grace. The land needs dressing to be sure, but the science of chemistry is alert, and will probably find the means.

On the other hand, a few centuries, or even a millennium or two, are a very short time in comparison with the habitable future of the earth, and population cannot continue to increase without limit, even on the rosiest hypothesis. Mankind, at the best, can hope for a respite only. Ultimately it has to face the alternative of controlling these matters for itself or of letting Nature control them for it, and the problem of human wellbeing, from this larger standpoint, depends upon the possibility of a general control of its numbers on the part of society. Human foresight cannot take the helm at the present time, but it may come to see the necessity, and to act upon it. If it does so, it will be able to supplant Nature's methods.

Those who maintain that conscious foresight has little or nothing to do with the matter are bound, of course, to deny that there is any possibility of this kind. Their arguments, however, are singularly unconvincing. It is indisputable, surely, that some parents restrict the number of their children, and that some customs like late marriages, monogamy, or systems of inheritance play a very important part in determining what children shall be born. If, then, it is true that, speaking broadly, there are always as many mouths as there is food for them, the only reasonable inference is that the effects of conscious restriction on the part of the few have always been counteracted hitherto by the heedless swarming of the many. In that case the problem is whether the motives which have affected the minority up to the present may come to actuate the majority.

It is clear, I think, that these motives are really very strong, and that conditions of society are conceivable in which they might operate generally.

These motives, so far as the fathers of each generation are concerned, are principally pride and pity. This statement, no doubt, seems frankly absurd to those who are in the habit of speaking of prudence and selfishness. But it is not absurd. Even if reckless propagation were unselfish (and that is nonsense), there would be neither prudence nor selfishness in the case if the fathers were not personally responsible for their children; and this responsibility implies pride and self-respect. If every child came on the parish, and if every prospective father were utterly careless whether his children came on the parish or not, there would be nothing to prevent indiscriminate paternity except abstract Malthusianism, and no one can seriously believe that Malthus is directly responsible for the small size of the families of the middle classes or of skilled artisans. Pride, then, plays its part, and so does pity; for maternity is a heavy burden, and any reasonable man desires to make it as light as possible unless his own judgment and his wife's are warped by custom and mystical imperatives. Those who regard women as slaves naturally regard them as child-bearing slaves, and the women will acquiesce so long as they feel enslaved. Otherwise they will not.

Pride and pity are very strong motives, and they are highly educable motives. They depend upon ideas. The pride which induced the Hebrew or the Bedouin to glory in the number of his offspring induces the middle classes, nowadays, to be cautious. This change is no stranger than any other variation in the code of honour, and although this kind of education is neither very general nor very powerful at the present time, it might easily become so. Social psychology is not fixed. It is plastic; and it is even possible that a change in our ideas on this matter might come to work very rapidly indeed once it had outgrown its early impotence. The war has shown us that the habits of great communities may be changed very profoundly, or, at any rate, that it is impossible to distinguish sharply between the customs that cannot be shaken and the customs that can. As things are, a man who is prudent in other things is also prudent in this matter of paternity, and, speaking broadly, most people are prudent if they have good reason to be prudent. Prudence is foolish when there is nothing at stake. It happens when a man has something at stake. It would seem, therefore, that if social conditions can be improved so that the majority comes to have some reason for prudence there will be a prudent and general control of the population. No one can foretell, of course, how quickly this change could come about, and it would affect different peoples unequally. Perhaps there is little hope for the savage. His ideas may move too slowly, and he may have to succumb because he follows Nature where others are able to control her.

It may be argued, to be sure, that the majority in any community are born to be shiftless and imprudent, and that nothing can alter this circumstance. If so, the case is hopeless in the end; but this lugubrious theory is very far from being certain. Or, again, it may be argued that Malthus himself has conclusively shut out this ray of hope. Did he not prove that the population always increases so fast that the majority of mankind must always miss starvation by a hair, or, in other words, that the masses must always be in such a hopeless plight that it can never be worth their while to attempt to better themselves? And have we not always this rod in pickle for the optimists? This argument undoubtedly is very weighty, but it is scarcely conclusive. A comparatively short period of abundance might be long enough to alter the distribution of power in the community in such a way that the majority could dig themselves in against the future. Malthus's reply to Godwin begs the whole question, because he assumes that selfishness in times of scarcity will always leave the rich where they were and grind the faces of the poor. Even rationing in war-time was not so bad as that, and our trades unions may be expected to see to it that the faces of the workers shall not be ground. If the poor must suffer, the question is, *Who* will be poor when scarcity comes? and the answer to that question lies on the knees of the gods.

Pride, therefore, may come to play a preponderating part in the future, and there is good hope for the influence of pity. Again, the world has much to expect from the emancipation of women, for power comes with emancipation, and the common-sense of womankind may surely be expected to reinforce the pity of the men and to destroy the absurd notion that a maximum fecundity is the duty of woman. Why should anyone bow down before this monstrous fetish? Maternity is indeed a glory and a privilege partly because of and partly in spite of its perils, pangs, and malaise; but it is little better than a curse if women are expected to bear child after child for twenty or thirty years without even the three years' interval which American science recommends. Such a life is only an alternation of weakness, toil, and dread. It would kill wifely culture, wifely leisure, and wifely companionship.

It would seem, then, that the optimists need not strike their flag, and no one ought to manufacture dismalness by weeping over the countless multitude of the unborn which a stationary population implies. There would be too many myriads of billions of them if there were twenty children in every family instead of two or three, and we trench on insoluble ethical problems whenever we begin to ask how far mere numbers are important for human welfare. Those orthodox utilitarians who believe that the ideal of society is the greatest happiness of the greatest number are bound, of course, to maintain that twenty happy persons are twice as valuable as ten who are equally happy. I do not believe a word of it, and I never heard of anyone who applied this argument to the millions of China, except for consistency's sake. *Per contra*, the usual constructers of Utopias desire quite a small population for their cities of felicity. They are literary men who make a garden of their imagination and distrust the jungle; and they tell us that they prefer quality to quantity, a kind of life to the size of it. This idea, however, is quite as hard to accept as its opposite. There cannot be too much literature or art when the quality is the best, and it is better to have much of it than to have little. Or, again, if quantity does not count, why should length of days be important? Multiplication in this dimension is logically on the same footing as multiplication in any other. But enough of these disputes. The ethical merits of the question are at least very evenly divided, and therefore it is rash to think that human beings should deplore the fact that there must always be limits to their numbers.

JOHN LAIRD.

BELFAST.

HAS JUDAISM A FUTURE?

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

Has Judaism a future?

In what sense shall the question be put?

There is a sense in which the triumphs of Christianity are also the triumphs of Judaism. For just as Christianity is not Judaism at its lowest, but at its best, so also with Judaism. And between the two religions at their best there is a kinship and a harmony. Christianity is not, "Narrow is the gate that leads unto life, and few there be that find it," but it is, "If any one would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me." It is not, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels," but it is, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." It is not, "I pray not for the world," but it is, "Pray for them that persecute you." It is not, "Ye serpents, ye offspring of vipers," but it is, "Love your enemies."

So, too, with Judaism. Even if, for the sake of the reader, I limit myself to Old Testament quotations, Judaism is not, "Happy shall he be who takes and dashes thy little ones against the rock," but it is, "The alien that dwells with you shall be unto you as the homeborn among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were aliens in the land of Egypt." It is not, "Thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed," but it is, "I desire love and not sacrifice." It is not, "Do I not hate them that hate thee?" but it is, "Should I not have pity upon Nineveh?" It is not, "If Yahweh has stirred thee up against me, let him smell an offering," but it is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." It is not, "The Ammonite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord," but it is, "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations."

In respect of the true kinship between the higher Judaism and the higher Christianity, the victory of the one is the victory of the other. In *that* sense, for the believer, the future of both is equally assured.

In what other senses, then, can the question "Has Judaism a Future?" be propounded? It might be interpreted to mean: Has it any future at all? Is it likely that three, four or five hundred years hence there will be a living religion called Judaism existent upon the earth? Or, again, the question might mean: Has Judaism before it a future of power, a future of influence, a future of importance? And this second meaning of the question is the only one which is of any real interest. For religions are tenacious of life, and Judaism has shown more than average tenacity. There is, therefore, it would be reasonable to think, every likelihood that five hundred years hence there will still exist a group of persons who will call themselves Jews by religion, and that consequently Judaism will still be a living religion. But the only interesting point about which to speculate is as to what *sort* of religion Judaism will then be. Will it be the religion of more people than it is now, or of fewer? Will it still be the religion of a single race? What sort of religious purpose will it serve? Will non-Jews still think of it, as they mostly think of it now, as a museum or curiosity religion, a survival, obsolescent, and spiritually negligible? Assuming that the ordinary judgment of outsiders is true, and that Judaism, as a spiritual or religious force, is negligible to-day, is it likely to be no less negligible in a distant to-morrow?

To attempt a categoric answer to such questions would be presumptuous and absurd. How can any of us predict the future? And if anybody is to indulge in profitable speculations about Judaism, it ought, perhaps, to be a Hindoo or a Confucian rather than a Christian or a Jew. But the following tentative suggestions may, nevertheless, be permitted. There is a certain interest, and even a certain value, in the one-sided observations of those who speak from within. Lacking impartiality, they possess sympathy. If they show prejudice, they may also reveal fragments of knowledge.

One may justly leave on one side the problem whether all the world will ultimately become of one religion. It is legitimate to believe that a future of influence lies before a particular religion, without at the same time believing either that that religion, or any other religion, will become the one and only living religion throughout the globe. Turning back to the future of Judaism with this proviso in mind, it has also to be asked of what kind of Judaism is the question raised?

For it may well be that one kind of Judaism *has* a future, another kind *not*. Now, there are two main kinds or divisions of Judaism: Orthodox Judaism and Liberal Judaism. There are, indeed, certain varieties of these two main divisions: there are even some Jews in England to-day who say that they object to adjectives, or to labels, as they prefer to call the adjectives, altogether. They say that their religion is Judaism, neither more nor less. Are there people who say that they are Christians without label or adjective? I rather doubt it. At any rate, I propose to ignore that central, balanced, and exquisitely perfect Judaism which claims to dispense with, and to rise superior to, qualification and label. It has thus far produced no justification for its claim either in theory or in life. It has neither theology nor embodiment. I shall only consider Orthodox Judaism and Liberal Judaism, and I shall assume that Judaism can be divided up into these *two* sections, with little remaining over. For, assuredly, if neither Liberal Judaism nor Orthodox Judaism has any future before it, we may safely neglect the claims and chances of Judaism without an adjective.

Orthodox Judaism possesses a certain massive strength in that it is not always thinking about the future, and is not, more especially, always thinking about its own future. The future, and its own future, are both guaranteed by God. *He* will look after the future: all that the orthodox Jew need do is to be faithful in the present. But there is a special reason also, in addition to its perfect faith in God, why Orthodox Judaism is not troubled about its own future; why it is not concerned or worried by such a question as: "Has Judaism a future?"—a future, that is, of influence or of power. For, as regards its diffusion in the world without, the important things to Orthodox Judaism are its fundamental ideas and conceptions, not the mere *word* Judaism, or even the organisation or the group called by that name.

Orthodox Judaism is concerned about the world-diffusion of a few fundamental doctrines, of which the Existence, Unity, and Righteousness of One God, Maker of heaven and earth, are the chief. These doctrines, which are very broad and universal in character, will, according to its belief, be ultimately accepted by all the inhabitants of the earth. Any nation, or any group, society or community, will give such ritual or embodiment as it chooses to these doctrines, provided that the embodiment is in no way antagonistic to the doctrines, but reflects and expresses them. It would not really matter what names the various groups might choose to give to their various religions.

They would all alike confess and worship the God of Israel, and believe in the Divine Unity. As regards the form and character of Judaism itself in this distant Messianic age, the orthodox view has not been unanimous. Some Orthodox Jews, especially in the post-Talmudic period, maintained (and still maintain) the eternal validity of the existing law. Israelites, in other words, will always observe the injunctions of the Pentateuch and the Rabbis. But other, no less Orthodox Jews (especially in the Talmudic age) have upheld the view that even for Israel the Messianic Era will mark the time when the need and the domination of the ceremonial Law will cease. In either case, whether the Law is to cease or to continue, it is not to become a universal rule of life. All men are to believe in the One God of Israel, but not all men, or even many men, are to practise the religious rites, or observe the religious ordinances, of the Law. Each nation will clothe the great dogma of the Unity in its own fashion. There will be various embodiments of the one fundamental idea.

Thus Judaism will, in one sense, never become a religion of power; not even in the Messianic Age. But in another sense it is, and, still more, it will be, a religion of power, because its fundamental ideas and conceptions will become the religious ideas and conceptions common to all the world, to whatever varying rites, ceremonies, and institutions these ideas and conceptions may be united and wed.

Such, then, I take it, would be the answer of Orthodox Judaism to the question, "Has Judaism a future?" It looks forward to the victory of its ideas, and in no wise to an expansion of its own body of members, till, at last, all the world should become Orthodox Jews. Hence it is that, as a preparation for the triumph of its fundamental conceptions, the victories of Islam and of Christianity, however strange the statement may appear, are steps and stages in the final victory of Judaism. For to turn Polytheists or Pantheists or Atheists into Theists is, in itself, a victory for Judaism, and this is what the expansion of Christianity and Islam may be said to mean. Nor does it matter if these two daughter religions call their parent bad names, or are a bit contemptuous. *Nothing* matters, so long as the purposes of God prevail; the growth and increase of Christianity and Islam are moments in the march of the monotheistic idea. In the end, that idea will conquer everywhere, and it will conquer in its purest, that is, of course, in its Jewish, form.

With an ill-concealed smile a critic might reasonably ask: "Assuming that all this be so, how far has Judaism helped to the diffusion and triumph of this monotheistic idea?" The question is quite legitimate. But Orthodox Judaism is not disconcerted. It is perfectly content to let God achieve the result in His own way: to Him be the glory, and to Him alone. Jews have only to play a sort of passive part in the evolution of the drama. They must bear witness to the truth of the Idea by faithfulness in belief and faithfulness in observance, whether amid the allurements of prosperity or amid the horrors of pogroms and persecutions. That is *their* duty, and the rest they must leave to Him who entrusted to them their charge.

Thus if we consider the future of Orthodox Judaism as a distinct and separate religious organisation, we perceive that, according to its own wishes and belief, this future will be much on the lines of its past. It seeks no proselytes. It does not *want* to be more than a "national" religion, if by the word "religion" we understand a system which is made up both of doctrine and embodiment, of inward and outward, of theory and practice. It is therefore content with both the present and the future. God will never desert His witnesses. His own cause is wrapped up with the cause of Israel, and there must always be Jews and Judaism till the purposes of their existence are accomplished and fulfilled.

The Liberal Jew views the prospects of Orthodox Judaism with a less trustful and favourable eye. For him the future of Judaism seems dark, unless Liberal Judaism prospers and expands. He is inclined to think poorly of the future of Orthodox Judaism, and for some of the same reasons as an outside Christian critic. First, he too would be disposed to hold that a national religion not only cannot have a future of power before it, but is not likely, in the long run, to maintain its hold upon its own adherents. Secondly, he would argue that Orthodox Judaism is bound up with a view of the Old Testament, and more especially of the Law, which Biblical criticism and comparative religion have made it increasingly impossible for any educated person to believe or to defend. Thirdly, the Liberal Jew would maintain that, as a necessary sequitur from the second consideration, the stress which Orthodox Judaism lays on the practice of ceremonial minutiæ, and especially of dietary laws, has become out of harmony with modern conceptions of religion, as well as with the conditions of modern life. And Orthodox Judaism is a combination of doctrine and practice, in which, for its adherents, the emphasis, to say the least of it, is rather on the practice than on the doctrine. If the practice is given up, the religion as a whole will gradually, though very slowly, crumble away and disappear. The proviso "though very slowly" is important. The process may well be indefinitely delayed. For let us consider what is likely to happen as regards religion to the thirteen or fourteen million Jews existing in the world. There are about six possibilities for them, and a certain number will doubtless fulfil each possibility. Some, for many generations, will remain Orthodox Jews in belief and in practice. Some, through race loyalty and national enthusiasm, will maintain an inconsistent position: they will observe the ceremonial law, without believing the doctrines upon which that law is based. A third class will remain nominally orthodox, but will actually present a flabby combination of partial belief and still more partial practice. Some will become indifferent or agnostic, and of this class—itself, I fear, fairly numerous—a considerable proportion will marry wives or husbands outside the Jewish pale, and their children will be brought up as Christians. Some, for various reasons, partly honest and partly dishonest, will become baptized, and leave the brotherhood themselves. And, lastly, some will join the ranks, and become adherents, of Liberal Judaism. There are likely to be for long quite enough Jews to fill all these various classes, though I doubt whether, in spite of the enormous sums which amiable old ladies provide for, and which the missions spend on, the conversion of doubtful Jews into not less doubtful Christians, the fifth class will ever be very large. But what about the sixth possibility? Here, then, we pass from Orthodox Judaism to Liberal Judaism. Has this phase of the Jewish religion any future before it?

At the outset I must observe that part, or even much, of the hope or belief which is cherished by Orthodox Judaism as regards the religious future of the world is cherished by Liberal Judaism also. Orthodox Jews and Liberal Jews have certain fundamental beliefs in common, and therefore their vision of the future has certain common traits, though even here, as we may have occasion to see, Ophelia's words apply: we Liberals wear our rue with a difference.

But before touching further upon visions and anticipations of the world's future, something must be said as to the possible future of Liberal Judaism as a distinct and separate religious community. I will begin by quoting the adverse opinion of a very distinguished Jew, and one of the finest minds of our own time, Arthur Cohen, who, in the opinion of all his greatest legal contemporaries, ought to have been, though he never was, raised to the highest judicial rank. Writing to his daughter in 1897, when he was sixty-eight years old, he says: "I sometimes think that when I retire from my profession, I may do something for Judaism, but it will be on lines very different from those of Claude Montefiore, for I am convinced that Judaism will never be the future religion of a monotheism which is to supplant Christianity. It is essentially a religion for a particular race; deprive it of this characteristic and of its historic garment, and you make it cool, lifeless, and insipid." Most Christians, I think, would agree with the verdict and the view of this distinguished man. They would say that Liberal Judaism was too thin and superfine a creed, too flimsy and extenuated, too lacking in body, on the one hand, and in emotional capacity, on the other, to attract and satisfy any large masses of men, whether Jewish or non-Jewish. Liberal Judaism is on the horns of a dilemma. Universalise it, and it becomes more and more flaccid and flimsy, with little to distinguish it from a certain type of Unitarianism, while even that little would not be to its advantage. For if it denudes itself of every nationalistic Jewish feature, it becomes very unattractive to the Jew; and yet it is none the more attractive to the Gentile, who can get all he wants out of some form of Unitarianism or Theism. Even if Liberal Judaism adopts a more reasonable attitude towards Jesus and the New Testament, that will help it none the more, for the nearer its attitude to that of moderate Unitarianism, the more it will alienate the Jews, and the less it will be needed as a distinct religious organisation over and above Unitarianism, or some form of Christian or semi-Christian Theism.

These are formidable objections. It would be impossible to deal with them adequately within the limits of this article, and therefore I prefer to leave them, so far as direct reply goes, untouched and unanswered. Indirectly, however, what there is still space to say may show the lines on which I should wish to combat them. Here I would only add that the objections, though strong, are by no means invincible. They can be answered and overcome (as I believe) both in theory and in practice. But one thing is, I admit, quite clear. Liberal Judaism must first make large headway among Jews before it can attempt to make any headway among Gentiles. Time is, however, long. There will be many centuries still before the ice age returns. Judaism has been for many ages very patient and very believing; it must be, and I hope that it will continue to remain, very patient and very believing for a long while to come.

Let me, then, now mention certain strong points about

Liberal Judaism, which are not, perhaps, immediately apparent to the outsider. I do not, however, deny that it shares several of these strong points with Unitarianism.

First may be named its freedom as regards the results of criticism and history. Whether there are two Isaiahs or twenty, whether the Pentateuch is composed of four sources or of fourteen, whether Moses had a hand in the Ten Commandments or no, whether any of the Biblical miracles took place or not, Liberal Judaism is lifted above all these things, and is quit of them. Again, it is free to take the good and reject the bad. It has not to swear to the words of any Master, for one only is its Master, and that Master is no *man*, but God. It has not to hope intensely that sentence A may be authentic and sentence B spurious. It has not to say to criticism, "Thus far and no farther." This jade or that may wince; *its* withers are unwrung.

Secondly, I would mention the capacity of Liberal Judaism to expand and absorb. Do some critics allege that Liberal Judaism, unconsciously to itself, has adopted many a product or creation of Christian thought or Christian philosophy? Be it so. I have no objection, so long as these adoptions are not inconsistent with our Jewish fundamentals. Have we learnt from Christianity a deeper appreciation of the divine immanence? But Christians themselves are emphatic that immanence, rightly understood, is complementary, and not antagonistic, to transcendence. Has Christianity taught us to lay more stress upon vicarious suffering, or upon self-sacrifice, or upon the redemption of the sinner? It may be so. But there are many parallels to such teaching in purely Jewish sources, and the doctrine fits on harmoniously to the purest Judaism. The Daughter learnt much from the Mother; why should not the Mother learn also from the Daughter? A living religion is both old and young. It is never too old to learn. From the Greeks, too, we can learn, and I daresay we can learn from India also, and yet be true to ourselves.

Thirdly, I see no reason why Liberal Judaism cannot adopt a more intelligent and less parochial attitude towards Jesus, Paul, and the New Testament as a whole. Nor can I agree with the critics who say that the more we do this, the less will Liberal Judaism be Jewish, and the less will it attract Jews. The clock will tick for many a long hour. If Christendom abandons the folly and the wickedness of anti-Semitism, Jews will be willing to think more accurately and more wisely about the founders and the sacred books of Christianity. And whatever may be said about Paul, I think Jesus, at any rate, would have been quite astonished at the idea that any amount of appreciation of his teaching would have made a man any less fitly describe himself as a Jew and as an adherent of Judaism.

Fourthly and fifthly, I come to two very important points, both of which are contentious, both of which would be denied, but both of which I believe to be true, and on both of which I lay very great stress. The first of these two points is the connection of Liberal Judaism with the past. It is still an historical religion, and has all the advantages which an historical religion brings. It is the heir of many ancestors, and is organically connected with, and affiliated to, all the long history of Judaism. Because we call our religion Liberal Judaism, we do not any the less feel ourselves to be Jews; the teachers, the saints, and the martyrs of Judaism still belong to us, and we to them. It is true we are separated from them in some things, but we are united with them in others, greater, deeper, and more fundamental, than those in which we are separated. And if we, existing Liberal Jews, feel this connection very keenly, why should not others feel it too? Why should not masses of Jews feel it? There is something grand and majestic about Judaism as an old historical religion, and by this grandeur and majesty we too can be moved and stirred. Moreover, though this remark lies outside my immediate purpose, it is a curious fact that there are outsiders to whom this aspect of Judaism and of Liberal Judaism makes strong appeal. Two or three people who have become Liberal Jews have said to me: "I had lost my belief in the Divinity of Christ long before I became a Jew, but I never cared to join Unitarianism; it did not attract me; it was not historical enough for me; it made no appeal to my imagination." And I have also heard one or two others say: "If I were to lose my belief in the Incarnation, which God forbid, I should prefer to become a Jew rather than a Unitarian." But what has to be added, in order to make this point about history and the links with the past reveal its full force, is this. It is not merely a matter of imagination or of interest or of picturesqueness; it is not merely a question of loyalty and pride; these may come in; but it is, above all, *a matter of faith*. And this matter of faith may appeal both to the insider and the outsider. Upon it, more almost than upon any other doctrine or article, rests the speciality of Judaism. Without it, you might believe all the other doctrines, and you could hardly be a Jew. With it, and with the belief in God which it implies, and you *are* a Jew. This matter of faith which illumines the past, sanctifies the present, and guarantees the future, is the belief that, be the date of the Ten Commandments what it may, Israel has been entrusted by God with a certain mission or charge, and that this charge has never been cancelled. "Thou, Israel, art my Servant. Ye are my Witnesses." Interpret history with *that* belief, and the historical character of Liberal Judaism may be justly claimed as a point of the greatest influence and importance; for upon Liberal Judaism, as the one and only form of Judaism with any promise of life and of development, there then falls a tremendous, and yet inspiring responsibility.

The last of my six points seems to run counter to, and to weaken, the fifth. A critic may be inclined to say: "For heaven's sake be more modest, and make your claim either for one or for the other, but not for both." But it is no good. The advocate of a religion is never afraid of putting forward what apparently are the most inconsistent claims. The sixth excellence, then, is the capacity of Liberal Judaism to universalise and spiritualise what is particularist and national. It can gradually make its embodiment, as well as its doctrine, purely religious and purely human. Israel, for most Liberal Jews, is no longer a race or a people, but a religious community, the borders of which are not limited by ties of kinship or of blood. Such a statement will evoke three distinct doubts. First, whether the thing is feasible; secondly, whether, if feasible, it would not choke off and chill the Jews; thirdly, whether it could conceivably impose upon any Gentile. As regards the first, there is really no such great difficulty. More and more do Liberal Jews, and all the children who are brought up in Liberal Judaism, regard Judaism as a universal religion, for the adherents of which race is accidental, and not inherent or essential. Israel means the community of believers; he who ceases to *believe* has ceased to *belong* to it. Again, the embodiment of Liberal Judaism can be, and is being, successfully universalised. Of the five Pentateuchal festivals four present no problem. The Day of Memorial and the Day of Atonement are purely general. Indeed, no religion can boast of a sacred day more spiritual and more catholic than the great Day of Atonement. Tabernacles is a harvest festival, which is dedicated to the relation of God and man to the natural world. Pentecost celebrates the place of Law in religion, and more especially the relation of the Moral Law to man and to God. There remains the Passover, a national festival in origin, but capable of being transfigured into a festival of Liberty, and of the relation of freedom to man's nature and to God's. I fully admit that the proselytes to Liberal Judaism are as yet only a few individuals here and there, and that one must not base much argument upon individual instances. But for what it is worth I would mention that I have not found that these few proselytes experience any particular difficulty in joining with us in the celebration of these festivals, or that they feel in any way "out of it" because they are not of Jewish race or parentage. That is all that here and now I can say in reply to the third doubt; the second, the most serious and urgent of the three, demands a somewhat longer consideration. I admit that many Jews still cling to their nationally-coloured religion, and to the curious inconsistency and misfit of a universal God and universal doctrines combined with a particularist and national cult. But I believe that they will gradually become more acutely aware of the misfit or the inconsistency, and that they will gradually learn to dislike it; then, as the universal God and the universal doctrines must be maintained, they will gradually realise that if Judaism is to be saved at all, Liberal Judaism is the only way out. All the more will this tend to happen if, and when, anti-Semitism disappears. I have too much faith in human nature, and I was going to add in Christianity, to believe that anti-Semitism is a permanent quality of the European nature. But what, some may say, about Zionism and the present chauvinistically national attitude and movement among thousands, if not millions, of Jews? I recognise that these things have delayed the diffusion of Liberal Judaism very considerably, but he who has faith will be content to wait. Moreover, let me throw out a whimsical paradox which is, nevertheless, not quite so whimsical as it sounds. Let us imagine Zionism an accomplished fact. Let us imagine that, in forty or fifty years from now, there are two million Jews in Palestine, and that these Jews constitute a Jewish nation, even a Jewish State, and that all the Christians and all the Mahommedans have voluntarily departed. There is the Jewish nation re-born; two millions of Jews, all to themselves, in their own ancestral home. Well, to begin with, they will be only a sixth of the total Jewish population of the world, and I hope that the five-sixths will have some say and some influence in the development of Judaism. But there is something more. When those two million Jews are comfortably established in Palestine, and a new generation grows up there, I think that many of them will soon begin to say: "I am a Jew by nationality right enough, just as *you* may be an Englishman or a Dane, but I do not want a national religion any more than you. I want a universal religion.

My religion is one thing, my nationality another." Liberal Judaism may *then* become the religion of many Palestinian Jews, who will feel united to Englishmen and Danes of the Jewish faith, not by belonging to a common nationality, but by belonging to a common faith. Meanwhile, I fancy that Christians hardly realise how entirely the word Jew denotes for a large majority of educated Jewish men and women (and not for Liberal Jews only), a member of the Jewish religion; how completely for us a non-Jew has become a Jew, if he *adopts* Judaism, and how completely for us a born Jew has ceased to be a Jew, if he *abandons* it.

Even, however, if it be admitted that my six points have some force in them, it may, nevertheless, quite fitly be asked: "Have they had any effect? What about Liberal Judaism in *practice*?" Well, to reply to these questions would take too long. Liberal Judaism is not more than a hundred years old, and it has had to contend with many difficulties. Yet it is a not unimportant religious force in the United States, and before the war it was making considerable strides in Germany, and it has begun to take some root in England. The Nationalist movement has acted as a certain check, but I do not anticipate that this check will be more than temporary. There is no cause for alarm.

Meanwhile, Liberal Judaism does not, and need not, put forward any claim to become the *one* religion of the future, which will swallow up, or substitute itself for, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and all the other religions of the world. But a Liberal Jew, without making any such wild demands upon human credulity, may yet argue and believe that, alongside of Unitarianism, or alongside of Liberal Christianity, there may be a place, if a modest place, for Liberal Judaism as well. Nor is it, I trust, too presumptuous to say (and I believe that certain facts in the United States give some basis or justification for the remark) that these two forms of Liberal Religion, with so many points of contact and resemblance, may exercise upon each other a certain influence, and may even very slowly, very gradually, converge towards each other without actually meeting. Each may emphasise more fully, and perhaps with a touch of one-sidedness, particular aspects of a fuller and highly complicated truth. Neither may feel itself constrained to say, "We possess, and believe in its fullness, the exact mixture and balance of complete, final, and perfect truth." Liberal Judaism, at any rate, as a great Liberal Jewish scholar has just finely said, will only seek to be "a religion ever progressive, on lines of historical continuity, but never finished and final." I can imagine, for instance, that Liberal Judaism might still continue to lay stress upon its own somewhat stern and uncompromising Monotheism, its lofty doctrine of the relation of God to man, its high ethical teaching of the Moral Law and of its perpetual obligation. Both Liberal Judaism and Liberal Christianity may claim, in their conception of the divine, to find a due place for Transcendence and Immanence, for faith and for works, for man's likeness to God and man's difference from God, for Grace and for Law, for commandment and for redemption, for man the "servant," and for man the "son." Dr. Rashdall has finely shown how these oppositions and distinctions are never absolute, and are often exaggerated.[1] Yet can we imagine Liberal Judaism and Liberal Christianity as two sentinels or rallying places for the one aspect of Truth and for the other. Such a sentinel or rallying place, at any rate, would Liberal Judaism seek and claim to be for the purest and most austere monotheism, and for the purest and most austere relation of man to God and to the Moral Law. And yet neither religion need be one-sided, and perhaps both religions may become increasingly less so. Nor does it much matter if the Christian thinks that any modern Jewish advance is partly due to the unconscious adoption of Christian teaching and of the spirit of Christ, or if the Jew thinks that Liberal Christianity is tending in the direction of Judaism, with a veneer of varying thinness made up of old Christian ideas and phraseology. Perhaps both views are not without their justification. I, at least, am ready to allow that Judaism had become too one-sided, and that it needed a complementary dash of doctrine, which may, if you please, be loosely called Christian, but which was yet by no means absent from the Rabbinical literature. Is it too outrageous to suppose that Judaism may have had some unconscious influence in helping Trinitarianism (which, when philosophically interpreted, I fully acknowledge to be far more monotheistic than any form of Arian, though not of Unitarian, teaching) to keep clear and free of all Tritheistic heresies and perversions?[2] Theism is so big and grand a thing that it may well be content with more than one expression of it, and more than one servant. Over and above that section of Christianity which is definitely Unitarian, there may long and fitly continue in existence a Liberal Jewish form of Theism and a Liberal Christian form; and though their conceptions of the Divine Nature may be represented in different language and symbols, yet both because, or in spite, of these differences, may guard and may teach various complementary aspects of the fuller monotheistic truth, and, conceivably, some men may be more drawn towards the one teaching about God, and some towards the other.

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[1] *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, pp. 491, 492.

[2] Dr. Rashdall, in his new and deeply interesting book, gives an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity of which it is hardly too much to say that, with some little reserve, it could be accepted by any Jew. (*The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, pp. 444-446.)

We Liberal Jews, at any rate, whatever the future may have in store, cannot doff our armour or renounce our charge. Others too may bear their witness, and it may be, according to its measure, a witness of truth. For here, we see, as we believe, more clearly than the prophets of old. But not idly or falsely were we called to bear our witness, and witnesses, with our separate camp, and separate language—I do not mean Hebrew!—and separate nomenclature, we must remain. And of Liberal Judaism, our spiritual Mother, paraphrasing the words of a certain Pharisee from olden times, we feel inclined to say: "If this faith have grown up according to the purpose and will of God, time and chance will not be able to overthrow it."

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THE PARABLE OF THE WICKED HUSBANDMEN.

(Matthew xxi. 33–41 ; Mark xii. 1–9 ; Luke xx. 9–16.)

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THE versions of the story of the Wicked Husbandmen in Matthew and Luke are clearly derived exclusively from a Marcan source. So also are the sections preceding the Parable (Mt. xxi. 12, 13, 23–27 ; Lk. xix. 45, 46 ; xx. 1–8) and those which follow it (Mt. xxi. 42, 45, 46 ; Lk. xix. 17–19). In attempting to arrive at the significance of the story, we shall not leave out of sight the parables told by Matthew alone, viz. The Two Sons and The Marriage Feast, and placed by him in the same context ; but in the main Mark must explain his own meaning. We shall not go to Matthew and Luke for an interpretation which may be remote from Mark's intention. Still less shall we confuse issues by importing developed Christological ideas from John or the Epistles into a narrative intended for the ears of priests and scribes. Nor shall we expect to find in the vocabulary of Mark's tale the specialised meanings which are attached to words in the later Gospels or by Paul. It is important to make these points clear when we consider expressions used in Mark's parable such as "son," "heir," "beloved."

The application of these expressions to the speaker as the Divine Son has never, I think, been contested. It is consecrated by long usage beginning with the first century. Nevertheless, Mark furnishes weighty reasons for thinking that such was not his intention. Later we shall see grounds for the belief that Matthew was in agreement with Mark. In Luke there is an inconsistency.

Taking the words above mentioned, we may consider the probability that Mark understood them as applying in an exceptional sense to Jesus.

1. "Son." The Vineyard Lord is, of course, the Lord of Hosts (Isaiah v. 7). The Divine Sonship has no part in Mark's account of the teaching of Jesus. He never calls himself "the Son of God": he is never so called by his disciples. In some texts of Mk. i. 1 he is "a son of God," without the definite article; and so again in the centurion's exclamation at the Cross (xv. 39). Twice demoniacs give him the title of "the Son of God," and once that of "the Holy of God," and on two of these occasions the cry calls forth rebuke. Even when Jesus gives assent to the High Priest's question (xiv. 61) he immediately reverts to his accustomed phrase, "the Son of Man." "My Father"—an expression constantly used in Matthew's Gospel—is altogether absent from Mark's. The sole indication in Mark that Jesus recognised himself as standing in the unique relationship of the Son to the Father is in the strange passage (xiii. 32) where the Son holds intermediate rank between the angels and the Father.

2. "Heir," ὁ κληρονόμος. The word is not used elsewhere by Mark. In the story it is a natural and simple expression: it gives a motive for the murder of the son. To attach to it the theological significance which it has in Hebrews i. 2 is unreasonable. The word is of frequent occurrence both in Hebrews and the Pauline Epistles, but is not in any way limited in its application to Jesus.

3. "The beloved," ἀγαπητός. Mark's words are, "he had yet one, a beloved son." Matthew writes simply, "he sent his own son": Luke, "I will send my beloved son." It is possible that Mark used the expression with a conscious recollection of the utterances of the Heavenly Voice at the Baptism and the Transfiguration.[1] The form of these utterances is perhaps suggested by Psalm ii. 7, but if so, the citation is not verbally accurate. "Beloved" is lacking in the Psalm, and in the passage, Acts xiii. 33, the quotation is given more accurately from the LXX., "Thou art my Son: this day have I begotten thee." There is no evidence that Jesus based any claim on either utterance. After the second he immediately reverts to his wonted description of himself as Son of Man (Mt. xvii. 12; Mk. ix. 12).

Though the expression is so simple in Mark's story that it would be superfluous to look for a parallel in the exceptional use of "the Beloved" with reference to Christ in Ephesians i. 6, or of "the Son of his love" in Colossians i. 13, yet it is possible that Mark found the suggestion for it in the Parable of the

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[1] In Luke's version of the utterance at the Transfiguration the word is not ἀγαπητός but ὁ ἐκλελεγμένος.

Vineyard (Isaiah v.), the phrases of which he almost literally reproduces from the LXX. in describing the operations of the Vineyard Lord. That parable begins, "I will sing to the Beloved a song of my Beloved (τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ μου) for his vineyard. A vineyard was made by the Beloved," etc. "The Beloved" there is Jehovah. The strikingly picturesque use of the expression in the original of Mark's Vineyard story may well have been present in his mind when he wrote his own version.

Using Mark to explain his own story, I see no justification for the belief that he used such ordinary words as "son," "heir," "beloved" with any theological connotation, or so interpreted the thought of Jesus. If there is theology in the tale it is of the Eocene order, and the superimposed strata of later and developed Christian thought belong to an altogether different system.

If we take Mark's narrative of the circumstances in which the Parable was spoken, there are obvious difficulties in reconciling them with the belief that the speaker intended to represent himself as exceptionally distinguished by the title of God's Son, and that his hearers, the priests and scribes, so understood him. Jesus has come to Jerusalem, two days before he utters the Parable, with a premonition that he will share the fate of the Baptist (viii. 31; ix. 12), and that the chief priests and scribes will condemn him to death, the Gentile power merely carrying out their sentence (x. 33). But Mark's story does not lead us to suppose that he would needlessly court death by a gratuitous assertion of superhuman authority. On hearing of John's death he retires with the apostles to the desert (vi. 30, 31). He avoids the dominions of Herod Antipas, and carries on his ministry at one time at Tyre and Sidon (vii. 24), at another at Cæsarea Philippi (viii. 27), avoiding towns (viii. 23) and making secret travels in Galilee (ix. 30). On one occasion, which Mark places at the beginning of his ministry (iii. 6), he tells us that the Pharisees and Herodians took counsel to destroy him; but nothing came of it, and the Pharisees and Herodians were neither the anticipated nor the actual contrivers of the plot which ended in the Crucifixion. The purging of the Temple took place on the day following the Entry, and then, apparently for the first time, the scribes and chief priests sought how they might destroy him (xi. 18). Next day they put the, to them, not unreasonable demand about "authority," and they got no answer. Then Jesus tells them the story of the Wicked Husbandmen.

If we accept the traditional view that the son of the Parable is meant to stand for the speaker's self, difficulties at once suggest themselves. Is it credible that he who has just refused to state his authority should now claim for himself an authority above the scribes', above that of Elijah and the prophets—the commission of God to His Son as His final representative? Is it credible that to his enemies he should make an avowal which he has never made to his most intimate followers? And *they*—whose hostility he foreknew, whose murderous designs were exposed in the Parable—what a weapon was this that was put in their hands! It was the damnatory charge at the Trial: "What need have we of further witnesses?" And yet the evidence *then* came from Jesus' answer to the High Priest—not from the avowal made in the Parable, an avowal which his accusers had heard with their own ears a few days before.

Observe that Jesus, if he was alluding to his own death, was speaking of an event yet future. Elsewhere (xiii. 9) he foretells another future event—that his apostles would be beaten in synagogues, etc., very much as the servants were beaten in the Parable. Therefore it could not be said with strict accuracy and knowledge of futurity that the son in the Parable was "last" in the succession of God's maltreated messengers. But if the allusion of Jesus, recognised at once by his hearers, was to a past event, ἔσχατον means obviously "last at the time of speaking."

And in the comment which follows there is striking evidence that the event referred to was past, not future. The passage from Psalm cxviii. 22 is quoted verbally from the LXX. by all the Synoptists:

> The stone which the builders rejected,
> The same was made (ἐγενήθη) the head of the corner.
> This was (ἐγένετο) from the Lord,
> And it is marvellous in our eyes.

Do not the aorists make it plain that the event alluded to as the rejection of the stone was past, and not to come? It may be said that the passage was cited in the Hebrew; but the case is not altered. The O.T. Revisers translate, "The same is become" and "This is from the Lord." The event is past: its consequence remains and *is* (not "will be") marvellous. If certainty could be made more certain, Luke in his citation of the passage has made it so. In Acts iv. 11 the first of the two verses is brought in—but only in loose paraphrase—and it is applied to Jesus. When Luke, if he were the author of the Acts, wrote, Jesus had incontestably become the corner stone of the Church. "Christ himself" is the chief corner stone in Ephesians ii. 20. In the Acts passage the verse is perfectly suitable in its application to a past event. It was otherwise in the Gospel. Jesus being the speaker, his death, if that were typified by the rejection of the stone, could only be referred to as future, and the past tense was awkward. What does Luke, or his recensor, do? The text, cited again in 1 Peter ii. 7, and referred to in Ephesians, was familiar: he could not tamper with the tenses. He simply omits the second verse with its compromising ἐγένετο. The omission is deliberate, for the rest of the context shows a close verbal correspondence with Matthew and Mark, who retain the past tense.

But it may be said that the rejection of the stone typified, not the death of Jesus, but the already manifested refusal of the priests and scribes to accept his teaching, and that God's marvellous work is the progress which Jesus' gospel was then making among the people, In that sense, though it would require a perfect tense, γέγονε, Luke perhaps understood the first of the two verses. In the second verse this interpretation would seem to demand a present tense, "This *is* from the Lord." But, no doubt, this view of the matter has been popularised by the A.V. rendering of Isaiah liii. 3, "He was despised and rejected of men," a passage understood to be Messianic. But the connection fails if we turn to the LXX. The word for "reject" in the LXX. passage from the Psalm is ἀποδοκιμάζειν, and all the Synoptists reproduce it. But in Isaiah the Greek runs τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἄτιμον καὶ ἐκλιπὸν παρὰ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, where there is no verb corresponding to ἀποδοκιμάζειν, and the second adjective may be better rendered, as in the margin of the R.V., "forsaken," or, as I venture to suggest, "eclipsed."

But Luke is a witness against himself. The Parable has been introduced by talk about John, and the priests and scribes at once recognise its meaning and plot the death of Jesus. Was the motive that Jesus taunted them with rejection of his doctrine? It was something far more serious to them. They had rejected in a very conspicuous and flagrant way, not Jesus, but John. "The Pharisees and the lawyers," says Luke (vii. 30), "rejected for themselves the counsel of God, being not baptized of John." Let it be granted that in that passage the rejection was that of John's baptismal teaching, and that the verb is ἀθετεῖν, "to put aside," not ἀποδοκιμάζειν: there is no question of the accurate citation of a text. But the rejection of the teaching, as will presently be shown, led to more violent measures: they did to John whatsoever they listed. True, Jesus had foretold to his disciples his own rejection: but in what connection? Luke (ix. 18–22) tells us that it was immediately after a reference to John. "Whom say the people that I am? They answering said, John the Baptist, but some say Elias. . . . The Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected (ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι) by the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be slain." Mark (viii. 31) gives the saying in the same words as Luke, and again after a reference to the Baptist. In Luke xvii. 25 the rejection of Jesus (ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι) is foretold without any reference to John: coupled with παθεῖν, "to suffer," the allusion is clearly to his death, not to the rejection of his teaching.

With the passages in which "reject," ἀποδοκιμάζειν, is the word we must consider those in which "to set at nought," ἐξουδενεῖν, is used as its equivalent. It is so used in Acts iv. 11, the passage already mentioned, in which the set-at-nought or rejected stone stands for Jesus. In Luke xxiii. 11 it is used of the setting at nought of Jesus by Herod and his "armies": coupled with ἐμπαίζειν, it is manifest that it represents physical violence. Mark ix. 12 is a curious passage. As it is translated in the A.V. and R.V. it suggests that there has been compression in the text, possibly the omission of a clause: Matthew's version is clear enough. As it stands, the best solution of the passage from Mark is that of Professor Swete, who takes *vv.* 11, 12, 13 as two questions and their answers. "They asked him saying, The scribes say that Elijah must first come. He said unto them, Elijah indeed cometh first and restoreth all things. (They asked) How is it written of the Son of Man, that he should suffer many things and be set at nought? (He answered) I say unto you that Elijah is come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed." Notice that the setting at nought is coupled with a reference to John. Apart from the quotations of Psalm cxviii. about the rejection of the stone, ἀποδοκιμάζειν is used three times and ἐξουδενεῖν twice in the Gospels, and the latter once in Acts. Whether they be applied to Jesus or to John, both of them refer to the final rejection, "the suffering," or "the killing," or "the physical mistreating" with which in every case they are coupled. It is evident that the Evangelists understood the metaphor of the rejected stone in this sense, not as the mere rejection of teaching.

What then was this past event involving physical suffering to which Jesus alluded, and which the priests and scribes at once recognised as an indictment of themselves? Mark's narrative is amplified and explained by Matthew. Between the question as to authority and the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen Matthew interposes the Parable of the Two Sons (xxi. 28–31), and after the former parable he adds that of the Kingly Wedding Feast. The three parables in question bear the plainest impress of the Master's hand; and it is equally plain that they were delivered to the same audience, the priests and scribes, on the same or following days, and that their theme is identical. They differ from the parables addressed to the people in that they have an allegorical reference to a particular class, and their moral is driven home by comment—which was not the practice of Jesus when his audience was a popular one. They can only be understood as a connected series, a dramatic trilogy. In two of them the scene is laid in the Vineyard: in all of them father and son are more or less conspicuous *dramatis personæ*. The father is the Universal Father, God. Who then is the son, the heir, the beloved, the stone rejected by the builders? The plain answer which I read in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark is—John the Baptist.

The conclusion is startling. It runs counter to preconceptions which are at least eighteen centuries old; and it will not commend itself to those whom—in the classical sense—I may call the "contaminators" of Gospel tradition, *i.e.* those whose literary sense is insufficient to distinguish between picturesque story and systematised theology. But it is no paradox. Let us take the three parables in the setting which Matthew gives them.

Jesus expels the Temple traffickers, and next day the chief priests and elders (Mark adds the scribes) raise the question of authority. The reply is another question—John (xxi. 23–27). Then immediately follows the Parable of the Two Sons (*vv.* 28–30); and that brings in John again—"John came unto you in the way of righteousness." Publicans and harlots repent, as the son in the Parable repents: the priestly caste, with lip-service, rejects his message. Then follows the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, and the hearers recognise that the parables (plural) have reference to themselves. Then immediately follows the Parable of the Kingly Wedding Feast. The sonship is little emphasised, but the moral is identical with that of the preceding parables. The feast is John's message. The King's table is furnished with guests by violence—"Compel them to come in," "From the days of John the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence." From highways and hedges publicans and harlots are pressed in: the murderers who refuse the invitation are destroyed like the Husbandmen. The murder of the servants by the invited guests is altogether motiveless in the story; but the reference to John's murder could not be missed by the scribes to whom the tale is addressed. Jesus was not alone in his assurance that the divine vengeance attended John's murderers. When Herod Antipas dismissed his wife, daughter of Aretas, Aretas made war upon him, and defeated him in a great battle. The Jews, says Josephus, were convinced that the disaster was due to God's vengeance on John's murderer.

I have already remarked Luke's editorial methods in dealing with the passage from the Psalm about the rejected stone. In his day the star of John was occulted in the superior radiance of Jesus: in the estimation of the Christian community John had decreased and Jesus had vastly increased. He did not understand the reference to John, and appropriated the text to Jesus. In the same way he ignores John in his story of the Great Supper (xiv. 15–24). He is blind to the reference to the scribes, and he transfers the Parable to a time before the Jerusalem visit. He brings it in on a certain occasion when Jesus "sat at meat" with those who had bidden him, and connects it with monitions, drawn from the Book of Proverbs, about conduct at feasts. His Parable has no king and no son: there are no "murderers," and the excusing guests are not destroyed: the incident of the wedding garment is omitted. In Matthew's story the guest in the inappropriate garment has the same rôle as the son who made profession of obedience to the father's bidding but did not perform it, *i.e.* the priestly caste. Luke strangely distorts the lesson of the story into a precept about hospitality to "the poor, the maimed, the lame and the blind" (*vv.* 13 and 21).

"There was a tendency in early Christian literature to re-write the story of John the Baptist so as to bring him into conscious subordination to Jesus."[1] Luke's account of the family ties which connected the Master with his great Forerunner may be legendary, but it seems to point to an earlier acquaintance than the Baptism; and the teachings of Jesus have so many points in common with the little knowledge that we possess of the Baptist's missionary work, that it would be a reasonable surmise that Jesus in the wilderness learnt from John the Gospel of the Kingdom and of Repentance which was the characteristic of his first discourses. Whatever their relations may have been, the abounding veneration of Jesus for John is patent in the pages of all the Synoptists. "Among men that are born of women, there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist." "Much more than a prophet." Greater than that first Elias with whom he was associated in Jesus' thoughts at the Transfiguration. Nobler than all that came from God before him, as the heir is nobler than the bond-servant. Not to be classed with God's δοῦλοι, the prophets, but rather unique, the inaugurator of a new epoch. "The law and the prophets were until John: from that time the gospel of the kingdom is preached." What place shall Jesus assign him in the family of the Vineyard Lord? Might he not say, as Jonson said in his splendid testimony to Shakespeare, "I loved the man, and do honour his memory on this side idolatry," or in Shakespeare's phrase about Coriolanus; "He loved him above the measure of a father, nay, godded him indeed"?

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[1] Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, part i., vol. i. p. 109. The authors quote an instructive parallel from the story of the Bâb in modern Islam. "The Bâb, whose name was Mirza Ali Muhammad, was a Persian reformer who was put to death in 1850. Fortunately Count Gobineau, the French Minister in Persia, was interested in him, and wrote an admirable account in his *Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*. He also brought back and deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris a MS. copy of the life of the Bâb by Haji Mirza Jani, his friend and contemporary. The Bâb appointed Mirza Yahia, under the title of Subh-i-Ezel, as his successor, but foretold "One who should come." When Beha, the brother of Subh-i-Ezel, claimed to fulfil this prophecy, the text of Gobineau's MS. was re-edited in a manner which reminds the student of the New Testament of the relation of

Yet neither is it wise to insist on the degree of honour which Jesus would confer on him, The story is a story. Its purpose is fulfilled if the hearers understand its allegorical significance. Tropically, John is son of the Vineyard Lord—not, by necessary consequence, Son of God. It will be said, and I agree, that in the parables of Jesus it is unwise to seek for a too literal application, a minute correspondence between the thing said and the thing signified. But, as the priests and scribes recognised in the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen an allusion to themselves, we must suppose that it contained pointed references to their doings. So I think that I am entitled to draw attention to the peculiar expression, common to all the Synoptists, "They took him and cast him forth out of the vineyard." In Mark, the casting forth is made to follow the killing; in Matthew and Luke, to precede it. In the

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Matthew and Luke to Mark; and finally an entirely new story was written, showing about as much trace of the original narrative as the Fourth Gospel does of the Synoptic account. There are thousands of Behais now, many of them in America, and it is safe to say that few of them know the story of the origin of their cult, or would believe it if they were told."

traditionally accepted interpretation of the Parable the incident seems to be without special significance; it gives colour and no more. The preceding messengers, if we take the versions of Matthew and Mark, were not so treated; but Luke, editing and spoiling the story, relates that the third servant was wounded and cast forth. The point in the story of Matthew and Mark is that this indignity was uniquely offered to the son of the proprietor of the Vineyard. What did the priests and scribes recognise in the casting forth? The Vineyard is the house of Israel, either the people or the land. To Jesus, whose expulsion was not contemplated, it could not be referred by his hearers. The Evangelists could not so refer it: Jesus died and was buried close to the Holy City, But John was first imprisoned and afterwards slain at Machaerus, a place technically in the district originally assigned to the tribe of Reuben, but in the days of the kings occupied by Moabites, who owned the faintest allegiance to Israel, and whose savage fetishism was a special abomination of the Jewish race. To the pious Hebrew it was additionally hateful as the fortress-palace of Herod Antipas, and its remains show that it was given over to pagan worship.

But it will be said that there is no evidence that the scribes had any part in the destruction of John. Both the Gospels and Josephus lay the crime on Herod Antipas. Let it be granted that direct evidence respecting John does not suffice to prove the complicity of the scribes. But the Gospels furnish a clear presumption of their partnership in the crime. Matthew (iv. 12) and Mark (i. 14) state that John was "delivered up" (παραδοῦναι), exactly as they say that the Sanhedrin "delivered up" Jesus to Pilate (Mt. xxvii. 2; Mk. xv. 1). In Acts vii. 52 (Stephen's speech to the Sanhedrin) there is a hardly doubtful reference to John: "Which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? and they killed them which showed before the coming of the Righteous One." In Mark ix. 13 the reference seems to be the same: "I say unto you that Elijah is come, and they have also done unto him whatsoever they listed": "they" are apparently the scribes, mentioned just before. In the parallel passage in Matthew (xvii. 12) it is said: "Even so shall the Son of Man suffer of them." As neither Matthew nor Mark records the arraignment before Herod and "his armies," there can be no allusion to Herod. Nor can it be to the Jewish people generally, of whom it is said that *all* counted John as a prophet (Mt. xxi. 26; Mk. xi. 32).[1] In

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[1] The murderers of John did not know him (Mt. xvii. 12): Herod at least knew that he was a righteous man and a holy (Mk. vi. 20).

Matthew xxiii. 31 Jesus, addressing the scribes and Pharisees, implies that they share the guilt of their fathers in shedding the blood of the prophets, and indignantly flashes on them the very words of John, "generation of vipers." The language of that passage is closely modelled on John's denunciation in Matthew iii. 7–9. The scribes profess themselves sons of Abraham. Be it so, replies Jesus; Abraham's sons, deader than the stones, have stained their hands with righteous blood.

So the trilogy of the Father and the Son is worked to its end with thunders of denunciation of the prophet-slayers. As the drama of the Husbandmen is unfolded to them they, "like guilty creatures sitting at a play," are "struck to the soul," and, like the murderer, Claudius, they instantly plot to rid themselves of their accuser: "in the same hour they sought to lay hands on him." The entangling questions with which they sought to incriminate Jesus were a cloak to their real motive of fear: "they feared the people." The people "hung upon him, listening," and doubtless sympathising with his denunciations of John's murderers. He spoke daily in the Temple, and no hand was raised against him. If teaching only were Jesus' offence, the Sanhedrin might have threatened him, as Gamaliel on another occasion advised. It is fairly clear that they would not have proceeded to extremities. When Peter and John were asked the question put to Jesus, "By what power, or in what name have ye done this?" they did not parry it, as Jesus did: they gave a plain answer. But in his address in the Temple preceding that trial, Peter had gone far to condone the crime of the priests and scribes, as an act due to misunderstanding: "I wot that in ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers." So the council decided to let them go. It was otherwise with Stephen: he was outspoken in his denunciation of the betrayers and murderers of the Righteous One and of his precursor, John. The Passion was of the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. But the basest human motives were the engine. Looking only into the guilty minds of his judges, we may say that if Jesus had held his peace about John there would have been no Crucifixion.

ARTHUR GRAY.

CAMBRIDGE.

JAMES HINTON'S MESSAGE FOR OUR TIMES.

Rev. The Hon. E. LYTTELTON, D.D.

It seems as if the writings of the very remarkable thinker James Hinton the aurist (1822–1875) are no longer read. Yet there is no question that his philosophy of life has a message full of the highest encouragement for a generation like the present, and for the peculiarly harassing kind of bewilderment which has taken possession of innumerable minds since the war began. By way of justifying this statement his experience as a youth of sixteen on first coming to London may be given in the words of his biographer, Miss Ellice Hopkins. "Brought up as he had been in a pure country home, and drinking in from his mother a reverence for women which in him was always akin to worship, he was suddenly thrust into rudest contact with our worst social evils." (This was in Whitechapel.)

> The weary and the heavy weight
> Of all this unintelligible world

came crushing down on his young heart with a most cruel force, and the degradation of women possessed him with a divine despair . . . at last, as he once said, "it crushed and crushed me till it crushed 'The Mystery of Pain' out of me."

In other words, Hinton early in life, marvellously sensitive in heart, and with a mind furiously eager to know, set himself to reconcile the most heartrending facts of life with his undying conviction of the Love of God. That is exactly the problem before which many thoughtful minds are quailing to-day.

Briefly, it may be said that popular Christianity at the present time has proved itself unable to interpret such an experience as the great war. Men have been asking in every direction how can a belief in an All-powerful and All-loving God stand when confronted by unparalleled horrors inflicted on innocent and guilty alike, on a scale never dreamt of before in the history of mankind? At first English people threw themselves into the gigantic and long-sustained effort demanded by the war, buoyed up by the hope that on its conclusion the world would be a different place. But the answer to the question, "Why are such things permitted?" namely, that war is and always has been a purifying or regenerating influence, has been nullified and sneered out of court by observers of events since the Armistice. Far as the eye can reach, of the foremost nations of the earth those who are not fighting still are either starving in sullen despair, or amid unspeakably baffling internal disorders are labouring to restore the *status quo ante bellum*: though all agree that the days of peace were days of moral degeneracy, and that moral degeneracy was, in varying degree, the real cause of strife. In short, the war not only caused the most ghastly havoc and irremediable loss, but has already shown that as a trainer of character it has failed; it has not raised the tone of society in Europe by a single point. It has made this life nearly intolerable, and wholly failed to prepare men for the next.

Now, what has the popular teaching of Christianity to say to this? Its utterances have been halting, uncertain, and obscure. Some exponents have insisted "God's ways are not as our ways," and have explained the primeval maxim to mean that they are wholly unintelligible. The world has angrily rejoined that they ought to be intelligible, and the ministers of religion are challenged to make them clear: for what else are these men paid? Or if it is more definitely urged that the Almighty has seen fit, for reasons beyond our ken, to punish man for his sins, the answer promptly comes that that is no justification for the slow wasting away of half a million German children, or the unutterable miseries of the Armenians, or the hopeless obstacles in the way of peace which are reducing the stoutest reformers to despair. Less often one hears cautious reminders that these anomalies will be set right in another world. But with more disgust than ever the rejoinder is flung back that a creed which has no message for this world is not worth a moment's attention. God no doubt showed wonders in the Creation, and may again after æons of ages rescue it from decay: meantime, however, things are going from bad to worse. It is clear that He will not interpose; and the reason must be that He cannot, so all talk of His Omnipotence and Love is clearly but "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal." It speaks of a God who looks on at the collapse of His own handiwork, and such a God is not to be worshipped by men who love their fellow-men, and the less account is taken of Him the better.

Nevertheless the age-long hunger for a religion which will satisfy and give something like peace of mind in the midst of the cosmic turmoil has never been so insistent or more acute than it is to-day. And who can wonder? Let us turn, then, to the passionately convinced sage who fifty years ago brought comfort to his own torn heart and to many thousands of others, James Hinton, the ear-doctor, the sufferer, the prophet.

The present article is only an introduction to an examination of Hinton's teaching, and it will deal mainly with the simpler elements, that is to say, the theory of Pain. The philosophical basis on which it rests will be indicated, but requires a separate investigation on its own merits.[1]

Hinton started with a rich equipment for his life's work. First and foremost he had a singularly compassionate heart. His words of consolation are never those of the shallow optimist whose cheerfulness may be ascribed to a sanely balanced temperament or to a good digestion. He was one of the chosen few who have been martyrs for others' woes. Most utterly Christlike and selfless was his sorrow for the wreckage of human life, and quite as a young man he grasped with a burning conviction the fact of his own peculiar vocation, viz. that he was to show mankind the source of their misery as being not in the Universe, not in God, nor in Satan, nor in objective evil, but in themselves; in the universal disposition to treat suffering as worse than sin; in short, as the one wholly intolerable horror in life. That we may regard as Hinton's second qualification for his work, his insight into the psychological basis of man's unrest.

But with all this, encompassing it, enfolding it, irradiating it, was his passionate and unalterable conviction of the Love of God. The inquiry on which he started as a very young man was simply how to reconcile the tragedies of Creation with the Love of the Creator. If his feeling for the misery on the one hand and for God's Love on the other had been less passionate and sincere, his words would have rung less true. To this we may ascribe the furious zeal of his thinking. No sooner did he discern that the Light was before him than he burned with eagerness to spread far and wide the wonder of its appearing, that all who were wandering in the vast shadows of death might rejoice with him at that which was a veritable demonstration of the purpose and method of evil: the clue to the working of all tragedies: the grand principle of Creation; its intention: its tranquil and victorious conversion of every bad element in life into the purest and eternal good.

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[1] The books which I have examined at present are: (1) *The Mystery of Pain*; (2) *The Philosophy of Religion*; (3) *Man and his Dwelling-Place*; (4) *Life and Letters of James Hinton*, by Miss Ellice Hopkins. Of these (1) is simple and popular, (2) the most suggestive, (3) the most systematic exposition of the scientific basis of the writer's view of Pain.

What, then, was the keynote of his doctrine?

It started with the perception that the same grim phenomena presented themselves in an entirely different light to different minds: to some as a warrant for the blackest despair; to others as painful, but yet as an ingredient in the highest joy; and that the difference in the two views was not owing to changeableness in the phenomena, but to varying degrees of vitality in the minds of those interpreting the phenomena. The facts were facts, and the same facts to all. But the difference in the minds of those who experienced them made them either unspeakably hellish or the beginnings of the kingdom of heaven.

Thus, beginning from a homely personal experience, he found that the discomfort involved in a slight service done to another was actually not only overborne, and outweighed, by the joy of service, but was a necessary ingredient in the joy, a condition of it, but that it was felt as joy only according to the spiritual vitality of the mind experiencing it. If that vitality is defective, the pain is treated as an objective and irremediable evil, and the inference is despair. If, however, there is a certain robustness of thought and feeling in him who undergoes the pain, it is felt not as pain but as joy. In short, pain is what it is relatively; unless human beings were sick and labouring under a defective vitality, all pain would be an uplifting condition of the highest life, a necessary ingredient in all happiness.

If that is so, then the Universe is "all glorious within"; the only really staggering mystery is man's pertinacious misinterpretation of what he sees, based as it is not on reason but on sensation. Pain is to us an objective evil because we *feel* it so; but all advance in knowledge is a setting aside of feeling and a following of the intuitions of the "moral consciousness," which are gradually confirmed by the reason, the two faculties together correcting always the evidence of the senses.

Anyone can verify this teaching in its rudiments. We all know that the welcoming of fatigue is a sure symptom of vitality. But if that is true of fatigue why not of sharper pain, once granted that the right feeling depends on there being some lofty objective in view. As the contusions in a football match are unnoticed because of the eagerness for victory, so why should not all pain, privation, failure, and perplexity be likewise an ingredient in the highest joy, in the life of self-sacrifice, the only life worthy of the name? For Hinton had a firm grip of the psychological truth that the essence of all misinterpretation of experience is simply self-regard. The moment man pursues that which he *feels* to be desirable, he is pursuing a phantom and striving to feed on deadly poison.

Supremely interesting and suggestive is Hinton's philosophical basis for this ethical doctrine; but it is advisable to lay hold first of the moral principles, and if, as I hold, they are self-evident, we can approach the philosophy with a greatly quickened interest. Let it now be noticed that, proceeding from the facts of every healthy experience, we reach the perception that *all* suffering is only evil to us relatively, not absolutely; that in the ideal life we call Heaven it is not true that there will be no more pain, but that it will not be felt as pain; and if that is true of so dark an element in human life as suffering, how can we help hoping that we may come to see sin and all evil in the same way, as a good disguised by our own wrong thinking?

Naturally Hinton was profoundly optimistic in his views as to the end of things: the coming of the Kingdom and the Redemption of mankind. Misery is no longer misery when it is understood as the working out of Divine Love; for Love works by Law—that is, uniformly; and it is the Divine Law that Sin—that is, wrong notions about Creation—should uniformly work misery, not as an arbitrary punishment sent by God and to be averted by supplication, but as the eternally appointed sequel of Sin, and its purge. If we understood it rightly, we should welcome the misery produced by man's selfishness as the one grand cleansing influence which nothing in the long run can resist. Sin, in short, is the only remedy of Sin.

Space forbids further explanation of this most robust and virile doctrine. Let us conclude by an application of it to our present distresses.

Perhaps the most harassing of all the perplexities by which we are beset to-day is that the horrors of the war have failed to purify the hearts of men. The hope in which we were just enabled to endure the piteous loss of life, the havoc, the desolation, the insolence of brutality, the triumphs of cunning and the feebleness of human foresight, has been most woefully disappointed. Men are apparently as selfish as before. A vast amount of "reconstructive" endeavour is merely an effort to hark back to the deadly miasma of money-making and amusement in which we were plunged in 1913, and which every right-minded citizen recognises as a veritable walking into the lion's mouth, a slipping into the jaws of Hell. If this is so, the image of the dog returning to his own vomit is tame and feeble as a statement of the fact; and if it be a fact, could any tragedy be more ghastly?

Now, Hinton was penetrated through and through with the conviction that owing to "inertia" of spirit in ourselves we necessarily feel suffering as supremely evil, though all the time it is a good. It is impossible to dispose of his doctrine by the cheap theory that he was a thick-skinned man and knew not what real suffering meant. No one as far as we know has ever dared to suppose that Christ was insensible to pain. Yet He bade the sympathetic women not to weep for Him, warning them against the universal delusion that suffering *in itself* is an intolerable evil, an inexplicable blot on creation.

But universal though the delusion be, the true disciples of Christ have in all ages escaped it. The New Testament writers never give in to it for a moment. St Paul often insists on the blessedness of suffering. What would he have said of this war and its failure to cleanse? Something doubtless sublime, profound, and illuminating. But Hinton's teaching, coloured by the scientific movement of 1840–1870, was simply an application to life's enigma of the eternal supremacy of God. Certainly St Paul's teaching would have been the same.

Thus open-eyed observation of Nature teaches us that there is a tendency to the uniform sequence of things which we call Law. So we connect, though reluctantly and very partially, the outcrop of strife with the previous sowing of the seed of selfishness. Belief in God means not only the perception that He ordains this particular sequence, but the conviction that it is ordained in love (uniformity being, according to Hinton, the unvarying action of unchanging love). If this is so, a Christian, or rather any honest Theist, approaches the consideration of war strongly predisposed, however great his abhorrence, to see in it a blessing, and more than that, *a blessing in proportion to its pain*. Reflection teaches him before long that whatever else war may be, it is a revealer of the connection between sin and misery. If selfishness has been on a vast scale, the strife that follows it must be on a vast scale too. The awfulness of the misery involved is something of a measure of the hideousness and malignity of sin; of the peculiar form of selfishness which each separate nation develops according to its own temperament, much as it elaborates its own cookery to suit its own taste. But however congenial won to its predilections the dish may be, nothing can alter the fact that mankind has been feeding on the deadliest poison.

Now, it is difficult for many not to suppose that the first thing a loving Creator would do in presence of a problem on this scale would be to ensure that the poison should be purged out of the social system as speedily as possible by the misery that attends its cure. It is exactly on this point that we spoil our obedience by bargaining with God and clamouring that His Law should be modified to suit our blindness. Hence many of us have been saying, "I can endure the pain and can see that it is the outcome of sin, and so is all right; but the one thing that I cannot brook is that it should fail in making things better." But that is just where the terrible agony brings salvation. Suppose we grant that as the Bible insists from the first page to the last, the grand object of the Redemption of the World is the correcting of man's *thought*, the winning him to Truth, the enlargement of his mental horizon, then surely it is to be expected that just where his vision is most blurred, and his prejudices most stubborn, there the corrective will be most drastic. Now, in what department of experience is man most certain to be blind? It is, of course, in the estimate of his own sin. He is born to believe that if he follows his own inclinations things will go pretty well. "And the serpent said to the woman, 'Ye shall not surely die.'" Especially true is this where the nation is concerned, not only the individual; for the course of conduct which results is bound to be congenial to the collective temperament; that is, it has the approval of a multitude and to it we are accordingly impelled by the strongest influence possible, the "herd instinct." Thus we are all besotted by admiration for our national qualities even when they take the form of disloyalty to the Divine Law, that "a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things he possesseth." There is only one conceivable way of waking man out of his dream, viz. by letting the Law work its effect upon those very feelings which he has chosen as his god. Supposing the delusion is really strong, the resulting pain must be indeed searching like a two-edged sword. That is why the failure of war to cleanse society makes it so powerful a revealer of the deadliness of sin. It is a measure of the depth of our slumber that the awakening proves to be so difficult. In other words, if war were plainly and invariably successful in bringing peace to mankind, there would be no chance of our being freed from the spell under which we have been sinking into Gehenna. It would be a remedy wholly inefficacious for the disease. As it is, the one fact which makes war really awful is that it fails to purge. How awful, then, must be the sin that caused it! and how urgent the need that the truth of it should be burnt into the inmost heart of each one of us! For there are times when the "unspeakable gift" of the Holy Spirit of God to man must either be withheld altogether, or be imparted in the form of "the everlasting burnings."

This is only one among many applications to present-day necessities of the teaching of James Hinton, doctor, saint, and seer.

E. LYTTELTON.

LONDON.

MY TWO PASTORS.

DAVID GORDON,
Cleveland, Ohio.

When, after thirty years of his mild episcopate, the pastor of my church retired to private life, to be succeeded by the young, ardent, and cocksure Rev. Mr Jones, my thoughts wandered upon an unfamiliar subject—theology and theologic institution. Ordinarily, I don't bother much about my soul nor any of the apparatus catering to the subsistence of that organ. I am that typical individual of the time whose church is simply one, quite minor, department in the well-constituted world of everyday. I go to church, not for spiritual refreshment, but because the church deserves the support of a good citizen. It is a healthy influence against the Bolshevik and the liquor interests. It keeps before men the *practical* utility, the advantage in your business or on your job, of the godly life.

It was Sunday, and I was just home after hearing the new minister deliver a spirited fulmination entitled, "The Cigarette Evil: A Sermon for Young Men." I sat on the porch musing on the character of my new heavenly usher: his ferocious certitude, his theology centred upon a rockbound conviction that a heaven on earth could be established in about twenty-five years, his dramatic appeal to his audience, giving it, I malevolently suspected, the same sort of psychological thrill as a closely contested ball-game. And I knew that, on most of his flock, he would have more of an effect than his predecessor. For he would modify their daily conduct in their offices and their homes; a greater share of a sort of justice would be meted out to employees and servants. He has already converted a good half-dozen of his parishioners to Woman Suffrage and the Minimum Wage.

And this, I reflected, was good. Mr Jones, who is fast becoming the typical American sacerdos, is affecting the lives and the opinion of many, where his predecessor appealed to but a few. I am malicious enough to harbour the opinion that Mr Jones' religion is not essentially religious, but, whatever it is, he is "putting it across," and that is the important thing in this pragmatic, democratic day.

Falling into a vein of unfamiliar sentiment, I mused upon the profound difference in the character and effect of the retired pastor: his unobtrusiveness, the esoteric quality of his appeal: something Rosicrucian, implying that his spiritual elixirs could only be tasted after a patient and privileged novitiate, the great prize of a great effort; above all, something about him suggesting a deep and fragrant placidity; a quality of passion static, but nevertheless passion of the deepest sort, in the nature of an exalted reverie. The passionate element in religion, I thought, the love of God, which was for Dante a companion sentiment to the love of woman, is dead in our day. Men no longer conceive religious frenzies and found churches upon pillars, as did good St Simeon, but become pillars of the church, wearing white neckties bought at the ten-cent store. The retired cleric, however, seemed to display a recreant reluctance to impart his spiritual treasures widely to others; one got the impression that he felt his message was caviare to many. He is not one who cries in the wilderness, but one who broods in retired places. I was fortunate in being one of his chosen ones, and his effect upon me was deep.

I don't know how most aptly to illustrate this delicate but mighty difference between the two clerics. The older man always gave me an impression of resemblance to St Francis of Assisi—he who blended his sainthood with an æsthetic delight in natural things, "my brother the wind and my sister the rain," and who, in his youth, was a great gallant and duellist, carrying a sort of negative and hardly repressed consciousness of the gay life through his days of sackcloth. Mr Jones, on the contrary, is Savonarola, the reformer. And I thought that this comparison of prototypes could effectively be carried out into the works of both men. For Mr Jones achieves reformations (which are, alas! only too often, in turn reformed), while my friend (let us call him Mr Francis) communicates a personal spiritual potency. Mr Jones has published a book called *Christianity and Social Service*, which had a very wide circulation. Mr Francis published a brochure on *Meleager and the Greek Poetry of Alexandria* (a beautiful and half-pedantic scholarliness is one of his central characteristics), which found its delighted way into the libraries of a hundred poetic faddists throughout the world.

A whim intruded itself upon me that Mr Francis' personality suggested to me some visual physical sensation, and I suddenly realised that I was thinking of the flower-bordered hedges of Devon, as I once saw them through a train window, and the placidly spiritual atmosphere of the shires of Britain, which I find wafted to me with a particular pungence through the poetry of Wordsworth. And I thought that Mr Francis' spirituality was of the same quality as Wordsworth's: quiet and untrumpeted, but deep and awful as Nature herself—and, like the pleasant mysteries of Nature, hard to apprehend and non-existent to the gross, distracted vision of the many. I don't know why, but I find something essentially English in Mr Francis' genius (the strange conglomerate, often coming at odds, of a simultaneous love of plum pudding, the green country, and Divine Grace). And I shall show, further on, that English history especially has been rife with this type of character.

But here I must make an abrupt stop and divert my path. For I have been giving the impression that my Reverend Francis is a dreamy, unworldly sort of a person. He isn't; he is very much a man of the world—and therein lies that essential and wonderful duality of his nature. He is versed in the ways of the world and moves in a homelike manner through its avenues, but with a sort of sense of displacement, an aspect of dreamy acquaintance with more Elysian territories; like one of Heine's gods in exile, making an excellent woodchopper, or some truly *spirituel* Jesuit, participating efficiently in thumb-screwings, knowing them to be for the ultimate benefit of the victim and the world. Such as these seem to emphasise their consciousness of superior elements by living emphatically in inferior ones, as one longs all the more for meat after an intensive vegetarian diet. These rare souls live on something like a Platonic philosophy, finding in the plethora of matter recurrent flashes of the Idea, like glints of gold in the lump of ore. And their lives seem to be one long search for these evasive glints. These fine moments—moments, as he once explained to me, of a "deeper quality of consciousness"—Mr Francis finds in various aspects of this kaleidoscopic world: the first tuft of violets of the spring, the yellow hair of his little daughter; most of all in the graceful fancies of the Greek and Latin poets and philosophers. He finds in these undying artists, he once told me, that quality of universality (being the reason for their durability) which is the chief element in the Beautiful, because it is a momentary inlet into the universal which is God. Now, religion for him is the science of discovering and communicating the Divine in the purest form possible. Knowing him for a generation, I have noted in him manifestations of this strange heavenliness in earthliness. Mr Francis loves a good game of golf, a glass of champagne—and I remember how, twenty-five years ago, he married the most beautiful girl in the neighbourhood.

And here, perhaps, in the course of this desultory causerie, I have come upon the nature of the difference between our two divines. For Mr Jones, Heaven is something like a suburb or model village bordering on the metropolis of our earthly existence, and to this suburb he would have us go for edification. It seems to me that Mr Jones is quite too myopic to see that his Heaven is one he has created with earthly materials, with which he is familiar—a pale adumbration of his earth. On the other hand, Mr Francis, in spite of his thorough living in the world, gives, to those intimately acquainted with him, the impression of an almost physical consciousness of the Divine and the Inscrutable. To him, this life, real as it is, is but an island in a sea of peopled shadow, and his thirst for apprehension of this infinite boundary is intense. He is consecrated in the true sense that he devotes his days to peering into this void, and communicating to those who are not too blind to see some of his mystical discoveries. Thus is he a true priest. We may see that his Heaven is too sacrosanct to be degraded to the service of the trivial life of everyday. Unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's indeed but Cæsar is the ruler of but a minor kingdom. Believing that his soul is a fragment of the ethereal of which he is so profoundly conscious, he considers it uninfluenced by the pigmy sins and virtues of this speck of an earth.

And so, accepting, somewhat reluctantly, the inevitable conditions of this mortal existence, he plunges into it with a relish, as befits one whose faculties are all quick and keen. A very good explanation, perhaps, of this strange duality of my spiritual mentor and his type, often to be observed in the history of the world, is this: Their capacity of feeling is extraordinarily intense. This makes them partake, with especial avidity, both of the visible and the invisible worlds. Their inordinate love of the cup is often the measure of their love of the Holy Ghost. It is the greatest sinners who make the greatest saints. Mr Jones is the opposite type: his sentiments are as the wind in the wheat, gusty but light and transitory, substituting loudness for power; deluding itself with a great noise. Mr Francis is a great deal of an idealist (in the Platonic sense), and, believing this life, minor as it is, to be an incarnation of the grand Idea, enters with content into its activities. And this does not at all detract from his consciousness of the supernal.

This then, I think, is the quality of the difference, as well as I can analyse my sentiment, between the two clerics. The younger minister, his faculties being naturally more obtuse, propounds a spirituality which is a mere addendum to what he actually sees. The elder man is soaked with a consciousness of the Divine, and finds it everywhere. Knowing that everything, however gross it may appear, is an incarnation of the spirit, in a more or less perfect degree, he is afraid of nothing. This world is a dwelling-place provided for us according to our needs. Let us not neglect this dwelling, says my friend, although we are conscious of the bountiful spaces without.

. . . .

Sitting on my porch awaiting my Sunday dinner, my temper became melancholy because I knew that Mr Francis is not an isolated individual, but the obsolescent representative of a great race and a great tradition. He is an excellent type of the poetic clergyman, and reminiscent of the time hitherto when most clergymen were poetic, in the sense that they preserved the knack of appreciating and rendering the invisible in visible form. What a sweet confusion this was: that of the graces of the inapprehensible with the graces of the world! how interesting it is to study the shifting of the balances of these qualities in some historic personalities of the clerical profession!

It would be too obvious to call attention to Fra Angelico, who was a devout and stainless monk, and, at the same time, used for his models in painting the Holy Virgin, Florentine belles with supple figures and glittering golden hair. It would surely be overstressing the subject to refer to Rabelais, who was certainly a true believer and yet succumbed to his torrential delight in the obscene.

I thought of Fénelon, keeping his regal episcopate at Cambrai during the reign of Louis le Grand, administering a firm, practical authority—and of the same Fénelon striving to blend in the gorgeous rhetoric of his time, which he employed so beautifully, his Platonist Hellenism with his intense love of God: this mighty priest of France, who dared not acknowledge to himself that his attraction to Madame Guyon contained within it an admixture of the quality of the attraction of his sovereign for La Pompadour. They are a lovable species, these magnificent French ecclesiastics, stemming as they do from the sweetest figure in all legend, the dainty young Abelard, who read St Augustine to the canon's beautiful niece on the steps of the cathedral.

More intimate yet to me are the exquisite race of the English clerical bards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Donne and Herbert and Vaughan—and, most beloved of all, the golden-tongued Herrick, this gracious child of his time who, from the remote quarters of his rustic parsonage, has given to the world for ever those gossamer lyrics of youths and maidens and daffodils ; not neglecting, at the same time, Noble Numbers for the spiritual edification of his audiences. It has always been a pleasant thought to me that it was a clergyman who wrote :

To Live Merrily and to Trust to Good Verses.

Now is the time for mirth,
  Nor cheek, or tongue be dumbe ;
For with the flowrie earth,
  The golden pomp is come.

This interfusion of the worldly and the divine, as manifested especially in a love of rural Nature, seems to be a peculiarly English characteristic. The sentiment found its apotheosis in Wordsworth.

And here I must be unfashionable and tilt a spear in defence of the most abused character of all time—the English tea-party curate. This person is The Demon incarnate to the young Socialist publicists of our day. I look at him with entirely different spectacles. Whether he believes in the Inheritance Tax or not, I do not care. I like him, this youth fresh from Cambridge, with his well-tailored blacks, his acquaintance with Ovid, his placid mode of life. Perhaps he doesn't really exist, but the conception itself is graceful. He is the legatee of a fine spiritual tradition, and I am sure my soul would derive more benefit from him than from any clerico-sociologist in all the Middle West.

I will mention a particular favourite of mine in English literature—an almost forgotten sonneteer of the Victorian era, who belonged to the race of curates : Edward Cracroft Lefroy. He was born in 1855 and, fated to ill health, died in 1891. I treasure (as have John Addington Symonds and a few other poetry-lovers throughout the English-speaking world) a copy of his *Airs from Theocritus*, published in

1858. I have always had my own, individual darlings in literature, and this curate-poet is one of them. By some unerring instinct, springing from the beautiful English tradition, he conceived a deep attachment to the most pagan of the pagan poets, Theocritus. It was Theocritus, you know, who sang, not of gods or heroes, nor yet of ideals, but of sweet familiar things: the threshers of wheat, the daisies in the field, and the Eternal Girl, "Bombica, the Honey Pale." And so, his themes being those commonplaces which are universal and primordial, he has retained his freshness and his fame for two thousand years. Lefroy seems to have found something sympathetic in Theocritus. He too, while a sincere communicant of the Church of England, took delight in the cricketers in the mead and the girls picking hepaticas for the May Day. He says, in one of his diaries: "Art, Nature, and Youth have yielded to me 'the harvest of a quiet eye.' It would be affectation to pretend that I am weary of existence, . . . but I have faith enough in my Lord to follow Him willingly where He has gone before." How perfectly this expresses the personality I have been trying to portray! Surely, he was not less a true priest than a true poet, who could write like this:

> Then count me not, O yearning hearts, to blame
> Because at Beauty's call mine eyes respond,
> Nor soon convict me of ignoble aim,
> Who in the schools of life am frankly fond,
> For out of earth's delightful things we frame
> Our only visions of the world beyond.

DAVID GORDON.

CLEVELAND, OHIO.

DR FELIX ADLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.[1]

J. A. HOBSON.

Professor Felix Adler of New York stands in a unique position as a moral teacher. Bred in the austerities and depths of the Hebrew faith, and falling in early youth under the spell of the Kantian ethics softened and sweetened by the teaching of Jesus, he has devoted the whole energy of a long life to discovering for himself and communicating to others the secret of a good life. For upwards of forty years he has been speaking Sunday after Sunday on the platform of his Society for Ethical Culture. On weekdays he has taught in the classes of Columbia University, and has taken leadership in various experiments for educational and social reform. Everywhere he has brought the steady and persistent pressure of the ethical ideal.

In this endeavour to state "a philosophy of life growing out of the experience of a lifetime" Dr Adler necessarily begins with a personal confession. I say necessarily, because the essence of his system is the uniqueness of personality as acquired by and expressed through concrete experience. The high worth attaching to his exposition comes from the richness of his experience. No chamber or class-room philosopher could do what is done here to test the principles of an ethical philosophy by application to so many spheres of human conduct. The family, the school, the vocation, the State, international relations, the varieties of voluntary organisation for political, economic, and spiritual reforms, present to-day in a new intensity problems of conduct for which every thinker must attempt to find some coherent solution, unless he is prepared to sink to the acceptance of a moral multiverse.

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[1] *An Ethical Philosophy of Life.* By Felix Adler. (Appleton, New York and London.)

I lay stress on Dr Adler's personal qualifications, because it is no easy matter to get serious attention to-day for a work which claims to make a new statement of the theory of human relations, and to apply it as the basis of a radical reconstruction of society. Beginning by a reasoned rejection of the Christian system and of others, on the ground that they furnish no sufficient guidance to those who must live in the world we know, and affirm their ethical personality in dealing with it, Dr Adler builds up a system of his own of which the conception of "the ethical manifold" is the corner-stone. It is an able and sincere attempt to restate the relations of the One and the Many, so as to bring out in clear relief the passionate conviction of the supreme worth of the unique personality. The degree of its success will depend upon the extent to which readers will find what I may term a satisfactory substance in a system of related personalities, stripped of all their empirical trappings and viewed *sub specie æternitatis.* The ethical manifold is the ideal of the whole, each member of that manifold preserving his singularity, that singularity being essential to the singularity of every other member, so as to display the infinite variety of the pattern. Each member thus finds his reality and significance in the unique contribution his personality makes to this manifold whole. Here it is claimed that the demand for every person to be treated as an end, not as a means, is reconciled with the demand for a moral whole, in which each lives and moves and has his being. Thus we get the reformulation of a Golden Rule on a categorical imperative, dictated by the principle "that the unique difference of each shall be such as to render possible the correlated unique differences of all the rest," and the following three formulas of conduct emerge:—

"A. Act as a member of the ethical manifold (the infinite spiritual universe).

"B. Act so as to achieve uniqueness (complete individualisation—the most completely individualised act is the most ethical).

"C. Act so as to elicit in another the distinctive, unique quality characteristic of him as a fellow-member of the infinite whole."

This doctrine claims to transcend Egoism and Altruism. The moral life of the whole is lived in and through the individual members. There is no common consciousness, no directly collective life, such as can be got by raising into ethics the biological concept of organism. But, since everyone's achievement of his place in the "pattern" is dependent upon the similar achievement of his place by each of the others, a genuine moral harmony is attained. When we ask, "How far shall each person keep his mind on his own part, how far set himself consciously to help others?" we seem to pass from theory to policy or tactics. The best energising for the whole, and so for our part in it, is obtained by directing as much effort as we can to helping others to fulfil their parts, for our own particular end will otherwise obtrude its claim too prominently. "So act as to elicit the unique personality in others and thereby in thyself."

Dr Adler claims that this policy of mutual aid is removed, on the one hand, from any empirical utilitarianism by placing its ends outside this world. His pattern, like Plato's, is "laid up in Heaven." On the other hand, it escapes the charge of emptiness which is brought against the Kantian ends. His final formulation of the principle of conduct runs thus: "So act as to raise up in others the ideal of the relation of give and take, of universal interdependence in which they stand with an infinity of beings like themselves, members of the infinite universe, irreducible, like and unlike themselves in their respective uniqueness" (119).

Now the mutualism, the interdependence, of this doctrine is common ground to most modern operative systems of ethics. But while the others usually dwell upon what is common, or like, in the members of humanity, Dr Adler dwells upon the diverse or unlike. In fact, the ultimate and absolute worth of a person resides in this difference, his particular contribution. Of the significance of specialisation in this world's work we have general recognition. But to Dr Adler this is only serviceable as feeding the specialisation in the spiritual universe. In order to realise the important question thus posed, we must mention the constant stress laid by Dr Adler upon the instrumentalism of our activities in "the world." The finite nature of man is sometimes described as "a clog and screen"; the struggles of man in this world, not merely on the material plane, but in the intellectual and moral, are only significant as means or instruments for ripening spiritual differences or "worth."

What is this spiritual universe, this ideal pattern and the spiritual nature in individuals? Sometimes Dr Adler presses the contrast between "the world" and this "spiritual universe," so as almost to reach the familiar theological antinomy. All immediate ends in this life, health, wealth, education, friendship, etc., are instrumental. So are all human relations. "I must have the courage and the truthfulness to look upon neighbour, friend, wife, husband, son, daughter, *sub specie æternitatis*; that is, as primarily spiritual beings, and estimate any physical, intellectual, or emotional help I can give them by the consideration whether it does or does not advance them towards the master end of their being" (229). Now the instrumentalism of all activities in "the world" enables Dr Adler to give some novelty of shape to "the problem of evil" in its triple aspect of sickness, sorrow, and sin, by stress upon the spiritual use of the feeling of "frustration" in every department of human activity which follows from the refractory material in which man works. This feeling of frustration is the quickening element in spiritual life. The artist, the statesman, the reformer, have an intense appreciation of the struggle which finds its highest significance in "the agonising consciousness of tangled relations with one's fellow-beings and the inexpressible longing to come into right relations with them" (351).

So strongly does Dr Adler press home this instrumentalism that the doctrine almost turns upon him with the question, "Have you any ultimate right to distinguish thus sharply means from end, the life of this world from your spiritual universe?" Can this or any other dualism be regarded in any other way than as a provisional hypothesis, in fact itself an instrument? Or, to come more closely to a concrete case, "If we exclude the 'physical, intellectual, or emotional' relations which we have with our friends from the essence of the relations we hold with them as members of 'the ethical manifold,' what substance or reality will remain in the latter relations? Will they be *persons* to us, or we to them, in any way that gives emotional interest or moral meaning?" Dr Adler claims they will. It is a question of the definiteness of the beings that constitute the spiritual universe, *i.e.* the spiritual value. Dr Adler faces this issue. How far will his answer satisfy? "I have frequently urged that the lack of a definite description of the spiritual value is the chief defect in ethics up to the present time. This defect I endeavour to supply. The spiritual nature is the unique nature conceived as interrelated with an infinity of natures unique as itself. The spiritual nature in another is the fair quality distinctive of the other raised to the Nth degree. We are to paint ideal portraits of our spiritual associates. We are to see them in the light of what is better in them as it would be if it were transfigured into the best" (231).

But if we are to exclude all those empirical traits in which our earthly relations with them are mingled, what sort of reality attaches to the spiritual relations? Emerson perhaps posed most ambitiously for modern men this question of the intercourse of souls, stripped of all that was earthly or accidental, and assuredly failed, I will not say to make it acceptable, but to make it really conceivable. By removing all taints of the empirical from the nature of the ethical manifold, we seem to have for our leavings a spiritual absolute to which no intelligible or emotional significance attaches. This evidently is not what Dr Adler intends. For though he is careful to insist that this ethical whole is not a personal Deity (in either a centralised or a diffused sense of personality) the diverse spiritual ends which compose the manifold are personal ends, and its reality claims to be a complexus of uniquely differentiated personal units. By excluding from all participation in spiritual reality all those "instrumentalities by which we are to become aware" of it, we are landed in a sharp dualism, the logical difficulties of which appear to most minds insuperable. All that gives intellectual and emotional concreteness to our experience lies on one side of the fence, and, on the other, what? No doubt Dr Adler would reply, "All that constitutes ethical significance, the substance of true personality." But that leaves most of us in the perplexity of being totally unable, composed as we are of intimately interacting corporeal and spiritual elements, to envisage any world, or condition of being, from which the corporeal is entirely absent, but which claims for us an emotional interest. I choose the word "emotional" because it contains the gist of our difficulty. For it is in what we call "emotion" that the physical and spiritual urges, which are the "go" of life, are somehow inextricably merged. In short, to most persons a heaven of wholly non-corporeal ethical beings is as inconceivable and as uninteresting as the orthodox theological heaven turns out to be to those who seek to realise it as a "going concern." Even if it be a pattern, a pattern palls.

. . . .

It may, however, well be true that in thus stressing Dr Adler's dualism, I am failing to do justice to his theory. I am the more disposed to think this may be so, because of the value and fertility I find in the application of his principles to the great practical problems of conduct in our times. The later chapters of his book, containing this application, are devoted to that revaluation of human institutions, the family, the vocation, the State, religion, international relations, which is so urgent in our age of reconstruction. For, if we are undertaking to rebuild the entire social fabric, from home to human race, we must try to realise, first, what we are "after," and, secondly, by what "criterion" of "rightness" we may proceed. The bold and clear proposals set forth by Dr Adler for handling the central problems of the age, so as to use "the world" as a great field of experience for the creation of a spiritual universe, certainly go far towards the vindication of his general philosophy. Particularly interesting is the support given to the new reformation of industry and politics by stress upon the determinant value of special functions in their spiritual bearing. Here, for instance, is his summary of industrial reconstruction in the light of his principle of a spiritual manifold. "1. The idea of service to be pre-eminent, instead of the gain, the wage or salary to be apportioned as the means of sustaining the worker in the best possible performance of the service. 2. The work done by the workers to be the means of developing them mentally, æsthetically, and volitionally, the educational features therefore to be preeminent. 3. The industrial group to be transformed into a social sub-organism (in the ethical sense a sub-organ of the larger organism of the nation). By this is meant that the employers cease to be employers and become functionaries, while each worker in his place and in his degree likewise becomes a functionary." The central point of this "socialism," however, is not the abolition of private gain, or even the cultivation of a sense of social service, but the liberation and enlightenment of the will of the individual worker, so that he may best develop his unique personality.

This end or significance of industry is, of course, commonly recognised in those fine modes of production which we term Art. It is there acknowledged that this freedom of self-expression of the artist is his best contribution to the wider human end, "the ultimate purpose of human existence." But to apply the same criticism to the general body of useful occupations, to insist in redeeming them from the slavery which most of them have hitherto imposed upon their workers, and to convert them into positive instruments for raising human personality—there is the supreme economic issue. It cannot be done by making all or most industrial work directly interesting or pleasurable to the worker in its detailed actions. The liberation must rather come jointly in three ways: first, by a shortening of the work-day for routine labour; secondly, by such variation of routine labour as will extract what interest such variety can give; thirdly, by educating workers into some recognition that, by taking their share in the dull or heavy work of the world, they are acting not only as servants but as masters and makers of human society. Regarded from this standpoint, the reformation of industry requires that each industrial worker shall take a sort of moral exercise in doing his share of this dull work. Such exercise is contributable to a morally healthy personality, just as physical exercise (often equally dull) contribute to physical well-being. But the participation of each worker in the self-government of his industry is quite essential to this moral redemption, giving as it does a positive content to his free agency. To personalise each individual is the chief aim of all reconstruction, and reformed industry is valued in terms of its contribution to this task. Sometimes his intense sense of this end leads Dr Adler to appear to ignore or disparage the supply of the common character from which this flowering of unique personality must grow. This issue is brought out by the new conception of a State founded upon vocational representation alone. This is advocated as the true basis of political organisation. Representation by geographical areas Dr Adler considers to be "the logical outcome of the individualistic conception of democracy." By that he means that "the State is supposed to take account only of the common interests, those in which all individuals are alike, such as security of life and property, those interests being ignored in respect to which the groups that constitute society, the farmers, the merchants, the industrial labourers, etc., differ." Now here, as is natural, Dr Adler's mind is dominated by the conception of a "political manifold" corresponding, and indeed contributing, to his "ethical manifold." And he has an exceedingly strong case for functional representation as an important factor in political self-government. But why should it displace, instead of supplementing, local representation? Is the State to take no cognisance of the interests that are common to all its members? If so, must not the basis of that community, *i.e.* locality or neighbourhood, be retained? A certain overstress of the special as against the common, the many as against the one, appears in Dr Adler's neat account of social institutions, where he tells us, "The family prepares for the vocation, the vocation for the State or nation, the nation for the international society, and all the successive terms receive their ultimate definition for the infinite spiritual universe which includes them and broods over them and dwells in each." Now, though there is a literal truth in this statement, it is not true that the sole meaning and purpose of the family is to prepare for the vocation, or of the vocation to prepare for the nation. The State, or organised nation, concerns itself with other matters than the vocational, and therefore demands other modes of representation. By making the State a manifold or a federation of vocations, there is not only the obvious danger of depreciating the interests of the consumer. Dr Adler, of course, recognises that there are important functions for the State quite outside the economic sphere. Then it follows that purely vocational representation will not yield a State suitable for their performance.

On the important topic of sovereignty Dr Adler takes the liberal view. The State recognises and enforces certain rights, but does not in any sense, except a legal one, create rights. Nor does the State purposely claim to define or to override the rights of the individual, the family, or the vocation. The ethical purpose within each area constitutes its rights, and gives an element of sovereignty that is indefeasible. The State in this respect stands on a level with other social institutions, its sovereignty being measured by its contribution to the spiritual end of citizenship. Dr Adler justly denounces the doctrine of arbitrary and absolute State sovereignty as a doubly dangerous stumbling-block. For while, upon the one hand, it oppresses individual freedom within the borders of the State, upon the other it obstructs the formation of an international society. In his powerful plea for a society of nations Dr Adler makes the finest application of his ethical principle. For he appeals, primarily, not to community of interests in matters of trade, health, science, or communications, not even to the cause of peace, but to the development of national character. As within the smaller social groupings the individual not only finds his proper place but realises his personality, so with nations. Living in splendid isolation their characters remain inchoate: only in society do they find those special tasks for humanity which discover and educate their special powers. As with individuals, so it is to the unique quality of a nation that he looks for his *Vinculum Societatis Humanæ*. This great society is composed of different nations, each representing a significant type of humanity, and therefore capable of rendering a separate contribution to the pattern of the whole. But the crucial task and test of such a society he finds in the performance of the duty of the forward towards the backward peoples. "No single nation is really competent to undertake the great task of awaking the stationary peoples of India and China, of educating the primitive peoples of Africa. A union of the civilised nations should be formed in order that together they may jointly accomplish *the pedagogy of the less developed.*" Lip service to this ethical ideal is furnished in the mandatory policy of the Covenant of the League of Nations. But the hard crusts of national selfishness and State absolutism must be dissolved before the genuine co-operation for the realisation of the ideal is practicable. Dr Adler is surely right when he urges that for the performance of such common service for humanity "peace must come incidentally." This spiritual co-operation of nations, however, is not attainable by mere appeals to community of interests, or by any territorial settlements, or by political alliances. There must be the spiritual undergrowth of a common purpose realised in the willingness of each nation to make its unique contribution to the character of humanity. Internationalism is a larger pattern of the "ethical manifold." But though the stress throughout is upon human character and human relations, and there are passages which seem to identify the spiritual universe with humanity, this is not Dr Adler's final philosophy. For "even mankind itself is but a province of the ideal spiritual commonwealth that extends beyond it."

This short presentation, overstressing, as it must, the formal aspects of his teaching, does no justice to the intensity of Dr Adler's passion for righteousness, or to the richness of the spiritual gleanings from a wide experience of life that are scattered over these chapters. The Ethical Movement has produced no other book so worthily fulfilling the high claims it makes of devotion to "the good life."

J. A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

THE PILGRIMS' MOTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION.

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INDISCRIMINATE eulogy is as irrational to the judgment as it is unpleasant to the trained emotion. The *Mayflower* Company is the victim, on its 300th anniversary year, of general commendations which are quite as true to the emotional eulogist as they are false to the discriminating historian. For in all the significances of the Pilgrim emigration — significances which one of their sons in the ninth generation would be the last to undervalue—there does appear at least one element which deserves special consideration and which is in peril of not receiving proper proportional emphasis.

This element is the fact that the little company of one hundred and two souls, with a single or partial exception, contained no man of liberal education. Searches made in the matriculation registers of Cambridge and of Oxford have failed to reveal a single name of a family or individual of the *Mayflower* Company, with the exception of that of Elder Brewster. Brewster matriculated at that most ancient college, Peterhouse, at Cambridge, in the year 1580; but he left without receiving a degree. For nine years following the landing he was the only man of university training in the Plymouth Colony. In 1629 Ralph Smith, a matriculant of Christ's College, Cambridge, in or about the year 1612, became the first settled minister and the second member of the Company of liberal education. It was not, be it added, until another period of eight years, in all seventeen years after the landing, that a third addition was made to the duet of so-called "educated" men.

This fact becomes the more important when it is remembered that to the one hundred and two members of the

Mayflower Company were added, in the course of the remaining years of the decade, thirty-five arriving in 1621, sixty arriving in 1623, thirty-five with their families arriving also in the *Mayflower* in 1629, and sixty who arrived in 1630, making a total of nearly three hundred.

Intellectual relationships and motives were in fact lacking in the Plymouth Colony. It was not until the first generation had passed away that public schools were formally established. It is also significant that among the graduates of Harvard College from 1642, when the first degrees were conferred, down to the year 1658, comprising no less than ninety-seven men, are found the names of only one native and two residents of Plymouth Colony.

This interpretation of the lack of liberally educated men and of educational motives among the citizens of the Plymouth Colony, an interpretation at once so simple and so significant, becomes yet more impressive when it is brought into comparative contrast with a corresponding interpretation of the presence of liberally educated men and the support of liberal education in the neighbouring colony of Massachusetts Bay. In the Bay Colony there were resident about ninety guaduates of Cambridge and of Oxford,[1] the larger number coming from Cambridge, and for a reason which will be presently touched upon. Of the Cambridge colleges Emmanuel furnished the larger share, about a score being credited to this Puritan foundation, Among the Emmanuel names I find Thomas Hooker, John Cotton, Nathaniel Ward, Thomas Shepard, and John Harvard; Trinity, Cambridge, furnished the next larger number. In the list I find the names of Charles Chauncey, Hugh Peters, and John Winthrop—Winthrop, however, not taking a degree.

Oxford, at the same time, was credited with about a score of matriculants who finally came to New England. But the list fails to contain names so outstanding as the Cambridge registers offer. About a third of the names belong to Magdalen and to Magdalen Hall. Christ Church, New College, Queen's, Wadham, and All Souls are credited with one name each.

The reason of the contrast between seventy matriculants of Cambridge and only twenty of Oxford is not far to seek.

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[1] For these facts I am indebted to a most weighty and informing tract, *The Influence of the English Universities in the Development of New England*, by Franklin B. Dexter, Professor in Yale University. Professor Dexter's paper was originally read, February 12, 1880, before the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Cambridge, and especially Emmanuel, was a Puritan seed-plot, and this plot received an ecclesiastical and even a clerical cultivation. Sir Walter Mildmay, who founded the College in 1584, said in his nineteenth statute he desired it to be known that the study of theology was to be made the chief subject in his College, in order to raise up preachers, and not administration of the sacraments. The Puritanism of Cambridge stands out in deepest contrast to the Tory tenets of Oxford. In the year 1603 the Vice-Chancellor, the Doctors and the Heads of houses of Oxford made answer to a "humble petition" of Puritan ministers of the Church of England desiring reformation of certain ceremonies and abuses of the Church. These ministers had made a petition to the King for ecclesiastical reforms. The answer of Oxford stigmatised the petitioners as "absurd Brownists," as having "a self-conceited confidence," and as holding "pestilent and blasphemous conclusions." Such an academic condition would not attract the sons of Puritan families.

The cause of the presence of learned men in the Bay Colony—and their number was as great in proportion to the whole population as could be found in any similar number of people in the world—and of the absence of such men at Plymouth is also not far to seek.

The most obvious of the reasons is found in the fact that the Pilgrim Company were of a lowly and humble origin. In his farewell letter John Robinson says that "you are not furnished with any persons of special eminency above the rest." Their employments at Leyden indicate their social condition. They were of the order of weavers, hat-makers, journeymen masons and carpenters. A few became known as "merchants." They were not of the classes which furnished matriculants to university registers. In fact, only three of the Pilgrim families can be traced to English homes. The Pilgrims belonged to the great body of the commonalty whence have come no small share of the brawn and the sinew of the English stock.

Be it also said, the Pilgrims were what is known as Separatists. Their presence at either university, even if they had desired to attend, would not have been allowed, and it is apparent that they did not desire to attend. Being Separatists from the Church of England, they were also Separatists from the English universities. Those, however, who came to Massachusetts Bay were not, on leaving England, Separatists. They came bearing university degrees; and among them were found the great men who ultimately led that colony to noblest achievements in a new civilisation.

The primary and the ultimate truth, moreover, seems to be that it was not education as certainly as it was not trade, that it was not government any more than it was "worldly prosperity," which formed the moving impulse in the Pilgrims' bosom. The fact is that RELIGION was that impulse and motive. The history of the Separatists in England in the closing years of the sixteenth and the first years of the seventeenth century makes plain the fact that the Christian faith as they interpreted it was to them more than life. For this faith they suffered manifold persecutions. They were deprived of their property; they were cast into prison; and for it six of them died. The martyrs were: Dennis, Copping, Thacker, Barrowe, Greenwood, and Penry. In allegiance to their faith they moved to Holland. The annals of the Church at Leyden also give proof of a similar and deepest religious conviction. They endured residence in Holland—though the citizens gave them ample opportunities in freedom of living and of work—"as seeing Him who is invisible." Their preparation for emigration to the New World offers similar evidence of the fundamental character of their religious constitution. They emigrated as a Church, or as a part of a Church, containing the "youngest and strongest members." Their farewell was a Church farewell; their good-byes were ecclesiastical benedictions. Robinson's farewell letter is filled with invocations and prayers for divine blesssings to rest upon them. Of the four reasons which Bradford in his immortal *History* gives for the emigration, the last is by far the most important:—

"Lastly, (and which was not least,) a great hope & inward zeall they had of laying some good foundation, or at least to make some way thereunto, for ye propagating & advancing ye gospell of ye kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of ye world; yea, though they should be but even as stepping-stones unto others for ye performing of so great a work."[1]

The life of the Pilgrims, once arrived in Plymouth, was also the religious life. Lacking certain of the specifically religious requirements laid down by the citizens of the Bay Colony, it was yet in atmosphere and influence, in belief and practice, in family and individual, in principle and application, in purpose, programme, and achievement, religious. Defining religion as primarily an interpretation of the relation which man holds to God, the Pilgrim believed that this relation was constant, intimate, all-pervasive, and all-important. The

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[1] *History of Plymouth Plantation,* by William Bradford (the second Governor of the Colony), p. 24.

Pilgrim was not God-intoxicated, like Spinoza; he was rather God-fearing, like Jonathan Edwards. His was not the rationalist's system, which found a God at the end of a syllogism. His point of view was not intellectual. It was rather that of a servant of the Lord of Hosts, willing to be damned for the glory of his Creator, Preserver, and bountiful Benefactor. His possessions, though he gained them by a racial energy and held them by a racial prudence and sagacity, represented a trusteeship which he sought to fulfil well. His Master's name was on his forehead; and his Master's sake was his abiding motive. Prayer was to him not a vain petition, but an act of faith which could move mountains. He was, here and now, a citizen of God's kingdom.

Bradford's precious *History* is filled with incidents and allusions which prove and illustrate the primarily religious character of the little settlement. As its members were in trouble and in danger, seeking their way to the shelter of an unknown harbour, they found a gift of God in "a morning of comforte & refreshing (as usually he doth to his children)."[1] When sickness was afflicting others the Lord upheld them, so that "they were not at all infected either with sickness or lamnes."[2] When famine was upon them and "begane now to pinch them sore, they not knowing what to doe, the Lord, (who never fails his,) presents them with an occasion, beyond all expectation."[3] It was declared, too, that "it has pleased God to stirre up ye harts of our adventurers"[4] to give them sorely needed aid. Upon another occasion it was plain that "the eminente hand of God was with them, and his blesing upon them."[5] The Pilgrim did not write of the immanence of God; but the indwelling of God in his spirit and the presence of God in his environment was to him vital, constant, comprehensive, fundamental, inspiring, and directive.

Religion may exist without the Bible, but the Christian religion which the Pilgrims possessed and which possessed them is a religion founded on the Bible. They received the book as their ecclesiastical creed and as a sailing-chart for the voyage of each day and of every year. Its Ten Commandments were to be obeyed implicitly and explicitly. Its Levitical laws were to be observed, and the penalties of the violation of these laws were to be, and were, applied. The application of these laws in capital punishment, a punishment which was recognised as befitting as many as eight crimes, was strictly observed.

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[1] Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation*, p. 87.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

The Christian religion is founded not only upon a belief in God and in the Bible as a revelation of His will and mind, but also on the derivation from the Bible of the observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest and of worship. The Sabbath *was* made a day of rest in the field and the home, and a day of worship in the "meeting-house." But far more important than the observance of the Sabbath as a part of the Biblical and Christian economy was the doctrine of the Church. The Church, according to the Pilgrim conception, was fundamental to the individual and to society. That doctrine taught that a church was a complete entity or unity in itself. It was a body segregated from constitutional or vital relationships with other bodies or churches. It had complete power unto, and in, and of, itself. It was not governed by bishops, it was not controlled by an oligarchy; it was a democracy, sufficient for its own existence, present and future. It was, in and of itself, an individual divine and human corporation. When coming to hold relationships to similar bodies, it would have been denominated, in modern phrase, a Congregational church in the United States, or an Independent one in England. But in the *Mayflower* time the Pilgrim Church was an individual religious unit. Such a unit incarnated and illustrated the religious belief and practice of the Pilgrim Company.

After two generations the Plymouth Colony ceased to exist as a civil and political unit and agency. Its fortunes became joined with the interests of the more prosperous Bay Colony, of richer soil, of deeper harbours, of greater numbers, and of nobler intellectual interests. But while it lasted as a distinct unit it stood for the power of religion. The Bay Colony also stood for the power and place of religion, of education too, and of other great civil and personal elements as well. Henceforth the two settlements, Pilgrim and Puritan, were to be united.

For two and a half centuries these two bodies have formed, and still continue to form, a river of influence which has served and has determined American life to a degree greater than any historical prophet or prophetic historian would have dared to predict. From the 21,000 persons who came to New England between 1620 and 1640, when emigration in large numbers ceased—because of the calling of the Long Parliament,—have sprung, directly or indirectly, not far from 4,000,000 persons. In the four millions, at least a strain of English blood may be found. From this number also have come forth the great personalities which have so largely dominated American life, made American achievement, inspired American thought, and formed national character. Of course there are outstanding exceptions. George Washington of Virginia is one whose immigrant ancestor came to Virginia. Abraham Lincoln of Kentucky is only an apparent exception, for his immigrant ancestor settled in Hingham of Massachusetts. But in general this number of 21,000 persons, or 4000 families, have given birth and being to the men and women who have served to keep and to transmit the Anglo-Saxon ideals of the commonwealth, of the family, of liberty supported by law, of law inspired by liberty, of pure morality, of the worth of the individual, of education, and of religion, as the regnant forces in American life and character.

As I close, I desire to call attention to one, and to only one, inference among the many which might be drawn from this survey. It is the inference that religion separated from education is in peril of becoming narrow, unhuman, dogmatic, severe in tone, reactionary in statement and act, uninteresting, self-destructive. It nurtures man as a citizen of one world only, and that not chiefly the present. It builds the church; it erects the altar; it reads the Holy Scriptures. It does not build the all-comprehensive and eternal city of God. Education without religion, it may be added, also becomes narrow, tends to become technical, over-intellectual, over-individualistic, unsympathetic, radical, lacking highest motives, materialistic. Education alone and unaided interprets man as a citizen of one world only, and that not of the world to which religion inspires and points him. The Pilgrims' motive, nobly religious and ecclesiastical in its origin and staying power, was obliged to unite itself, though unconsciously to itself, with the intellectual, educated, and educating forces of its neighbouring Colony. It thus not only saved itself, but also helped to save New England and the new world beyond the western seas in the successive generations.

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THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN ROBINSON AND OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS.

PROFESSOR H. H. SCULLARD, M.A., D.D.

JUST now when England, Holland, and America are uniting to honour the memory of the Pilgrim Fathers, it is natural to ask again concerning the faith that was in them. How came they to be what they were? What were the things most surely believed among them, and, believing which, they were empowered so to act and suffer that three hundred years after they left these shores millions of their fellows should wish to recall their deeds? The best answer is to be found in the writings of their great teacher, John Robinson.

It is hard for some of us to appreciate the theology of the Pilgrims. We have travelled so far away from their standpoint, and the temper of the times in which we live is different. Some of us wonder how the passengers of the *Mayflower* succeeded in getting to the other side of the Atlantic with so much theological lumber on board. Yet, lumber or ballast, hindrance or help, they arrived at their desired haven, and became the founders of a new world. Shall we? Is our faith adequate to a venture equally heroic and to a work equally enduring?

I.

They believed in God. Do we? We may claim to have a larger faith, but is it as firm a faith as theirs? In the things of the spirit it is quality rather than size that counts. We have a pathetic confidence in numbers and rejoice in big demonstrations. But the Pilgrims had read their New Testaments, and arrived at another conception of the methods of the Divine operation. They believed in small churches and individual effort, in the weak things of the world, which God had chosen. It sometimes seems as if we believed in big organisations and a fair show in the flesh. They were Separatists. We are Unionists. They bore witness to the world. We try to govern it. Is it the one and the same Spirit working in them and in us?

And as to the God we believe in—how different are our conceptions from theirs! There is quite enough in popular theological writing to make us doubt whether the God of the Pilgrims is our God. John Robinson's idea of God was that of the great Egoist of the Universe. One can imagine the horror and resentment of those who have been brought up on a diet of Spencerian altruism and mistaken it for the Gospel of Jesus Christ. "That is not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," they will exclaim, "but the teaching of Antichrist—selfishness, brute-force, Nietzscheism, diabolism, anything but a truly ethical conception of Deity." To worship a self-centred God is in their opinion to hand over the world to perdition, so far at least as man can do so. Nevertheless such was the God in whom these strong, patient, self-sacrificing Pilgrims believed. "God loveth himself first and most, as the chiefest Good." Were they right, or are we? or is it a matter of indifference what conception we form? Are we always something better or other than our creed? A gentle and pure-minded Indian, we are told, will often take a strange delight in the savage and repulsive images of Siva.

Unlike Luther and some other of the sixteenth-century reformers, Robinson was a lover of philosophy. To him the universe was a rational order, and "nothing true in right reason, and sound philosophy, is, or can be, false in divinity." There was little of the mystic about him, except in the sense that vital religion is always mystical, and still less of the fanatic. Every doctrine must justify itself in the court of Reason, or at least be accepted on rationally approved authority. And from this point of view is there not much to be said for his conception of God? If God be the first and ultimate reality, must He not be self-contained? "Of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things." God does not exist for any end outside Himself: He is Himself the Creator of ends. He does not exist primarily for the good of the creature: the creature exists for Him. The modern humanitarian notion that the goal of the universe is the well-being of man would have seemed to Robinson an impious inversion of the truth. God is Supreme in His own dominions or He is not God. A finite God is no God at all, but a pale projection of man's fancy, creating a God in the image of self, or, as Robinson might have put it, "making a bridge of his own shadow only to fall into the water." The glory of God is infinitely more than the good of men. It is the cause and ground and substance of all good. How, then, can a rational God love men more than He loves Himself? The love of God for men is the love of His own work in them. God loves all good things, "as he communicates with them, less or more, the effects of his own goodness."

And why should we deny to God what we wish to secure for the lowliest of men, the privilege of self-realisation and self-expression? If God were not always realising Himself in the creature He would cease to be God and become as one of us. Unlimited self-realisation is the prerogative of Deity, a prerogative not laid aside at the Incarnation, but finding its supreme vindication in the Cross. But is not the essence of the Divine character self-sacrifice? I do not think Robinson would have said so. He would have scrutinised the word much more closely than we are in the habit of doing before applying it to a holy and omnipotent God. Sacrifice is a dangerous word to use of Deity without qualification or comment. There are meanings of the word which we have no right to accept in thinking about God. "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son." But love is more than sacrifice, and giving cannot impoverish God. The "sacrifice" of God might have meant not simply the condemnation of the world, which according to Christian theology it did, but the ruin of the world, which it was meant to avert. God loved Himself before He loved the world. Creation and redemption are alike the consequence of the Divine self-love. So the same Evangelist, who speaks of the love of God for the world, records the prayer of Jesus, which looks beyond all sacrifice and all redemption to a far-off Divine event, which is neither primarily the salvation of the world nor the perfecting of the Church, but the revelation of the glory of God—"That they may behold my glory which Thou hast given me, for Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." The glory of God and not the salvation of the race was the prime object of the Incarnation and the Cross.

So at least it seemed to Robinson. This was the determinative thought in all that he wrote—a God glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing whatsoever He pleased in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. There were no limits to His power. The wills of men He turned whithersoever He would, but always, whether in renewing or in hardening, without doing violence to human freedom. Even sin was no obstacle, but only an occasion for the manifestation of the Divine glory. With relentless logic, shattering the distinction between "permitting" and "ordering" —for how can God "permit" what He is powerless to prevent? —he boldly asserts that "God orders both the sin and the sinner to His own supernatural ends." Limitations of knowledge or of power, whether proceeding from the Divine nature or from the Divine will, were derogatory to the glory of God. The Moral Governor of the Universe never for one moment, through lack of power or lack of knowledge, lost control of the vast system of discordant and conflicting wills of men. It was His all-seeing eye and all-embracing purpose which directed the whole course of human history. Nothing was done without Him. Even a limited atonement appeared to the Pilgrims more tolerable than the conception of a God powerless to achieve His ends. They believed in a strong God, and so were strong. They believed that God was free, and so became the advocates of human freedom.

II.

But the God who was strong enough to achieve His own ends was able also to reveal His will to men. This had been done once for all in the Bible, which was a convenient summary, but not a complete transcript, of all the oracles of God. Many of the words of men inspired by the Spirit of God had not been committed to writing. What the Canonical Scriptures contained was all that was necessary for "salvation" and "obedience." And these oracles are living oracles, and so, though none may add to them, they have the power of revealing more of the will of God, as men may be prepared to receive it. There is no more frequently quoted sentence in Robinson's works than the words of his parting address to the Pilgrims on leaving Holland, "The Lord has more truth and light yet to break forth out of His holy Word." The Lutherans and the Calvinists had alike forgotten this, and so come to "a period" in religion. Everything was being stereotyped. In England the laxer Church party was turning the Gospel into "an easier law," and the Puritan party into a harder law, both forgetting that the Gospel is not a law of commandments contained in ordinances, but a law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. Against this perversion of the truth Robinson protested. There were no final and infallible interpreters of the Word of God. Let every man remember that "the Word of God neither came from him nor to him alone." Least of all were his own interpretations a law to the Church he served.

He urged the Pilgrims "to follow him no further than he followed Christ, and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of His to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry."

As compared with some of the utterances of his Puritan contemporaries and successors this is the language of liberalism and of liberty. Moreover, Robinson was prepared to allow that all parts of the Bible itself were not of equal value. No word of Scripture should be neglected, but there were "main truths," and "the Gospel is the more principal part of the Word." Yet Robinson has not the boldness of some of the earlier Reformers—Luther, for example, and Tyndale—in his treatment of Scripture. The hand of Cartwright was heavy upon the men of his generation. He never worked out his idea of progressive revelation or distinguished sufficiently between the Eternal Spirit and the changing forms. The New Testament was too much of a copy-book even to Robinson. But then it is given to very few, if any, of the enunciators of great principles to apply them consistently and completely in every particular. How far some of us still are, in spite of all that our New Testament scholars have done for us, from realising the progressive character of New Testament revelation, and from laying hold of the Gospel beyond the gospels. We are not as advanced as Tyndale was, and the battle of the Reformation is still being fought on the field of New Testament scholarship.

But if Robinson had not the spiritual genius of Tyndale, he had great openness of mind, wide knowledge of Scripture, and much common sense in applying it. He had discovered in it the true note of inspiration, which is certitude—"The truth of God goes not by peradventures, neither needs it any such paper-shot as likelihoods are to assault the adversary withal." Probability was not for him the very guide of life. The will of God could be known, "To the law and to the testimony: if they do not speak according to this word surely there is no morning for them." But the morning had come for the Pilgrims, and theirs was the confidence of those who were walking in the light of the Lord.

III.

It was also a great advantage to these pioneers in religion that they knew what they meant by the Church. In the Church of England, from which they sorrowfully withdrew, they found conflicting views as to what constituted the visible

Church, and none of these seemed to them to agree with Scripture. It has always been the misfortune of the Church of England that it has had no consistent teaching regarding the visible Church, and the lack of it is one of the barriers to the reunion so many desire. Is it not possible for Christian people, who to-day, by a curious coincidence, are honouring one of the greatest of the Separatists, and thanking the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England for their attempts to reunite the Churches, to tell us plainly what the visible Church really is? The Bishops have certainly not made it easier for us to get at the real doctrine of the Church of England by distinguishing the "universal" from the "Catholic" Church and assuring us that the latter does not yet exist.

The idea of the visible Church, which the Pilgrims had, may seem to some narrow, unpractical, and insufficient for the needs of our time, but it meant much to them and may not be without instruction for us. "Many men have written much about the notes and marks of the true Church, by which it is differenced and discerned from all other assemblies: and many others have sought for it, as Joseph and Mary did for Christ, with heavy hearts, Luke ii. 48, that they might there rest under the shadow of the wings of the Almighty, enjoying the promises of his presence and power." . . . "I had thought the Churches and people of God should have been known by His dwelling among them, and walking there, and by Christ's presence in the midst of them." If that sign of the visible Church is present, what other sign is necessary? If it is absent, what other will suffice? The visible Church becomes recognised by all just in the same way as an individual Christian. Labels are no more necessary in the one case than in the other.

The unity of the Church according to Robinson, perhaps with the High-priestly prayer of Christ in mind, was qualitative and not quantitative. The visible Church was "one" because it was one in "kind" and one in "nature," not because it had one visible head or one common external organisation. "All true Churches from the beginning to the end of the world are one in nature and essential constitution"; and that which constitutes a Church is the meeting of Christian men in the name of Christ, the actual fellowship of those who have made a public covenant with Christ to do all things to the glory of God. The people are the Church, because they have become, in this sense of definite practical fellowship with one another and with Christ, the people of God. Officers do not make the

Church, for the Church existed before it had any officers. Sacraments do not make the Church, for the Church must have been in existence before it could receive any sacraments. Even the Apostles, extraordinary ministers of Christ, as Robinson regards them, were God's gift to the Church and not the creators of it. There were Churches which were not apostolic foundations, and Churches before there were any elders to govern them. None of these things can be of the essence of the Church. They are added to it, but they are not constitutive of it.

It is the Divine fellowship of Christian persons that constitutes the Church, and "we are fully persuaded that the Church constitution in which we are set, is cast in the apostolical mould, and not one day nor hour younger, in the nature and form of it than the first Church of the New Testament."

From this point of view it seemed to Robinson that the Church of England was not the visible Church. It was not constituted as the visible Church of the New Testament was constituted. And so, though there were real Christians within its borders, there were no Churchmen. Members of the invisible Church there were, but members of the visible Church there were none, because they were not united in any "true Church-state." There was no "Church" of England. The visible Church of England was a national Church and received all comers. It not only received them, but compelled them to come, and penalised them for not coming. It was not a society of spiritual persons, but "clapped and clouted together of all persons, of all sorts." Though Robinson says nothing quite so bad of the English Church as Hooker's terrible indictment—"full of liars, dissemblers, whoremongers, and drunkards," he knew that it was not composed of spiritual persons, but contained many to whom it would have been sacrilege to offer the Communion of the Body of Christ. "Let a man but hire a house within the precincts of your parish, and he is a joined member in your Church, *ipso facto*, though he cannot manifest the least kernel of faith, or repentance, yea, though he profess himself an atheist, heretic, sorcerer, blasphemer, or that which is worse, if worse can be." Such an assembly, however it might be organised or officered, had not the constitution of the visible Church of Christ. It was not "a spiritual politic body" partaking of an apostolical constitution, such, for example, as that of the Church of Corinth, "unto which do appertain the oracles of God, sacraments, censures, government, and ministry ecclesiastical," . . .

and he continues, "I cannot but confess and profess, though with great grief, that it is to us a matter of scruple, which we cannot overcome, to give that honour unto it which is due from the servants of Christ to the Church of Christ, rightly collected and constituted."

The apostolical constitution of the Church was the essential thing for Robinson, but he also judged as very important the apostolical organisation or government. "It is to me a matter of great scruple, and conscience to depart one hair's-breadth (extraordinary accidents ever excepted) from their (the Apostles') practice and institution, in anything truly ecclesiastical, though never so small in itself. . . ."

He may have been too scrupulous in this matter. There is no proof that the practice and institutions of the Church were everywhere and ever the same, even in the apostolic age. Still less is it evident that Jesus and His Apostles wished them to remain the same for all time. But the apostolic models are guides to us, and anyone who makes essential to the idea of the Church anything which is not clearly apostolic unchurches the Christians of the first age, and does it at his own risks. He is the enemy most to be feared. Both in letter and in spirit the Churches of Rome and England seemed to Robinson to have been faithless to the apostolic ideals. The "Spiritual lordship of the prelacy was a mark of Babylon and of Antichrist," violating not simply the letter but the spirit of the New Testament. The bishop is "a lord over them, and not a minister and servant unto them, and so bears more sway over the profane multitude, whereof those Churches most . . . what consist, by lording it with his imperious canons, and purse-penalties, than many true bishops could do, by their faithful ministry, and service, according to Christ's testament." In apostolic times "the Holy Ghost had appointed sundry overseers or bishops over one flock to feed it. . . . It is, then, the unholy ghost of Antichrist which hath devised one bishop over many flocks, which he cannot possibly feed, if he would." The history of the Pilgrim Fathers shows us what may be accomplished by the abandonment of the Imperialistic ideal of the Christian ministry, and the rediscovery of the visible Church.

IV.

Among other points of present-day interest in the teaching of John Robinson are his views on representative government, marriage, and divorce. With regard to representative government, however necessary or expedient it may be in the State, it is out of place in the Church. No Christian who realises the meaning of his act will vote by proxy. The decisions of a Christian, exercising the most sacred privileges of his calling, are his own decisions, and must be taken in full knowledge of the actual situation when the voting takes place. The bishop or elder or delegate who is representing him may know, but the person represented does not know. No man can make a Christian decision in the stead of another. This cuts at the root of consistorial government whether by elders or bishops. Such action is "consonant unto the papists' implicit faith." It is not necessary in the visible Church, as understood by Robinson.

Marriage is an ordinance of God and to be highly esteemed. "The love of the husband to his wife must be like Christ's to his Church." Yet marriage is not a Church ordinance, and no Christian minister should be required to solemnise marriage in the Church. It belongs to the ordinances of nature and of civil society. There is not necessarily anything specifically Christian in it. And there is no direction in the New Testament to show that the marriage of even Christian persons should be added to the duties of any Church officer.

In regard to divorce Robinson held that according to the teaching of Jesus it was permissible only in the case of adultery. In any other circumstances it was not approved by Jesus as a sinless act "in the court of heaven." But Robinson does not say definitely that the judgment of the highest tribunal must be transferred to the civil courts, and so no Christian magistrate be allowed to grant divorce on other grounds. It was not so in the Jewish courts. Still the law, he thought, ought to be stricter in Christian courts than in Jewish, because Christian hearts were less "hard" than Jewish, and so the necessity for relaxation was not so pressing.

Such were some of the opinions and beliefs of a very remarkable man, the pastor and guide of a little company of men and women who have done more than can be told in making possible the freedom of men and the comity of nations.

H. H. SCULLARD.

LONDON.

A PLEA FOR AN EXTENDED LECTIONARY.

The Rev. J. M. CONNELL.

I think it will be agreed that the main purpose of a religious service is to stimulate and express the spirit of worship, and that each feature of the service—the hymns, the lessons, the prayers, the sermon—should have this end in view. My object in this article is to consider how the choice of lessons may be made to contribute as fully as possible to the furtherance of the general purpose.

It is in accordance with this purpose that the lessons from the Bible are selected. Except among the most extreme bibliolaters, it has never been the custom to regard every chapter of the Bible as fit for public reading; and even in the most orthodox Churches nowadays many chapters, and indeed whole books, are omitted from the lectionary, simply because they are felt to be out of harmony with the spirit of worship and with the religious views of the worshippers. In the endeavour to worship in spirit and in truth, and to avoid everything discordant in thought and feeling, the choice of lessons from the Bible tends to become more and more restricted in many of the Churches. Thus it may be said that a Bible has been formed within the Bible, and it is from this Bible-within-the-Bible (in some cases a very attenuated one) that the lessons are taken. It is important to recognise clearly that the Churches generally use a very reduced or restricted lectionary as compared with the one they used even twenty or thirty years ago. This reduction of the Biblical lectionary has been tacitly accepted by the congregations, except for an occasional grumble on the part of some member about hearing the same old lessons over and over again. In the Church of England, where the lessons for each day are fixed by authority, this reduction has not taken place; and what I have to say on the point applies only to the Free Churches whose ministers have the matter in their own hands. It may be that some of these ministers are over-fastidious, and that their choice of Biblical lessons is much more limited than it need be, and that they should begin to extend their lectionary within the Bible itself before going further afield. It is certainly desirable to make renewed and careful search for suitable lessons in the Bible; for in confining the choice to the well-known and well-loved chapters, as is apt to be done, we miss a great deal in the Bible that is of the highest value. Scattered throughout its neglected portions are passages too short perhaps to be read apart as lessons, but too precious to be lost. Some of them might easily be combined so as to form distinct readings, and thus the Churches would be made and kept familiar with them.

In attempting, then, to advocate the use of lessons from outside the Bible, I must not be understood as seeking in any way to discourage the use of those from inside it. That is as far as possible from my wish. If it were a question either of having the lessons from the Bible or of having them from other writings, I should, without hesitation, choose the Bible. I yield to no one in my reverence for it, and in grateful appreciation of all it has done, and is still capable of doing, for the spiritual life of mankind. As I have said elsewhere, "The Bible, both for its own supreme merits, and for the consecration which the piety of the ages has given to it, must remain the book of books for all Christians. It contains the foundation-documents of our faith, the title-deeds, as it were, of that Kingdom of God of which we are heirs with Christ and fellow-citizens with the saints; and to its inspiration is due, in a larger measure than it is possible to realise, whatever is greatest and best in the history and literature of Christendom."[1]

As regards the limitations of our lectionary, and the means of extending it, we find ourselves, I think, in very much the same position as the early Christians. For a time their only Bible was the Old Testament; and when the Epistles of St Paul and the Gospels and the other writings which now form the New Testament began to be read in the Churches in an informal way, it was probably never imagined that they would by and by take rank with the Old Testament as authoritative Scripture. But, apart from the supreme interest and value of these Christian writings, it was found that Christianity, with its new and higher thought of divine things, had made a difference in men's use of the Old Testament. That Testament could not be used throughout in the same free way in the Christian Church as in the Jewish Synagogue. Large portions of it had become a dead letter, superseded by the teaching of Christ, out of harmony with the spirit of the new age, or only rendered acceptable to that spirit by a process of allegorical interpretation which was forced and fanciful. So, but for the introduction of the new writings, the Church would have found itself with a very restricted lectionary as compared with that of the Synagogue. The books of the New Testament, however, gradually filled the place of those parts of the Old which had fallen into disuse, and they were, of course, of vastly richer content, more truly inspired of God and profitable for instruction in righteousness.

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[1] *A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom*, p. v.

As I have said, we are in much the same position as the early Christians in this matter. The new spirit, the new science and criticism, the new Christianity of our time, have made a difference in our use of the Bible. We find ourselves with a greatly restricted lectionary as compared with what our fathers had, both as regards the Old Testament and the New. Ministers do not find it easy to read out, with assurance and a good conscience, stories of miracles that never happened, doctrine based on an exploded psychology and theology, reasonings unlikely to convince, and that they do not want to convince; though, of course, it is necessary sometimes to read such things for the sake of the truer and better things that go along with them, and to leave it to the intelligence of the hearers to make the necessary qualifications and deductions.

With the utmost desire to make the fullest possible use of the Bible, we are faced by the fact that there are large portions of it that cannot be used to edification, to the building up of the body of Christ in these latter days. What, then, are we to do? Are we to rest content with our limited range of selection from the Bible, or are we—following the example of the early Church—to take the liberty of reading lessons also from other sources? To my mind there is but one answer to the question. Since the last of the Apostles fell asleep, and the canon of the New Testament was closed, there has been accumulating a vast treasury of Christian devotional literature, and surely it is reasonable to suppose that from such a treasury we should be able to bring forth lessons that will not be unworthy to take the place of the discarded portions of the Bible. If anyone says that even the poorest lesson from the Bible is better than the finest that could be read from post-Biblical Christian writings, then I am afraid that either he does not know these writings, or that there is still in him something of the bibliolater; and bibliolatry is not appreciation of the Bible, but superstition in regard to it, or, at best, appreciation *plus* superstition. Many of these writings have long been canonised in the Christian heart; they have proved their inspiration by their power to inspire, their power to promote the life of God in the souls of men. I am not arguing that they are worthy to compare with the best passages of the Bible—that I would not argue; I am only concerned to assert that they are more than worthy to take the place of those parts of the Bible which, for one reason or another, we do not now feel justified in using.

But besides taking the place of the discarded portions of the Bible, the reading of lessons from post-Biblical writings is otherwise, as it appears to me, of great advantage and value. It would symbolise, in an unmistakable manner, the change that has been brought about in the doctrine of inspiration; it would show that we have really got beyond the notion that divine inspiration and revelation ceased when the last of the New Testament books was written. In theory many of us have long been free from this idea; but in practice, so far as the ritual of our Churches is concerned, we lag behind the Church of Rome, which early found a place in its lectionary for the Acts of the Martyrs, the writings of the Fathers, and the Lives of the Saints. From force of habit we follow the custom of reading the lessons from the Bible alone, a custom which arose at the time of the Reformation, when the Bible was held to be the only book that contained the word of God. It is only occasionally in their sermons that ministers can speak of the continuity of inspiration since New Testament times; but if one lesson were read from outside the Bible at each service it would be a constant and impressive witness to the truth. Our enlarged conception of inspiration makes, as it seems to me, an enlargement of our lectionary both reasonable and inevitable. We need not be afraid that by the introduction of lessons from other sources, the Biblical ones would suffer any depreciation. The Bible would remain the chief lesson book. It is the main source of that mighty stream of inspiration which has flowed throughout the Christian centuries. But we shall be guilty of no disparagement of the source if we follow the wanderings of the stream, a veritable river of life, and drink of its waters,

And not only would the lesson selected from the writings of such men as Justin Martyr, St Augustine, St Anselm, St Francis of Assisi, Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, Luther, and

Bunyan, be an impressive witness to the continuity of divine inspiration since the time of the Apostles, but—what is of even more importance—it would be a most valuable means of deepening and strengthening the life of the Churches. Can we, indeed, overestimate the effect which this witness of the ages to the reality of divine things might have upon them? The Christians of St Paul's time were confirmed in the faith by being reminded that they were built on the foundation of Apostles and prophets; and might not the Churches of our day be confirmed in the same faith by being reminded by the lessons in their Sunday services that they are built also on the foundation of martyrs and saints, and mystics and reformers, and puritans and devout philosophers and poets—Jesus Christ being still the chief corner-stone?

The aim should be to make the public worship as varied in its appeal as possible. "A verse may find him who a sermon flies," said George Herbert; and so a reading from such writings as I have named may stir the divine life in some whom the Bible lesson and the hymns and sermon fail to touch. Since the introduction of hymns into the services of the Churches about the beginning of the eighteenth century, as supplementary to the metrical psalms, no step has been taken which seems so likely to enrich and vitalise public worship as the reading of lessons from writings that are outside the Bible but are, at the same time, one in spirit with it.

It is of interest to remember that Isaac Watts and those who along with him were responsible for the introduction of hymns were moved to take this step by the fact that many of the Psalms, which their predecessors in the seventeenth century had sung without any scruple of conscience, were felt to be out of harmony with the spirit of Christian worship and with the teaching of the Gospel.[1] Thus the hymns were intended to take the place of such of the Psalms as had become obsolete and could not be sung without offence to the reason and conscience of the worshippers. Their introduction met with much stubborn resistance. They were denounced as mere "human composures," by way of contrast with the "divine songs of David"; and hardly any names were thought too bad to hurl at Watts for his daring innovation. But there must be few people now who would not admit that the innovation had been completely justified. For many, indeed, in these days, the hymns are the most precious part of the service. Some people, no doubt, would speak of all non-Biblical writings as mere "human composures," or, at any rate, they would use the twentieth-century equivalent of that phrase, and would resent the use of any of them as lessons in public worship. But those who recognise that other writings besides the Biblical ones are inspired of God ought, I think, to recognise also that such writings are profitable for instruction, and should therefore have a place in the lectionary of the Church. This, however, is what some are still disinclined to do. They tell us that these non-Biblical writings—St Augustine's *Confessions*, Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ*, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and the rest—are excellent for private reading, but are not suitable to be read in church, except as quotations with which to adorn a sermon—in much the same way as people used to tell Isaac Watts that hymns were good enough for singing in the home, but were unequal to the dignity of public worship. Such a view is, I believe, as absolutely mistaken in the one case as it was in the other. But whereas, in the case of hymns, people generally would have sung them in their family gatherings whether they had been allowed to sing them in church or not, we have to recognise in the case of devotional books, even the best of them, that they are read by few, and that unless they are read in public large numbers of people will never get to know them at all. In the Church services there is the opportunity of making this inheritance of noble and beautiful thought and feeling a more common possession; and shall we, in deference to a custom that has lost its justification, let the opportunity go unused Sunday after Sunday? Ought these writings to be regarded as a mere private possession, reserved for those who have the leisure and the inclination to read them and to search out the precious things they contain? They are of the same spiritual estate as the Bible, and continuous with it, bright like it in the sunshine of the divine love, watered like it by the streams that make glad the city of God; differing from it, as the Old Testament differs from the New, in having flowers of holy thought, wells of devout feeling, and gems of divine truth that are all their own. Why, then, should they not, like the Bible, be made public, so that the wayfaring men among us may rest and be refreshed in their quiet valleys, or climb to their sublime heights and enjoy the visions of God that are to be had therefrom?

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[1] See Watts' prefaces to his *Psalms and Hymns*.

It has been argued that the use of non-Biblical lessons would widen the breach that separates the liberal Churches from the more orthodox. But if the use of such lessons is demanded by our own spiritual needs, and brings our services more into harmony with the larger and truer views of inspiration and revelation, it is surely our duty to take the forward step, and leave the other Churches to follow when they will and can. No Church can afford to impoverish its own religious life in order to please others, and it is not for their good or for the good of the world that it should do so. The freedom of the Free Churches is a great privilege, but it is also a great responsibility ; it has been given them in order to take such steps as this whenever they are convinced of the desirability of them, and if they fail to do so they fail to discharge their special mission. But, speaking from considerable experience, I venture to say that I have not found that the reading of the non-Biblical lesson tends to separate one Church from another; and I am certain that the reading of such a lesson often helps those who hear it to think more kindly of other denominations. A lesson from Thomas à Kempis, or St Francis de Sales, or Fénelon draws them into closer sympathy with all that is best in the Church of Rome ; a lesson from Richard Hooker or William Law warms them towards the Church of England ; one from Calvin draws their affection towards the Calvinists ; one from Bunyan makes them more friendly towards the Baptists ; one from George Fox or Robert Barclay or John Woolman makes them realise and love the spirit of Quakerism ; one from Wesley brings them closer to his followers ; and surely, in thus cultivating those friendly feelings in themselves towards other religious bodies, they are doing much to establish the only kind of union that really matters, the spiritual union that transcends all dogmatic and ecclesiastical divisions and constitutes the One Holy Catholic Church of Christ.

It will be observed that I have pleaded only for the inclusion of Christian devotional writings in our lectionary, and have said nothing of the literature of other faiths. Is not this literature also, in its way and measure, inspired of God ? I should be the last to deny that it is ; and I would admit that there are occasions when non-Christian writings may be used as lessons ; as, for instance, when the sermon is dealing with one of these faiths a lesson from its sacred scriptures would be quite appropriate. But such non-Christian lessons should, I think, be exceptional. We and our Churches are Christian ; we have been nurtured in the Christian tradition ; and Christianity is the mother-tongue of our souls and of our religious services. It is the Christian voices, therefore, that we want as a rule to hear Sunday by Sunday, not those of aliens. It is just here, as it seems to me, that some believers in an extended lectionary have made a mistake. On the principle that the scriptures of other faiths are inspired of God, they have read a lesson, say, from *The Sacred Books of the East*, and they have been surprised that it left the people cold and gave little satisfaction to themselves. But surely it is to be recognised that the forms of thought and expression which inspiration assumes differ greatly according to the different mental and spiritual characteristics of the peoples addressed. What may appeal very deeply to a Hindu or a Chinaman may not stir any devotional feeling in an Englishman. There are many voices in the world, and none of them is without significance for some people; but it is the Christian voices that are most significant for us. This difference of appeal is, I think, a plain fact of psychology, and we have to reckon with it in our choice of lessons.

As I have already said, the chief place in our lectionary should still be reserved for the Bible. By reading the first lesson partly from the Old Testament and partly from the New, the scruples of some worshippers may be satisfied. I am all for lengthening the lessons at the expense of the sermon, which in many Churches is much too long. The main purpose of the service is, I repeat, to stimulate and express the spirit of worship, and the lessons have at least as important a function in this respect as the sermon.

In the selection of lessons from post-Biblical writings, the utmost care should be taken. We do well to be jealous for the dignity of public worship, and the lesson must accord with that dignity, like everything else in the service. As a rule it will be wise to read from books that have an established authority in the minds of men, books that have long proved their value in private devotion, and been canonised in the heart of Christendom. The best example of such books is, perhaps, *The Imitation of Christ*, which, as George Eliot said, has "turned bitter waters into sweet . . . and remains to all time a lasting record of human needs and human consolations." The use of such books will help to disarm prejudice and to commend the practice of post-Biblical reading to every man's conscience in the sight of God. Once it becomes customary, we shall realise how greatly it adds to the interest and helpfulness and enrichment of the service.

J. M. CONNELL.

LEWES.

SCIENCE AND LIFE.

F. C. S. SCHILLER, D.Sc.

LIFE has always been unmanageable. From the moment it was created it turned out otherwise than it should. It was intended to be good, but, alas, it usually prefers to go to the bad. "But that is on account of its endowment with Free Will!" cried the more ingenuous theologians. The grimmer sort, with a juster appreciation of its innate perversity, predestined it wholesale to eternal damnation. Both, however, were such devotees of the dead letter of tradition that they could not master the alphabet of spiritual progress. Hence they could not solve the mystery of Life, which is a perennial spring of novelties. It eluded all their dogmas, or rather, subtly transformed them into satisfactions of its cravings—which is why all the heavens become visions of fulfilled desire, and all the Creeds remain invulnerable to the shafts of reason; also why all religions are so different in practice from what they seem to be in theory. Practically not one of them is able to control Life. It persists in going on much the same all the world over, and exploits them all. All the religions are about equally efficient, and pretty well agreed about what is wrong with Life; but they have *not* succeeded in controlling it.

Next the philosophers took on Life. They "reflected" on it, and, Narcissus-like, too often fell in love with their pale reflections. They "analysed" it, in a harmless, futile way that did not cut it up or hurt it. They "speculated" about it, with minds that mirrored just the one wretched, infinitesimal, individual "aspect" of it that appealed to them personally, which they took to be "universal." They confined it in "categories," and tried to coerce it with chains of "logical necessity." But no logical necessity could secure it, and it passed as easily through a category as through a colloid membrane. So the philosophers retired hurt, betook themselves to the pure contemplation of the infinite inane, and, as supine spectators of the suprasensible, gloated over the bloodless battles of their categories and the dialectical evolutions of principles too "sacred" to be applicable to the sordid particulars of life and action. Life has clearly been too much both for Religion and Philosophy!

But in the fairy tales it is always the youngest brother that carries off the prize or princess. Now Science is going to have a try. It feels that it is the hero of the hour, and that life must be rendered fit for heroes. It has publicly been recognised to be of national importance, and the man in every street is quite convinced that no limit can be set to the future developments of poison gas and high explosives. *Ergo* Chemistry may cherish a well-founded hope to be a match for Life. Also the British business man has discovered that there is money in chemistry, especially if you can get the Government to provide you with capital upon inadequate security.

Wherefore Professor Soddy, the brilliant and revolutionary researcher whom Oxford has recently recovered from Aberdeen, has become the champion of Science. He has written a brilliant and revolutionary book, called it *Science and Life*, and gone on the warpath, resplendent in the finest British dyes, professedly indeed to tomahawk the humanities and to endow research with all the laboratory equipment it can use, but really to show us how to take Life scientifically. He is not indeed the first brave who has set out from a chemical laboratory on this adventure; in Ostwald's *Naturphilosophie* he had a doughty predecessor. Nor perhaps does his fascinating book contain anything—not even the suggestion (p. 74) that man may be "essentially insane"—quite so delicious as the definition by which Ostwald rendered all philosophic questions *pseudo-problems*. But undoubtedly he does mighty execution upon the enemies of Science, from the Carnegie Trustees to the merest Mods. don. I am filled with admiration of his book—it has set me thinking, furiously, and moved me to raise some questions.

For to think is to doubt, and, if I ask myself whether Professor Soddy has proved his case and made good the claim of his Science to control Life, I have my doubts. Life is so intractable, so unamenable to scientific method. Even if we sternly disallow its claim to freedom as an impudent defiance of the demand of Science for a calculable order of events, does it not exhibit other habits which are hardly less objectionable? Do not the facts remain that it grows and transforms itself by what Science can only describe as "accidental variations," and that it generates, at every instant of its career, a spice of *novelty*, which is never wholly reducible to anything old? With all its loyalty to the "cause of Science," psychology can only slur this awkward habit over, not deny it. Moreover, has not Life most reprehensibly set itself to run counter to the downward trend of cosmic energy, and, thanks to the invention of chlorophyll, to some extent succeeded? Was it not Life that stored up the coal and oil we are now wasting so hideously and with such prodigious prodigality? Even as a chemist the simplest plant is still the superior of Professor Soddy. It can make chlorophyll, and he can't.

Still, I will not question that in the end the laboratory will learn to manufacture all that the living body does, the more so that there are other doubts to raise about Professor Soddy's arguments. To be candid, they seem to me to be pervaded by a number of implicit contradictions. Not that I grudge him, or any progressive thinker, the right to express his thought in contradictory terms. Not being a formal logician, I do not at once denounce a verbal "contradiction" as a conclusive proof of error; I recognise that the meaning of no term in scientific use can really be fixed, because it must continually be expanding, to take in our growing knowledge. Professor Soddy's challenge to the Chemical Society[1] to offer £1,000,000 (which it has not got) for an up-to-date definition of the "element" and the "atom" that shall be intelligible to a first-year student of chemistry, can quite well be met by glorying in the rapid evolution of these notions. But *such* "contradictions" are scientifically justified, and are not what troubles me. The contradictions that seem sometimes to vitiate Professor Soddy's reasoning arise from a different source. They are not verbal strains generated in old terms by their extension to new situations, but survivals (largely emotional) of old ways of feeling, after their intellectual grounds have been removed by the advance of knowledge. And the objection to them is that they lead to relapses into obsolete ways of thinking and render nugatory the effect of the new truths.

As our first illustration of such a contradiction we may consider what should be the effect of the new theory of radio-activity on the old assumptions that matter and energy are uncreate and indestructible. These assumptions were, of course, never proven facts, but essentially *methodological—i.e.* the simplest and most natural assumptions wherewith to approach the facts,—and the physicist ought never to have regarded them as dogmas, seeing that all his "proofs" of them presupposed the principles to be established. But this might well escape notice, seeing how prone the human mind is everywhere to turn its methodological assumptions into metaphysical doctrines. The error of the physicist was pardonable, and almost inevitable. When, however, the theory of the spontaneous dissociation of the atom was adopted as the interpretation of the marvellous facts of radio-activity, the logical situation should have become clear. It plainly pointed to the corollaries that the atom was as little immutable as were its combinations, and that in every case it had probably come into being and was destined to pass away, though so far this behaviour had only been established as the habit of the uranium and thorium families. These new facts should have sufficed to discredit the dogma of the indestructibility of matter. They definitely proved that the experimental evidence by which this indestructibility was supported had been grossly inadequate, and that we had *never* really been in a position to decide whether matter was increasing, decreasing, or constant in amount. They should at least have suggested to us that since "atoms" were generated from "electrons" "positive" and "negative" (? male and female), were born and died and had a definite (average) period of "life," they might presently be found to be capable also of *breeding*, although we had not yet detected this habit in an (approximately) stationary population.

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[1] *Science and Life*, p. 116.

Again, if the physical universe is really uncreate and eternal, how is it that the uranium and thorium in it, and indeed all the other perishable substances it contains, have not long ago passed into their "end-products" (if such there are)? Must we not revert to the doctrine of creation and admit that it was no mere "myth"? Or shall we prefer to believe that radio-activity may conceivably be an *acquired habit*, and proves that the "inanimate" world is alive enough unpredictably to change its habits on occasion? We can postulate, of course, a converse process of atomic reconstruction, and even claim to have observed it; but that too, in so far as it is not an illusion, is not a fact (so far), but a methodological assumption. It is mere blindness therefore, or lingering prejudice, to deny that the new facts definitely point to a beginning, and an end, of the cosmic process, and reinforce the implications that were latent in the irreversibility of the course of nature and the "dissipation of energy," which was always a covert way of *denying* the conservation of energy. I conclude that it is an error of tactics for Professor Soddy to call up the old guard of mechanical materialism, as he does in his address on "Matter, Energy, Consciousness, and Spirit."

I pass, secondly, to Professor Soddy's dicta on the subject of Truth (absolute, pure, scientific, and commercial) and our proper feelings and attitude towards it.

As might be expected, he is quite sound, and admirably clear, on the nature of *scientific* truth, the sort with which he is really familiar. It is the child of hypothesis and testing, and holds its rank just so long as there is no reason to suspect it of error. When it is convicted, it is promptly executed, and replaced by a better, descended from itself. "The measure of the exactness and extent of our knowledge of the inanimate universe is shown by our powers of *controlling* it and *guiding it to serve our ends.* In the inaccessible regions of space the *test* is *prediction*, but, with regard to the phenomena around us, in addition to this, imitation and *control* follow understanding and are the signs that we are on safe ground."[1] So the man of science is unperturbed by the vicissitudes of truth, which are incidental to its growth; the continuity of the succession is not broken, and his "sense of direction" is not deceived. He finds this sort of truth so satisfying that at bottom he cares for no other.[2] All of which is simply an expression of what modern philosophy calls the pragmatic theory of truth, and suffices to discriminate real knowledge from spurious.

But unfortunately Professor Soddy does not always content himself with scientific truth. He does not quite discard the notion of *absolute* truth as a blunder incompatible with scientific method. He retains it as a ghost, impalpable and "unattainable."[3] He recognises also a *pure* love of truth for its own sake, which is sometimes "overwhelming,"[4] but fails to specify upon what sorts of truth this manifestation of our cognitive instinct should be bestowed. Clearly the answers to this question will make a difference. If the only truth we love is absolute and unattainable, our affection will be wasted or mocked by illusions. If, on the other hand, it is directed upon commercially valuable researches, we shall be enabled to serve both God and Mammon. But in neither case is the purity and ardour of our affection any guarantee of the value of our object. Professor Soddy fully recognises that our love of truth may be frittered away on unprofitable researches. He disapproves of dissipating effort on "the most useless and uninteresting parts of mathematics,"[5] and "knows from experience in scientific research how easy it is to immerse oneself in a subject that was fascinating to a past generation, and waste time in the minutiæ of still ungleaned detail, until one finds oneself in a backwater which the main tide of discovery has left long since, and wherein one can waste a lifetime, which, if spent among the real outposts of knowledge, would have resulted in substantial and permanent progress being made."[1] Clearly the "pure love of truth" must not be allowed to run *amok*, and even in "pure" science there is need of intelligent *selection* of remunerative subjects of research!

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[1] *Science and Life*, p. 161. Italics mine. *Cf.* pp. 154–156.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 160.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

I would suggest therefore that the time has come for scientific men to drop these misleading phrases altogether. They are simply part of the traditional cant of the old "liberal" education which prided itself on being "useless." But they express neither what they mean nor what they want. What they *want* is to be left alone by the commercially-minded, and to be left free to pursue what they perceive to be the most promising clues of their subject, without being challenged at every step and turn to produce something that has an immediate practical application and can be patented. In this they are quite right; but they should not try to make out that random exploration of a subject guided only by curiosity is more likely to conduct them to important discoveries than the definite incitement of an urgent unsolved problem. What they *mean* is the psychological truism that *personal interest* (generated by whatever ends, hopes, or illusions) must always be the *immediate* stimulus to research. What they *say*, however, plays straight into the hands of those who pretend, for purposes of their own, that the more useless knowledge is the higher and holier it becomes. This, which is *false* of all that is truly *knowledge*—though it long seemed to quench the questionings of the young (and also of their parents) who wanted to know what was the use of what they were taught,—has broken down in consequence of the war and has finally wrecked the old liberal education to which it had treacherously allied itself: it will wreck scientific education similarly, if the interests of the specialist are not subordinated to that of his subject.

This remark leads on, thirdly, to the question of the adequacy of Professer Soddy's educational policy, and of the reforms he advocates in academic constitutions. His main contention is that it is vitally necessary to demand research, and to insist that universities shall justify themselves by adding to the sum of knowledge. This need he does not exaggerate, but he hardly realises how difficult it is to organise universities so that they will actually perform this function to any notable extent. He perceives, indeed, that education and examination, when prosecuted with the implacable zeal that is customary in this country, are serious obstacles in the path of his ideal. But he has not realised that there are others, no less serious and more subtle, which are rooted in the very nature of the professor as such, and in his necessary relations to his subject and to the institution which appoints him.

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[1] *Science and Life*, p. 198.

It is usual to suppose that human institutions exist to realise some purpose, to satisfy some need. But experience shows that when the institution has been set up, it tends to operate so as to defeat the purpose, and to frustrate the desire, to which it owes its being. The practical difficulty is always how to prevent this. How, *e.g.*, are churches to be prevented from killing religion, by deadening and starving the spiritual instincts, and forcing those in whom they are strong and progressive to accommodate their pace, in the ecclesiastical convoy-system, to that of the slowest and least sensitive? How can law be hindered from defeating the ends of justice, how can teaching be organised so as *not* to starve the appetite for knowledge? To counteract these tendencies is a matter demanding thought and effort upon which Royal Commissions might profitably be employed; for every institution, like the living body, generates toxic by-products and waste products, and in the end is choked by them, if they are not effectively purged away.

Now the professor is an institution of this sort. So soon as he is appointed his interests and those of his subject begin to diverge. His subject demands to be made accessible and intelligible, attractive and progressive, in order that its influence may be spread wide over the minds of men. But if he pandered to these demands, he would die of overwork. What is even worse, he would lose caste. His colleagues, the other professors in his subject, would denounce him as a revolutionary, who pits his wild vagaries against the approved wisdom of the ages and upsets men's minds (meaning their stereotyped lectures), as a disregarder of trade-union rules who will not limit his output to what conduces to the comfort of academic life, and, worst of all, as a "populariser," who degrades the dignity of his subject to the level of the average intelligence. "And what *we* can understand," they will justly say, "we despise." He, therefore, feeling that a "populariser" cannot be popular, declines to be a blackleg. In 99 cases out of 100 he seeks safety and honour in the opposite policy. The more conservative he becomes the more he pleases those whose minds have ceased to advance and to assimilate new truth —*that is the old men who appoint and promote him.* The more abstruse he becomes, the fewer he has to teach, the more he is respected, the less he is exposed to criticism. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico.* If he can contrive to develop a specialty that can be entered only through a technical language of his own invention, he becomes a "greatest living authority," and is perfectly safe. Of course he kills his subject in the process, so far as human interest or influence is concerned; but he has his reward. No wonder William James, observing all this, once said to me, in the course of a talk about the unprogressiveness of philosophy, "After all, Schiller, the *natural enemy* of every subject is the professor thereof!" No wonder, too, that there is considerable consensus among professors that their value must not be judged by their output, and that the spectacle of a professor who has triumphantly destroyed his subject, and is flourishing on the proceeds of his crime, is familiar to every academic institution.

All these tendencies are naturally as rampant in Science as in other subjects. They might be even more so, were it not that, unlike the latter, the sciences have a peculiar safeguard. They cannot wholly disavow the belief that knowledge is power, and cut themselves off from the reference to application and the control of events. For they are continually appealing to each other for help in their perplexities, and demanding that science A, say mathematics, shall conduct researches which can be used by science B, say physics. This is in itself just as much an infringement of the independence and "purity" of the science as is the pressure put on it to produce something of commercial value. But it is just as salutary, because it guides its development in the right directions, and protects it against the ravages of the murderous professor. The latter, on the other hand, is the main reason why the sciences are ever growing more technical, and narrowing themselves down to affairs of highly dehumanised specialists, who are devoid of interest in anything outside their specialty, and indeed incapable of understanding it. He is the reason also for "Britain's neglect of Science." For there *was* a time, not so many years ago, when the influence of Science over the minds and feelings of men was appreciably greater than it is now. But that was a time when Science did not scorn to express itself intelligibly, and its great experts, like Darwin and Huxley, did not dread to be popular and disdain to be democratic. In those days Science actually existed as a social fact, comparable with Religion. *Now* it exists no longer. It has been dismembered, like the giant Ymir. We now have no Science, but only sciences, each separated from its nearest neighbour by insuperable tariff-walls of technical terminology, and when scientists try to co-operate, they are stopped by the confusion of tongues. If Science has lost *prestige* and influence, has it not done so by its own act, and deservedly?

I am not among those, who, judging upon too superficial a consideration of the facts, declare that Science is inherently unfit to form the staple of a really liberal and general education, and that the classics have any natural monopoly of broadening influence. It has been proved over and over again that they *can* be turned into hotbeds of pedantry and every educational vice. I cannot readily forget that it was the scholars of the Renaissance who killed Latin as the living tongue of international communication, by decreeing that no idea and no phrase that had not found expression in the works of Cicero should be admitted into Latin prose. And I am ready to admit that it is quite possible to conceive the curriculum even of *Literæ Humaniores* as a divine opportunity for thoroughly obfuscating the mind of youth and rendering it impenetrable to any novelty of thought. Indeed, something of the sort is not uncommonly tried, not only at Oxford. Still the broad fact remains that the traditional education has on the whole been mindful of man's proper study and concerned itself with human nature as a whole, and has often succeeded in opening up the mind, whereas the scientific man has too often scorned, myopically, to look beyond the borders of his specialty.

Consequently those who devoutly hold that Knowledge is one, and is no "Brownian movement" of sciences, each chaotically struggling for its own hand, and, moreover, that Knowledge is *good* and that ever since Adam took a nibble at the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge and failed to perceive that it was the Tree of Life, men have erred in thinking it *bad*, and imagining, in the teeth of experience, that the fear of wisdom is the beginning of virtue, and that the multiplication of knowledge is the multiplication of misery, have a difficult choice. Are they to cling to the old "humanities" that recognise, however imperfectly, the unity of human nature, or to deliver themselves over to the scientific specialist who will mince them up, body and soul? Or shall they try to persuade him that his specialty needs mitigating by philosophy, conceived as a correlating of scientific principles and methods?

This choice really exists also for the scientific specialist. For unless he can grow some *esprit de corps* and sense of scientific solidarity, so as to combine and agree upon some common policy, it is morally certain that he will continue to be exploited, and remain an instrument in the hands of the rulers of the world, powerless for good but with an infinite power to harm. For the world's actual rulers, as Professor Soddy points out, are, as ever, ignorant, stuffed with effete ideas, and mostly savages at heart. On the other hand, it seems simple enough, on paper, to dethrone the old types of ruler. The "British Ass" would merely have to turn itself into a trade-union, and keep its knowledge to itself, in order to rule the British masses. If it would only refrain from the "criminal lunacy" of publishing the secrets of science broadcast, it would speedily become, not only more powerful, but also richer and more progressive than Science now is anywhere. But, alas, the scientific world is *not* united, and so long as its spirit remains specialistic it cannot unite.

If it ever does, its first, most urgent and most difficult task will be to render human nature fit to be trusted with more power over nature. Or, in other words, to insure society against catastrophic disruption by internal forces and inherent vices. This would demand the construction of a really efficacious science of ethics, which would not be content to rehearse time-worn platitudes about (inapplicable) "principles," but would be willing to tackle *la bête humaine*, and in co-operation with an operative psychology and a eugenical biology, would remould man into a creature such as he never yet has been, viz. one able to control and harmonise his passions.

If this effort is not undertaken, and that soon, it is entirely possible that his Science may be the death of man. Not because it is intrinsically hostile to human life, but because it will enable him to indulge in his devastating instincts to a fatal extent. That is the last, and very serious, danger that besets the relations of Science to Life.

Or shall I rather say, the penultimate? For it would be unworthy of the candour with which this article has abounded, if I suppressed a final fear with which Professor Soddy's activities alarm me. It strikes me that, with the best intentions, he may be an extremely dangerous man. He is, one understands, like his former colleague, Sir Ernest Rutherford, at Cambridge, pertinaciously tampering with the integrity of the atom, in order, of course, to unlock the vast stores of energy it contains. He makes it quite clear that, if he succeeded, the energy at man's command would be multiplied a millionfold, and be practically inexhaustible. There need then be no more poverty, because we should be rich beyond the dreams of avarice. A world of such *nouveaux riches* might well inspire the social philosopher with the gravest apprehensions.

But now suppose that Professor Soddy did not quite succeed, but came within an ace of it. Suppose, that is, that he discovered how to *start* the disintegrating of the atom, but not how to control the process or to *stop* it. Fortunately "atoms" appear to behave like sturdy individualists, and to be highly indifferent to the Bolshevism of disintegrating neighbours. Still, their stability depends on motions of vibration, and if the shattering of atoms were artificially accelerated, vibrations might be started that would prove irresistibly infectious. And then would not the rhythmic vibrations that shattered the first atoms spread, with the speed of *alpha*-particles, and attack their neighbours? Every atom would become more dangerous than a 12-inch shell. And there would be 20,000,000,000 or so of such projectiles in every pin-point of "matter." So, almost in the twinkling of an eye, a cosmic conflagration would ensue, the famous ἐκπύρωσις philosophy had prophesied, and make a holocaust of man and all his works. A few years after, the (relatively backward) astronomers on a luckier planet of a distant sun would record the outbreak of a "new star" with a "strong helium line in its spectrum," as the after-glow of human effort. Thus, finally, would Science triumph and settle its account with Life!

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OXFORD.

THE FUTURE OF PROTESTANTISM IN AUSTRALIA.

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PROTESTANTISM in Australia is drifting. Whatever the ultimate explanation of this may be, the drift is actual, and it may be taken as a basal fact that, unless a distinct change takes place in the immediate future, Protestantism as a religious force in Australia will steadily decline. During the war, more especially at the commencement, it was hoped that the serious issues involved would awaken the people to a new sense of obligation in matters of religion. Similar hopes were entertained in Britain, and there as here they have proved vain. It is probable that even the temporary effects were less in Australia than in the old lands. Australia did not feel the strain of the war as Britain did. There was no war here: there were no air raids: there was no food shortage. To us the war was rather an echo of horrible happenings far off, than a thing present and immediate in its danger. The full horrors were not realised by us, and, although we were touched when we lost our loved ones on the battlefield, we could not but look upon the struggle as a thing remote. Certainly the war did not awaken us to greater seriousness in religion, and, now that it is over, our spiritual condition is, if anything, worse than it was six years ago.

Even before the war broke out, the state of Protestantism was such as to cause apprehension to serious men in its ranks. The outward and visible signs of decay were to be clearly seen. The churches were no longer full: many of them were almost empty. Here and there a popular speaker drew a crowd, but, even where crowds gathered, there was no sign of a revival. As in older lands, the old-fashioned Sunday had passed, never to return. People were escaping from the bustle of the city at the week-end to refresh themselves with the pure air of the country or the sea, and the week-enders were seldom churchattenders at the places to which they went. An even more serious indication of decline was the failure to retain the young people in the Sunday school or in the church. There were other signs too, such as the decline in the educational status of candidates offering themselves for the Christian ministry. All combined to show that for a time at least Protestantism was drifting.

One of the peculiar effects of the war was the revival of political Protestantism. It would be most unjust to Roman Catholics generally to suggest that their Church was not loyal to the Empire during the war. Roman Catholic lads fought side by side with their Protestant comrades, and in the great struggle religious differences were subordinated to a sentiment of brotherhood. Unfortunately, another factor was at work at home, producing discord. The Irish question influenced opinion here. Some of the Roman Catholic leaders condemned England for her treatment of Ireland. They opposed the Nationalist Party, and in their opposition went so far as to seek a friendly understanding with an extreme section of the Labour Party which was opposed to the war and was ever ready to act as apologist for Germany. To the onlooker it seemed that in this alliance the Church of Rome was making a vigorous bid for political power in both State and Commonwealth. Finally the purpose became so evident that Protestants awoke to its meaning. A Protestant Federation sprang into being, not as the result of any deep religious motive, but as a patriotic and anti-Catholic organisation. Many Protestants held aloof from it, just as many Roman Catholics held aloof from the anti-British policy advocated by some of their leaders. It cannot be said that the community generally joined the Federation. The average Australian dislikes religious quarrelling. When Roman Catholics and Protestants begin to dispute, he is inclined to exclaim: "A plague on both your houses!" Nevertheless, the combined sentiments of patriotism and Protestantism did for a time give vigour to the Federation, and it even seemed that the Protestant Churches might recover by means of it something of their old power and enthusiasm. In the Commonwealth elections held at the close of 1919 the Federation took an active part, declaring itself to be in favour of the Nationalist policy, to be whole-heartedly loyal, and above all to be opposed at all costs to political Roman Catholicism. There can be no doubt that this anti-Roman feeling was in no small measure responsible for the decisive defeat of the Labour Party at the polls. The Protestant Federation may therefore claim to have justified itself as a political organisation, but not even its most enthusiastic advocates would declare that it has in any way influenced the religious life of the community. Its policy is negative, and it will survive as long as Roman Catholic leaders declare in any aggressive manner that their aim is to obtain political power. As a factor in the revival of Protestantism generally it must be neglected.

What then is to be the future of Protestantism in Australia? The drift is so serious that it must end in ruin if it cannot be checked. The question is, can it be checked? and, if so, how? One answer given to the question is that to avert disaster the Protestant Churches must unite, so that they may be able to present a solid front to their adversaries. For many years negotiations have been carried on in Australia for organic union between different denominations. There was even a movement to secure union between the Anglican and the Presbyterian Churches. To this the question of orders forms an insuperable barrier. Nevertheless, negotiations did take place, and they were characterised by a high seriousness on the part of the negotiating representatives. Various suggestions were made for overcoming the difficulty of orders. One was that all the clergy of the uniting Churches should be reordained. This was scarcely taken seriously. Another proposal was more ingenious. It was an attempt to carry the position without a frontal attack. It was suggested that the question of orders should not be discussed at all, but that, if the principle of government by bishops were admitted, the Church of England might consider whether the welfare of the Church as a whole might not warrant a special and extraordinary measure, whereby Anglicans would accept as on an equality with themselves in the privileges attaching to a priest's orders all ministers in the Churches uniting with them, no matter what the manner of their ordination might have been. The suggestion was ingenious but not practicable, and with the recognition of this fact the proposals for organic union between the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches dropped.

It has been otherwise with the movement among non-episcopal Churches. Negotiations between the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational Churches have now advanced so far that the committees entrusted with the negotiations have been able to lay definite proposals before the governing bodies of the Churches concerned. There are many reasons why union is desirable in a country like Australia. It is a land of great distances, and in country places the preaching stations are usually miles apart. The result is that much of a minister's time is spent upon the roads. Denominational competition leads to sad waste of effort. One little country place may have in it four or five ministers or home missionaries belonging to different denominations, who are competing with each other, while there are other places where no service is held because no minister is available. It would be far better to have united effort. There would then be no competition; ministers would receive a better salary without having to travel such great distances, and the people generally would be better served. The need for economy of effort is one of the great reasons advanced for Church union. It weighs heavily with the Methodist Church, which is by nature a pioneer in bush and other home mission work. Methodist congregations have not yet been consulted, but conferences and synods of the Church have for the most part voted in favour of union. The only serious opposition has come from local preachers, who think that the proposed polity does not make sufficient provision for lay effort and its due recognition in Church courts. Congregationalists also are in favour of union. The Congregational Church in Australia is not strong, and it has so many affinities with Presbyterianism that there seems to be no valid reason why the two bodies should not unite. Both have modified their polity in a practical way to meet the needs of a new land, and in doing so they have drawn nearer to each other. Consequently nothing but sentimental reasons need keep them apart. Sentiment is, however, a strong factor, and it makes itself felt distinctly in a historical Church. It is influencing many Presbyterians against the union proposals. As far as can be seen, about two-thirds of the members of Presbyterian Church courts are in favour of union, but the remaining third are strongly and even vehemently opposed. A "Church Defence Association" has been formed, and its members are resolved to remain Presbyterians at all costs. What under these circumstances will the majority do? They may feel that union is essential, and they may decide to go on, leaving the settlement of property questions to Act of Parliament. If they do so, it will mean that the present Presbyterian Church will be divided. If, on the other hand, they resolve that union is impossible without the agreement of practically all, the union movement will receive a set-back for many years.

That which gives to the question of union such importance is that it is vitally linked to the problem of Protestantism in Australia. Those who advocate it say that it will result in a revival of Protestantism. They maintain that what Australia needs above all else is a strong evangelical Church, which could speak with power and authority on great subjects, and that the forming of such a Church would awaken enthusiasm and give fresh life. If this really would be the case, the duty of those concerned is evident—they should press on with union at all costs. But will this result necessarily follow? There are various considerations which must be taken into account before it can be accepted as certain that union means new life. The Churches which are negotiating for union admit that their spiritual life is weak. Each seems to be hoping that the other will give him something he does not himself possess. A leading Methodist minister recently stated in a conference of Methodists that Presbyterians were hoping they would gain in evangelical fervour by the importation of live Methodists through union. "They are mistaken," he said; "we have not got that evangelical fervour which we are supposed to possess." The fact is that evangelical fervour is at a low ebb in all three Churches negotiating for union. Will the union of three lukewarm Churches make one vigorous and efficient united Church?

It may be taken as an axiom that vigorous life in a Church can only come when the members of that Church believe with all their heart and soul that they have a gospel for humanity which has been entrusted to them in order that they may proclaim it. When Luther nailed his theses to the church door at Wittenberg, he felt that the very essence of the Gospel was at stake, and he was prepared to maintain his case or die. That is the spirit of all great reformers, and it was the spirit which provided the motive power in all Protestant Churches at their inception. Each Protestant Church believed that it stood for truth, and the divisions of Protestantism were due in large measure to the great sincerity of those who held divergent views. To them their creed and their polity were matters of principle, and they were prepared to separate from others to maintain them. That their descendants are now willing to sink old differences may be due to clearer vision and increased broad-mindedness, but it may be due equally well to a spirit of indifference. Men seldom quarrel about things which have no interest for them. Certainly, if Church union is to be successful, the uniting bodies must be as enthusiastic over some new programme of Christian work upon which they are agreed, as their ancestors were about things in which they differed. To the critical onlooker, the absence of a definite constructive programme for the uniting Churches is one of the most serious defects in the movement. There is no rallying-point, such as Luther had when he proclaimed justification by faith, or Wesley when he challenged men to accept or reject the Gospel statement which he uttered. The attitude of many is that they feel union is right, but they have no great enthusiasm for the proposals. They fear that the movement is one of ecclesiastical strategy rather than a great compelling force which will purify and uplift the Churches that are concerned in it. Behind the question of the probability of organic union there is, then, another and more vital one. Do the Churches concerned desire union because they can thereby have a grander organisation and dominate political and social movements in the community, or are they seeking to unite because they are fired with zeal to send out missionaries of the Cross, and can do so on a grander scale by acting together? If there is no fire of religious enthusiasm in the movement, and if ultimately nothing more will be gained from union than the establishment of a strongly organised ecclesiastical body which can hold its own against other ecclesiastical bodies, the motive seems to be similar to that which Protestants have been wont to criticise in the Church of Rome.

It is at this point that the discussion of the local question of the future of Protestantism merges into the larger question of the future of Protestantism throughout the world. The movement towards union in Australia is not accompanied by any outburst of zeal for the spreading of the Gospel. On that point there can be no doubt. Indeed, what its most serious leaders hope is that it will be followed by an outburst of zeal when the people realise what splendid power is in their hands. The prospect seems very doubtful. For one thing, the organisation of Protestantism will never be able to compare in efficiency with that of the Church of Rome. The only real way of securing Protestant unity is by convincing individual members of the right and justice of what is proposed or affirmed. By reason of its very nature Protestantism cannot secure permanent power through ecclesiastical organisation, and it is an interesting fact of its history that at the times of its greatest religious fervour it has tended to division and not to union. This does not prove that union among Protestant Churches is incompatible with religious zeal, but it does seem to indicate that the only way of securing unity is to present a programme of Christianity which will command enthusiasm. The Protestant Churches of Australia are confessedly not doing this at the present time. Can they do it in the future? Can Protestant Churches in any part of the world do it? Is Protestantism a spent force, or can it revive? Has it served its purpose in history, and must it now yield to some larger movement, to something which might be called a New Protestantism, or even a New Catholicism? Obviously, if it is a spent force, then a scheme of union along old lines is futile. Yet this is precisely what the negotiating Churches in Australia are contemplating. The creed which has been drawn up as part of the basis of union differs in no essential from old creeds of the Churches. It might be described as a compromise creed between Calvinism and Arminianism, and this fact in itself indicates that it is inferior in its logical statement to the great creeds of Reformation times. The proposal to make a new creed embodying our conception of Christian truth in the language and from the viewpoint of our age has not even been made. Nor in this are the negotiating Churches in any respect worse than those standing out of the union movement. No Australian Church, episcopal or non-episcopal, has within recent years endeavoured to revise its statement of doctrine in the slightest degree. During the war it was freely said that the Churches must alter if they were to survive in the new age, and padres affirmed without hesitation that old credal formulæ must go. But they have not gone, and the padres, instead of endeavouring to get them altered, have settled down to the old order of things. Meanwhile religion in Australia, or at least that form of religion which is associated with Church life, is at a discount. The working man openly charges the Churches with being under the control of the capitalist. If he makes any exception, it is always in favour of the Roman Catholic Church, never on any account of a Protestant denomination. Young people are everywhere drifting from the Church of their fathers, and here once again the marvellous system of education in the Roman Catholic Church gives it a distinct advantage over Protestantism. Finally, it is a sign of the times that educated people are tending more and more away from the Churches, and university men are reluctant to enter the Christian ministry.

All these facts point to the conclusion that Protestantism is a spent force, and that the Reformation movement is to be viewed, not as the final and perfect embodiment of the Christian Church, but as a wave of progress similar to other waves of progress, destined in its turn to give way to a new incoming wave. Looking at the Reformation without bias, we realise that it was after all but a section of a grander movement. It was, moreover, distinctly limited in its achievement. It was a movement towards liberty, yet it did not achieve freedom. It was rebellion against external authority, yet it is itself a religion of authority. It affirmed the principle of freedom of inquiry, but it limited very severely the scope of those who endeavoured to inquire. It arose in conjunction with a great social and political movement towards freedom on the part of the downtrodden people of Europe, but, from the time when Luther sided with the nobles against the insurgent peasants, Protestantism and that movement, which for want of a better name may be called democratic socialism, have trodden divergent paths. Is it rightly credible that the religion of Jesus has no place for the discoveries of science, for the social ideals of humanity, and for a fearless inquiry after truth? Protestantism has not found room for these things, and the question now forces itself upon us, must it not yield to a grander movement which will find room for them?

If the argument here advanced is valid, the future of Protestantism in any country depends upon the statesmanship and determination of its leaders to bring in a reformation as far-reaching and as drastic as the Reformation of the sixteenth century. A reformation of this kind is spoken of privately by ministers and thoughtful laymen, but there is not the slightest evidence of any movement in any part of Australia to bring it to pass. On the other hand, the temper of Church assemblies and conferences is distinctly conservative, if not reactionary. Occasional attempts are made to bring about a revival, but these follow old lines, and, when made on a big scale, they prove conspicuous failures. It is doubtful if an evangelistic mission such as that conducted some years ago by Dr Chapman, or that conducted still earlier by Dr Torrey, would now be taken up with any enthusiasm at all. Dr Torrey realised that a change had come over the people when he said that his task was harder than that of Moody. The people of to-day have a set of ideas different from those of the people of fifty years ago, and the evangelist finds that his appeal evokes little response. It is not the function of an evangelist to recast doctrine. His work is to reawaken enthusiasm for beliefs already held. The fact that he fails to do so now is another proof that what is needed is something more than a revival of the old type: we need a second Reformation.

It would not be possible to conclude a discussion on the future of Protestantism in Australia without reference to the possible consequences of the establishment of Church schools on a large scale. This is a policy which is finding many advocates in Protestant Churches here at the present time. The Church of England took the lead several years ago, and it has for some time carried out a definite progressive policy. More recently the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches have resolved to do the same. The Presbyterians of Victoria are endeavouring to raise a fund of £250,000 for the carrying out of proposals for the furthering of its system of Church schools. The Presbyterian Church in New South Wales has recently received a large bequest which will enable it to extend its work in this direction. In Queensland Presbyterians and Methodists are working together for the establishment of schools. The declared object of these schools is to strengthen the Church by giving to young people sound instruction in the Bible which they will not get in the secular Government schools, and by fostering a spirit of loyal attachment to the Church. It is not supposed that these denominational schools can meet the needs of more than a relatively small portion of the community, but it is thought that they may do much for the Church of the future by training men and women who in days to be will occupy important posts in the land. The scheme thus outlined has possibilities, though it remains to be seen whether it will receive the support from the people which the leaders desire.

There can be no doubt that the Protestant authorities have been influenced in their determination to establish Church schools by the success of the Roman Catholic schools. The Roman Catholic policy of religious education had its genesis in the counter-Reformation movement. It arose at a time when the fortunes of the Church were at a low ebb, and when the losses were more pronounced than those which are manifesting themselves in Churches at the present day. The object of the movement was partly missionary, inasmuch as it sought to reach out to and gain the children of Protestants; but it was also conservative in the sense that it aimed at keeping the youth of the Church within its ranks. From the point of view from which it was designed the system has been eminently successful. It was the genius of Ignatius de Loyola which first showed how it was possible to construct a system of education upon primary emotions and instincts. His system has been modified and adapted to suit new conditions, but the fundamental aim is the same. With the scientific exactness of trained psychologists, Roman Catholic teachers build up a system of ideas and sentiments which will bind the scholars throughout their lives to the Church. That is why the Roman Catholic Church in Australia has so much power over its young people.

By analogy with the effect of the Roman Catholic system of instruction in arresting the drift from its ranks, the proposed development in the educational policy of the Protestant Churches seems to be full of promise. Why should Protestants not evolve a system of education which will be as effective as the Roman Catholic? Unfortunately, it is just here that the radical defect in the proposals comes in. Protestantism has never seriously attempted to evolve a religious education system of its own. Here and there individual men like Arnold of Rugby or Thring of Uppingham have endeavoured to make their schools centres of religious influence. To Arnold belongs the credit of utilising games as a means for disciplining character. It must also be admitted that he succeeded in making religion "good form" for the boys of his time; but, while granting this and much more to the great public-school master, it is impossible to find in his system the materials for a complete scheme of religious education, and public schools of a later age which have followed along the lines he laid down are by no means successful now in linking the young people who attend them to the Church. There have been Church schools of this type in Australia for many years. These schools are excellent in many ways, but they certainly are not centres of religious influence. Our Churches admit this and lament it, and yet in their proposals for establishing new schools they have no suggestions to make for increasing the efficiency of the religious training. Obviously, it will not serve their purpose to model their system on that of the Church of Rome. The Roman system takes as a fundamental position the acceptance of a set of dogmas without inquiry. The whole purpose of their system is to prevent inquiry within the range of those dogmas. Protestantism, on the other hand, must allow individual judgment. Rightly conceived, a truly Protestant system of education would aim at leading the pupil to perfect freedom of choice, yet withal to an acceptance of truth and right for their own sake. To do this it must avoid the methods pursued by the Roman Catholics, formulating instead a scheme based upon a clear conception of the nature of moral freedom and of the genetic factors leading thereto. It would seem that the establishment of such a system must be one of the aims of the New Protestantism. Meanwhile, nothing of religious value can be hoped for from the movement in Australia to establish Protestant Church schools. Certainly it can do nothing effective to stop the drift.

From this discussion the conclusion seems inevitable that the future of Protestantism in Australia is doubtful in the extreme. Church union, even if accomplished, will not mark the opening of a new era. The most it can do will be to stem the drift for a short time, and it is quite possible that by dissolving old ties and destroying old sentiments it may even hasten the process of decay. Nothing can be expected from the education policy, and there is no social policy in any of the Churches other than that connected with the centres of benevolent activity which have existed for years. Sunday schools are confessedly unable to retain their scholars, or to instruct them adequately while they are with them. Under these circumstances the only possible result seems to be gradual decay. That is what is happening at the present time. The Protestant Churches of Australia are slowly disintegrating. Our intellectual activity is not being directed towards religion. Instead, we are under the influence of a practical materialism which is not sufficiently interested in religion to talk about it. This materialism has laid its deadening grip upon our Church life as well as upon the general life of the community.

Yet, in spite of all these things, it is not possible to believe that true religion will die. Out of the wreck of the old must evolve something new. One would like to think that the Protestant Churches possessed within themselves the forces that would enable them to evolve a new order from the old. The present indications are that they have not, and that to endeavour to bring about a reformation within the ranks of Protestantism is to try to put new wine into old wine-skins. So far from endeavouring to reform, our Churches are discouraging the spirit of initiative because it involves too rude a conflict with inherited beliefs and institutions. Men of liberal views are sadly leaving them because they cannot find a home within them.

Yet in history it is often the unexpected which happens. Australians have been so occupied hitherto with the material problems that face them in a new land that they have had no time to think deeply about spiritual ones; but with the development of our land a new era may dawn. If once the idea of a New Protestantism grips the imagination of Australians, that spirit of daring and even of lawlessness which made our soldiers achieve so much in the great war will enable them to evolve a new system unfettered by the mistakes and errors of the past, in which the Gospel of Jesus will have a truer and grander interpretation than it has ever yet received; in which justice, mercy, and truth will be supreme; and which will provide scope for the restless striving of the human soul to know and realise that which is unseen and eternal.

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MELBOURNE.

A TEACHING CHURCH.

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In the *Shepherd* of Hermas, a Christian document of the second century, occurs the following striking passage: "A revelation was made to me, brethren, while I slept, by a very beautiful young man who said to me, ‘Who do you think the old lady was, from whom you received the little book?’ ‘The Sibyl,’ I replied. ‘You are wrong,’ he said; ‘it was not the Sibyl.’ ‘Who was it, then?’ I asked. ‘The Church,’ he replied. ‘Why then was she old?’ I inquired. ‘Because,’ he said, ‘the Church was created before all things, and for her sake the world was framed.’"

This sentiment, which represents a common opinion of Hermas' Christian contemporaries, is probably shared by few of us. The Church, we commonly believe to-day, is not an end in itself, but, like all other institutions, a means to a farther end. It exists to serve, we say, rather than to be served; to minister rather than to be ministered unto. Not the world for the sake of the Church, but the Church for the sake of the world, is the watchword, and justly so, at any rate of most modern Christians.

There have appeared recently two very significant books throwing light upon the way the Church has served, or failed to serve, the world in our own day—the one the report of a British Interdenominational Committee, entitled *The Army and Religion*, the other the report of the American Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, entitled *Religion among American Men*. Both of these reports agree in calling attention to the extraordinary and lamentable ignorance on the part of the soldiers concerning Christianity—concerning its nature, its meaning, and its *raison d'être*—ignorance on the part, not simply of those who have never had anything to do with the Church, but also of those who have grown up under its influence and in more or less intimate contact with it. The reports agree also in the conclusion that the chief deficiency of the Church lies in the field of education, that whatever else it has done it has egregiously failed to make itself and its message understood.

To quote from the British report:

> "That probably four-fifths of the young manhood of our country should have little or no vital connection with any of the Churches, and that behind this detachment there should lie so deep a misunderstanding of the faiths by which Christian men and women live, and the ideals of life which they hold, is, perhaps, the most salient feature of our evidence. Here is an alarming fact, which is, surely, clear proof that something somewhere has gone gravely wrong, and that the hour has come when we must discover the hidden causes of the evil and do what may be done to set things right." (p. 240.)

Similarly, the American report says:

> "The testimony that we have received goes to show that if a vote were taken among chaplains and other religious workers as to the most serious failure of the Church, as evidenced in the army, a large majority would agree that it was the Church's failure as a teacher. We have not succeeded in teaching Christianity to our own members, let alone distributing a clear knowlege of it through the community at large." (p. 131.)

The situation thus described demands the most serious attention of Christian people. How are we to explain it, and what is to be done about it?

It should be said that the evidence adduced in the reports concerns only those of Protestant affiliations and antecedents. Had the study included Roman Catholics as well, we may guess that the results might have been very different.

I. How, then, are we to account for the failure of our Protestant Churches to make Christianity more generally understood by the young men who belong to them or have grown up under their influence?

A fundamental cause of their failure is to be found in the Reformation itself. When the Catholic Church was abandoned by the Reformers nothing adequate was put in its place. Catholicism was not only a complex of theological doctrine, but also a well-defined system of moral teaching. Indeed, its moral teaching was its most important part. The whole career of the Christian was carefully regulated, and with its ethical code, its confessional, and its penitential discipline the Church afforded constant instruction in the conduct of life. With the Reformation all this was swept away. The dogma of a present salvation by faith alone meant the repudiation of righteousness by works and the consequent relegation of instruction in morals to a wholly subordinate place. Instruction in doctrine would have shared the same fate had it not been that saving faith was early identified with sound belief, and the purpose of the Reformation interpreted as the purification of doctrine. To teach the true faith thus became a matter of primary importance, in comparison with which the inculcation of Christian ethics seemed of small moment.

Again, it is to be remembered that Protestantism appealed from the authority of an infallible Church to the authority of an infallible Bible. But the Bible lends itself to a great variety of interpretations, and as a consequence the traditional dogmatic system was soon displaced by a multitude of discordant systems each claiming to represent the infallible truth of divine revelation. Inevitably, in the rivalry of warring sects, stress was chiefly laid upon the things in which they differed, and their adherents were schooled rather in their distinctive peculiarities than in the great fundamentals of human faith and duty. Had there been a single undivided Protestantism to set over against Catholicism it would not have been so bad, though even then, probably, Christianity would have been widely overlooked in zeal for Protestantism. But, as it was, not only Christianity but Protestantism itself was too commonly lost sight of in concern for Lutheranism or Calvinism or Anglicanism. In their interest in their own peculiar sect, men ceased to ask what Christianity itself was, or rather they identified it with the tenets of their own form of Christianity and thus made it a system having to do with the periphery instead of the centre of human life. This substitution of the things of secondary for those of primary concern has cruelly avenged itself in these modern days. The old denominational interests have broken down. One of the most striking facts, indeed, revealed by the British and American reports is the impatience of the soldiers with the sectarian divisions of Christendom; and their impatience is but symptomatic of the attitude of thinking men everywhere. But there remains out of the wreck of the old denominationalism no adequate appreciation of what Christianity is or can be if it be not mere Anglicanism or Presbyterianism or Congregationalism. No wonder the Protestant world is in dire confusion as to what it is all about.

Another cause of the failure referred to is the evangelical revival, the greatest revival in the history of Protestantism, whose effects are still felt in every Protestant communion on both sides of the sea. The significance of the evangelical revival is that it confined attention largely to the experience of the new birth. To save men by bringing them to Christ was its great concern. Like the old-fashioned novels which always ended with the marriage of hero and heroine, the old evangelicalism stopped with conversion. What followed seemed a matter of minor importance, or a matter so simple and self-evident as to require no special thought. Moreover, her absorption in winning men for Christ left the Church little time and strength to guide those already won. A simple theology and a simple code of ethics became a necessity, and it is no accident that the test of Christian orthodoxy was reduced to the acceptance of the atonement and the deity of Christ, and the test of Christian character to abstinence from a few definite and widely popular pleasures. Relieved of the necessity of more elaborate doctrinal and ethical instruction, the Church could give itself, both at home and abroad, to the work of evangelism. The Church was transformed, in fact, from a teaching Church into a converting Church.

If evangelicalism's radical simplification of Christianity had proved permanently satisfactory this transformation would perhaps have mattered little. But unfortunately the simplification was exclusive, not inclusive, and from the beginning left out of sight vast areas of thought and life which have steadily widened with the growth of humanism and humanitarianism during recent generations. As a result the old evangelicalism has become little representative of the mind of Christendom and little responsive to the needs of modern men. That Christianity should seem of all things wholly unreal to vast numbers of the troops, both English and American, as countless witnesses testify, is an illuminating commentary upon the distance we have travelled since the days of the evangelical revival.

II. The immediate duty of the Church, then, is to resume the teaching function which it fulfilled so magnificently in centuries long gone. It has confined itself in recent generations too exclusively to the rôle of exhorter, has been too content with inspiring men instead of instructing them.

What is most needed now is neither exhortation nor inspiration but education.

The Church's teaching function has been largely taken over in modern times by other agencies—the press, the public school, the women's club, the lecture platform. These are not a cause but rather an effect of the abdication by the Church of its ancient responsibility. I have no desire to urge that the Church displace these modern agencies and try to do the work in their place. I am the last one to wish again to bring secular education and the organs of public opinion under ecclesiastical control. But within its own sphere the Church has a duty to perform whose importance is only accentuated by the confinement of its responsibility to the narrower field. When the Church was the great moulder of thought, the great mistress of life in all its varied aspects—artistic and literary and scientific as well as religious—it was possible for it to command the respect of intelligent men whether they were interested in religion or not. Now that its province has been so greatly circumscribed, it must at least show itself expert in the narrower field, or it can count on nothing but indifference or contempt.

The rapid development in recent years of the movement known as Religious Education is a very promising thing in the life of the modern Church. But religious education must not be confined to the Sunday school. The Church itself must become an educational institution. No successful man stops learning when he leaves school. In business or trade or profession he is constantly acquiring education. So it should be in religion. It is all-important that the young receive adequate religious instruction, but it is no less important that they go on learning even after they are grown. The moment education stops, development is arrested and decay sets in. Religion is no finished product which can be imparted in a few lessons and retained through life unchanged. It is a living interest or it is nothing. And so the Church should be a lifelong school, constantly training its members both in the theory and the practice of Christianity.

If preaching has any place at all in the modern Church, it is only as a form of teaching. It shows a lamentable lack of religious insight and of practical efficiency to make the sermon usurp the function of worship, to use it as a means of inspiration when prayer and praise, which presumably bring the worshipper into communion with his God, should be far more effective sources of inspiration than any human speech. There is undoubtedly altogether too much preaching in our churches.

Only the man really fitted to teach should be allowed to enter any pulpit.

But far more important than the sermon is the discussion class in which Christians hammer out for themselves the truth they need to live by. No modern university would think of getting on without the seminar. How many of our churches have anything remotely resembling it? Democracy in education has penetrated our modern schools and colleges, but our churches live still for the most part in the age of pedagogical autocracy. And how antiquated are the text-books of the Church! Creeds formulated centuries ago still express for us ostensibly the principles of our religion. The chief objection to historic creeds is not that they compel us to believe things we have long outgrown, but that they relieve us of the responsibility of trying to put the things we now believe into teachable form for the generation that now is.

But if the Church is to be a teaching institution it must be a learning institution as well. It can be a worthy *ecclesia docens* only as it is a faithful *ecclesia discens*. What should we think of a university which had in its faculty teachers only and no scholars?—which simply purveyed knowledge handed down from the past and discovered nothing new? The Roman Catholic Church, with its infallible truth and its infallible interpreter, may not need to learn; but Protestant Churches are in no such easy case. When the Reformers broke away from the old Church they found it necessary to go to school again, and the very essence of Protestantism is the recognition that we have not reached finality but must be ever seeking. We have had a fresh demonstration in the last half-dozen years that there is still much to learn. The perplexity of the Church in the midst of the war, its hesitancy in confronting the issues raised by the awful catastrophe, its abnegation of moral leadership and its contentment simply to follow in the wake of public opinion, all this showed its own uncertainty touching the nature and meaning of the Christianity which it claims to represent. Are we surprised that the men in the trenches were so largely in the dark about Christianity? The churches at home, their members and their leaders, seem to have been little better off. It is high time for the Church to awake to the necessity of subjecting itself to a thorough course of instruction. It must cease repeating the lessons it learned long ago. No teacher could continue to command the respect of his pupils who followed such a method, and the Church ought not to be surprised if it loses its hold upon the world when it has nothing fresh to give.

Even if the Church had a changeless message, as the Roman Catholic Church at least believes it has, it would still be obliged to adapt it to an ever-changing situation. For to teach successfully you must have regard to your pupils as well as to your subject. But Protestants believe in an ever-enlarging revelation, and hence the Protestant Church, if it is to be a teaching Church, must be an ever-learning Church, keeping abreast of the age not merely in its expression of the truth, but also in the truth it expresses.

It is frequently said that the Church has lost its influence as a teaching Church because of the divergent and contradictory views that prevail within it; that if we are to recover our leadership we must get back the old unity of faith and the old conviction of absolute truth; and modern criticism, which has resulted in the overthrow of many old beliefs and the unsettlement of not a few minds, is often blamed for the difficulties we are in. This, however, is wholly to misunderstand the situation. There was a time, perhaps, when men took their opinions ready made from their betters, when the main thing in the teacher was to be certain he was right, when demonstration gave place to assertion and learners were convinced by the very positiveness of their teacher's declarations. The Roman Catholic claim to infallibility was exactly suited to that age, and is still suited to the survivors of it. A dogma, asserted dogmatically enough, carries conviction to their minds. But Protestantism by its very constitution neither belongs to that period nor is intended for that kind of people. It is not conviction in the teacher but convincingness in the message that is needed. A certain modesty in the Christian teacher is as becoming as modesty in the teacher of any other subject. Not that he knows infallibly the truth of what he is saying (such knowledge is the cheapest thing in the world, and the most easily assumed by ignorant men), but that he has made his best effort to find out the truth and urges others to test it by their own experience; to accept or reject or improve upon it, or better still to make fresh and independent research for themselves. That kind of teaching makes a subject interesting and attracts students to the study of it. Any other kind makes it simply a task to be learned, which is abandoned at the earliest possible moment. This means no abnegation of our Christian faith. It means to trust Christian truth enough to let it make its way, as any other truth must make its way, not by the pressure of infallibility but by the persuasiveness of its own appeal.

The issue between these two attitudes is a radical one. If the Church thinks itself commissioned to impose a complete and finished Christianity upon a docile world, it must reconcile itself to a continuance of the unfortunate situation revealed in the British and American reports. The modern world is not docile and will not take that kind of thing from anybody. Why should we expect it to, when all education—outside the Church at any rate—is doing all it can to put an end to such docility ?

But it is not enough for the Church to be a learning Church and clothe itself in the humility of the true inquirer. If it is rightly to fulfil its teaching function it must turn its eyes from the superficial and unimportant matters that have too largely absorbed its attention and must grapple with really fundamental questions. A frequent criticism brought against the Church by the soldiers, according to both reports, is its failure to throw light upon the burning problems forced upon men's minds by the war. Questions of polity and ritual and doctrine, interesting enough to the theologian and the sectary, but wholly foreign to the average man; questions of ecclesiastical authority, of Biblical inspiration, of historical criticism, all these have their place. But there are times—and this is one of them—when they pale into insignificance beside the greater questions of human life and destiny: the spiritual interpretation of the world in which we live; the possibility of believing in God at all in such a world; the reality of human freedom and responsibility; the validity of religious and moral values; the nature of the Christian ideal and its practicability in this modern, materialistic, mechanistic age. It may be retorted that such problems as these are as old as human history, and that Christianity has dealt with them over and over again and disposed of them for good. But the retort is misplaced. Most of the questions that agitate philosophers are hoary with antiquity, but they have to be studied afresh age by age in the light of the new experiences and achievements of the race. Christianity cannot escape the responsibility to reconsider its own traditional solutions. It has taken too much for granted and has allowed itself to become absorbed in things of lesser weight, on the assumption that the greater things were settled long ago. The assumption was never less warranted than now. We have got to re-think the fundamentals of Christianity and of all religion, and in the re-thinking we shall find emerging many things that were not dreamed of in our ancient theologies.

The note of unreality in contemporary Christianity is frequently commented on in the quotations from the soldiers. What does that mean but that Christianity is dealing too much with issues that are no longer living issues for the mass of men? One trouble is that the things the Church is saying seem to multitudes of so little consequence. It is not that they seem untrue but that they seem remote and, even if true, not worth bothering abont. If the Church is to regain any measure of its one-time leadership it must grapple with living problems that make a difference in the life of the world. Not that it should deal with all the passing questions of the day. Many of them it may best leave severely alone. But that it should concern itself above all with the great underlying principles upon which all life must ultimately be built for good or ill. More theology we need, in my opinion, not less—a theology that takes things seriously and is not the mere child and handmaiden of some economic or social programme.

The earnestness with which scientists are continually testing and re-testing their fundamental assumptions is worthy of all praise. Christian teachers, dealing as they do with issues of even greater moment, should emulate their example. Too commonly we are only dilettanti in our chosen field. We must come to grips with bottom facts even at the risk of making mistakes. Knowledge progresses by error, and the Church ought not to be afraid of it. It is a great curse to be thought infallible, for you have to be so careful lest you betray your fallibility. The Vatican dogma of papal infallibility, from which so much was expected by many of the faithful, seems only to have condemned the successor of Peter to inglorious silence.

If what I have been saying is true, it is evident that the Church to-day is most in need not of administrators, and not of pastors, and not of preachers, but of teachers. Of course I do not mean mere occupants of professorial chairs, but those who, whatever their official position, whether in pulpit or pastorate or college or seminary, are equipped to discover and interpret the truth. In their hands is the real leadership of the future. In the early Church the apostles, prophets, and teachers were the recognised leaders because it was believed they spoke for God, whose will was the law of the Church. When Christianity was well established and its principles had become stereotyped the teacher was of less importance and the ecclesiastic took his place. At the Reformation, leadership passed again for a season to the teacher, the discoverer and promulgator of truth. But once more the truth was made safe by the formulations of the creeds, and the ecclesiastic assumed his wonted control. Now again, as in other critical and creative epochs, it is the teacher's opportunity; for it is not the spread of the Church as it is that the world most needs to-day, but a reinterpretation of Christianity which shall make it once more mighty for the regeneration of humanity.

The Church's most pressing problem is to find the needed teachers. How is it to get them? Only as it can convince the rising generation of the reality of the need and the genuineness of the opportunity—that the need is the world's and not the Church's need alone, and that the opportunity is not hedged about with restrictions created by timidity and fear, but is as open as the vast realm of truth itself. For some reason, as is made manifest again and again in the British and American reports, the world outside the Church thinks that the Church cares less to discover truth than to confirm the truth it already has. In some way or other we must convince the world that it is wrong in this opinion. When we have succeeded in doing that we shall not lack leaders, and right-minded men everywhere will again gladly look to the Church for the leadership they need in the things of the spirit.

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MIRACLE AND PROPHECY.

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THE present generation has witnessed a revolution in Christian Apologetics. All down the ages until the later part of the nineteenth century the main defence of the truth of Christianity rested on the two pillars, miracle and prophecy. Paley's *Evidences* carried the old method on into our own times by being used as a University examination text-book—a soul-destroying futility. Meanwhile more recent productions with fresh handling of the whole subject have laid increasing stress on pragmatic, moral, and spiritual considerations. A good illustration of this new tendency may be seen in Bruce's *Apologetics* (International Theological Library). The innovation has come none too soon, and it must go further, because criticism is emulating the feat of Samson in the temple of Dagon with its treatment of the two old pillars on which have been piled the massive structure of orthodox theology.

It is true that some of those arguments which can be better appreciated to-day were not wholly unknown to antiquity. That second-century work, the beautiful little *Apology* of Aristides, calls attention to the innocent character of the Christians and their kindly conduct; Tertullian appeals to the *Anima naturaliter Christiana;* Lactantius makes much of the moral grounds of belief; and indeed it may be allowed that no apologist has been so foolish as to neglect them entirely. Nevertheless they were relegated to a secondary place, and the most earnest attention of the apologists was always focussed on their two favourite witnesses, miracle and prophecy.

In the earliest times the precedence was given to prophecy. This is seen in the New Testament, the Apostles and the gospel witness repeatedly appealing to the realisation of passages quoted from Hebrew Scriptures in confirmation and explanation of their statements. Seeing that some of them claimed to possess the charisma of miracle-working, it is very noteworthy that for the most part they made singularly little use of it in the way of evidence. The author of the Fourth Gospel is the one exception to this reticence—a perplexing phenomenon, seeing that he goes deeper than any other New Testament writer into the spiritual nature of Christianity. Accordingly one able critic thinks he detects a later editor in the author of these appeals to miracles in the Johannine literature. It was the same with the patristic apologists—Justin Martyr, Origen, Eusebius, Augustine, and others, with all of whom the fulfilment of prophecy is the dominant topic of appeal for credence to the Christian Message.

When we turn to the eighteenth century, that golden age of English apologetic theology, we find the centre of gravity shifted from prophecy to miracle. If only Hume can succeed in destroying belief in the physical marvels of the Bible, the citadel of the faith would seem to be lost. On the other hand, if Paley can so marshal the evidence as to convince a British jury that they actually happened, Christianity is to be accepted as a revelation from Heaven.

It needs no discussion to show that neither of these lines of argument grips the age in which we live, and indeed it is no longer possible to use them as they were employed by our forefathers. Then what place, if any, should the two subjects —miracle and prophecy—take in Christian theology?

1. MIRACLE.

No one can deny that the attitude of thinking people towards this subject has undergone a tremendous change during the present generation. Until recently we were complacently invited to believe in Christianity because of its miracles. To-day the very reverse of this position is adopted, and some declare that they have renounced the gospel message for the very reason that it is miraculous—as, for instance, the melancholy Robert Elsmere, who becomes an unbeliever in orthodox church theology because "miracles do not happen." Others claim a stalwart faith when accepting Christianity in spite of its miraculous element: this element perplexes them; they would much rather it did not exist. But they yield their reluctant credence to it for the sake of the spiritual truth with which it seems to be bound up. Others, again, take a bolder course, eliminate the miracles, and breathe freely in the pellucid atmosphere of their expurgated Bible.

The questions that here arise are much more complicated than those of the times of Celsus, Voltaire, or even of Hume. In the first place, there is the critical inquiry into the comparative authority of the various Biblical documents and their sources. For example, in dealing with the Pentateuch we find the first literary draft of the Hebrew legends in "J" dated about the ninth century B.C., the Deuteronomic sections, "D," from the seventh, and the Priestly, "P," from the fifth centuries. Evidently these successive strata must vary in historical value. But the very earliest of them are hundreds of years later than the persons and events to which they refer, and the bridging of that dim intermediate period we can only assign to unveritable tradition. How entirely different is the case of the gospel history recorded by contemporaries who had eye-witnesses for their authorities. Then we have the contributions of ethnology and comparative religion with the myths and legends of the early national history of other peoples to compare with the primitive Hebrew stories. The researches of Sir James Frazer throw a flood of light on this subject. We cannot ignore his striking analogies. But now, taking the Bible narrative as it stands, a little consideration should lead us to discriminate between the many different kinds of marvels, all of which the apologists have been accustomed to label with the one title "miracle." That the priests by bearing the ark into the bed of the Jordan should arrest the flow of the river is one thing, and that Jesus should hearten a man with a withered arm to straighten it is another; and it only confuses the issue to set them both in the same category as is done in a list of "Bible Miracles." Nevertheless, with regard to the gospel story itself, we should do well to bear in mind Dr Sanday's caution that, if the occurrences there recorded had been reported by modern scientific observers, probably their accounts of them would have been very different from the New Testament narratives. Even here, where the evidence comes so near to the event, we have to consider questions of exactness of observation, correctness of memory, and accuracy in recording—all on the part of simple folk who are quite ready to believe in marvels, and who have no conception of the uniformity of natural law, while their admiration for their Lord and Master is most enthusiastic.

On the other hand, the scornful attitude of arid rationalism argues limited mentality. The question is too complicated. It seems to be impossible even to frame any adequate definition of the word "miracle." The New Testament has three words for occurrences we have been accustomed to designate miraculous, viz. δύναμις, σημεῖον, and τέρας—rendered respectively "mighty work" and "miracle"—literally "power," "sign," and "wonder," none of them terms of any very specific application. The first meaning of the English word "miracle" in the *Oxford Dictionary* is "marvellous event due to some supernatural agency." But here we have another word very difficult of definition — the word "supernatural." The eighteenth-century notion of miracle as a breach of the laws of Nature—adopted by Hume—has been generally abandoned because it involves an unproven assumption. The more modest science of our own day declines to set any limit to the powers and possibilities of Nature. An age that has witnessed the discovery of radium and X-rays, and seen the invention of the wireless telegraph and telephone, would indeed be foolish if it pretended to say what could and what could not happen without any disturbance of the course of Nature. Nor is this all; that bed-rock of science, the theory of the uniformity of Nature, is now recognised to be the result of an empirical induction, which by the nature of the case must be imperfect.

Hume's argument on the ground of probabilities may be irrefragable, so long as we grant his data and allow no more. But here another phase of philosophy comes to be observed. The sharp distinction between bodily and mental, physical and spiritual, has broken down. The materialistic conception of the universe advocated by Tyndall, Clifton, and Häckel is giving place, under the influence of Bergson, Eucken, and other more recent and metaphysical thinkers, to the idea of mentality as the primary factor of existence; so that we must interpret matter in terms of mind, rather than mind in terms of matter, as the materialists had attempted when saying that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." Lastly, in this connection we have to take note of the study of psychotherapeutics, now only in its infancy. There seems to be no known limits to the operations of hypnotism, curative suggestion, telepathy, the influence of one mind on another mind, and also the influence of a mind on the body with which it is connected. When, therefore, we read of a personality so unique as that of Jesus Christ being associated with wonderful cases of the healing of sickness and insanity, we may well pause before relegating the many stories of the kind, so well attested in the gospels, to the limbo of baseless superstition. We might be wiser if we followed the hints which He Himself has given us, and if we therefore aimed in our more limited sphere at some humble following of the great deeds which He said He effected "by the finger of God."

Now, with this conspectus of the case in view, the question returns as to what is the significance and value of it for Christian faith? Here we cannot do better than turn to Christ's own treatment of the subject. It is quite clear that He scarcely attached any importance to His miracles as evidences of the soundness of His claims when pressing His teaching home to the people.[1] If they asked for a sign, He flatly refused to give it them. The expression, "a sign from Heaven," seems to indicate something more startling and portentous than those works of healing—perhaps something like the manna to which reference is made in the Capernaum discourse of the Fourth Gospel, or possibly Elijah's sign of the fire on the altar at Carmel, seeing that our Lord's mission had come to be associated with the name of that prophet. This shows that while no one doubted the reality of His wonderful cures, they did not convince people of the genuineness of His mission. Why should they? The exorcising was assigned to Satanic agency. He Himself spoke of exorcism as being carried on by His opponents, and the deliverance of demoniacs was the most frequent and best known of His curative works. Matthew declares that when at Nazareth He could not do many mighty works because of the citizens' unbelief (Matt. xiii. 58). If the miracles were designed to instil faith, that unbelief would have been the very reason why He should have produced them there. Moreover, while the apologetic argument is not given as His aim, another motive is clearly assigned by Matthew—this is, that He was "moved with compassion." Here is a plain, simple, perfectly intelligible explanation of how it was that He came to spend so much of His time and energy in healing the sick. To give an apologetic or didactic meaning to His action is to take the bloom off His gracious ministry. He saw suffering; He was conscious of power to remove it; therefore His immeasurable compassionateness drove Him to respond to every appeal for relief.

Shall we then say that all this was but a kind of by-product of His ministry, of no significance in view of its world-wide and age-long purpose? That would lead us to conclude that His sympathy with what came immediately under His eyes was largely distracting His attention from the real object of His mission, and so suggest an appearance of sentimentalism.

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[1] It is true that He seems to point to His miracles in His message to John the Baptist (Matt. xi. 4–6). But His inclusion of preaching the gospel to the poor as one of His "signs" may suggest a metaphorical meaning in the other phrases. Anyhow, the case is exceptional.

Florence Nightingale must not spend too much time as "the lady of the lamp" nursing the sick if she is to accomplish her stern task of saving an army from stupid incompetence. But suppose we ask ourselves, how did our Lord propose to accomplish His great work? The answer may well be that this was mainly by the very living of His life as the brother-man in the spirit of love to God and one's neighbour which He taught as of primary importance. His cure of a few scores or hundreds of Jews scarcely touched the fringe of the great world's misery. But in doing what He could within His influence Jesus did His part, and as He gathered followers it would be that they within the range of their powers should do their parts, and thus as the spirit of His life spread abroad the kingdom of God would be growing in power and transforming the world into the new heaven and new earth. This may be a very superficial view, but it may help us towards ascertaining the true value of our Lord's deeds of mercy.

No doubt this view of the place of miracle in relation to religion, especially as it cannot but assign the magnificent pageantry of Old Testament supernaturalism—the wonder of our childhood—to the category of unhistoric legend, will appear to impoverish the Bible. But what does it take away? A wholly materialistic treasure, at which the ignorant and shallow gape in awestruck wonder, but which is of no moral or spiritual value. When Aaron's rod, turned into a serpent, swallows the serpents which have been produced by Pharaoh's magicians out of their rods, this might seem to show that Hebrew magic was stronger than Egyptian magic, but it could neither prove the moral right of Moses' demands nor the truth of his religion. There is no reason to think that the real value of the Old Testament is lessened by criticism of its physical marvels. On the contrary, the fascinations of those marvels had turned our attention away from the weighty matters for which we should prize the Hebrew Scriptures. A great nature poem such as Psalm civ. is of more religious significance than Miriam's song in celebration of a physical wonder. Indeed, the old orthodoxy leads to the melancholy conclusion that "There hath passed away a glory from the earth" because we do not enjoy the privileges attributed to antiquity. Besides, it implies that Christians are less favoured than Jesus had been. The mighty arm outstretched for the deliverance of Israel is not raised to save the Armenians from slaughter. Thus there is a double preference—a preference of antiquity to modern times and of Judaism to Christianity. Accordingly, those Old Testament marvels, if proved to be historical, would tend to discourage present faith by the comparison of the sublime past of Israel with the mournful fate of modern Christendom. But now we are learning to perceive the most valuable parts of the Old Testament to be those sublime utterances of the prophets which set before us great ethical and religious verities, by their very nature eternal, and as serviceable to us as they were to the Israelites of the past.

Then as regards miracle in the New Testament, while the unique personality of Jesus Christ may well induce us to believe in the unique character of His actions, we can gather from His own teaching that He would not have this so completely without parallel as we have been accustomed to suppose. He conferred the gift of healing on His disciples. There are those among us who hold that He intended it to be practised continuously, that it has only been lost by failure of faith, and that it might be recovered—and perhaps in some cases has been recovered—by a reawakening of this primary requisite.

2. PROPHECY.

The apologists have treated prophecy in much the same way as that in which they have been accustomed to deal with miracle—they have valued it mainly as a phenomenon indicative of supernatural agency. The prophet has been regarded as a man gifted with capacity to write history in advance of the events he described as predestined to happen. The subsequent verification of his predictions by the occurrence of those events has then been appealed to as a miraculous proof of the divine authority of those statements. Now with regard to this treatment of prophecy two remarks may here be made. First, if the logic of the implied argument is allowed, that will not amount to a proof of the truth of the later Christian message; it will only go to the credit of the type of Hebrew religion represented by the prophets; in other words, the conclusion pointed to will be not faith in Christ, but faith in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and their confrères. Second, the gift of "second sight" penetrating into the future is no proof of the moral or spiritual value of the general teaching of the men who enjoyed it, nor even of their veracity. We cannot say that because Balaam foresaw the future greatness of Israel his religious teaching in Mesopotamia or Moab was true and weighty.

But now, even within the circle of the marvellous, and when that is valued for the sake of its marvels, the argument very often breaks down. Fragments of Old Testament literature, torn from their contexts, have been cited as aptly fitting New Testament events, to which we must say that they certainly were not applied by the writers, even if the gift of prevision were possessed by those writers, for the reason that the much simpler interpretation of them as referring to contemporary or older events is plainly indicated. For example, the author of our First Gospel sees in the flight of Joseph and Mary with the child Jesus a fulfilment of the prophet's saying, "Out of Egypt did I call my son" (see Matt. ii. 15 and Hosea xi. 1). But the passage in Hosea shows clearly that the original reference was to the exodus of Israel under Moses. Similarly, that evangelist's treatment of Judas' thirty pieces of silver (Matt. xxvii. 9) as a fulfilment of the prophecy in Jeremiah (cited from Zech. xi. 13; with a reference to Jeremiah xxxii. 6–9) and the disposal of Christ's garments as described in the gospel of John (xix. 24), there regarded as having been foreshadowed in scripture—viz. Psalm xxii. 18—are both instances of a new application of Old Testament words which were evidently intended for contemporary reference without the least thought of the meaning subsequently given to them in the New Testament. Plainly the claim to fulfilment of prophecy based on any such accidental coincidences, while allowable according to the quaint methods of Rabbinical interpretation, are inadmissible under the rules of scientific exegesis. But these coincidences were never important, and the apologist can afford to lose them, while he cherishes the great prophecies, the contents of which are of inestimable value, namely, those which express spiritual and ethical truths and their issues—the essential "burdens" of Hebrew prophecy.

Now, when we come to inquire into the relation of these sublime utterances to Christian truth, we find that we must take up a different ground from that of the old apologists if we are to adhere to sound methods of literary interpretation. In the first place, we see that the most characteristic feature of the prophetic mind was the gift of insight rather than that of foresight. The popular prophet is a person who foretells the future. But even in the form of the utterances only a small fraction of Hebrew prophecy is expressed in the future tense. Most of it is concerned with present affairs, and its greatest productions set forth eternal truths, truth independent of time. The prophets tear up the veil of hypocrisy and shatter the fabric of self-delusion, making a terrible exposure of the condition of their contemporary world, with penetrating insight into human nature. This gives a prophecy the value of an articulate conscience. But the prophets do not stay with mere exposure and denunciation. Speaking in the name of Jehovah, they declare the counsels of God as these are revealed to them; in other words, they have inspired visions of spiritual truth. This statement demands no formal verification. It is of the nature of such truth to be self-evident when once it is brought home to our awakened spiritual nature, and that is what the dogmatic form of Hebrew prophecy assumes. Then, on the rock of this revelation of God's eternal verities faith builds its hope for the future. The greatest utterances of the prophets point on with assurance to judgment and redemption. The essential idea is that God being what He is, just and good, mighty and merciful, He will not, cannot let the wrongs of the world go on unchecked, or its desperate needs unsatisfied. The golden legend of the Davidian Age associates the future deliverance with a restoration of the royal line in a descendant of the idealised son of Jesse. This is the sum and substance of Hebrew prophecy in so far as it concerns the future. Meanwhile questions of dates and other formal details among which our modern prophecy-mongers revel have really no place here. Products of idle fancy, they are irrelevant and unimportant.

Now we come to the fulfilment of this prophecy as a confirmation of the Christian gospel. Here we must reverse the common process of argument. Instead of asserting that the prophets foresaw what Jesus would be and do, in some cases down to minutest details, we have to turn the case round and say that He endorsed the great ideas of the prophets, and moulded His course of action upon the programme with which they furnished Him, and that He did this deliberately and discriminately, selecting those prophecies with which He was most in sympathy and working on the lines which they had laid down.

We have two palpable illustrations of this method. The first is in our Lord's discourse at Nazareth, when He selected a passage from Deutero-Isaiah and declared that the Spirit of God was upon Him in order that He might do the things there promised (see Luke iv. 17-21 and Isaiah lxi. 1, 2). It was not that the prophet had foretold what the Christ was destined to do; it was that Jesus adopted this prophet's scheme, and was proceeding to carry it out.

The second illustration is seen in the story of the triumphal entry. This was carefully arranged by our Lord down to the method of obtaining the loan of a colt from some friend in a neighbouring village. Matthew rightly detected a fulfilment of prophecy (see Matt. xxi. 4, 5 and Zech. ix. 9). But everything in the story indicates, not that Zechariah had a vision of Jesus riding on the ass, but that our Lord chose this, for Him, quite unusual mode of entrance into Jerusalem, in order that at the very last, abandoning His habitual secrecy about His claims, He might declare Himself as the expected Christ, but without adopting the popular Messianic militarism. Instead of the war-horse on which a conquering monarch would be expected to enter His capital, the prophet depicts the great Deliverer coming in a gentle way of peaceful travel. This ideal Jesus now publicly undertakes to realise.

This fulfilment of prophecy as a programme intentionally adopted and voluntarily carried out by Jesus, rather than as the mere happening of things predicted ages before, is of much higher value as a testimony to the truth of Christianity than the old apologetic view. That view, as we saw, went to glorify the Hebrew prophecy itself rather than the Christian gospel. It was a mere marvel of no moral or spiritual value. But now, in seeing the programme of prophecy carried out by Christ, we have a splendid testimony to the character of His gospel. In the prophets we have set forth the world's desperate need, and over against that the revelation of the very heart of God which assuredly promises redemption from present evils. Then comes Christ, facing that dark problem of evil which the prophets expounded so terribly, and setting Himself to bring about the promised deliverance. In so far as His message is received, and blind eyes are opened and captive souls set at liberty, this programme is fulfilled, and Christ is seen to be realising the brightest dreams of the world's greatest seers.

WALTER F. ADENEY.

LEWES.

THE CLAIMS OF SCHOLASTICISM ON MODERN THOUGHT.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

In the period after the death of the Apostles, a vast number of theological problems presented themselves to the early Church, and for several hundred years controversy as to the substance of the deposit of faith did not cease. Scholasticism is a term of wide meaning applied in a general way to Western European thought from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries. By Scholasticism is meant the method of presenting Catholic faith which takes the substance—revealed truth,—arranges all the data of religion under a well-knit system of theology, and reserves to philosophy the task of arranging these truths in their logical connection, deducing inferences, solving difficulties, and harmonising apparent discrepancies. In a word, it designates both a method and a system that grew out of the academic curriculum of the schools.

It is necessary to call attention to the fact that Scholasticism deals with the divine as well as the human, with the theological and ecclesiastical as well as with questions of philosophy and natural science. At the same time it did not fail to distinguish between these two sides of truth, one of which it called revelation and the other reason. While it was the essence of Scholasticism to maintain the agreement of the two, it was equally essential to hold that there is a distinction between them. Nowadays, Scholasticism is accused of undue subservience to authority, and represented as an ambitious attempt to rationalise all religious as well as purely scientific thought. In the philosophic part of the work the Scholastics accepted Aristotle as their guide. St Anselm of Canterbury was the forerunner of the Scholastics inasmuch as he applied philosophy to the doctrines of religion, without founding a connected system of theology. Anselm was the first writer to state the ontological proof of the existence of God, and he was also the founder of Scholastic realism, the theory (derived mainly from Plato) that universals are real archetypes of the particular things, and that the particulars are mere copies of these universals. He found a brilliant imitator in the genius of Abelard, whose lectures at Paris and elsewhere drew large numbers of students, but Abelard's teaching soon led to heresy. It was St Bernard of Clairvaux who by his trenchant logic and inspired eloquence averted the danger, and Abelard died reconciled to the Church. But the real originator of Scholasticism was Peter Lombard and the great friar doctors of the thirteenth century. The most prominent of these were Alexander of Hales in Gloucestershire, a locality no longer identifiable (*doctor irrefragilis*, died 1245); Blessed Albertus Magnus, Bishop of Ratisbon (*doctor universalis*, 1193–1280); St Bonaventure, the biographer of St Francis Assisi (*doctor seraphicus*, 1221–1274); among the great theologians were John Duns Scotus (*doctor subtilis*, 1266–1308) and the English Franciscan, Roger Bacon. But the greatest of all was the Dominican, St Thomas Aquinas (*doctor angelicus*, 1225–1274), who surpassed all by the depths of his speculation, the clarity of his method, and the extent of his learning. His *Summa* has to the present day remained the standard work of Scholastic philosophy and theology. And the long line of Schoolmen was closed by William of Occam (1280–1347), the invincible doctor who revived the nominalist views.

Scholasticism has taught students to think, to distinguish carefully the meaning of technical words, to systematise knowledge. Its greatest exponent, St Thomas, brought Christianity into closer relations with civilisation and with science, and, while fully protecting the ascendency of religion, he also awarded to the other departments of life their respective rights. In fact, the very essence of Scholasticism is, first, its clear delimitation of the respective domains of philosophy and theology, and, second, its advocacy of the use of reason.

The world to-day feels more than ever the need of a philosophy which is, at one and the same time, true to all the facts of human experience, which gives an adequate account and explanation of the things that are, and which also safeguards the great and immutable principles of justice and moral law. The world is alive to the dangers of the Gospel of Might, and is ready to receive a Gospel of Right in its place. Mankind cannot live and exist without a philosophy, and we may venture to hope that one of the results of the recent war will be a return on the part of European thought to those sane principles of Scholastic philosophy which alone offer a satisfactory basis for human knowledge and human activity.

The unhistorical neo-Thomism has often caused the original and genuine system to be depreciated. That St Thomas stood at the summit of intellectual development of his age is convincingly shown by Dante's recognition of him.

St Thomas is one of the great reconcilers, of that order of spirits who have no rest until they discern truths, seemingly at strife together, converging towards and merging in truth itself, the ineffable. One can readily imagine him anything but dismayed at the present results of physical science. Like Aristotle (whom he knew only through a Latin translation), his master, he would eagerly and promptly apply to them his doctrine of "form" and "matter." Truth, to him, would still be the equation of perfect assimilation of the subject knowing with the object known. And in solving riddles offered him he would still have pursued his method of careful equilibration, of balancing between conflicting statements. He cherishes the medium between extremes. Nominalists and Realists might contend; he is with both parties, and with neither. He seeks that higher truth which, haply, should satisfy. And, as is ever the case with the conciliatory, he is claimed by all parties in turn; declared to be inconsistent; praised or blamed for inveterate scepticism. For philosophy, pure and well reasoned, founded on the broad basis of scientific fact, is the greatest human asset in the life and development of any individual, or of any community.

It may be remarked that opinions are often determined more by intelligent anticipation of antecedent probabilities than by a careful examination of facts. And it must be confessed that it does not seem very likely that the writings of St Thomas should be studied or held in high esteem by our non-Catholic philosophers. Even among Catholics there was some need of a movement of revival in Thomistic studies. And if the orthodox had, apparently, been guilty of some neglect in this matter, it can scarcely be supposed that the writings of the Angelic Doctor have been duly esteemed and attentively studied by Protestants and unbelievers. And beyond all this, we have the patent historical fact that, as a result of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the old Schoolmen were deliberately dethroned and rejected, and their names were made a byword for sophistry and hair-splitting and foolish disputation. Nor can it be supposed that their philosophy fared any better than their doctrine and their Latin style. For did not Bacon come to complete the work of the Humanists and Reformers, and set a new inductive philosophy in the place of the discredited mediæval metaphysics? Surely, a contemptuous treatment of the Schoolmen is one of the characteristics of English Protestant tradition.

Apart from the anti-Catholic prejudice which, as Mr Belloc reminds us, has prevented St Thomas from taking his rightful place in English philosophical studies, the philosophy of the Schoolmen has also suffered undeserved disparagement and neglect from other causes which, though often combined with the *odium theologicum*, are really distinct and independent. "It is idle to indulge in visions of hypothetical history," writes an anonymous critic, "yet it may be safely said that the authority of the mediæval masters would have suffered some decline in England even if the religious revolution of the sixteenth century had never taken place at all, or had never affected this country. For we have abundant evidence of what may be called a pre-Reformation depreciation of Scholasticism, both here and on the Continent, largely due to two main causes—to wit, a natural reaction arising from certain excesses of the latter Scholastic disputants, and the rivalry and hostility of the new Humanist scholars." The influence of both these diverse forces may be clearly seen in the brilliant pages of More and Erasmus. And as this estrangement from Scholastic tradition, to use no stronger term, began before the rise of Protestantism, it can scarcely surprise us to find some traces of it in Catholic lands and in our own theological literature. One may remember how Huxley, nearly fifty years ago, complained, on the one hand, that every day he heard "'Cause,' 'Law,' 'Force,' 'Vitality,' spoken of as entities by people who can enjoy Swift's joke about the meat-roasting quality of the smoke-jack, and comfort themselves with the reflection that they are not even as those benighted Schoolmen." And, on the other hand, he allowed that Scholasticism was anything but dead, and that men of the highest calibre "hold by it as the best theory of things that has yet been stated." All Scholastic philosophy is based upon the distinction between *matter* and *form*. Modern thought makes light of the difference. Likewise, we must bear in mind the distinctions of *substance* and *accident*.

In his candid *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, Sir James Mackintosh—the redoubted antagonist of Edmund Burke, the man for whose memory Macaulay had such a profound reverence that he was once nearly driven to vindicate it on the field of honour—certainly speaks of

St Thomas with great respect. And he seems to have studied his writings so carefully that he discovered therein an unnoticed anticipation of the controversies of Bossuet and Fénelon. "It is very remarkable," he writes, "though hitherto unobserved, that Aquinas anticipated those controversies respecting perfect disinterestedness in the religious affections which occupied the most illustrious members of his communion four hundred years after his death; and that he discussed the like question respecting the other affections of human nature with a fulness and clearness, an exactness of distinction, and a justness of determination, scarcely surpassed by the most acute of modern philosophers." As, in spite of all this high praise, Mackintosh endorses some of the conventional censures on the Scholastic system, his tribute to St Thomas might, perhaps, be dismissed as inconsistent, and merely an individual eccentricity. But he forestalls this objection by assuring us that all the great men who knew his writings spoke in his praise: "The praises bestowed on Aquinas by every one of the few great men who appear to have examined his writings since the downfall of his power, among whom may be mentioned Erasmus, Grotius, and Leibniz, are chiefly, though not solely, referable to his ethical works." And even opponents cannot deny that St Thomas is the master of precision and analytic subtlety. How many systems of philosophy perish for the want of clarity! How profound the groan of foreigners over German thought! On the other hand, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Mill are indebted in some measure to their style.

It was, however, in 1879 that Pope Leo XIII. gave impulse by his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* to the renewed study of Scholasticism, and above all of St Thomas Aquinas. The philosophy of the Angelic Doctor was freely admitted to be one of the chief marvels of the ages miscalled the Dark. It could be admired in the way of an incomparable cathedral. More than this, it was now claimed that the majestic monument was capable of being restored and adapted to the requirements of our own times. The encyclical describing Christian philosophy as Scholastic urged the renewed study and application of Scholasticism, especially as synthetised by St Thomas Aquinas. Side by side with the lessons of ancient wisdom, it also advocated the full use of recent discoveries in the natural and social sciences, from which treasures might be drawn "equally profitable to religion and society."

Science and philosophy are each of them autonomous. Truth is truth, from whatever source it comes, and cannot be opposed to itself. But what of the supposed subservience of philosophy to theology in the Middle Ages? Is this to be renewed in modern times? Cardinal Mercier and his colleagues go upon the old distinction, recognised in the Middle Ages, between philosophical and religious dogma. Their "Rational Dogmatism," as the tendency of neo-Scholasticism may be termed, is philosophical, not theological. The relations of philosophy and theology are as those of philosophy and science; autonomy, self-determination, is the order of the day. It is not the business of the philosopher to vindicate the certainty of theological data or of scientific conclusions. And may we not add, in the way of comment, that this is fair dealing, however it may lend itself, upon various issues, to those subtleties of control and interpretation which came into view, for example, in controversies between the Ultramontanes and the Agnostics of the last generation, or indeed at any period from the Renaissance onward to the present?

It would be difficult to conceive a more demonstrative object-lesson of the hopeless bankruptcy of the philosophies that have reigned in Great Britain from Hume to Herbert Spencer. Assuredly this should be a hopeful season for urging by every means in our power the claims of an old philosophy that justifies our trust in our intellectual faculties, that provides a solid foundation for the ethical convictions of mankind, that satisfies the religious instincts of our nature, and that finally furnishes a coherent rational theory of life for the human race—for the individual, for the family, and for the State. We are living in an age in which the critical faculty far overweighs the constructive, when we can see the faults of what exists and expose them, and see and appreciate all kinds and sides of truth very much more effectively than we can build systems which can commend themselves constructively. We do not say that a critical age is more intellectual or exhibits more intellectual power than a constructive age; but they are different. The great power of St Thomas Aquinas to construct a great system intellectually, which takes account of all the known facts, and which commends itself to a great circle of people, and becomes their adequate intellectual expression—that sort of constructive power we do not appear to possess, at any rate in large measure.

Philosophy is, indeed, perennial, alike stable and full of change. Duly recognising our human limitations, we had best accept the words of Bossuet: "We must not loose hold of any truths which we know for certain, whatever difficulty there may be in reconciling some of them with others; we must, so to speak, hold on tightly to both ends of the chain, though we cannot see the middle of it, nor follow it with our eyes from end to end.” Philosophy must for ever start from the facts of which it claims to give an adequate explanation. In other words, philosophy is not, and should not be, divorced from the particular sciences; it must, on the contrary, go to them for its facts, and keep in touch with their developments. There are also the relations of the new philosophy with its competitors, and with the data of science. Philosophy, to Cardinal Mercier, is “the full understanding of the order in the universe, of man’s moral duties resulting from it, and of his knowledge and reality.” Philosophy is science “at its highest degree of perfection, that knowledge which penetrates to the bottom.” Other knowledge grows from more to more, and also the knowledge of human limitations. Sytems perish. Truth, philosophy, are ideals, to use Cardinal Mercier’s words, “which in the present conditions of human life we can only approach and never attain.”

During the last fifty years, successive Pontiffs have taken step after step to promote the teaching of the Scholastic philosophy in ecclesiastical seminaries. Their avowed object was to provide Catholics, and above all the priesthood, with a solid basis against the vagaries of modern idealism. A coherent system for present uses, it was urged, could be furnished by St Thomas alone. Aristotle, Plato, St Augustine —the “two Antiquities,” Græco-Roman and Christian—were reconciled in the Thomistic philosophy. Here, if anywhere, the Christian philosophy which had been the perennial desideratum was adumbrated, if not fulfilled. But what of the modern natural sciences with their enormous reach? Philosophy was duly to be wedded to these very sciences. The ancient principles of Aristotle were of sole avail to interpret and assimilate the established data of science; indeed, it was only by their means that these data were explicable philosophically.

As for the suggestion that famous modern philosophers have appropriated some of the wisdom of St Thomas, we will quote the following testimony of Coleridge: “In consulting the excellent commentary of St Thomas Aquinas on the *Parva Naturalis* of Aristotle I was struck at once with its close resemblance to Hume’s essay on Association. The main thoughts were the same in both, the *order* of the thoughts was the same, and even the illustrations differed only by Hume’s occasional substitution of more modern examples. I mentioned the circumstance to several of my literary acquaintances, who admitted the closeness of the resemblance, and that it seemed too great to be explained by mere coincidence; but they thought it improbable that Hume should have held the pages of the Angelic Doctor worth turning over." It will be enough here to remind the reader that modern Oxford has been guilty of "Scholasticism" in the person of one of her most eminent psychologists and mental philosophers—Dr M'Dougall in *Body and Soul*; that even the Dean of Carlisle has told us that another Dean of the fourteenth century, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, anticipated Bishop Berkeley; and we may ask whether Vitalists of to-day would have leapt from Aristotle to Van Helmont, had they studied the *Summa* of St Thomas Aquinas.

If in cultivating their own field with such conspicuous success the mediæval masters did nothing for those physical sciences which have made such rapid strides in a later age, it must, in fairness, be allowed that they did nothing to hinder or delay the progress of scientific inventions and discoveries. But it may be remembered that Pope Leo XIII., in his celebrated Encyclical on St Thomas and the Scholastic Philosophy, expressed a hope that the renewed cultivation of that philosophy would contribute to the progress of the sciences. Neo-Scholasticism is a brave challenge, a notable claim to reconcile science and metaphysics; philosophy must ever draw upon the results of the various sciences as they come to the view; and, the sciences of nature offering a shifting and progressive basis, how shall any synthesis be final? History humanity in the long run must judge. For the present, one could only state in more or less detail that Neo-Scholasticism is received with indifference, welcomed as helpful and adequate, rejected in haughty and hostile fashion. Science twits philosophy with being but poetry at the best, and philosophy bids science consider that it founds upon hypotheses, assumptions, fictions, thus fairly incurring its own reproach. One feels inclined to say that it would be difficult to find a closer approach to the scientific attitude of mind which Huxley described as ideal: "Sit down before the fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses Nature leads, or you will learn nothing."

St Thomas sometimes consciously went beyond Aristotle. On the whole, he was more concerned to square Aristotle with Christian teaching than to square himself with the Stagirite.

The light of reason is as that of a lamp or of the sun, equally diffused on all sides and by its illumination permitting consideration of the whole circuit of the horizon. That of instinct is a straight, extremely narrow, and very brilliant beam. A philosopher ought not to get himself out of his difficulties by an appeal to theology, nor rest his thesis mainly on theological grounds. Philosophy should be proved by philosophy. But, once so proved, the proof way well be confirmed by theological considerations. It may safely be asserted that there is nothing in Scholasticism that is incompatible with the progress of the physical sciences. If the Middle Ages were comparatively poor in scientific discoveries and inventions, no serious historian of science would lay the blame on the dominant philosophy of the age. For the same comparative poverty is found in lands or in periods unaffected by the philosophy. And, from the nature of the case, the first stages in scientific discovery must be slow and gradual, while the pace is accelerated as facts accumulate and experience gives rise to improved methods of research. The new Scholasticism has abandoned such of its old doctrines as are now known to have been false, while retaining the great constitutive doctrines of the mediæval system, but only after their having stood the double test of comparison with the results of present-day science and with the teachings of contemporary systems of philsophy.

At a time when Empiricism is a dominant philosophy, when Agnosticism is trying to take the place of faith, it is fitting that we should know the common-sense of St Thomas. Those who have any acquaintance with the *Summa* can hardly fail to be struck by its strictly methodical and symmetrical arrangement. His style is distinguished by a manifold brevity. There is brevity in his word, in his phrase, in his paragraphs, in his articles. This has been justly noted as a proof of the author's architectonic genius—in the world of thought, alike to that of the contemporary architects who were building the great mediæval churches. Nor must it be believed that St Thomas is too conservative a mind for these progressive days. It was the error of the Scholastics to put too full a reliance on the secular philosophy, history, physics, and criticism of their own day, to be ever eager to enter into harmony with it, to regard their painfully wrought syntheses as final. Clinging to that belief, their successors were often disposed either to ignore the total change of position on the part of secular thought, or else to labour vainly to bring the world back to that philosophy which their syntheses supposed, and for which alone it availed. Even our first principles now are beyond the daring conjectures of the early ages.

> "What sages would have died to learn,
> (Is) taught by cottage dames."

Perhaps the full significance of a work like the *Summa* of St Thomas Aquinas is not often realised. The questioning of all things in heaven and earth that went on in many directions throughout the mediæval period is reflected in the objections which the author puts before every enunciation of a particular truth. And in, *e.g.*, the arguments which he states for belief in the existence of God, it is most interesting to notice how he confines himself to the use of what we call inductive methods, how he always tries to reason from the known to the unknown. Harnack, in his *History of Dogma*, says with justice that the science of the period when St Thomas lived was "in fetters." Then he goes on to say: "The science of the Middle Ages gives practical proof of eagerness in thinking, and exhibits an energy in subjecting all that is real and valuable to thought, to which we can find, perhaps, no parallel in any other age."

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"EFFECTIVE IDEALISM."

(*Hibbert Journal,* July 1920, p. 659.)

In the article in question Mr F. R. Hoare seems to underrate the danger of taking neighbourly kindliness for the whole duty of man. It would be easy to imagine (some of us may even think we have actually in some measure had experience of) a state of society in which such an imperfect ethic was in vogue; in which goodness and good-nature were confounded, and adherence to principle stigmatised as evidence of a cruel, perverse, even of a bad heart; in which the moral approval of the community went out, for instance, to the patron who considered the nearness and neediness of particular candidates for office above justice and the efficiency of the public service, or even to the professor who gave away examination secrets for the "benefit" of beloved pupils; where, in fact, the general attitude was roughly this, that here we all are under a malignant system to which we owe no loyalty, so that the most we can do is to relieve the misery it inflicts upon those immediately about us.

I do not, of course, accuse Mr Hoare of advocating any such attitude; I only say that his article suggested the above not entirely imaginary picture to the mind of one at least of his readers as inevitably as Sir Francis Younghusband's article apparently suggested to him his delightfully satirical picture of the dilettante pantheist.

What the good citizens of our philanthropical Utopia forgot was that one must not only love one's neighbour as oneself: one must also love God with all one's soul. This is the first and great commandment. Now, Mr Hoare, by doing his best to conceive God as a kind of big neighbour, does his best also to represent God-love as a kind of neighbour-love. As a pantheist, I feel that this identification is unfair. Surely the theistic notion of the love of God is nearer to the pantheistic mood than to the notion of ordinary neighbourliness. God-love may be nearer to neighbour-love than world-love often is, but surely God-love is itself nearer to world-love (I hope I make my proposition clear without a diagram) than it ever is to neighbour-love. God-love and world-love supply the same necessary corrective to neighbour-love. The real rivalry seems to lie between God-love and world-love.

Now, nobody denies the emotional appeal of the idea of loving and being beloved by a personal God; but what becomes of that appeal if the idea itself fails to satisfy the intellect? This is the question which the modern moralist has to face. Moreover, it is hard to see how a consciousness of the special and personal interest in oneself of a being who is also specially and personally interested in everyone else in the world, born and unborn, besides having the sparrows, the lilies, and the angels to consider—how such a consciousness, even if it can be induced, is calculated to stimulate a rational mind more than the thought, say, of a system favourable to the best that is in us. How much, I mean, of the monotheistic fervour of the past has not been fiercely stimulated by the thought that the worshipper was in some way, racially or individually, the elect and chosen of a partial Deity? The fact is, we are driven more and more to seek our corrective to mere human kindness in some such pantheistic notion, however sentimentally chilly it may feel at first.

To make the world-lover a worshipper of his own ease, as Mr Hoare does, is surely a gratuitous unkindness! It is easy to caricature the moral impulse in any form; Mr Hoare's own busy Samaritan might in the same spirit very well be represented as prompted by a subconscious sense that he is somehow feathering his own nest, and making friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness. To judge as good and just those qualities in others and those aspects of the universe which suit our private ends is a deep-down human instinct, not confined to, nor even most commonly noticeable in, such imaginative types of mind as find inspiration in world-consciousness. Only the man who makes the highest ends his own is worth hearing on the subject of human virtue and of the "goodness" of the world. Whether such a man be prompted chiefly by world-love or by neighbour-love is mainly a matter of temper and brain; but in the one case his neighbour-love will be more discreet than that of ordinary men, in the other his world-love more abiding and effective. OSWALD COULDREY.

ABINGDON.

"MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 776.)

IT would be difficult for any Christian psychologist to find himself in disagreement with the general conclusions of this article. There are, however, particular points which seem to be open to more or less serious criticism.

The first point is a psychological one of no great importance to the argument. The author says that "stored within the psyche . . . is the whole record, without exception, of every experience the individual has ever passed through." Now, it is true that many apparently lost memories can be shown to be really stored in the unconscious mind, but there is absolutely no evidence for the extreme statement that no memory is ever lost. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine any observation which could be devised to prove it. Freud, who has particularly emphasised the importance of unconsciously stored memories, points out that the permanence of the whole record cannot be proved.

A more serious criticism must be directed against the statement that by Dr Freud "the sexual element in human nature is far too exclusively dwelt upon. It is held to be present in almost every phase of human mentality, normal and abnormal, to affect every relationship in life, even that of parent and child and brother and sister."

We must object, in the first place, that this statement is liable to mislead, since the author does not point out the extended sense in which Freud uses the term "sexual." It includes the psychic or higher aspect of the instinct, as well as the somatic or lower. It includes, therefore, everything covered by the word "love" as ordinarily used. It is, moreover, extended to include many activities with a strong pleasure tone which are not usually spoken of as sexual (as, for example, the baby sucking at the breast).

Furthermore, a Freudian might ask why we must reject Freud's conclusions on the importance of sexuality. Because "such conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid," is Miss Caillard's reply. But what is this more than an expression of the fact that the author has a "resistance' against the idea of the dominance of sexuality.

Freud's conclusions on the subject of sex may indeed be overthrown or modified; but it can only be as a result of scientific criticism of the whole psycho-analytic position. We cannot accept this position as, on the whole, valid, and then reject such part of it as repels us. Such an attitude proclaims itself to be unscientific.

The author's solution is, in psychological language, "the sublimation of repressed instincts into religious channels." With this solution we can have no quarrel.

But is not something else necessary—the frank recognition of the fact that there is no "lower" or "higher" in human nature; that the instincts which we think it unpleasant even to mention are, in themselves, not less holy than the intellect on which man prides himself? The chaining of the sexual instinct has a moral value only because unchained it would become anti-social. For the sake of society, it must be repressed. In itself it may be, as Coventry Patmore suggests, the earthly pattern of the eternal purpose of man's nature—the Love of God.

R. H. THOULESS.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

"SURVIVAL AND MONADOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 803.)

I AM so much in agreement with the general trend of Mr Powell's observations on my article that I hesitate to make further comment. It may be well, however, that I should disown any intention of ignoring the distinction which he so rightly emphasises. Otherwise it might be supposed that my main contention has, at any rate in this regard, been invalidated.

I freely grant that what we know as "matter" exhibits certain characteristics which lead us to differentiate it from what we term, by way of antithesis, "mind." To ignore these characteristics would be futile. But this is not to allow that we are therefore precluded from regarding matter as being of an essentially "psychical" nature. Its claim to a special category may be due to its plane, or grade, of being, or to its mode of manifestation under the conditions and limits of our experience. Without in any degree blurring the distinction, I ventured to maintain that the physical universe is the "appearance" through which we apprehend a certain class of interactions between monad will-centres. As regards the problem of the relation between body and mind, I repudiated the hopeless dualism which assumes a gap between them. I placed, in sharp distinction to such a theory, the supposition that the body is a highly specialised community of monads. Its physical characteristics would thus be the "appearance" of the complex organic relations thus established. Its reality as a definite mode of being is not for a moment brought into question, nor the necessity for submitting it to physical categories. But there is a world of difference between regarding it as mere material used by an alien mind, and regarding it as a peculiar manifestation of psychical activities.

I trust that this brief restatement of my case may suffice to clear me of the charge of confusion, and may justify my assertion that "the true line of advance, on the score of probability, would be to discover the 'psychical' nature of what we now call 'physical.'" J. EDWARD MERCER.

CHESTER.

"BUDDHISM AND SPIRITISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 721.)

MR DE SILVA's account of the importance attached in Eastern countries to the creation of a harmonious atmosphere for the act of death may be interestingly compared with the attitude attributed to Socrates in the final scene of the *Phædo*. He is here represented as being greatly concerned lest his friends by their lamentations should disturb the state of *εὐφημία* (*i.e.* "holy calm") at which he aimed, and in which he wished to take his departure. To ensure this, he states, was not the least of his reasons for sending away the women of his household:—

> "ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν · καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν."

The reference to the fear of the creation of a state of dissonance, or the disharmony of a false chord, is also noteworthy as indicating the desire of the philosopher for a "harmonious shaping of his last thoughts." The precept is stated by Archer-Hind, on the authority of Olympiodoros, to be derived from the Pythagoreans. E. W. ADAMS.

SURBITON.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

Professor G. DAWES HICKS.

During the last six months several very important contributions to philosophical thought have seen the light. In particular, three works of far-reaching significance, which will be reviewed at length in these pages, call to be noted. Professor S. Alexander's Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time, and Deity* (London: Macmillan, 2 vols., 1920) constitute undoubtedly a permanent addition to metaphysical science. With the intrepid daring of a Spinoza or a Hegel, Professor Alexander attempts to show that the multiplicity of the universe is derived from Space-Time, as the ultimate ground of things. Space-Time he conceives to be the stuff of which all existents are composed, a stuff which breaks up of itself into the complexes which the world contains. The theory itself is certainly bold and striking, but the great value of the book consists in the thorough and detailed way in which the theory is worked out. Not only mathematical and physical science, but biology and psychology are freely drawn upon for material, and Professor Alexander's handling of the many problems that present themselves is suggestive and stimulating in the highest degree. Dr William M'Dougall, who is leaving Oxford to succeed Münsterberg in the Chair of Psychology at Harvard, has contributed to the *Cambridge Psychological Library* an interesting volume on *The Group Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), in which he tries to determine the principles of the mental life of groups and to apply those principles to the understanding of the life of nations. He rejects the notion of a "general Will," but holds that a society acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who compose it. Such a society becomes, in his view, an organised system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system. One of Dr M'Dougall's contentions which is likely to occasion difference of opinion is that during the historic period the peoples of Europe have made no progress in innate qualities, moral or intellectual, although that period has been characterised by immense mental development. Is it possible thus to sever the "innate" qualities from the empirical details of knowledge and conduct? Lastly, Dr A. N. Whitehead's Tarner Lectures on *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge University Press, 1920) form a very welcome supplement to his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, reviewed by Dr Broad in our January number. While the previous work based itself chiefly on ideas directly drawn from mathematical physics, the present book keeps closer to certain fields of philosophy and physics to the exclusion of mathematics. Professor Whitehead acknowledges that the view of nature which he has maintained in these lectures is not a simple one. But he urges that we should distrust the jaunty assurance with which people pride themselves that they have at last hit upon the ultimate concepts in which all that happens can be formulated. "The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanations of complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of thinking that the facts are simple because simplicity is the goal of our quest. The guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher should be, Seek simplicity and distrust it."

The bearing of the theory of relativity on philosophical problems has been absurdly exaggerated and misunderstood. To suppose that it has any relevance to the issue between idealism and realism is simply to interpret it wrongly; it lends no more support, for example, to a doctrine of monads than to the fundamentally opposed view (say) of Professor Alexander. But of its revolutionary character within the domain of mathematical and physical science there can be no question. And there are now ample means of obtaining such a general view of the character and import of the theory as is possible without resort to the elaborate mathematical apparatus of modern physics. Probably the best introduction which has yet appeared to the whole subject is Dr Broad's able and lucid article in the April number of this JOURNAL. In conjunction therewith Mr Henry L. Brose's Lecture on *The Theory of Relativity* (Oxford: Blackwell, Revised Edition, 1920) will be found helpful. Mr Brose has also published a translation of Erwin Freundlich's booklet, *Die Grundlagen der Einsteinschen Gravitationstheorie*, under the title of *The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), wherein the results of the special or restricted principle of relativity are utilised for bringing out the significance of the general theory. The difficulties involved in the principles of classical mechanics are discussed, and it is shown how a series of new discoveries, brought to light by electrodynamics, led necessarily to a new view of the basis of mechanics. In particular, justice is done to the thought of Riemann, "a mathematician," as Einstein says, "far in advance of his time." The valuable *Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation*, drawn up for the Physical Society by Professor A. S. Eddington (London: Fleetwood Press, 1920), should also be mentioned. In this Report the absolute differential calculus of Ricci and Levi-Civita is used, but there is much in it that can be followed by a reader whose mathematics have not been carried to that stage. More recently, Professor Eddington has published an extremely interesting and suggestive treatment of the subject in a volume entitled *Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), in which he endeavours to explain and exhibit the consequences of the work of Minkowski, Hilbert, Lorentz, Einstein, and Weyl, without introducing anything very technical in the way of mathemathics, physics, or philosophy. Professor Eddington starts with a description of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment of the year 1887 and of the explanation of its results proposed by FitzGerald—namely, that a course of wave-motion undergoes an automatic contraction when it is swung from the transverse to the longitudinal position. He then proceeds to consider the meaning of the term "relativity" as it is now employed in physics, and turns afterwards to a discussion of the notion of force and of fields of force, bringing out the nature of the generalisation known as the principle of equivalence. Next there are chapters on various kinds of space, on the new law of gravitation, on the influence of gravitation on light, on momentum and energy, on absolute rotation, and on electricity and gravitation. The book concludes with a chapter much more speculative in character, "On the Nature of Things," in which is incorporated the substance of the author's article in the April number of *Mind* on "The Meaning of Matter and the Laws of Nature according to the Theory of Relativity." Here, in this last chapter, Professor Eddington appears to me to have advanced to a position far beyond anything that can be claimed as a legitimate inference from the theory of relativity and to be landed in a subjectivism for which that theory supplies no warrant. What I mean may be gathered from the following passage: "We have a world of point-events with their primary interval-relations. Out of these an unlimited number of more complicated relations and qualities can be built up mathematically, describing various features of the state of the world. These exist in nature in the same sense as an unlimited number of walks exist on an open moor. But the existence is, as it were, latent unless someone gives a significance to the walk by following it; and in the same way the existence of any one of these qualities of the world only acquires significance above its fellows, if a mind singles it out for recognition. Mind filters out matter from the meaningless jumble of qualities, as the prism filters out the colours of the rainbow from the chaotic pulsations of white light. Mind exalts the permanent and ignores the transitory; and it appears from the mathematical study of relations that the only way in which mind can achieve her object is by picking out one particular quality as the permanent substance of the perceptual world, partitioning a perceptual time and space for it to be permanent in, and, as a necessary consequence of this Hobson's choice, the laws of gravitation and mechanics and geometry have to be obeyed. Is it too much to say that mind's search for permanence has created the world of physics?" It is an old doctrine that out of a "meaningless jumble of qualities" mind somehow constructs an ordered nature. Yet mind itself exists only in so far as it knows nature and is in virtue of such function a part of nature, so that what according to the doctrine in question is represented as the product of mind might with more truth be said to be the very making of mind. Finally, within the last fortnight there has appeared Dr R. W. Lawson's excellent translation of Professor Einstein's own little work, written for the non-mathematical reader, *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory. A Popular Exposition* (London: Methuen, 1920). The author tells us he has spared himself no pains in the endeavour to present the main ideas in the simplest and most intelligible form. He has certainly succeeded in producing a delightful volume which is probably destined to become one of the classical texts of physical science. Only at the end does he venture into the domain of metaphysics, where he contends that, since in the general theory of relativity one is constrained to renounce Euclidean geometry, one is led to the conclusion that our space is finite and yet has no bounds; it is curved, somewhat like the rippled surface of a lake.

Professor James Ward's treatment of "perceptual orders"—those, namely, of Time and Number—in his third article on "Sense-Knowledge" (*Mind*, April 1920), is opportune now that the theory of relativity is so much to the fore. Dr Ward contends that in the perception of time, as in the perception of space, a factor is found that disappears from the concept. In space-perception it was extensity—an objective factor; here it is protensity—an essentially subjective factor. It is through protensity that we ascribe to sense-data the characteristic of duration, and so speak of that too as protensity. Duration as experienced is inseparable from the activity which all experience implies: it means not barely to exist but actively to persevere or persist. Though we ascribe it to sense-data, protensity is not, as extensity is, a sense-datum; yet like extensity, it is continuous, and we may even say that it differentiates itself. These primary differentiations are not co-existent, but they give rise to a secondary continuum—the so-called memory-thread — that may be so described. The differentiations of the latter have, however, their spatial analogue in a one-dimensional continuum of positional signs, which, like the positional signs of spatial perception, imply movement, but not space. And it is these "temporal signs" (as Dr Ward calls them) that first lead us to the perception of time-order. They are themselves to be accounted for as the consequences or residua of the same movements of attention on which *tempo* depends. The concept of "pure" temporal order is only attained when the filling and the varying durations of actual experience are left out and an absolute time flowing at a constant rate is put in its place. In the latter half of the article Dr Ward tries to show in regard to number that there is a perceptual knowledge prior to any conceptual knowledge such as that afforded by mathematics.

Philosophical students will be glad to hear that there are some posthumous works of Josiah Royce to appear, and that the first of them, edited by J. Loewenberg, of the University of California, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (Yale University Press, 1920) has already been published. These form a very useful volume, intended as a partial introduction to the study of post-Kantian idealism. The volume comprises ten lectures, the first two being devoted to Kant. Royce goes at once to the heart of the matter by insisting that the Kantian Deduction of the Categories is the one genuine means of approach to the problems of subsequent speculation. Two assertions characterise Kant's position with regard to knowledge: one is the assertion that the conditions, upon which the form, the structure, the organisation of experience depends, are themselves not empirical; the other is the assertion that when we scrutinise these forms of our experience, we are learning nothing whatever about the ultimate nature of anything that exists beyond the knowing self, but are just learning about the self and its equipment for the life of knowledge. But Kant nowhere, it is pointed out, implies that this self should be viewed as any absolute, or as any superhuman mind that comprehends all the facts of nature at once. He nowhere implies that the self to whose categories all natural facts conform has anything but a virtual, a conceived, unity of consciousness. The knowable world is, for him, the realm of the possible experience of this virtual self to whose *one* experience we inevitably refer any natural fact. The one self, as Kant conceived it, is not a metaphysical entity, but merely a formal presupposition of the theory of knowledge. Royce shows, in a suggestive way, why a view of this sort is in somewhat unstable equilibrium, and how the Kantian notion of a purely logical unity of consciousness became transformed into the notion of the "Absolute." One of the chief reasons for substituting the latter for the former was interwoven, Royce urges, with motives furnished by the social consciousness. Another reason was that while Kant's philosophy supplied, within carefully guarded limits, a theory of knowledge, it provided no theory of nature. The empirical details of nature remained a mystery. And yet another reason was the problem which the religious thought of the time was bringing into prominence. The author then proceeds to trace the manner in which the dialectical method arose; he discerns its antecedents partly in the Platonic dialogues, especially in the *Parmenides*, and partly in Kant's doctrine of the antinomies. And in an extremely illuminating way he exhibits the dialectical method at work in that extraordinarily brilliant but now little known treatise of Schelling's, the *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, published in 1797. For Schelling, the problem of philosophy appeared to fall into two distinct departments; there was a dialectic of the self and also a perfectly parallel dialectic of the non-self, or of nature. Abstract from the self that knows experience, and then you have before you the world called nature. Be deliberately naive, while you observe, although with the philosopher's thought in the background, outer nature; view nature as something found; and at once it becomes obvious, so Schelling affirms, that nature itself is not a mere collection of substances, but a process and system of processes. An intuitive observation, an open eye, sees in nature the objective dialectic of the processes there present: everything in nature seeks its own opposite, and transcends, by its relationships, its own isolated being. Abstract, on the other hand, from externally given data, fix attention wholly upon the subject, as that in and for whom are all knowledge and all fact, and then, just as the objective view leads us to regard nature as a process of unconscious dialectic out of which the consciousness of self is evolved, so this subjective view of the same world will show us nature as that which the self necessarily, although unconsciously, constructs—constructs even as a basis for its own attainment of self-consciousness. It is to be hoped some of the readers of Royce's pages will be induced to study Schelling's treatise for themselves; it deserves a better fate than has hitherto attended it. The later lectures are devoted to Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, which Professor Baillie's translation has rendered accessible to English students, and which is comparatively more familiar ground. "Hegel," says Royce in a pregnant passage, "did not suppose that if we had never been enlightened by experience we could deduce *a priori* the nature of the world. But he did suppose that experience had at last attained a point of view from which it is possible to reconstruct, by an *a priori* method, precisely so much of the meaning of experience as is in fact rational." And so far apparently Royce would follow in Hegel's footsteps.

In an article on "Some Recent Theories of Consciousness" (*Mind*, July 1920), Professor A. K. Rogers subjects to criticism a number of writers who attempt "to get rid of psychical states," meaning by psychical states the sort of facts to which traditionally such names as sensation, feeling, idea, and the like have been assigned. He objects to Professor Alexander's analysis of perception that it splits up the concrete mental experience from which it starts into two unreal abstractions. On the side of the object, there is no doubt a definite and thinkable content; but it is a content devoid of the existential and causally effective character of that which we naturally mean by an objectively real world. It consists of redness, spatiality, and the like, but not of red things in a real space; in short, it consists of logical properties rather than of actualities. On the side of the subject the difficulty is greater still, because in abstracting "awareness" from its object there is no content left in terms of which to think the mental "act." Action, unless some meaning is given to the term quite different from that in its normal use, implies something of which it is the act; and there cannot be an act *of* that which has no nature *except* action. Again, few things, it is argued, can be more unilluminating than to explain knowledge as the mere "togetherness" of awareness and a quality, for togetherness is one of the emptiest and most general of all relations, while knowing is one of the most peculiar and characteristic facts of the known world. Once more, with reference to the now familiar distinction between "contemplation" and "enjoyment," Professor Alexander's point is that the self cannot contemplate itself, alike because there is nothing to contemplate, and because it cannot dirempt itself and be present in two forms at the same moment. But if mental acts have no distinctive characteristic, what is there to "enjoy" or "live through"? It is unfortunate that Professor Rogers' article was written before the appearance of Alexander's *Gifford Lectures*. Much of his criticism would need re-statement in view of what is contained in the new book.

There is ground at once for suspecting any alleged branch of science which arrogates to itself the title of "new." Of the "New Psychology" of a few years ago, Professor Ward remarked, "new it undoubtedly is, and there are signs that in its present form it will not long survive"—a prediction which even many of those who were once its pioneers would now admit to be justified. At present, the self-styled "New Psychology" is largely made up of generalisations based upon the psycho-pathological researches of Janet, Freud, and Jung; and, although no one would wish to depreciate their work, it is simply childish to suppose that what is disparagingly designated the "older psychology" is thereby superseded. Those who desire to gain information as to the kind of generalisations put forward as "new" will find Mr A. G. Tansley's book *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920) useful. He proceeds upon a principle which, as a matter of fact, every psychologist from Aristotle downwards would have recognised, that the mental factors which produce the characteristic behaviour of the neurotic patient and lunatic are at work in the "normal" mind and give rise to many well-known traits of "normal" behaviour. A large variety of topics are dealt with—the "unconscious," "complexes," "psychic energy" (a loose and misleading conception), "conflict," "repression," "dreams," while under the head of "the contents of the mind" the nature and mode of working of the great dominant instincts are considered. A large amount of material is thus brought together which, when it is handled in a genuinely psychological spirit, will be of scientific value. The recent number of the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* (May 1920) contains a paper by Professor Jung on "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits." The three main sources of the belief in spirits he takes to be dreams, waking visions, and mental disease. From an anthropological point of view he is doubtless right. But *psychologically* the fundamental consideration surely is one that he does not so much as mention—namely, that for the primitive mind the means of discriminating an "image" from a "percept" were far less developed than they are for us. A volume on *The Psychology of Persuasion* by Mr William Macpherson (London: Methuen, 1920) also deserves mention. The writer tries to distinguish the elements of persuasion as a mental process, and describes the various forms of false persuasion in individuals and groups. In later chapters he deals with persuasion more exclusively as a form of expression, and devotes special attention to such modern forms of propaganda as advertisements, newspapers, the cinematograph, the novel, and the drama. Then the more formal persuasion of books and speeches is discussed, and in the last chapter an attempt is made to define the typical features that are likely to mark the persuasion of the future.

Professor J. S. Mackenzie's volume *Arrows of Desire. Esasys on our National Character and Outlook* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1920) owes its origin, he tells us, to the war. The essays, if somewhat disconnected, are not inappropriately grouped together, and they certainly form a very readable and suggestive book. The chief subjects are—The English Character, Shakespeare's Henry V. as a National Type, The Character of Shakespeare, Conventional Morality, The Sister Nations, Our Present Outlook, National Reconstruction. Professor Mackenzie is optimistic, although not unduly so. "An educated people, in which the spirit of citizenship has been gradually developed, may," he thinks, "be trusted in the end to see that the most competent people secure control of those things that they are best fitted to manage. This kind of general wisdom of the people requires, no doubt, a long process of cultivation. It is, unfortunately, almost always true in human affairs that all the wrong ways have to be tried before the right way is discovered. But it has, on the whole, been the good fortune of our own people that the process towards this discovery has been a gradual one, 'from precedent to precedent,' rather than one of sudden transformations. Many of the peculiarities of the dominant types in our national character depend on the fact that we are constantly clinging to the past, and yet striving towards a better future. We do not readily let go any good that has been achieved, however imperfect it may seem; and yet we do not readily acquiesce in the persistence of any evil, however firmly it may be rooted."

It is difficult to speak in a few words of Dr Bernard Bosanquet's judicious and inspiring booklet *What Religion is* (London: Macmillan, 1920). His aim has been, he says, to help in guiding some minds to the right type of expectation, the true and open attitude in which they will have a fair chance to feel their religion in its fulness and its simplicity. His hope is not to suggest or advocate a new religion to them, but to assist them to reach the full value of their own. No man is, he believes, so poor as not to have a religion, though he may not, in every case, have found out where it lies. The true religious temper is, he urges, that of simplicity: there is a total simplicity in supreme experiences, and it is impossible to enter into them save by a total sincerity and candour. And this is at the same time the spirit of complete appreciation, which alone can seize the whole fact in its due shape and proportion. "Love speaks with better knowledge, and knowledge with dearer love." What religion truly is Dr Bosanquet seeks to unfold in a peculiarly persuasive way. Religion is faith, which is contrasted *not* with knowledge but with sight. And it is contrasted with sight, because it is essential to it that we rise into another world while remaining here. "Whenever a man is so carried beyond himself, whether for any other being, or for a cause or for a nation, that his personal fate seems to him as nothing in comparison of the happiness or triumph of the other, there you have the universal basis and structure of religion." The old expression "Justification by Faith" sums up the knot or centre in which the open secret of all human nature is bound up. For we can only be saved by giving ourselves to something in which we remain what we are, and yet enter into something new. Religious faith means absorption in a good such that nothing else matters and nothing else is real. And this is why religion "justifies" the religious man. What a man's religion brings him, and what he cannot help receiving when he places himself humbly and sincerely in the attitude of religious faith, that, urges Dr Bosanquet, let him hold to without scruple; it will be the nearest thing to truth that he can make his own. I have said perhaps enough to indicate the theme which the author develops in eight brief chapters, dealing with the Peace of God; Freedom and Power; Unity with God, Man, and Nature; Hope and Progress for Humanity; Sin; Suffering; Prayer and Worship; and The Religious Temper. It is a little volume which ought to secure a permanent place in our devotional literature, and to aid many a wayfarer to reach that "peace whose names are also rapture, power, clear sight, and love," parts, as Watson sings, of peace.

Attention should be drawn to Dean Rashdall's article in the *Church Quarterly* (April 1920) on "Personality in Recent Philosophy," in which he discusses the Gifford Lectures of Dean Inge, Professor Webb, Professor Pringle-Pattison, and Professor Sorley. Dr Rashdall tells us that the most convincing argument that he knows of for the Christian interpretation of the universe, including the belief in personal immortality, is Professor Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. From the point of view of pure speculation he regards it as a work of consummate ability, while from the point of view of Christian Apologetics he considers its value to be unique.

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REVIEWS.

The Group Mind. By W. M'Dougall, F.R.S., Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920.—Pp. xvi + 304.

In his preface the author tells us that the present work must be regarded as a sequel to his *Introduction to Social Psychology.* Its appearance at the present moment is very opportune. It will be welcomed both by the student of social problems and by the general reader.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I. takes up the general principles of Collective Psychology. It gives an outline of the subject-matter and scope of such a psychology, a description of the difference between a crowd and a group, and an analysis of the conditions essential for the existence of a highly organised group. It is shown that the members will recognise the need of co-operation, be moved by a common motive and aim at a common objective which is regarded by each as the aim of the group. Group spirit or group self-consciousness is examined in detail with reference to the part it plays in human communities, both primitive and civilised. The various types of groups are distinguished from one another. Part II. takes up that field of collective psychology which has special relevance to public interests at the present time: National Mind and Character. In the author's opinion, "the answer to the riddle of the definition of nationhood is to be found in the conception of the group mind." A national mind or character—Dr M'Dougall regards the terms as covering the same content—requires for its development homogeneity in the group, either racial or geographical, freedom of communication, the presence of leaders, a common purpose and organisation. The examination of these conditions, with illustrations from the present and the past nations of the earth, furnishes some of the most interesting chapters in the book. They are followed by a discussion of the Will of the Nation and the factors which develop it, of the part played by ideas in national mind, and the rôle of public opinion in nations of the highest type. Part III. is concerned with "The Development of National Mind and Character." This is traced through the Race-making period, the Historical period, the period of Youth, and that of Maturity. Dr M'Dougall distinguishes innate and racial factors in development from tradition, both moral and intellectual. On the whole he is unwilling to recognise the transmission of acquired characteristics; evolution by such means is very slow and limited. The differences between nations depend ultimately on innate characteristics, spontaneous variations, and the effects of physical environment. A stock of knowledge slowly acquired becomes effective as tradition which, as social environment, gradually moulds the racial character. There is much which is interesting and suggestive in the author's account of the effects of crossing different stocks and of the forces which act as principles of internal selection; *e.g.* town life, military ambitions, celibacy of clergy. The conditions of progress, intellectual and moral, are analysed. Maine's law of progress, "from status to contract," is illustrated and confirmed.

Historians and sociologists may wish to dispute some of Dr M'Dougall's statements and his interpretation of facts in Parts II. and III., but the important issues for the student of psychology and political philosophy lie in the general principles of Part I. and in the treatment of the Will of the Nation in Part III. In his first chapter Dr M'Dougall writes: "In this book it will be maintained that the conception of a group mind is useful and therefore valid; and . . . some attempt to define and justify it may usefully be made at the outset; though the completer justification is the substance of the whole book. . . . We may fairly define a mind as an organised system of mental or purposive forces." In his book *Community*, Mr M'Iver, who rejects the conception of a group mind, claimed that "the mind of each of us has a unity other than that of such a system." Dr M'Dougall now challenges him to explain what kind of unity he postulates. Mr M'Iver wrote: "Every association, every organised group, may and does have rights and obligations which are not the rights and obligations of any or all of its members taken distributively but only of the association acting as an organised unity; . . . the unity of which we are thinking is not mechanic or organic or even psychic." On this passage Dr M'Dougall comments: "I cannot but think that . . . M'Iver is under the influence of that unfortunate and still prevalent way of thinking of the psychic as identical with the conscious which has given endless trouble in psychology; because it has prompted the hopeless attempt . . . to describe the structure and organisation of the mind in terms of conscious stuff, ignoring the all-important distinction between mental activity, which is sometimes, though perhaps not always, consciousness, and mental structure which is not. The structure and organisation of the spirit of the community is in every respect as purely mental or psychic as is the structure and organisation of the individual mind" (p. 15). But is the unity of system the only unity that we can predicate of mind? The biological conception of an organism applied to mental life might describe the unity from the standpoint of the spectator, even in the case of multiple personality, but it fails to express the unity of individuality from the standpoint of the individual. For the individual there must be the unity of self-consciousness. Dr M'Dougall himself seems to recognise such unity as essential. With reference to organic unity he says, "though mind has this kind of organic unity, it acquires in proportion as self-consciousness develops, over and above this kind of unity, a unity of an altogether new and unique kind; a unity which consists in the whole (or the self) being present to consciousness, whether clearly or obscurely, during almost every moment of thought, and pervading and playing some part in determination of the course of thought and action" (p. 157). After all, then, is not Mr M'Iver right in claiming a unity other than system for the mind of the individual? Is he not also right in denying such a unity to the group? It seems to me he is. Dr M'Dougall lays aside as unproven the theory of collective consciousness; the theory that just as colonial animals are a collection of parts each of which is a complete animal structure, so the community or group of individuals is a more comprehensive unit than the individuals who form it, and exists in addition to them. But how can Dr M'Dougall logically proceed to speak of national self-consciousness and of the Will of the Nation? He refers the reader to his *Social Psychology* for his theory of volition. "The essential mark of volition . . . is that the personality as a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the personality, the man himself . . . is thrown on the side of the weaker motive" (p. 240). "The idea of the self, or self-consciousness, is able to play its great rôle in volition only in virtue of the self-regarding sentiment, the system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organised about the idea of the self" (pp. 247, 248). Dr M'Dougall regards the national mind and the individual mind as parallel. There must be national self-consciousness in order that there may be national will.

Now what does Dr M'Dougall mean by the self-consciousness of a nation or of any other group? He criticises Professor Bosanquet's account of the General Will partly because he regards it as recognising only the lower kind of unity, the unity of an organism, and not that of self-consciousness. It is clear, I think, from his whole criticism of the presentation of the doctrine of the General Will, that he has not appreciated the line of thought which Professor Bosanquet represents. The question does not hinge on the recognition or non-recognition of instinct and feeling in willing, but on the conception of the good. "The General Will seems to be, in the last resort, the ineradicable impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself, in as far as that good takes the form of a common good. Though this impulse may be mastered or cheated in a degree, yet if it were extinct human life would have ceased" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 109). "This indestructible impulse towards the Good, which is necessarily a common good, the substantial unity and filling of life by the interests through which man is human, is what Rousseau plainly has before him in his account of the General Will" (*ibid.*, p. 110). Individuals can only realise such a good with fragmentary imperfection; a nation may realise it more completely in the sense that a "plurality of human beings is necessary to enable society to cover the ground, as it were, which human nature is capable of covering, yet actual individuals are not ultimate or equal embodiments of the true particulars of the social universal" (*ibid.*, p. 177). So far as the psychological process of willing is concerned, Professor Bosanquet would not predicate it of the social organism in the sense in which it is predicated of the individual; but then does Dr M'Dougall? Is the self-consciousness referred to anything other than the consciousness of the individual X or Y who has identified the self with the group? Consider Dr M'Dougall's excellent illustration of the distinction between the good of all and the good of the whole (a distinction which curiously enough he says Rousseau did not make), viz. the choice offered Belgium when Germany demanded free passage through the country. To have granted it would have secured material prosperity for the people; to refuse it meant to stand for national rights, to weigh past and future, to consider the good of the whole. (Might one not say rather it was to use a different scale of values?) But whose willing was this General Will? Whose self-consciousness? *Punch's* cartoon of October 21, 1914, gave the answer:—"*The Kaiser*: 'So you see you have lost everything.' *The King of the Belgians*: 'Not my soul.'" The choice of one man was the expression of the General Will. The discussion in chapter xiii. of nations of the higher type would seem to show that national self-consciousness is the result *in the individual* of organisation, both formal and informal within the nation group. It seems strangely perverse that as against Mr M'Iver Dr M'Dougall should deny of the individual mind any unity other than that of system, and yet as against Professor Bosanquet should demand for the national mind a unity which consists in the whole (or the self) being present to consciousness.

This question of unity is full of difficulty to those who found the unity of system unobtainable from the premises given in the *Social Psychology*. Starting from independent instincts, Dr M'Dougall failed to make it evident how the self-regarding sentiment comes to occupy the position of presiding genius in mental life. Can the answer be found in Association, which is where Dr M'Dougall appears to seek it? The adequacy of the premises of the *Social Psychology* as a basis for the present work is also tested by the question of progress. We are told: "Man is distinguished from the animals by his power of learning. Whereas the behaviour of animals, even of the higher ones, consists almost entirely of purely instinctive actions, innate modes of response to a limited number of situations; man has an indefinitely great capacity for acquiring new modes of response, and so of adapting himself in new and more complex ways to an almost indefinite variety of situations" (p. 209). Now is this power of learning an instinctive tendency to be placed on all fours with the other instinctive tendencies? It may be said it is a form of imitation, but imitation alone would not bring progress. There must be breaking of new ground somewhere, or there would be no extension in the field of activity. Does Dr M'Dougall rely on Association to furnish this extension?

It would be ungenerous to dwell longer on difficulties in a book which offers so much that is valuable to the psychologist, and is of such interest throughout. It is clearly written; the repetition of statement here and there, and the recapitulation with which some of the chapters open, probably find their explanation in the fact that the author "had the substance of the book in the form of lecture notes for some years." It is no doubt with intention that he uses the same hypothesis to show the force of racial characteristics (p. 118), which in his *Social Psychology* was used to show the force of tradition, but a cross reference would be helpful and prevent misunderstanding. There is a verbal error on p. 163, where "principal" is used for "principle." The depreciatory note sounded in the Preface with reference to German scientific work seems uncalled for, and is regrettable. In conclusion, one can wish for the book, in the interests of psychology, as wide a popularity as that gained by the earlier work of which it is the sequel.

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The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth. By J. B. Bury, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. xv + 377.

Professor Bury's book and Dean Inge's Romanes Lecture have opened a floodgate of interest and speculation on the reality of human progress as well as the history of the idea. The Professor deals almost exclusively with the latter, though he begins and ends on a note of doubt. "Belief in Progress," he tells us, "is an act of faith. . . . Even in science we cannot be sure that some day Progress may not come to a dead pause. . . . A day will come, in the revolution of centuries, when a new idea will usurp the place of Progress as the directing idea of humanity." And the Dean is more decidedly negative. The Cro-Magnon men were a finer type than we. What grounds have we for asserting any superiority at all?

The pessimism is not surprising when the greatest and most determined of wars has just been dealing terrific blows to the civilisation in which the theory of Progress has been built up. It needs a well-founded faith to resist depression when one tries all in vain to realise the loss of brilliant life, the vast destruction, the crushing weight of debt, the legacy of hate. Yet, if all the wise men whom Professor Bury quotes have not written in vain, one must make the attempt. We who are left have still to live, and where there is life there is hope.

From this point of view Professor Bury would have been more helpful if he had attempted a more philosophical treatment of his subject, if at least he had more carefully analysed the meaning of the conception of which he traces the literary expression with so much learning and care. Only a very brief examination of this fundamental point occurs at the beginning of the book. "To the minds of most people," he says, "the desirable outcome of human development would be a condition of society in which all the inhabitants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. But it is impossible to be sure that civilisation is moving in the right direction to realise this aim." This seems to imply that Progress consists in the realisation of greater general happiness. But the slightest examination of the various writers whom Professor Bury quotes would be sufficient to show that this was by no means their common idea. Men desire happiness, they often desire wealth, but they also desire knowledge, and they sometimes desire what seems to them a higher good without regard to the pain or happiness which it may bring with it. Hence it is clear that we need a deeper analysis and a more comprehensive conception if we would cover all the facts and be in a position to answer the question, "Is Progress a reality, or only a fleeting notion which has attracted the minds of certain enthusiasts at certain favourable moments in the history of the world?" The first result of such an inquiry would be to show that men have been possessed by different conceptions of what they meant by "Progress" according to the general philosophy or religion of the age in which they lived. Lucretius, who has the immortal honour of having first pronounced the word, envisaged the advance in the terms of Greco-Roman civilisation. He painted the progress of men from an animal state in which they fought with tooth and claw to the highest state he knew, viz. of the city with its laws and order and the beauties of art. Yet to the mediæval Christian—let us take him as represented in Dante, the finest type—progress was of another order altogether. It was the development by pain and purification and love of a higher moral state, where, after a probation in this world, the soul might be united with the Divine, its highest Good. If we pass to another stage, to the men of the Renaissance who first gave "Progress" its modern vogue, the dominant idea was the growth of knowledge, the conquest of Nature by the discovery of her secrets. And at the Revolution the emphasis was changed again to the conception of Freedom. Progress consisted now in the breaking of chains, in marching freely on to the enjoyment of all that man's nature entitled him to expect.

The first problem, then, from the philosophic point of view is to discover what, if any, is the common idea which underlies these various expressions of belief. We do not think it very difficult to find such common elements, and it will strengthen our confidence in the solution if it should appear that as time goes on they tend to emerge as one harmonious conception in which the different partial views can meet in reconciliation. We would suggest that the chief reconciling idea has been revealed by the two great new sciences of the last few decades, psychology and anthropology, and that the idea is that of the growth of the human soul.

If this is true, we should find traces of it from the first moment that Progress is discussed, and of course we do. "The use and the experience of the active mind," said Lucretius, "gradually taught men who were progressing step by step." To the Catholic mediæval thinker this "active mind" became an immortal soul, finding its fruition in spiritual good. To the man of the new science in the seventeenth century the connotation was a mind in touch with the realities of Nature, a mind widened as the earth was widened by the discovery of a new world, and the universe by the discovery of the telescope. But always, at every stage of the history of the idea of Progress, the growth of the human soul is the common underlying element, and psychology has in recent years made this appear as obvious as it is true. Dr Marett, carrying the new conception backwards into the recesses of pre-history, declares in *Psychology and Folklore* that the "growth of soul" is the conclusion that emerges from the study of the scanty remains of the cave and the drift.

It remains, then, to apply the conception to the most recent manifestations of "Progress" and to ask what solution it offers to the doubts with which Professor Bury concludes his treatise and the stouter denials of the Dean of St Paul's.

The nineteenth century elevated the idea of Progress into a dogma, but did not present it free from certain drawbacks involved in a doctrine of Progress as conceived biologically. Darwin was here the most powerful voice, and if we are misled by a narrow interpretation of evolution, we may easily see it as only a repetition of the struggle for existence made more acute by the use of man's active and ingenious mind for destructive ends. This was the demon of "imperialism" which affected us all and most acutely our late chief enemies. The truth which was obscured by this view of evolution was that in the case of man the "struggle" becomes progressively subordinate, that his real progress consists in the development of those sides of his nature in which all men share and to which all men contribute. And it is a significant fact that in quite recent days there has been a marked change in the sources and the character of the support which is given to the idea of Progress. To Comte or to Spencer, Progress was essentially a non-theological, if not an anti-theological, doctrine. Now, with the excessive specialisation of science and the demonstration by the war of the destructive uses to which science may be put, there is a cooling in the ardour of the scientist's belief in Progress, and one often finds a broader view and a calmer trust in those who look to a supernatural or immanent guidance from the Divine than in those who do not go beyond the immediate conclusions of the scientific mind. Dr Flint, in his *Philosophy of History*, thus becomes a better prophet of Progress than Professor Bury, who is nurtured on a rationalist creed and holds that "the undermining of the theory of Providence is very intimately connected with our subject; for it was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of Progress was to replace."

If, however, we place ourselves on the firm basis of a growth of soul, these contradictions disappear, and we are able, with a not impossible act of faith, to look beyond the conflicts and the setback of the moment into a calmer region where there is no serious ground to doubt the spread of light and its attendant greatness. The argument is purely a rational and historical one, and need not offend the susceptibilities of Professor Bury or any others who fear the introduction of what they cannot prove. The growth of man's mind has been most clearly demonstrated by science. Whatever the man of science thinks about progress as a whole, he has no doubt about progress in his own region. Even since the war, Einstein's work has been confirmed, and completes, with the necessary corrections, the laws of space and motion which we had learnt from Newton and the mechanics of the seventeenth century. The illustration fits very happily into the necessities of the moment, because it shows how in science at least progress is constant, with change but without revolution. But if in this and in every branch of science we see a constant advance, why should we entertain the fears which Professor Bury expresses? We have yet but scratched the surface of the universe, and the result has been an enlargement of our powers beyond the dreams of the wildest enthusiasts of the eighteenth century. Why should we put any limit to our hopes? What we need to limit is our selfish desires, the putting in the first place of that ideal of personal happiness from which unfortunately Professor Bury made his start. If, instead, we base our conception of progress on the growth of soul, individual as well as collective—individual growth through collective growth,—the example of science is both the most inspiring and the most conclusive.

It will be said that we have no guarantee that science may not go on growing and end by killing us all, or at least fail to keep us all alive and happy in fellowship. And that is, of course, a conceivable issue to man's age-long struggle, just as it is conceivable that this solar system might be annihilated by contact with some other star. Absolute security is no part of the human scheme of things, as it is so far revealed to us, or indeed as we may reasonably desire, for such security would deprive the struggle of its zest and virtue of its nobility. But, looking at the story of man's course as we know it, who can doubt that side by side with this extension of his mental achievement, there has gone a connected improvement in his moral nature, in his political capacity, and even—though this is more doubtful—in his artistic capacity? It must be remembered that in these days we are thinking of hundreds of millions and comparing them with hundreds of thousands in ancient Greece, or Renaissance Italy, or Elizabethan England. And even in these comparisons, the most severe to suggest, the most difficult to carry out, there would be an ample balance to the good on certain sides in favour of ourselves.

Perhaps in the simple fact that, with all the triumphs of modern

science and industry to our credit, we have at the beginning of a new era one of our leading men of learning bidding us question ourselves as to the future, and one of our leading prophets bidding us examine our souls, we may find another augury of hope. For no state is hopeless except that of complete self-satisfaction, and no life is stagnant or decadent except that which repeats the shibboleths of the past without criticism: and in our current writers we find both ample criticism and a wholesome absence of complacency.
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A History of English Philosophy. By W. R. Sorley, Litt.D., LL.D. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920.—Pp. xvi + 380.

IF Mr Alexander's sagaciously contemplative angel had to assess the merits of the different nations in philosophy, he would probably give the palm to the Greeks and he might place the Germans second; but he would not make this latter decision without misgivings, and he might even wish to consult an archangel before preferring the Germans to the English. Be that as it may, it is certain that the British genius for philosophy has acquitted itself most worthily in the eyes of all competent judges, and it is not a little surprising that so few complete methodical histories of English philosophy have appeared up to the present. Indeed, I do not know of any which cover the whole field, except the two which Mr Sorley mentions on p. 322, although the list of less comprehensive ones which he gives on that page might have been increased—*e.g.* by the mention of the relevant chapters in many other systematic histories of European philosophy, or of Mr St George Stock's *English Thought for English Thinkers* (London: Constable, 1912). Everyone who is interested in philosophy, therefore, owes the greater gratitude to Mr Sorley for following up his admirable chapters in the *Cambridge History of English Literature* with this most excellent *History*. Mr Sorley has all the qualities which a historian of these matters needs, and scarcely anyone could have them in a higher degree. He is lucid, sympathetic, and extraordinarily well informed. Moreover, he has a gift for proportion and a genius for conciseness. His book is the fitting culmination of many years of patient, skilful, and devoted study.

The preface states Mr Sorley's intentions very clearly. Although he appears to think that the history of philosophy may be written as if it were only the prologue to the Truth as it is in M or N—as if the Messiah had come, gracefully acknowledging his debt to a succession of John the Baptists,—he wisely does not choose this plan himself, but prefers instead to describe each philosopher from that philosopher's own standpoint, in the belief that "definite concepts and clear issues will emerge gradually as the story progresses." They do; and although English philosophers do not readily assemble into schools, or tie themselves to a common platform, the story of English philosophy, none the less, is a chapter in the development of ideas. Mr Sorley does the *liaison* work very well indeed (although I think he does it even better on the side of ethics or political theory than on the side of metaphysics), and he certainly avoids the temptation of substituting a series of special studies for a history, although the circumstances of his book's origin must have made success in this particular exceedingly hard to attain.

In the second place, Mr Sorley interprets "philosophy" most generously, including its affiliations (or partial coincidence) with theology, politics, ethics, and economics. This liberal interpretation adds greatly to the interest and to the value of the book, the more especially because Mr Sorley is so delightfully at home in all these fields. He did not need to "get up" any of these subjects *ad hoc*, and he assimilates them all into his narrative with the ease that is born of trained faculties and of much turning over in the mind. The result is that Hakewill, Selden, Harrington, Warburton, Glanvill, and Malthus are treated as they ought to be treated in his book. Mr Sorley is sparing of anecdote and biography, but he gives us just enough to let us peep into the lives of the men and the character of their times.

"By strict economy of phrase," he tells us, he has been able to trace this history from Scotus Erigena to the close of the Victorian era. This economy must have cost him infinite pains, for it is always present and yet it never obtrudes. Indeed, I have not noticed any example of redundancy, unless, perhaps, a slightly unnecessary recurrence to the origin of the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (pp. 162 *n.*, 200, 220, 229). One may feel, it is true, that this economy of phrase (despite the author's genius for it) has sometimes cost too dear. One would like to see more of the great figures in the story—Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Indeed, nobody on earth could deal adequately with Berkeley in ten pages, of which four are mostly biography; and Hume's theory of belief needs more than a paragraph. On the other hand, Mr Sorley can always reply that proportion must be respected; and perhaps he is right. Moreover, he makes most considerable amends (if these are needed) by giving us a most admirable bibliography of the works of the principal British philosophers, together with the chief commentaries and criticisms upon them. This bibliography occupies some fifty pages, and not a line of it is wasted. It provides exactly what a scholar needs if he essays to follow Mr Sorley beyond the limits he has set himself. (I have noticed only one trivial mistake: the date of Mr Seth's *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* being given wrongly on p. 373, although correctly on p. 322.)

Mr Sorley's comparative chronological table (pp. 303–321) is also most helpful, and if I wished to write a sentence of this kind: "In the year in which Blake's *Songs of Innocence* and White's *Natural History of Selborne* appeared (to say nothing of Lavoisier's *Traité élémentaire de chimie*) revolution and reform came together to the birth, for the long-pent storm burst in France just as Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* was published, belatedly, in England," I should know where to go. To be serious, this comparative table is as good as it could be, although I might have wished that Mr Sorley had called Richardson's novel *Clarissa* as Richardson himself did, instead of following Leslie Stephen's definitive edition and calling it *Clarissa Harlowe*. But that is a halfpenny matter.

Frankly, I do not see how any teacher of philosophy can afford to do without this book, and I cannot imagine a better or a pleasanter guide for the general reader.

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Christian Freedom: Hulsean Lectures, 1918–1919. By Francis E. Hutchinson, M.A., Oxon. and Cantab. (formerly Chaplain of King's College, and Lecturer of Magdalene College, Cambridge). —Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. 172.

Mr Hutchinson's book is "a plea for larger intellectual freedom in the Christian Church." He tells us that in his view "freedom is not an absolute good as truth is; yet it is the indispensable condition of reaching truth. From this aspect chiefly," he says, "I have treated of freedom in these lectures." The sincerity and earnestness of the plea for freedom in matters of religion is apparent on every page, and this, and the freshness and independence of thought which pervade the lectures, make them most impressive as a whole. They are moreover, as we should expect, scholarly and closely reasoned.

I suppose we would all claim to care for truth—for knowledge of what is true, and sincerity of profession—in our degree and to the extent of our ability and opportunity. No one could knowingly accept the false for the true in religion any more than in science or history; no one would proclaim himself to be deliberately insincere in his professions of religious belief. But it is in this region, above all others, that the thought even of experts—perhaps chiefly of experts—is embarrassed, and its expression shackled, by inherited fetters. Tradition (no less than custom)

> " . . . . lies upon us with a weight,
> Heavy as frost and deep almost as life."

How to adjust the claims of custom, tradition, institutionalism, on the one hand, and "spiritual" freedom on the other, is a problem which both "reformers" and authoritative rulers have to face. Such freedom is, as the author insists, a condition precedent to the possibility of religious development and advance. Every man who thinks for himself and has the courage of his opinions, is in his measure and degree a reformer. The religious reformer has to take account not only of the "ruler" but also of the crowd, and (like every innovator) exercises his freedom at a risk, and must bear (rightly bear) the "burden of proof." And he has often to carry his life in his hand. This was true of the Hebrew prophets, and pre-eminently true of that "greater than a prophet"—a Hebrew among Hebrews—whom Christians claim as the heaven-sent founder of their religion.

The first of Mr Hutchinson's four lectures, entitled *Christus Liberator*, brings out in a very striking way the spirit of freedom and fearlessness in Christ's teaching and life—his intellectual freedom, his independence of speech and action with regard to social and religious conventions, interpretation of the Scriptures and the Mosaic Law. He was one who came "to liberate mankind from oppression and cruelty, from fear and superstition, from unworthy conceptions of God and man, one who broke the chain of custom and ignored the artificial distinctions among men, and pronounced his blessing on those who preserve 'internal sanctity of soul' . . . the truest liberator that humanity has ever had from all its ills; from moral evil . . . from intellectual error—superstition and fear . . . dread of unfamiliar truth and bondage to tradition; from social error—unbrotherliness, exclusiveness, and all barriers to the instincts of natural kindliness; and from ecclesiastical error—legalism and literalism, and from every tendency to value the form above the spirit, a correct creed above a loyal discipleship."

"Christ's appeal is . . . to the awakened conscience, the open mind, the clear vision which distinguishes means from ends, and which seeks to obey the spirit without being tied to the letter." And "he was able to lead others into freedom, not because he was born superhumanly free from the common necessity of clearing himself from current conceptions, but just because he needed to work through the teaching which he had received to purer and freer thought." "We see Jesus himself subject to the imperfect mental environment of his time and race and national religion." He was "in all points tempted like as we are," and "learnt obedience by the things that he suffered." He had a divine capacity of attaining to true wisdom, to perfect courage, to clear vision of the truth, to absolute unselfishness and boundless sympathy, but he had to "grow" in wisdom—in mind and spirit—as in bodily stature. Thus regarded, the life and character of Christ are the most wonderful, the most appealing, the most convincing, of all recorded experience—a miracle that is both natural and supernatural. A miracle that was all miracle would be no miracle for us.

Christ did not give us cut-and-dried rules, but a principle—"a new commandment"—capable of application in all circumstances: not an elaborate organisation, but the guidance of an indwelling spirit. There must be rules and there must be forms, but Christ left it open to his followers to vary rules and modify forms, so long as they worked faithfully in the spirit of their Master; he set them the example of reform where reform was needed in the interests of something better than custom and convention. "He has called us 'to unfold a growing message, and not to rehearse a stereotyped tradition.'"

The title of the second lecture is *Christian Freedom asserted by St Paul but impaired in succeeding ages.* In it are discussed the Apostle's sense of emancipation as a follower of Christ, and his effort to liberate himself and others not merely from the letter of Judaic law, but also from the temper of mind which attaches undue importance to the letter. For St Paul, subjection to the letter is bondage; allegiance to the spirit of Christ's teaching is true freedom, and the Christian principle of life a "law of liberty." As a disciplinarian, it is with moral laxity that St Paul deals, rather than with doctrinal error. In the Christian communities, as described in the New Testament, we see that "the various churches still enjoy a wide latitude in creed and ritual and organisation. It is variety, not uniformity, which the New Testament emphasises as the full life of the Spirit-bearing body." This was naturally followed by development to greater fixity—especially in the region of theology—with consequent increase of stability as one of its advantages, but with loss of freedom, even in things indifferent. Development was inevitable; if Christianity was really alive, it had to grow and change (pp. 74, 75). Particular developments must be weighed and judged. Mr Hutchinson gives in this connection, as a most important criterion, one suggested by the Dean of St Paul's: "The Church is to grow up *into* Christ in all things, not out of him into something very different." And from the same writer he quotes a keen saying about the identity of Christ's Church: "When you want to convince yourself of the identity of an individual, you do not try to squeeze him into his cradle." The author concludes this lecture with the reflection that "our appeal is from what Christians have said about Christ to Christ Himself . . . we too must stand fast by the freedom He gave us, and not again be entangled with a yoke of bondage."

Lecture III.—*Incompleteness of the Reformation as an emancipating Movement*—begins by drawing a comparison between the religious experience of St Paul and that of Martin Luther; notes that the Reformation was rather a liberation of conscience, than a liberation of mind; and explains how its promise of intellectual emancipation was defeated, and how increase of the religious liberty of the individual, due to free access to the Bible, was coincident with a dangerous exaltation of the authority of Scripture. "The Word of God was simply identified with the Bible, . . . as if no fresh light could reach the human spirit save only by breaking out through the already written word." Against this restriction of the sources of spiritual enlightenment the Quaker protest was valid: "that the Bible was not the final or absolute authority in religion, but the Spirit which both inspired the writers of the sacred books, and still inspires and enlightens every man." The cause of religious freedom was served in England not only by other nonconforming sects, but also by a succession of representative members of the Church of England, such as Cranmer, Hooker, the Cambridge Platonists, George Herbert—whose poem *Divinitie* is quoted on p. 103:

> "But all the doctrine which He taught and gave,
> Was clear as Heav'n from whence it came.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> *Love God, and love your neighbour. Watch and pray.*
> *Do as ye would be done unto.*"

Of Cambridge Platonists, Whichcote is quoted as saying: "Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational." The lecture ends with a reference to Edmund Burke's dictum that "the Reformation is not complete; and those who think themselves good Protestants from their animosity to others, are in that respect no Protestants at all."

It is very difficult in a few paragraphs to do justice to Mr Hutchinson's argument, or to give an idea of the cumulative force of the quotations by which the author supports one of his main contentions—the contention, namely, that "representative Christians in almost every generation have felt misgivings about the doctrinal conditions of Church membership and ministry being unduly stringent."

The concluding lecture—*The Church in Bondage*—is thus summarised (p. 116): "The Church of the nineteenth century has not shewn itself friendly to the cause of freedom—social, intellectual, or spiritual. Its excessive reliance upon 'the tradition of the elders' is in damaging contrast with the freedom of criticism which the scientific method has introduced into all modern studies. . . . The kind of authority universally approved [is in contrast] with the special kind of authority which is still often claimed for the past decisions of the Church. It is not enough for the Christian to achieve personal freedom; he needs to enjoy it within the Christian society, for the fellowship of believers is a necessary part of the full Christian life. The Church should be a fellowship in the exploration of Christian faith and life. That fellowship is unduly narrowed and embarrassed by the Church's insistence on the definitions of the past. There is a limit to the legitimacy of symbolical interpretation of the creeds, and its adoption does not inspire confidence. . . . [As to] the conditions of Christian Unity, no intellectual agreement is to be expected. Why look for any other basis of unity than the confession of discipleship? 'What Christ never insisted upon, neither let us insist upon.'"

This is a book to be grateful for—a book that for the "general reader" at least is arresting and enlightening. It is attractive in style, convincing in argument, scrupulously fair and accurate; it is, above all, inspired by a steady enthusiasm for truth, a flawless courage and candour, and a clearness of vision, that are seen to be not incompatible with the spirit of Christian loyalty and the charity which thinketh no evil. The treatment is worthy of the theme; the plea for intellectual freedom in matters of religion has been well propounded.

Mr Hutchinson's appeal is very apposite to the present time, both because freedom of thought and sincerity of profession in matters of religion were never of more vital importance, and also because they are faced to-day with grave risks and discouragements.

E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

WESTON-SUPER-MARE, SOMERSET.

From Chaos to Catholicism. By the Rev. W. G. Peck.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1920.—Pp. 252.

MR PECK is convinced that "the modern world must discover the Church of Christ Universal before there can be peace or decency among men." The possibility of such a Church he thinks to have discovered in a certain conformity to, with some differences from, the doctrines and practices of the Middle Ages, before the Reformation spoiled "Catholicism." The seven papers that make up his new book serve as buttresses to his former essay, *The Coming Free Catholicism.* They are more in bulk than the earlier book, but notwithstanding this they are only buttresses. Their titles give some indication of their scope: "Chaos and Catholicism"; "Mr G. K. Chesterton and the Return to Sanity"; "Monsignor R. H. Benson and the Case for Rome"; "Ecclesia Anglicana: Her Problem and Opportunity"; "The Free Catholic Movement"; "The Christian Priesthood"; "Methodism in the New Age." The desperate desire for all that accompanies historic Catholicism is not so prominent in these pages. Compared with the former volume it reveals more of the doctrinaire than of the dogmatist. Mr Peck is a Methodist minister, and the two concluding papers were delivered to Methodist audiences. "No riot occurred upon either occasion." This can be readily believed. They are quite innocuous. And more tolerance and charity are to be found in a Methodist assembly than in historic Catholicism.

With the ideal that Mr Peck sets forth there will be hearty agreement. He desires to see a Church that is Catholic and free. "She must set forth the beauty of perfect holiness and the strength of corporate loyalty. She must combine historic sense with progressive endeavour; prophetic utterance with priestly function; dogmatic assurance with intellectual honesty." It is when he comes to detailed exposition that doubts gather. Such a Church must of course be Sacramentarian; excess in this direction is beyond conception. The Quakers will be allowed to hold their views on condition that they do not protest against what they do not believe. The model is the unreformed Roman Church, for Christianity is in essence what the Middle Ages had made it, before the canker of Protestantism turned its beauty to ashes. He shows defects in the Protestant appreciation and presentation of salvation, and then argues as if he had proved Catholicism to be perfect in these respects. It is true that Romanism has defects. Indeed at present "there is no Church in Christendom that is not a sect." But in its doctrines and in its devotions it is difficult to think that Romanism has gone vitally wrong. He does not go so far as to say that the Roman Church is the divinely appointed centre of unity, but his sympathies are all towards the type of religion that Rome represents in the world, and any unity that does not gather about these elements would have no appeal for him. Other things might go, everything that denied the Roman tradition might go, if this was preserved. Yet the goal is a synthesis, for which this age is said to be ready, that the Roman Church has never achieved. "The only new Church which Free Catholics would welcome must be the Church Universal."

It is easy from the standpoint of membership in an esoteric society to proclaim that all the Churches are sects. This may be a correct diagnosis. It will be difficult, however, to get the Churches, say the Roman or the Anglican, to accept this diagnosis. Even the Free Churches with their growing sense of what traditional Churchmanship implies, which finds recognition in these pages, would need something more tangible to fasten upon than the dream set forth here before they could be persuaded to confess their errors. The Free Churches are denied any true sense of corporate life, but Mr Peck seems to regard this as an error that can be remedied—in Methodism at any rate. This is why he is content to remain a Methodist. In discovering the possibility of a Free Catholicism he has discovered the value of his own Church. This is hopeful. But may not other Churches (or sects) have a value even as they are?

Another question emerges. If the world has waited nineteen centuries and has been put off with sects there will need to be a revision of values in respect to these. We shall need a more exalted conception concerning sects. We cannot submit blindly to the facts of history. Yet history has some intelligible meaning. And, however admirable the ideal set forth here may be, it will be well to cling to the imperfect societies in which corporate Christian experience finds expression a little while longer. Free Catholicism has found no tangible expression; there are endeavours towards the ideal, but they end in a sense of need to enforce the ideal that shatters the conception of freedom. "The Jerusalem that is above is free." Possibly no Church below that seeks to comprehend all humanity and all that is in human nature, as the material for Divine grace to operate upon, will attain perfect freedom. Catholicity will limit freedom until the word of complete redemption finds utterance. Then the Church militant will have become the Church triumphant, and categories of the world will vanish.

Mr Peck's interpretations of nineteenth-century decadence (an exceedingly insular treatment for "Catholic" purposes) and the Catholic revival, of the meaning of Mr Chesterton and Father Hugh Benson, and of the genius of the Anglican Church, are interesting and provocative also. The use of paradox, and general conclusions based upon particular instances, invite criticism. He is too apt to take side eddies for the main stream. What Mr Chesterton says, what Hugh Benson did, what Dr Orchard and his confrères are declaring, fill up all his horizon, and he imagines that all others must be impressed in the same way. But they are not. A mode of thought grows that regards ritual as not of the things to be sought for and cherished for themselves, but only to be recognised as having their use on condition that they are left behind as soon as possible. Freedom is not to be won by wearing fetters that have hindered it and that have no power to change their nature or significance. What does it prove for the truth and essential necessity of ritual that Hugh Benson was irresistibly attracted by it and was the better for it; or for the surpassing value of the Middle Ages that Mr Chesterton would fain conduct all the world thither? Father Benson was an attractive personality in some respects. His brother's memoir places this beyond dispute. But that he took naturally to ritual has no more Catholic (in the sense of universal) meaning than another fact, recognised but not praised by Mr Peck—that Mr Chesterton takes naturally to the extravagant praise of beer. The appraisal of Mr Chesterton is inflated. "He might speak with Chaucer and Rabelais. He has the vital creative genius, and it is impossible to think of him ever having said his last word." Mr Chesterton is, without doubt, a great man. In the sphere of literary criticism he has done valuable work. Nevertheless, it is possible not to know that he has uttered his first word and yet not to have missed anything that is vital. The English Reformation is denounced as being merely political; the Puritan movement as more ethical than doctrinal; while it is claimed that religion went out with the abolition of Papal rule in England. To say these things is to play conjuring tricks with history. What is not explained is the fact that the old religion was in so parlous a condition that it was put down so easily. Religion that really matters does not disappear at the behest of politicians, and it can survive many a Puritanic ethical lecture. Politics had to do with the English Reformation; how could it be otherwise with a State Church? Yet there were other influences at work. And the Anglican Church has been more of a religious force than the Tudor settlement intended or Mr Peck recognises. There is a strange jumble of idealism and materialism in such a sentence as this: "For, though this is a tight little island, and has been the birthplace of many noteworthy movements, it cannot claim to have invented the Christian religion, and it really is not big enough to contain the Holy Catholic Church." It is a wonder that Mr Peck does not utter his protest against Palestine as being altogether too small to be the theatre of the beginnings of Christianity.

It is perhaps not worth while to dwell upon points of this character, although the criticism might be extended. Yet a protest must be made against the weak habit of writing down as foolish those who cannot follow a dream that has so far given no promise of being a deed in the world. It is to run the risk of Mr Peck's scorn to question his diagnosis. He says: "Only to superficial or prejudiced minds will this seem an unwarranted or reactionary development." He is referring to what he describes as a Catholic revival. He regards such a revival as the same thing as a revival of Christianity. He takes Christianity, indeed, to be in essence what "Catholicity" was in the Middle Ages. The Middles Ages had their place in ecclesiastical development. They were not, however, so immaculate either in morals or manners as there is a growing disposition to describe them. Mediæval things were not always delectable because Mr Peck says they were and gives no proof. When it is said that "the Church cannot possibly be too churchly, any more than a man can be too manly, or a spade too much like a spade," and the practice of the Middle Ages is regarded as the purest type of what is churchly, this is begging the whole question. But here this is regarded as a closed question. Even the Revelation of John is regarded as a text-book of ecclesiastical ideals because of its sacerdotal imagery which came to full expression in the ritual of the Middle Ages. As for the manners of those times, it is very easy to hide behind a smoke screen. When Falstaff is met in literature some joy may be had of him, although something of pity mingles with it, and thus joy is robbed of its vital meaning. Meet him, however, in real life, in family life, and the joy will vanish. Only shame will be felt, or if anything akin to laughter lingers, it will be laughter near to madness. Any attempt to apologise for what is known to be contemptible breaks down when brought to a practical test, as it must be sooner or later.

Mr Peck has fine emotion, and he is an enthusiast. He has the gift of bold expression, but at times he tends to be merely flippant. He is an impressionist—the things that are suppressed are as significant as those expressed. Above all, he has the mediæval mind. His *a priori* conceptions will brook no disturbance from the modern attitude towards truth. The temper of a reformer is not revealed in these pages. There is an impatience of facts. When Mr Peck dislikes anything, even if it be only a suggestion that seems to arise out of his own conception of things, he straightway seeks to smother it. Enthusiasm can accomplish much, but not always the essential things. The enthusiasm of Father Benson for ritualism could not establish Catholicism, although he had much to say about Catholicism. Where he failed, it is difficult to think that any attempt which merely adopts as a fashion what in the Roman Church has become a habit will succeed. "The question of what constitutes a valid Catholicism is still awaiting settlement," says Mr Peck. He gives expression to some vague hopes that, apart from Rome or High Anglicanism, the Free Churches of England will settle this question. Yet it is evident that he has his doubts. And these doubts are well grounded.

The "Catholic" ideal has been in the world for centuries; it has split upon the very rocks towards which this new attempt is being steered in search of the perfection that is beyond. Catholicism is not enough. The deed waits to be done, and there are no signs at present of its being done. There can hardly be progress by deliberately going back to the old dead and distant things jettisoned by the necessities of progress in the past. If that be the only way, we shall need to ask if progress is at all worth while. Certainly we are not ready to believe that the way of man's proved folly, and worse than folly, can in these later days become the way by which God's complete salvation comes. Mr Peck's new synthesis rules out too many things that the world will not lightly lose.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

The Faith of a Quaker. By John W. Graham, M.A., Principal of Dalton Hall, University of Manchester.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920. —Pp. xvi + 444.

THE Quaker search for God, Principal Graham says in the opening sentence of his *Apologia*, is based upon the sure foundation of experience; and he acknowledges that the doctrine of the Light within, which was the special message of Quakerism in the seventeenth century, is now widely and livingly held, and is a subject of general religious interest. Thus we are brought to the right frame of mind for the study of such a work as this, which offers, in the author's words, "a sketch of the only considerable adventure in organised mysticism which has made for itself a permanent place in Christian history during modern times." In this account of the Society of Friends we are asked to consider "the classical case of a mystical society with a tough organisation," and in the somewhat composite material of the book we do find an interesting account of the organisation and a description and defence of the various forms of Quaker testimony and methods of religious activity. But there is more than this, and what will perhaps be most attractive to many readers are the passages of personal confession on the writer's part, who has been for many years a teacher and a minister among Friends, and his own contribution towards a restatement of the foundation truths of religion. For the sincerity of every such attempt we must be grateful, and the more so when the attempt is made, as in this case, without any trace of dogmatic assumption or assurance, with the desire simply "to tell in part what never can be told in full; to hold out what little light from the eternal radiance has come my way."

There are two points in Mr Graham's study on which we find our interest concentrated—his presentation of the Quaker ideal of worship, and his attempt, in dealing with the foundation truths of religion, to define the relations between the universal presence of the Holy Spirit, the Immanent God, and what is spoken of as the Indwelling Christ on the one hand, and the personality of Jesus Christ, as known to us in human history, on the other.

There is little similarity, either in conception or in structure, between Mr Graham's book and Robert Barclay's famous Apology, but they are alike in this, that in both the sections on Ministry and Worship are vital, and carry one to the very heart of the matter. No one who desires to understand the possibilities of the Quaker method in united worship should neglect Barclay's record of the moving experiences of his day and the account of what he felt when he "came into the silent assemblies of God's people," gatherings in which "the secret power and virtue of life is known to refresh the soul, and the pure motions and breathings of God's spirit are felt to arise." There is a like witness in the living touch of Caroline Stephen's *Quaker Strongholds* and in Violet Hodgkin's 1919 Swarthmore Lecture, *Silent Worship: the Way of Wonder*. Mr Graham speaks from the experience of thirty-five years of ministry, and is very clear in his conviction that this is the true method of worship and also of preaching, which must be on a basis of silence, not of man's will, but of the promptings of the Spirit alone. He has some searching things to say in the chapter on "The Reward of the Ascetic," notably on p. 181, as to the danger of settled orders of service, in which "words become cheap and insincere," and of the unreality, from the point of view of spiritual religion, and the corrupting power, of a constant and compulsory use of such a liturgy as that of the Church of England Prayer Book; but his plea for the Quaker ideal would have been more persuasive, both in the matter of worship and of preaching, if he had shown some measure of appreciation of what others have found of the same spirit under other forms of administration. Mr Graham, we are sure, did not intend, and is probably unaware of, the gross insult implied in the remark that Friends "decline to preach by salary," as though it were for the sake of salary that any true minister undertakes to preach, and there could be no question of a genuine call of the Spirit, in answer to which a man devotes his life to the ministry of religion, and constantly seeks to put himself more unreservedly at the disposal of that high service. There are doubtless worldly men in every Church, but the abuse of a calling is no true measure of its essential spirit; and regarding the various methods of ministry, we will dare to say that there may be as absolute dependence on the higher promptings of the Spirit in the preparation even of a written sermon to be preached at a stated time (of what Barclay disrespectfully calls the parson's "conned and gathered stuff") as in the quiet waiting of the Friends' gatherings for worship; there may be as humble a surrender to the message which comes with prophetic power, of which a man is simply the organ, even in a church of stately ritual, as in the plainest Quaker meeting. Mr Graham tells us that he has found rest and æsthetic enjoyment at a choral service in Westminster Abbey, but if that is all, he misses surely some of the supreme impulses of spiritual quickening and consecration which come from the solemnising power of music and its pure breathings of aspiration, which go beyond what words can utter. Delight in Nature he allows to his Quaker ascetic, but as with the cultivation of taste and imagination through poetry and the arts, apparently only for the sake of æsthetic pleasure. But there are those again to whom Nature means more than that, and in a deeper communion of the Spirit find the presence of the Shepherd who leads beside the still waters and up to the great heights of life; and that surely is true also of the silent appeal of a great cathedral. There is much to be learnt from the habit of silence and inward recollection, and the fellowship of the quiet meeting is a very beautiful thing; but it is not clear that the uniform method of the Quaker is the only way by which a true ministry of the Spirit may be exercised, nor that all deepest human needs are by that way most surely met.

Our second point of greatest interest is concerned with the doctrine of the Inward Light and the personality of Jesus Christ. What we desire is to realise truth as it rests "on the sure foundation of experience"; but the experience must be rightly interpreted. In the gathered silence of the Quaker meeting, who is it to whom they attend? "The Lord is the Spirit" is an apostolic confession apparently adopted by Mr Graham with the conviction that there is unity or identity between the historical Jesus of Nazareth and the Indwelling Christ. "The belief in the Christ within," he says, "is held in the Society of Friends to-day with the same wholehearted insistence as it was in the early days. At the same time I do not know of any attempt at what might be called an explanation of the identity of the human life lived in history with the universal spiritual influence acting in all ages and places." Nor do we find in what Mr Graham himself has written an explanation of that identity which altogether satisfies. The right guidance he finds in the doctrine of the Proem of the Fourth Gospel, with its "daring identification" of the divine Word, or Logos, "whom we usually speak of as the Holy Spirit," with the spirit of Jesus. For the first disciples he holds that the identification was easy, because "they had seen and spoken with the risen Jesus." On this point Mr Graham is quite definite. What Jesus did on the Resurrection morning is recounted as an actual occurrence, "when in the light of new knowledge of the unseen world, freed from the physical body, He was able to communicate several times with His disciples," telling them plainly that He would still be with them. And on a par with those communications, as carrying conviction of reality, are set the appearance to Paul on the road to Damascus and other visions; though with regard to visions this curious remark is added: "While granting in some cases the intra-psychical origin, it is nevertheless difficult to say at what exact time between the Resurrection morn and to-day Jesus abandoned His people or went too far away to be accessible." Mr Graham's confidence is fortified by the results established, as he holds, by the Society for Psychical Research of communications recently received from departed members, and thus he is able to accept without reservation the promise of Jesus, when released from the flesh, to be still actually with His friends, to work and serve and love and sympathise. "There will be personal identity, personal nearness, personal telepathic power." And the conclusion is that the Christian has warrant for believing "that we may in prayer still address our Lord Jesus Christ, the everlasting Paraclete."

On the other hand, there are expressions which seem to lead to a different conclusion, and that it is not Jesus who actually becomes the Indwelling Christ, the universal spiritual presence, the object of worship and prayer in spiritual communion. "The Indwelling God, outwardly revealed in Christ, is my God," says Mr Graham. He speaks of an "Eternal Father soul," "a permeating God, making His home in our souls," and if Christ in the flesh and the Indwelling Christ are to be identified, it is because "communion with our Lord is also communion with the Word, the thought and purpose of the Eternal." "In speaking of the Christ within we are extending our conception of the presence of a certain historical personality into that of the Spirit, of which that personality was the archetype, the classical example, and for us historically the source." We are to learn of our Elder Brother that our nature may become like His. In that sense "the divine Worker within us is endeavouring to have Christ born in us." Such expressions seem to point to one of two conclusions: either that the "Christ within" of the disciples' actual experience is simply the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, by which, quickened in our hearts, we learn what it is to be children of God, or that as an object of ultimate trust and worship it is actually the heavenly Father to whom Jesus taught His followers to pray. The expression is so variously used that both answers seem to be required to cover the whole round of experience so indicated. We cannot conceive of more than one eternal, spiritual Presence, with living power enfolding the gathered silence of Friends in their meeting, realised in the surrender of love and consecration and willing obedience to the Father's will. The right interpretation of the experience would seem to be that it is He, the one eternal Spirit of truth and love, who bears witness in our hearts to the grace and truth of Jesus, and bids us follow Him, obedient to the laws of life after the mind of Christ.

If, as is certainly the case, there is much else of real value in Mr Graham's *Apologia*, to which no reference is made in the present notice, we can only ask him to believe that the silence is due to no lack of interest or genuine appreciation.

V. D. DAVIS.

BOURNEMOUTH.

Tutors unto Christ: Introduction to the Study of Religions. By Alfred E. Garvie.—London: Humphrey Milford, 1920.—Pp. viii + 242.

THE title of this book will not specially commend it to the majority of its readers. At the same time, it serves a useful purpose. It is well to be reminded at the outset that the writer occupies a definitely selected viewpoint. His exposition is coloured by that fact from beginning to end.

The sub-title indicates the general aim of the volume. As one would expect, such topics as the historical development of religion, the comparative study of religions, and the philosophy of religion are successively dealt with. But these discussions do not constitute the distinctive contents of the book: they supply material for some seventy-five pages in all, whereas the prolegomena of this study, and particularly the psychology of religion, are assigned a hundred pages. It is only, however, in the subsequent formulation of judgments of value, and in certain contrasts drawn between Christianity and sundry other faiths, that Principal Garvie really lets himself go. The writer's primary intention then becomes apparent. His well-known *Fach*, as this "Introduction" once more makes plain, is the philosophy of religion—a study in which many an equally confident predecessor has eventually come to grief. The theme, moreover, which evokes his supreme ardour is a philosophical vindication of Christianity wherein it claims to enjoy a lofty and exclusive supremacy.

The History of Religions is expounded, not separately but incidentally, in many parts of the volume. Here is found one of the most unsatisfactory features of the manual. Lack of proportion is not its only fault; there is also frequently an evident lack of concentration. Several chapters are devoted to an examination of definitions of religion, theories of its origin, etc.; but far too little is said of its numerous and distinctive manifestations. As for the actual origin of religion, Dr Garvie supports by ingenious reasoning the view that it "began" at a certain stage in animistic speculation. Such an opinion, challenged already, is sure to be challenged anew. As the writer himself concedes, "this attempt to reconstruct the historical development of religion is only tentative; the most that can be claimed for it is a high degree of probability" (p. 133).

The Comparative Study of Religions is accorded ampler treatment, three entire chapters being devoted to it. For the most part, the comparisons instituted are limited to three faiths—namely, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Principal Garvie greatly dislikes the name "Comparative Religion," and more than once he lowers his lance that he may have a passing lunge at it. The risks which accompany the use of the comparative method are duly emphasised; but it must be remarked that an additional peril in this connection is rashly introduced. Dr Garvie asserts that "the purpose of our comparison is . . . to reach a judgment of value regarding the religions of the world" (p. 139). "The difficult and yet inevitable task of the judgment of value is the issue of the comparative study of religions" (p. 162). But, even on the writer's own showing, this attitude is untenable. If, as he holds, "the comparative study of religions can claim to be a science . . . only as long as it avoids any judgment of value" (p. 139), he must be ignoring the reasonable contention that Comparative Religion *is* a science. As a matter of fact, he misapprehends its spirit and function. Questions pertaining to the objective reality and the relative worth of the diverse faiths of mankind belong really to that branch of the subject which he next proceeds to expound.

The Philosophy of Religion furnishes Principal Garvie with a completely congenial theme. In this connection, he supplies an interpretation of the facts furnished by history when linked together through their individual inter-relations. And, summing up the product of his far-ranging inquiries, he concludes:—

> "Among the religions, . . . Christianity can be shown to be in the person, teaching, sacrifice, and sovereignty of Christ as Son of God and Saviour of men, the perfect fulfilment of their imperfect endeavours. . . . Christ alone, among all religious masters, has the absolute claim to the belief, trust, and surrender of all men" (p. 226).

It is here, at last, that one discerns the inspiring motive of this book. Dr Garvie resorts to no camouflage; keeping his goal constantly in view, he makes no attempt to disguise that fact. While this manual is ostensibly an introduction to the study of religions, its primary object is to frame an apology for the Christian religion. "There is need of a book written from the special standpoint and for the distinctive purpose of this volume" (p. v). The author's intention, as already remarked, is sufficiently revealed in the significant title he has chosen. At the back of his mind, throughout the entire course of his reading, there has remained undimmed the vision of a triumphing faith, proudly scattering its foes. His book has been written to establish the confidence of those who esteem Christianity to be the final and absolute religion; it is designed, in particular, to strengthen the resolve of any who propose to undertake service in the foreign mission field.

If prepared for use in a theological college, the manual may serve its turn. It must be pointed out, however, that a genuine study of religions does not concern itself with vested interests. It acknowledges no monopolies. It bestows no favours. It refuses to have anything to do with propaganda. From the contentious affirmations and denials of different schools of theology it holds itself deliberately aloof. Its task is restricted to an attempt to understand the numerous faiths with which it deals, to disclose their historical relations, and thereafter to expound (if possible) those problems which lie at the foundation of our belief in the objective truth of religion.

This little book possesses some admirable qualities. Principal Garvie knows his own mind, and he expresses himself with a refreshing frankness. He shows ample acquaintance with the leading authorities, all of whom are honoured by generous quotations. Attention is directed to the real and vital questions with which the study of religions has to do. A very great deal of valuable matter is to be found in the volume, whose quality is poorly disclosed in an index which is not only meagre but perfunctory. It is all the more to be regretted that the book is discursive, and somewhat carelessly written. The author has an unfortunate liking for unfamiliar terms, such as "physiomorphized" (p. 72), "solity" (p. 132), etc. In particular, he has gradually acquired the habit of numbering the paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of everything he writes. In the volume under review, the text has been mercilessly vivisected. Every page fairly bristles with interjected Arabic numerals, Greek letters, English letters, and other notation-symbols of a similar kind. This procedure has been adopted no doubt, here and elsewhere, with the purpose of increasing the lucidity of the exposition; but, in the present instance, it is carried to such an extreme that it becomes positively perplexing. No printed document should be wantonly disfigured and handicapped in this entirely needless way. Finally, as a handbook for students who propose to offer themselves as candidates for foreign mission service, the volume is chargeable with presenting a very one-sided view. While welcoming the broadening of opinion concerning alien systems of belief, now growingly current among Christian thinkers and scholars (pp. 141, 226, etc.), Principal Garvie also declares, "we do not believe in the absolute superiority of the Christian faith less than we did, but we do not hold the absolute worthlessness of all other religions as we did" (*The International Review of Missions*, vol. v. p. 130). This may seem to be a rather unhandsome concession; but, it would appear (p. 227), it represents the full length to which this critic is prepared to go.

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The Pastoral Epistles, with Introduction, Text, and Commentary. By R. St John Parry, D.D.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920.—Pp. clxvi+103.

These Epistles played an important part two centuries ago when Episcopalians, Presbyterians and others in this country so eagerly sought Scripture authority for their respective forms of Church government. In modern times their value, as witnesses to Apostolic practice, has been greatly reduced, because criticism has shattered the ancient confidence in their genuineness. Many scholars are willing to admit that 2 Timothy contains fragments of Pauline correspondence, but few to-day defend the authenticity of the three Epistles in their present form. Dr Parry, however, after many years of devoted study of the Pastorals, has produced a scholarly work, which is likely to be referred to in the future as the best defence of the traditional view in the English language. He, nevertheless, admits that the situation reflected in them cannot be contemporaneous with the story of Paul's life and activities found in the Acts of the Apostles, and he is forced to date them in a supposed second period of travelling and preaching on the part of the Apostle Paul, after his imprisonment at Rome, mentioned in the Acts. He finds evidence for this in Eusebius, who states that Paul was martyred in 67 A.D., in the Canon of Muratori, and in the phrase [1 Ep. ad Cor. c. v.] of Clemens Romanus, ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἐλθών. He is of the opinion that Paul visited Spain and Asia between 62 and 67 A.D., and that he was arrested in Asia Minor in 66. This is in line with the suggestion offered by a recent writer that the persecution of 64 A.D. was confined to Rome, and that the general persecution of the Christians in the provinces only began in 66, before which date, it is argued, the return of the adherents of the new religion ordered by Nero could not have been ready.

This theory is not in itself improbable, but it remains unsupported by facts. The evidence available supports the generally accepted view that Paul suffered in 64 A.D. The reference in Clemens [1 Ep. ad Cor. c. vi.] τούτοις . . . συνηθροίσθη πολὺ πλῆθος ἐκλεκτῶν is applicable to no other known calamity in the history of the early Christians. It is strange, if Paul visited Spain and the west as Dr Lightfoot argued, and our author believes, that the traditions of the Spanish Church make no mention of it. As early as 400 A.D. the Spanish Offices referred to the labours of James, the son of Zebedee, in Spain, and he is mentioned again in the writings of Isidorus (600 A.D.) as one of the early missioners in Spain. The legend states that Theodosius of Tira even discovered his body at Santiago in 829 A.D. In the traditions of Gaul, and especially in the fifteenth century MS., containing the Life of St. Mary Magdalene, which may have been derived from a much older MS., Paul is mentioned as having visited the Rhone Valley. Abbé Duchesne rejects these traditions as worthless. Some of them refer to Sergius Paulus, and not to the Apostle. Apparently there is no evidence of a visit to the West beyond Paul's own statement that he intended going to Spain. The Epistles themselves, if genuine, would lend some support to the view that the Apostle made another tour of Asia of which nothing was known to the author of the Acts.

Dr Parry considers the external evidence for the authenticity of the Pastorals adequate. He, however, overlooks the fact that Marcion omitted them from his canon of Pauline writings. If they were universally accepted among the Christians of his age as the work of the Apostle, it is hardly conceivable that such an ardent disciple of Paul, as Marcion was, would have rejected them, notwithstanding statements in them deprecatory of views he himself was supposed to espouse.

Their language and style, and the highly developed state of Church organisation reflected in them, have been the chief reasons for ascribing them to a post-Apostolic period. The attitude of mind evinced in them is akin to what is found in Clemens' Epistle to the Corinthians.

The author argues that the ἐπισκοπή of the Pastorals is not the Ignatian monarchical episcopacy, and that they cannot belong to the early second century, for that reason. Granted that this is so, it does not follow that because the episcopacy at Antioch was monarchic, it was so in Asia. Ignatius, in his epistles, seems anxious to persuade the Asiatic Churches to adopt that form of government.

The argument of Dr Parry that the vocabulary of the Pastorals can be reconciled with the language of the Pauline Epistles on the ground that Paul chose his words to suit his subject, no doubt contains much that is true, but it may be pressed too far, as in our opinion has been done by the author, when he makes the Apostle a frequent attendant at the lectures of popular Greek orators in his old age, in order to account for the similarity between the language of these Epistles and that of the literary κοινή of the Domitian period.

The sections devoted to the terms in these Epistles, around which the battle has raged, are important and informing, and if the reader could be convinced that διδασκαλία, διδαχή, παραθήκη, πίστις, ἐπισκοπή, refer not to a *body of doctrine*, and the *office* of a bishop, a great obstacle to their genuineness would be removed. Our author contends "wholesome teaching," *i.e.* morally healthy, should be substituted for "sound doctrine" in a well-known passage. That the emphasis in the Pastorals should be on character as a qualification for position in the Church, and not on a personal experience of the truth of the Christian religion, as in the Pauline Epistles, is regarded as being in no way inconsistent with their being the work of Paul, for they are personal letters to trusted friends, dealing with practical affairs and not with the deep things of the soul.

From the point of view of one interested in the problem involved in the Pastorals, this work is not a complete answer to the case against their authenticity; but it is a valiant attempt to re-establish their authenticity.

There is appended a list of words used in the Pastorals, showing which are, and which are not, employed in the other Pauline Epistles.

On p. lxi. "the verb ἐπισκοπή" must be a slip of the pen.

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Simon de Montfort: An Historical Drama in Five Acts. By Alfred Hayes.—London: Methuen, 1918.

He who writes an historical play or novel proverbially gives hostages to fortune; he challenges on two sides the critic who lives or lurks in every reader. *Quentin Durward* is perhaps, in one sense, the most historical of Scott's novels; yet what bred in young Ranke his lifelong determination to hold the scales impartially was his discovery of the discrepancies between that novel and many of the actual facts. Professor C. R. Beazley's admiration for the poet in this play would seem to have tempted him to give too definite a testimonial, in his preface, to the historian. It is not so much that Mr Hayes makes technical slips; the monks of Lewes, for instance, were not Benedictines in the ordinary sense of the word, but Cluniacs (which alone could explain how a monastery of that importance was only a priory), and it is still more contrary to ancient or modern usage to speak of "Franciscan and Dominican monks"; nor, again, would Prince Edward have seen many milestones, or been troubled with much dust, on his February ride to Kenilworth (p. 179). These, after all, are matters of mint and anise and cummin, though it is a pity they did not attract Professor Beazley's friendly attention. It is rather more serious that Mr Hayes, in the plain prose of his notes, should attribute Bacon's imprisonment to no more serious cause than the jealousy of his fellow-friars (p. 227); that he should accept without scepticism one of the most irresponsible of the thousand-and-one mediæval poison-stories (p. 233); and that he should call Adam de Marisco "the founder in Oxford of the great school of theology, which continued to rule the thought of Europe till the Renaissance" (p. 226). Great as were the personalities of the Oxford schoolmen, the evidence seems to show that by far the greater part of their teaching was done abroad; and, where a man teaches in his earlier and later prime, there also he is probably learning. These again, however, are minor matters, which it would not be fair to mention unless they seemed typical of others which lend themselves less easily to concrete illustration, and especially of Mr Hayes's attitude towards the whole story of Simon de Montfort himself. He seems to have regarded that remarkable character, like the above-mentioned social and historical details, from too modern a point of view. It is very significant in this connection that, in his list of authorities, he does not claim to have studied Bémont's monograph, which the majority of historical students would probably put higher than Bishop Creighton's or Mr Prothero's. We had hoped, on opening this book, to find something which would take us one step, at least, beyond Bémont's rather agnostic judgment on Simon's character; but we feel, on laying it down, that for Mr Hayes the problems which baffled Bémont scarcely exist. Montfort is, for him, the simple-minded straightforward hero, the consistent saint and martyr, described in the hymn which contemporaries composed in his honour. We get no hint of Simon's undoubted illegalities in Gascony; no inkling of Bémont's uncomfortable suggestion that the Gascon complainants were quite possibly in the right on the main question; no suspicion of mixed motives anywhere, except in a fine passage where Montfort's religion contends with his natural desire for vengeance. Whether we follow Bémont in his further iconoclasm or not, it is impossible to compare the original authorities without concluding that he is at least right in emphasising the complexity of Simon's character and motives, and the quasi-fortuitous character of some of his greatest achievements. To most historians, we feel sure, Mr Hayes will seem to have used full poetic licence in bringing out every heroic fact, even every suggestion of heroism in de Montfort and his wife, and in steadily turning his eyes away from the rest. While agreeing with Professor Beazley that he has made the Countess a very charming person, we feel that she is not the exact daughter of Eve to whom Adam de Marisco wrote his 159th letter, wherein the good friar warns the Countess that the wife's duty is to cleave to her husband with constancy, prudence, and benignity (without which "every wedded soul is convicted of having damnably violated the law of marriage"), and to eschew "that crazy devotion to superfluity of personal adornment" which keeps so many servants at work and costs so dearly to the husband's purse.

But (it may be replied) what does Adam de Marisco matter, so long as Mr Hayes gives us a charming Eleanor? And indeed we are glad to reach this happier ground. Englishmen do not know too much about Simon de Montfort and that struggle for liberty of which he made himself the protagonist; and our main feeling must be one of gratitude towards the author who sets himself to this task. To bring forward again one of the great characters of our past; to win the sympathy of English-speaking peoples for one of the greatest chapters in our long fight for freedom; to show forth noble ideals, whether these were explicitly confessed in all their fullness by Simon himself, or whether they be partly lent to him by a twentieth-century mind—these things are worth doing for their own sake, and this Mr Hayes has achieved. The author shows clearly, though not obtrusively, his conviction that many of these thirteenth-century problems are, in a very real sense, our own problems of to-day. We hope, for the sake of civilisation as well as of literature, that he will find a wide circle of readers.

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The Letters of Charles Sorley. Edited by Professor W. R. Sorley. —Cambridge: University Press, 1919.—Pp. xiii+320.

Those who are familiar with the volume of poems by Charles Sorley (noticed in these pages in April 1916) will be glad to possess this further volume to place by its side. There is, as Professor Sorley says, nothing, in the book before us, of formal biography; but the letters, extending over a period of less than four years, convey a wonderfully vivid impression of the character of the author, and no reader can fail to feel the genuineness of the remark made by his kindly hostess in Schwerin that "the time with him was like a holiday and a feast-day." A happy joyousness and frankness, combined with a thoughtful seriousness, pervade the letters, and one is conscious all through the book of being in the company of a strong and lovable personality that would certainly have been a spiritual force in whatever career of life he had chosen.

In a brief introductory chapter Mrs Sorley tells just so much of the details of her son's short history as it is needful for the reader to know. He and his twin brother were born in Aberdeen in 1895; and, with their elder sister, spent four years of normal and contented childhood in their parents' country home overlooking the Old Town. In 1900, the family removed to Cambridge, where some years later the boys, who had hitherto been taught by their mother, were sent as day-boys to the King's College Choir School. Charles gained an open scholarship at Marlborough in 1908, and remained at Marlborough until Christmas 1913. The first half of the year 1914 he spent in Germany, intending to proceed for the Michaelmas term to Oxford, where he had gained a Scholarship at University College. On the outbreak of the war, however, he obtained a commission in the seventh battalion of the Suffolk Regiment, and at the end of May 1915 went with his battalion to France. He was killed in the battle of Loos on October 13, whilst leading his company (he was then Captain) at the "hair-pin" trench near Hulluch.

There are five chapters of letters, containing those from Marlborough, Schwerin, Jena, from the Army whilst in training, and from the Army at the Front. All reveal the working of a fresh and vigorous mind facing one after another of the problems of life. It was a critical mind and yet never merely critical; there is a vein of mysticism continually coming to the surface, but it is invariably an intelligent and healthy mysticism. "He revelled in big horizons, natural or social; he loved alike the boundless sweep of the Marlborough downs and the wide problems of human life."

The Marlborough letters date from the latter half of the writer's public-school period. His affection for Marlborough had already become a rooted 'sentiment.' "He loved it," so his house-master relates, "with a deep and growing love; and not the school only, but the downs, in rain, wind, and sun—Barbury, the Four Miles, and Liddington, the swift skies, and windy spaces, the old turf on which he ran for miles, with all its memories and traces of a bygone people." But already the critical attitude had begun to manifest itself. He had become in a sense a "rebel," though an eminently sane and reasonable rebel. By the time he had attained to the Upper Sixth he realised very clearly some of the weaknesses—perhaps the unavoidable weaknesses—of the public-school system. "When one reaches the top of a public school, one has," he writes, "such unbounded opportunities of getting unbearably conceited that I don't see how anyone survives the change that must come when the tin god is swept off his little kingdom and becomes an unimportant mortal again." And later on, when in Germany, he reverts repeatedly to "the artificial position of responsibility" that is thrown upon a head-boy, "which continually threatens to make one a prig, a poser, or a censor." The atmosphere, he says, deliberately over-develops the nasty tyrannical instinct, and fosters a tendency to be "always striving in the race of showing off," so that it is not what one is but what one appears to be which comes to be regarded as the main thing. Alas! *that* tendency, I fear, is fostered by more atmospheres than one in our human society. In another connexion, his spirit of rebellion was doubtless less justified, though even here one cannot help to some extent sympathising with it. It was a tough struggle, we are told, to induce him to work at anything for which he had no particular liking. Though evidently a classical scholar of no mean status, he revolted against the routine of classical education, and Latin literature especially failed to appeal to him. He rejoiced at the prospect of some day arriving at the stage when "there would be no pressing need to continue those detestable Classics in the detestably serious spirit demanded" in a public school or university.

"In the stirring of the masses" Charles Sorley found, to quote his house-master again, "the spirit of the age"; and, amongst other things, the discovery accounts for the enthusiasm he displayed for the poetry of Masefield. Certainly the two papers on Masefield and *A Shropshire Lad*, read to the Marlborough Literary Society, are remarkable productions, considering the age of the writer. Masefield, he declares, "has brought poetry down to the level of low life, and in so doing has exalted it to the heaven which there exists ignored." Masefield, he avers, "writes that he knows and testifies that he has seen. Throughout his poems there are lines and phrases so instinct with life, that they betoken a man who writes of what he has experienced, not of what he thinks he can imagine; who has braved the storm, who has walked in the hells, who has seen the reality of life." And of Housman he significantly asserts that "the compound of civilised instinct with primitive emotions has made him at his best reach the highest point of primitive virtue."

The letters from Germany are intensely interesting, especially to a reader who happens to be familiar with the districts they describe. One has a certain regret that a portion of the three months in Mecklenburg was not spent *auf dem Lande*, where he would have come more into touch with the "common people" who appeared to him "worth gold," rather than in the fashionable capital. Later on, indeed, during a flying visit from Jena, he did get a glimpse of the country folk in the neighbourhood of Wismar, and noted one characteristic of them—their easy-going, indolent mode of existence, leaving their roads unmade and their hedges untrimmed. A longer acquaintance would, however, have impressed him more firmly than ever with the charming simplicity, the unselfconsciousness, the sterling integrity of the unsophisticated Mecklenburg *Bauer*. But the story of Charles Sorley's life in Schwerin is a fascinating one from beginning to end. His description of the Herr Doktor, at whose house he resided, a "tal fat hearty man with moustaches," who returns home to Mittagsessen in a state of overwhelming perspiration, and who shouts out "Liebling!" at the top of his voice as soon as he catches sight of his wife at breakfast, of the refined and genial Frau Doktor, who gives him lessons in German and whose cooking is superb, and of her brother, the Neuphilolog, who is unashamed of the pursuit of learning, is admirably done, and might serve, I imagine, for a description of countless middle-class homes in the *Vaterland*. And a series of amusing incidents give piquancy to the narrative. There is a delightful naïveté, for instance, about the picture of the Herr Doktor officiating at the harmonium after Abendessen, and, with his eyes closed, deliciously enjoying the thick, smug notes, and of his young English guest exclaiming a dozen times, at the completion of the performance, "Ich danke!"—an exclamation which was intended to conceal his real feelings, but which, if taken as a German would have taken it from another German, exactly expressed them! And what reader can be so dull as to fail to see the stroke of genius involved in the comparison of life in Ithaca in the time of Odysseus with life in Mecklenburg-Schwerin in the time of the Herr Doktor? Underlying the gaiety, however, the deeper side of the writer's nature is all the while disclosing itself. One follows with avidity his gradual recognition of the greatness of Goethe. "The worst of a piece like *Faust*," he is led to confess, "is that it completely dries up any creative instincts or attempts in oneself. There is nothing that I have ever thought or ever read that is not somewhere contained in it, and (what is worse) explained in it." One feels, too, the contagion of his fervent admiration for Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman* in the German text, and of his enthusiastic appreciation of the representations he witnessed of it on the stage at Schwerin.

My space is exhausted, and I cannot linger over the letters from Jena or those from the Army. In the former, the allusions to Weimar—that fine old town on the banks of the Ilm, with its beautiful Park and Schlossgarten and lovely surroundings—are specially noteworthy; in the latter, the persistent resolve to be just to the German people strikes one as precisely what one would have predicted. With one last reflexion I must be content. Not a few of this young scholar's judgments were obviously prejudiced and premature; indeed, he now and again repented of certain of them and freely admitted he was wrong. I believe his dislike of Tennyson and Browning, for example, would some day have been no less relentlessly shelved than was his first perverted view of the Rietschel statue of Goethe and Schiller in front of the theatre at Weimar. None the less, the book as a whole is a convincing confirmation of his headmaster's assurance that "he would have been a great and a true man, who would have served his generation." Neither Marlborough nor any other public school can of itself turn out a Charles Sorley. To the moulding of that personality there went influences deeper far than even the most perfectly organised school system can call into being. But is it too much to hope that in the coming time this simple record of "the splendid promise of youth" unpretentiously given in the nation's service may make its quiet appeal to some of those who occupy a Sixth Form, and kindle the yearning to do in some small measure the work he would have done, had the sacrifice not been demanded?

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THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE *ENTENTE CORDIALE* OF THE HUMANIST SPIRIT AS THE BASIS OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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I.

Political philosophers have been familiar, at any rate since the day of Hobbes, with the idea that the best way of erecting and securing political power is for the people to "confer all their individual power and strength upon one man or one assembly of men." It is in this way, Hobbes urged, "wills will be reduced into one will, and every man acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever is done by the ruler so constituted. . . . This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: 'I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorise all his actions in like manner.'" The "multitude" so united is for Hobbes the Commonwealth, and the covenant thus made is the great "generation" of the great *Leviathan*, which, as he says, constitutes "our peace and defence."

Similarly the League of Nations would appear to aim at the "social contract" of a Commonwealth of Nations which should generate a super-Leviathan for a super-Commonwealth. It, too, is founded on a covenant. The essence of the covenant is an undertaking, on the part of all (in theory) civilised nations, in cases of differences and quarrels with other nations, to appeal to law instead of to military force; or at least to appeal to it in the first place, and to provide for a "cooling" interval in any case, before military measures are taken. But as there is a sovereign power of Leviathan to compel obedience to the law as administered in the Courts of Justice, so in the Commonwealths of the Nations power is concentrated, super-Leviathan power, in the combined League, to compel obedience to the terms of the covenant, to which each nation has bound itself. By the League of Nations a determined effort is to be made to compel arbitration. As has been said, in 1776 the Declaration of Independence was the high political maxim; in 1920 we reach the Declaration of Interdependence. An international court will decide questions of international law. But who is to see that the decisions are carried out? We are driven to the idea of an international authority, founded on force, an international Leviathan. "It is good," Mr Arthur Balfour has said, "that arbitration should be encouraged. It is good that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the nations. It is good that the security of the smaller states should be fenced round with peculiar care. But . . . what is needed now, and will be needed so long as militarism is unconquered, is the machinery for enforcing [these precautions]; and the contrivances of such a machinery will tax to the utmost the statesmanship of the world. . . . Behind law there must be power." Once more the idea seems to emerge of the necessity of a super-Leviathan. All national law requires its sanction. National force has been the final sanction for national law. Similarly, in a political League of Nations combined international force seems the only practicable sanction to secure the carrying out of the judgments of international tribunals, and also for the defence of any small (or even large) nation wantonly attacked by some other power or powers when the latter are not willing to refer the dispute to a recognised international court.

All these conceptions are prevailingly political. And they appeal, almost irresistibly, so long as we identify our sentiments and interests with the Leviathan idea. We imagine it will always be associated with the right and just, *i.e.*, of course, the right and the just as we see it. But where are the guarantees, or where can be the guarantees, for the future of the super-Leviathan? Given even the possibility of the creation of perfect machinery of law-courts, and military force to require the carrying out of decisions, we assume satisfaction in the interpretation of international law, and the finality of its pronouncements. We have seen, in our own country, the extreme difficulty of acceptance of the arbitration idea in industrial disputes. Would anyone suggest that refusal to accept this method of settlement should be followed by armed forces brought to bear on a section of the community? We shall now have the method of a self-binding international covenant binding nations to arbitration, contravention of which will lead to a state of compulsion by the United League against the offender. Though it is hoped that the threat held *in terrorem* will bring the culprit "to reason," we see that, in national affairs, such a threat might prove a provocation to civil war.

II.

"Behind law there must be power." We are familiar with the identification of the "power" of the law as the punitive steps taken to bring the individual into line with the rest of the community. We apply the same idea of "power" to the international scale. Politically a unified power is suggested to *repress*, and bring into line, the nations which show a disposition to refuse reference to international law. The League of Nations begins at once by production of apparatus and machinery. "The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council with a permanent secretary."

But the "power" which is ordinarily regarded as pertinent to the sanction of the law is not the only "power." It is a pity that we come to look on political and governmental "power" as our main conception of "power." It is excellent, or, let us say, it may be indispensable to peace, as a preventative of war. But the idea of power in itself is narrow, self-destructive, inhuman.

Political power, to be safe, must be directed towards some end *greater than itself*. The "power" which must be made available as a sanction for the League of Nations to carry out the decision of its courts of international law must be *itself* a means only to some end greater than itself. The end, in its final form, is humanism, as a transfiguration of undiluted self-regarding nationality into the humanised combination of both nationality and internationality. Humanism includes the rightly perspectived international mind, based upon the family-mind and the national-mind.

What, then, is the conception of "power" which should lie behind the idea of the League of Nations? Taking the comprehensive meaning of the "international mind" as including necessarily all the implications of home, local neighbourhood, provinciality, nationality, the "international mind" transfigures all these aspects (it does not in any real sense remove them) into the humanism that belongs to our common humanities, and particularly to what an Elizabethan writer called our "best humanities." It is these "best humanities" which stand out as the real end of a League of Nations; the military "power" behind the League (viewed apart from politics) is only a means to the real end. We thus get a standard of criticism and perspective by which to judge, intellectually, of the political machinery. How far will it all tend towards the real end of humanism?

Now this is an educational question, and light can possibly be thrown upon it by considering the educational aspect of the subject.

III.

As a method of procedure, educationally, we can choose between the method of "discipline" as repression and the method of discipline as stimulus. The League of Nations, in the last resort, relies upon the sanction of physical "power"; that is, it foresees the necessity of some mode of repression as "discipline." This, indeed, has been the main method of educational institutions in the past. But we are living at an interesting and, at least, transitional stage of educational development. It is now recognised that, educationally, there is a great waste in relying chiefly on repressive measures of discipline, and that a new era is opening out in the expansion of the method of stimulus. Much of the late Mr Arthur Sidgwick's famous lecture on "Stimulus" might be transferred (in spirit) in application, from the school to society, and from national to international relations. For instance, he refers to a striking sermon by Mr Bowen, of Harrow, on the subject of public spirit, in which he quietly remarked that "anybody would sooner be run out at cricket than run his partner out." It will be said that this public-school attitude cannot be expected to apply to nations. We may certainly say that, if it ever will apply, the method of its development is more likely to be that type of discipline which produced the public-school spirit, viz. that of stimulus, than that of repression. It may be added that the method of repression has played its part, not always a satisfactory one, in the history of the public school. Often the methods of repression and of stimulus have run side by side. But, on the whole, progress has been unspeakably more rapid when the method of stimulus has been in the ascendant. "Another potent stimulus to thought," says Mr Sidgwick, "is supplied by getting the pupils, whenever it is possible, to share in anything like original research." It is from this unifying sense of humanist comradeship that is developed in research that the Oxford Manifesto to the German professors bears far more international significance than its adverse critics can have realised.

Educationally it is the self-active energies that need developing, not repressing. This is the very basis of the "new education." The first necessity in education, says Dr Montessori, is to practise the child in the difference between *good* and *evil*. "The task of the educator lies in seeing that the child does not confound *good* with *immobility*, and *evil* with *activity*, as often happens in the case of the old-time discipline. Our aim is to discipline for *activity* towards the good, not for *immobility*, not for *passivity*, not for *obedience*." Surely this educational discipline is sound for nations as well as for children. Repressive measures may be necessary, as the final sanction for deliberate wrong-doing, in school and in nation. But in the school to-day educational thinkers are much more alert in measuring and encouraging the stimulative aspects of school-work and school-life. In many schools corporal punishment has completely disappeared; in very many it has nearly disappeared. The stimulative factors to right living and right acting are correspondingly more and more considered and applied. This transformation of view has taken place largely because education, instead of remaining unconscious, and carried on without reflection upon life-principles, has become self-conscious, and a conviction has arisen amongst thinking teachers of the need of bringing their teaching work into direct touch with life, instead of basing itself uncritically upon tradition and artificial maxims, and short-cuts to aims, external to the intrinsic work. The teachers have been led to regard the aim in teaching as being the deepest good, intellectual and moral, of the child, here and now, not his possible exploitation for some occupation or activity ten or fifteen years ahead. The school, and indeed the knowledge given in the school curricula, and the whole mechanism of school-life have ceased to be ends in themselves. All this institutional and material entourage is the *means* of helping the pupils to their own self-development. It is the process of the development towards application of the Kantian ethical maxim: So act towards every human being as to regard him always as an end, and never as a means only.

Such an attitude involves ever increasingly the employment of the method of stimulus rather than that of repression. Hence, educationally, the question arises: Can we look forward to a similar self-consciousness of the claims of humanism, which in the future may help forward the educational stimulus in the various nations towards those "best humanities" which feed the "international mind," and base it upon its natural growth through the family, the local environment, the nation to which it owes its starting-points, to humanity at large? The League of Nations takes within its survey not only international arbitration and its numerous problems, but also international labour questions, "traffic in women and children," the opium trade, trade in arms and ammunition, freedom of communications, international questions affecting the prevention and control of disease. Speaking generally, it deals with preventions of evils, repression of wrong-doing, and its guiding formulas are those of "direction" and "control." Largely, it is disciplinary in its outlook, and disciplinary in the negative and repressive sense.

Its function is, magisterially, to be authoritative, and therefore it does not so easily lend itself to the stimulative. As it becomes authoritative its official voice will make itself heard, and we all trust will be decisive in the regulative side of international political relations, watchfully helping to keep themselves in normal channels of peace and progress.

IV.

But outside of this authoritative and regulative channel of diplomatic and political settlements there are the movements of intellectual, moral, literary, philosophical, religious forces, which indeed are the essential underlying stimuli to the "best humanities." They have, for the most part, freed themselves from even national authority in each case. To be effective, the League of Nations apparently must develop a political orthodoxy internationally. Whereas in philosophy, in literature, in religion, in education, all modern tendencies have passed from the atmosphere of authority to that of freedom. No State Authority compels adhesion to particular views in philosophy, in literature, in education, in religion. It is true that the churches have their creeds, and where there is a State Established Church there is a prescribed set of formularies and creeds laid down; but in modern practice there is an ever-broadening scope of interpretation, in process, apparently, of evolution towards freedom. Philosophy was bound hand and foot through the Middle Ages to ecclesiastical Aristotelianism. Hobbes desired to use the Universities and the schools to promulgate the doctrine of monarchical absolutism, based upon his general philosophical principles, and invoked political authority for this purpose. But the whole tendency of philosophy since the Middle Ages has been away from Authority to Freedom. Education, indeed, in the past has been subservient to authority. Lily's *Grammar*, Ocland's *Prælia Anglorum* in Queen Elizabeth's reign, Mowat's *God and the King* (a pamphlet preaching the doctrine of absolute monarchy), were State-approved documents authoritatively appointed by the Privy Council to be used in schools. For purposes of organisation in the last half century education has passed through, and is passing through, a period of State control; but the dangers of State exploitation of education may be seen as an object-lesson in the last half century of German education. Yet, education as a subject of inquiry is on the road to becoming free from authoritative control and State exploitation, either for militarism or for any other sectional aims. Literature has become emancipated from the State censors. Freedom of thought and freedom of speech have been won—in all intellectual directions—in philosophy, religion, literature, and the process is going on in education. With freedom came inner expansion, and modern thought has gone forward by leaps and bounds in its elasticity of adaptation to life-needs. But with the growth and development has come the enormous intensification of analysis. Men to-day rarely call themselves philosophers, at most they describe themselves as devoted to one section of philosophy—logic, psychology, ethics, or metaphysics. Hence, philosophy, which ought to concern itself with the whole round of knowledge, the building up of the world of thought as a complete whole, to represent life as a whole, commonly presents itself as a series of sectional studies, and by intense concentration on narrowed areas prides itself on producing an increasing number of mental sciences, approximating to the natural sciences. The nearer these approximations of all sciences together take place, the less of the "best humanities" remains in each sectional study. But if we realise that it is in the pursuit of these "best humanities" that the hope of the future for a spiritual unity of nations is dependent, we shall then see that it is a matter of no slight practical consequence whether the philosophers as a whole take the view that their province is prevailingly humanist, or whether it is to be broken up into a series of natural sciences. Philosophy needs to be brought back to direct relation to complex life. Aims and ideals are present in, and arise out of, concrete experience. It is a truism to say that every man is a philosopher. But this fact makes it all the more important that every man should have the opportunity to be trained to think comprehensively, as well as carefully and thoughtfully. There is a high international value in trained thought brought to bear on life as a whole. Philosophers, even those ensconced in University chairs, have not affected so large a constituency as they might have done. With new openings such as those of the Workers' Educational Association, and Adult Education classes, there is a great work to be done for humanism by philosophical teachers willing to help to develop the attitude of seeing life as a whole, instead of dividing it up into all sorts of sectional interests. Separation of employments and division of labour have brought, or intensified, the inevitable class interests, and vast increase of knowledge has multiplied specialist pursuits and obsessions—and the claim of man, as man, to understand himself and his relations to his inner and outer worlds is crowded out of consideration. No men have a finer opportunity, in education, to-day than the philosophers to help forward the outlook on life as a whole, and to develop more widely this broad human attitude. The Churches, too, might well join hands with the philosophers, and encourage every man and woman to read and study tentatively some philosophical writer who brings his thought into direct touch with life. Human beings, as such, need a provisional philosophy of life, just as the scientific man adopts, say, his provisional hypothesis of gravitation as the basis of his physical theory. He accepts it as a working hypothesis till some new light modifies this basis. Einstein and his new reading of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge may cause new interpretations of space, time, and motion, and the shifting of ground in a modification of a formerly accepted hypothesis. So human beings, thoughtful human beings (as most of us are able to become, under favourable methods of teaching by others and thinking for ourselves), require provisional hypotheses for the whole of life, which can explain to our thought a reasonable synthesis of knowledge and a basis of spiritual and mental unity. Let me suggest that an example of such a provisional philosophy might be found in Josiah Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty*. This, in implication at least, unifies religion and philosophy. For the office of religion, in his view, is to aim towards the creation on earth of the

Beloved Community, based on a philosophical communion of saints of all creeds and climes and ages—united on the plane of a developed invincible loyalty to truth, to truth-seeking, to goodness, and to beauty. Royce further suggests that the future task of religion is the task of inventing and applying the arts which shall win men over to unity, and which shall overcome their original hates by the gracious love not of individuals only, but also of communities. Such arts are still to be discovered and to be grown into. But a sign of such humanism as permeates them is to be found in the test: Does this help towards the coming of the Universal Community? As to science, Royce says: "If the spirit of scientific investigation or of learned research shows signs (as it does already) of becoming one of the best of all forms of unifying mankind in free loyalty, then regard science not merely as a possible harmony with religion, but already as one of the principal organs of religion." So, too, with regard to religion itself. Its stagnant or retrogressionary attitude to human life is manifest enough at times, in the minds of critical observers, if not to those within the various folds. Again, Royce offers the test: "Does the religion accepted aid towards the coming of the universal community by helping to make religion not only as catholic as is already the true spirit of loyalty, but as inventive of new social arts, as progressive as is now natural science?" We must look forward to the insight of religion within its own aims becoming as progressive as the work of science itself on its research side, and in the long run on both as unified in the aim of the good of humanity. How intimately all this view would stimulate the *spiritual* unity of nations is evident. Let such a philosophical spirit be broad-spread in each nation, and the basis of international understanding and sympathy would become assured. For the truly humanist philosophical and religious minds constantly are within sight of the truly "international mind." I am only mentioning Professor Royce's book as an example of what I mean by desirable teaching of a synthetic philosophical view of life by the philosophical and religious teachers. If others have better books to suggest, by all means use them. But I suggest that the Churches and philosophy ought to combine, or at least supplement each other in the promotion of the study of some synthetic philosophy of life, especially to meet the needs of adult higher education throughout the nations. Nor can there be any doubt that the specialist bent in modern professional training ought, somewhere in a student's training, to receive the compensatory balance of a more synthetic outlook on life. This is particularly the case with the training of the teacher. How can he be expected to have the philosophical background of humanism if all his own training has been intensively specialist? It is not sufficient that he should be permeated with the "new" psycho-analytic psychology, or with experimental psychology, and mental - measurement formulæ and standards; for all these studies are at present approximating to the biological or physical sciences. The philosophy that is wanted must be synthetic, presenting thought and life as wholes, not as further professional studies in the analytic and disruptive tendencies of isolated, separate, specialised sciences, however valuable or necessary those may be *in their places.* M. Alfred Fouillée has forcibly said: "Une nation qui en aurait le sentiment, et donnerait aux autres nations le premier grand exemple d'une éducation vraiment philosophique rendrait service à l'humanité en même temps qu'à elle-même." With what some old-fashioned critics will regard as too buoyant an optimism, he is convinced that *l'hégémonie morale du XX^e siècle surtout dans l'ordre de l'éducation doit appartenir aux philosophes et sociologues, et je n'ai pas la moindre hésitation a prédire qu'en fait, avant cent ans, elle leur appartiendra.*

V.

M. Fouillée is an excellent representative of the acknowledged attitude of the best French educationists. But we fear that this aim is not yet understood in England. In English teachers' training colleges I wonder how many students, men and women, are studying philosophy in any comprehensive sense in any part of their course? I do not mean logic, psychology, and ethics in a bald outline. But I mean philosophy as an attempt to get a working-hypothesis for the synthesis of thought and life, to have some underlying conception of a humanist interpretation of the multiplicity of life and nature brought under higher and higher schemes and values into some harmony and unity, so that the effort is encouraged to make life as a whole presentable to thought.

There are, say, 200,000 or more teachers in this country, and, when we consider the teacher's influence, it is obvious what a mental and moral loss there is when this great band of men and women have not been stimulated and helped to a humanist philosophy of life, even for themselves. It is not only a national loss; it is a great *international loss.* It hinders the advance of the spiritual side of international sympathies. If I speak of the teachers, let me include with them the ministers of religion. Do they not also, even for their own inner aims, need to have a humanist synthetic philosophy of life? Is it too much, to-day, to look for that it should be a philosophy without narrow, sectarian, denominational implications? (those, if felt to be necessary, can be added). But, in the first instance, every minister of religion should be trained, in a synthetic philosophy of life that puts him in intellectual touch and sympathy with men of every other profession, in the "best humanities." This growing understanding, on a philosophical basis, of the solidarity of mankind, and the synthesis of all knowlege, and the implication of the unity (had we knowlege) of all the seen and the unseen, is a desideratum in the individual, in the professional, and in the national points of view. It is the basis, let us remember, of our understanding aright our relation with colonial peoples. It is at the root of sound "thinking imperially." It is, again, a basis of the international mind.

M. Boutroux affirms that morality must be lived before it can be taught. This is a demand which places the seal of unutterable sacredness on the work of the teacher at its noblest. And, implicitly, this demand of M. Boutroux is essential in the conception of the ideal teacher. For the great hope of the future of education, on the social side, is not the development of men and women who will merely set out to make a better social order than the past, but the development of individuals who will themselves *be* that order.

It should be realised that if the untrammelled spirit of philosophy amongst teachers and ministers of religion were the basis of understanding, sympathy, and common ground between teachers and ministers of religion in all countries, and amid all differences, it would bring all the separating differences of the lower level on to the plane of understanding at a higher level. The great opportunity of our physical expansion, consequent on the quickening up of communications and intercourse by land, sea, and the introduction of the new marvellously direct transit by air, makes possible the speedy removal of the old barriers to the transference of the best elements of our modern civilisation from one region of the earth to another. But we must recognise that Gresham's law, which has been regarded as a wonderful discovery in economics for 350 years, that *base coins will drive out of circulation good coins of the same metal*, is true in tendency in many directions besides money. What remedy have we in the case of the interaction of the "lower" and the "best" humanities? Surely it is that the intensifying of our concept of the "best humanities" should keep pace in our educationists (teachers and ministers of religion particularly) with the increase of the rapidity of communication internationally, because of the enormous increase in the area of mutual influences, good and bad, that is certain to be upon us immediately. Thinking philosophically has become a *social* as well as an educational necessity.

The anti-humanist sectional interests are presenting more and more a solid phalanx, each in its own sphere of activity. "Educational" institutional movements are started as instruments for furthering class economic policies in this country, and internationally, amongst the young at and after the school age. Education is being exploited for class interests. With the anti-humanism of organised capitalists, and the anti-humanism of sectional manual workers, the old humanism of the teachers and scholars is becoming obscured in the hurrying currents of the world-movements.

VI.

Anti-humanists both on the monopolist and on the manual-worker side have revealed, by their expressed opinions and still more by effective action, the sources of their strength. But the maxim *l'union fait la force* does not apply to the force of selfish purposes merely. It applies also to the enormous spiritual power of human co-operation, when urged by self-conscious purpose in good, as well as in harmful, directions.

Even if the League of Nations, by international politics and diplomacy, can successfully preserve the world from war, yet in peace there is still before the world the spiritual warfare between the "lower" and the "best" humanities. The *forces of the best humanities are enormous.* Often, they do not seem so, because they are not yet self-conscious in their co-operation. They are scattered and sporadic.

Let me illustrate. M. Otlet,[1] the Belgian economist, in his comprehensive inquiry in *Les Problèmes internationaux de la Guerre*,[2] brings together the statistics, which hitherto had been difficult to get at. In 1916, out of a population in Europe of 412,000,000, there were 88,000,000 children between the ages of five and fifteen years. There were 465,000 schools, and 45,000,000 pupils in the schools. There were just about *one million* teachers. As I have said, in the article referred to, "Do any of us realise what it would mean for the world if those million teachers, and eventually those 45,000,000 pupils, were united by an active humanist spirit for the good of the world rather than permeated by the ordinary parochial and local absorption, and ceased to be devoted so entirely to their sectional or specialist or narrowly scholastic interests?" In higher education Europe possesses 276 universities, 32 of which have over 4000 students. These statistics include, of course, all the directions of study, and in the term "humanism" I have in mind all types of teachers (scientists as much as literary teachers) who teach knowledge of value to mankind. Unfortunately, nowhere do we find the narrowing effect of specialist studies ameliorated by a synthetic philosophy of life. In no groups do we find a relatively large philosophical clientèle. *Nor* even is the teaching in the various philosophical chairs prevailingly permeated with humanism. Turning to ministers of religion, M. Otlet's estimate is that there are in Europe and America 700,000 priests and ministers of religion. Do we not at once see what this would mean if every one of these ministers of religion could be counted upon as an active inspirer of the "best humanities"? The common human interest in the investigation of the highest problems of life and thought is the closest bond of human union, independently of the conclusions reached, if the processes of consideration and reflection have been single-minded towards the search for truth. Moreover, the quickened unloosening of moral energy in the closer pursuit of humanist philosophical thought and interest would react incalculably in spiritual insight and power on the clergy's more direct work.

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[1] I have quoted these figures of M. Otlet in an article in the *Times Educational Supplement*, 25th May 1919. The figures collected by 1916 would be now considerably higher than those then stated. But even in this form, they will probably surprise many people by their vast significance.

[2] Genève, Librairie Kundig; Paris, Rousseau et Cie.

Besides this vast community of teachers and ministers of religion, there is the further educational contingent—the journalists and literary men. M. Otlet estimates European newspapers and reviews at 72,000, and the output annually of books at 150,000. Now humanism as a final end is, in a rough-and-ready way, though *unconsciously for the most part,* not far removed implicitly from all of these educational workers. But what a difference there would be, and what a mighty force combined there would result, if the whole company of teachers, clergy, journalists, and authors, and, let us add, artists (though M. Otlet gives us no help in the way of the census of them), became *self-conscious* of their power and responsibility as humanist thinkers, at least *as self-conscious as all the sectional anti-humanists rejoice in being to-day*!

We speak of the solidarity of mankind. No need, surely, is greater, in the consolidation of this line of tendency, than the *rapprochement* towards solidarity of this irresistible body of humanist, educational leaders. Then would the direction of the world's progress get a unification of *spirit*, in social reconstruction throughout the world, which would transfigure all organisations and leagues, national and international. The unity and solidarity of humanist leaders is finally dependent on the *stimulative* factor of education.

The real test and standard, then, of a League of Nations will be, not the rigour with which, by the accumulation of concentrated compulsory power, nations are kept in order by repressive measures, but: How far can the political League of Nations bring itself into touch with the spirit of the educational body of humanists, as they proceed steadily but surely to develop towards the self-conscious stage of the higher humanism, which (in its procedure by way of mental stimulus and human aspiration) throws off from itself, individually and in groups, the noxiously anti-humanist elements in sectionalism, nationally and internationally, and in doing so renders the method of forceful repression *pari passu* superseded? Politicians and diplomats, as well as teachers, must themselves be drawn more and more into the positive educative spirit of human stimulus towards national and international good, rather than into the watchful attitude of curbing and repressing what has been allowed to prepare itself often by thoughtlessness and recklessness. This has been largely due to the lack of humanist education in the intellectual leaders of the various communities, and their anarchy of individualism, run riot intellectually, in face of the iron-bound cohesion of the separate, sectional forces of anti-humanism.

What might not be accomplished if there were one common spirit, the best humanist spirit like that of Erasmus, rejoicing in the unifying of the sacred and the secular in life, amongst those million teachers, 700,000 clergy, 72,000 editors, and 150,000 yearly writers? And will not the statesmen, the politicians, and diplomats eventually be drawn into the ranks of humanists? The power to conquer the world peacefully exists in these forces being spiritualised, from within or without. It needs awakening to self-consciousness in the vast union of these combined educational leaders. This would be the *entente cordiale* of humanism. The humanist standard is the final measure of the statesmen, politicians, and diplomats, both those who may constitute the *personnel* of the League of Nations, *and* those who are the active directors of the destinies of each separate nation in domestic policy. I know no better statement of that standard than that of Bishop Berkeley:

> "Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum* may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but he will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman."

VII.

Though I am emphasising the importance of humanist leadership, I am not forgetting the need of the humanist training of the mass of the people. I believe the cultivation of the group-spirit and the group-mind is full of magnificent promise, in spite of its present, often apparently infantile, ill-considered, self-centred, reckless gropings. For us, however, at the present stage, Dr M'Dougall's view, as expressed in his *Group-Mind*, is of special interest:

> "The national character is not always best expressed by the mass, by the vulgar, nor even by the actual majority. There exists a natural *élite* which, better than all the rest, represents the soul of the entire people, its radical idea and its most essential tendencies. This is what the politicians too often forget. That is to say, it is what they forget when . . . they consider that no movement must be undertaken until the mass of the people demands it. They ignore the fact that leadership is essential to the maintenance of national life at a high level, and instead of exercising initiative, they wait for it to come from below—wait for a mandate, as they say."

Humanist leaders cannot lead, it is true, in opposition to the "soul of the entire people." But the great difficulty of the "entire people" is to know what its real "soul" is. The great function of humanist leaders is, therefore, that they should be able in their day and generation to reveal that "soul" of the people, *at its best*, to itself. So, essentially the great educational problem, in the widest and final sense of the term, is to develop the stimulus of education in the leaders towards the "highest humanities," by the recognition of their own effective group-fellowship, and to stimulate the preparedness of the popular "soul" to a readiness to respond to the noblest guidance of leaders. First and foremost is the step of bringing more and more into self-consciousness, as a vast group, the whole body of humanists throughout the world into a higher and closer bond of unity (both within their own several nations and beyond them), which will disclose stability and continuity of the best permanent human elements.

In his *Science of Power*, Dr Kidd showed how Germany, by educational stimulus, created "the idealisms of German nationalisation and imposed them on the young" through the teachers of the elementary schools, and of the higher schools, and through the university professoriate. But he showed also how ideals of a humanist type, in place of those of a militarist and nationalist character, could be diffused through communities. "Universal peace," he maintains, "can only be secured in one way—by raising the mind of civilisation, through the emotion of the ideal conveyed to the rising generation by the collective inheritance, to a plane where the barbarism of war would be so abhorrent to it that the degradation of engaging in it would take away from a people that principal motive of self-respect which makes life worth living. *Given clear vision in the general mind, this cultural inheritance, utterly impossible as it might seem, could be imposed on civilisation in a single generation.*"

For Dr Kidd's term, "imposed," I should substitute "developed by educational stimulus, derived from the self-conscious group of humanists united by the common spirit of the 'best humanities,' and permeating through their intrinsic sense of responsibility to a dissemination through each nation and through all nations." Dr Kidd's great contribution to sociology consists in his confidence in the foundation for optimism as to the possible rapidity of transference of ideals towards actualisation. His illustrations of Germany and Japan seem to suggest that, under favourable conditions, the "best humanities" would prove to have, at least, equal vital force in winning their way effectively, if urged forward in each nation by humanists with the thoroughness with which Germany inoculated her people in the narrow, aggressive, inhuman militarism of self-conscious, self-obsessed, sectional nationalism.

FOSTER WATSON.

Farnborough, Kent.

A LEAGUE OF CHURCHES.

A TRACT FOR THE TIMES.

THE REV. PROF. **WILLIAM A. CURTIS, D.D., D.LITT.,**
Regius Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh.

As we look back on all that has happened during the six crowded years that lie behind us, we see more clearly than ever that the whole world has been confronted with the heart-searching question: Are nations responsible like individual men? Have they ethical standards which correspond to those which all men acknowledge in private life as sacred and as binding? Is there such a thing as national sin, as international obligation? There was indeed a code of conduct, but it was little more than a first beginning. There were rough rules of decency in public and international life, but party feeling at home and diplomatic necessity abroad put a constant strain upon them, and self-interest was often able to interpret them by a casuistry of its own in such a fashion as to threaten their very existence. All great nations have some record of rapacity, and have used their power to advance their prosperity; but in war and in politics as in commerce something more than decency, something of honour and even chivalry, was able to assert and commend itself. The code was at least alive and growing, but its very growth constituted a menace to all hopes of future aggrandisement on the part of the nations which were conscious of a heavy handicap of time in the race for worldly greatness. I suppose that nothing hurt and revolted us more as a people of sportsmanlike instincts than the spectacle of a hostile race into whose calculations there had entered the assurance that, while they broke the rules of war and policy to their own immediate advantage, we to our initial and probably final disadvantage might be trusted to observe them. But they saw clearly that the rules made steadily for the permanence of our Empire and the security of our vast possessions. And if they violated them there was a chance that history would bow to their success, and that even Religion would interpret their victory as the will of God, rewarding not necessarily the proud but the prepared, and punishing the unready and complacent. Nothing succeeds like success: it always impresses the unthinking mass of men: it succeeds too often in persuading even the writers and readers of history that it deserved to succeed. As students of the past, their own past and ours, they could claim that victory again and again had crowned a cause which made no pretence of being ethically just if judged by common standards, that defeat had been sustained by smaller nations struggling against hopeless odds in a noble cause. Why should they not hope to add to the record, and trust to posterity to applaud the success of their deliberate venture? The restraining hand of New Testament religion, with its conception of God's fatherhood and human brotherhood, they claimed, should confine its operations to the domestic sphere of private and national life. The Old Testament conception of an Elect People destined to dictate to the whole earth a unifying rule of faith and conduct could still lend its sanction to the ambition of a great and masterful race. And history did repeat itself. The ancient dream of power cherished by Hebrew fanaticism crucified the Incarnate Spirit of the New Testament, and did it with the cry, "We have no king but Cæsar," on its lips. And we have been witnesses of the sequel in the torture of a Christian world which had been groping its way out of the tribal barbarism of the old order. War is a rough and clumsy instrument for the determination of right. Will those who appealed with conviction and confidence to its arbitrament respect its verdict? If victory was to be the final proof of right, will defeat be accepted as the final demonstration of wrong? For them the proof should be conclusive upon their own theory, unless they determine by and by to try again and so retrieve their humiliation. Humiliation, however, may not inspire humility or lead to self-reproach. Rulers and governments may be blamed; allies may be blamed; enemies may be blamed; luck may be blamed. A nation may be hardened by calamity, and forget its faults under its misfortunes. But for us who had no faith in war as a proper instrument of right, who accepted it as a hateful anachronism and a revolting method, it is not possible to derive such unmingled satisfaction from our dear-bought victory as our enemies in the like case would have drawn. Under protest we took up the weapons that we would have disallowed. With profound abhorrence we dipped our hands in the blood of fellow-men and fellow-Christians. Only with reservation can we glory in the verdict God has permitted us to win. We fought for something higher than national self-interest. We are pledged by our professions and our sacrifices to a nobler cause than victory. Victory will mean failure to us if self-preservation and a military respite prove the only fruits of our success. We struggled for the higher law, the loftier code, in the faith that God willed it and the world needed it. Not for the old order did we rally the allied peoples, and hazard everything we possessed, but for the new order that was already emerging from the old in spite of obdurate prejudice and inveterate suspicion.

The League of Nations is born. It has its infancy and childhood to pass through before it can reach its final form. Who can foresee through what periods of storm and stress its adolescence may pass? It will need the care and protection, the prayers and goodwill, of all right-thinking men to be its sponsors and its friends in the coming years. Let us not jeopardise its future by cherishing illusions as to the ease with which the scheme may be expected to work in the kind of world in which it is being established. It must rest externally upon a fresh understanding between the constituent peoples. That understanding must imply at least a rudimentary system of international law and an international tribunal, and behind it a certain international force to protect its order and to effectuate its decisions. Sooner or later international justice will run counter to the individual inclinations and ambitions of almost every member of the League. Law that is alive in a changeful world cannot help growing, but it is of its essence that the common welfare takes precedence over particular and local interests. Are we willing to bow to unpalatable findings and loyally carry them out? Moreover, we ought in international affairs to remember what is already obvious in social life, that law, however securely legislated and however justly conceived, is essentially limited in its function and in its results. It does restrain, and it does educate, at least in a negative fashion. But no one claims for it the power to inspire conduct. Though ideals create it, and though ideals in turn are suggested even by its prohibitions, it deals with average standards and the bare necessities of justice. Equity, its principle, means much for mankind, just as liberty, its co-ordinate, has meant. But they are only the foundation of a moral order, sanctioning such elementary virtues as honesty and truthfulness, and prohibiting such elementary vices as impurity and homicide. Law will not save the world, however effectively it may protect its citizens. For the higher virtues and for the graces of human life a less calculated rule of action is necessary, a quite different kind of sanction, a far higher kind of impulse. The final problem is not how to restrain the sins of selfishness and natural desire, but how to shame them out of existence and make them impossible.

If it be true that in the past our own and other nations have made little effort to rise above a rudimentary law in their dealings with one another, if to that extent we are under a common reproach and can make a common confession of our shortcoming, the plea of ignorance or oversight will not henceforth be available. We have deliberately arraigned our enemies, and the world has endorsed our view of their crime and their responsibility. We have denied that nations are exempt from the obligations of the moral law. We have achieved by war not so much a triumph of our principles as a world-wide opportunity for their practice. If we are to use that opportunity we must act in accordance with the light of social experience, and refuse to be content with any merely prudential and precautionary system, with any merely legal and judicial notion of justice. No Christian needs to be reminded that, left to itself, law may as readily provoke transgression and stimulate ingenious evasion as foster obedience and loyalty. Forensic justice may degenerate into an endless debate between the special pleadings of self-interest and custom. If law be invoked legitimately to school and discipline and inhibit mankind, whence ought we to draw the living water of moral inspiration?

That is the question facing the Christian nations to-day. Proud of our soldiers, we are ashamed of war. Ashamed of war, we want our children and our children's children to inherit peace. Peace, we know, cannot be guaranteed by the ever-changing self-interest of outwardly Christian peoples. Sorrow for our dead, horror at war's atrocities, dread of the future possibilities of warlike science, even these will not prevent the recurrence of world-conflict. Armaments however up-to-date, balances of power, considerations of finance, democratic control, these will not suffice. What will men and nations not dare, what will they not perpetrate, for glory, or for power?

If we are to trust in a League of Nations and hope for substantial disarmament and settled peace, the League will need to have behind it not only the mandate of all great nations but their sincere goodwill and enthusiasm. Now that autocracy is overthrown and democracy is in power, the way is open to the use of every legitimate means of influencing that public opinion to which the governments of free countries are characteristically sensitive and continuously answerable. Though the world may be sobered by sorrow, it still needs to be convinced by reason and conscience, and to be encouraged by a faith that is not afraid to take risks. And just as in our life as citizens and neighbours and social rivals we need more than the calm acceptance of a natural ethic, individual and social, so it has become clear that in the life and intercourse of nations the spirit of Christian faith and duty is a vital necessity. For if nations are under a common Law of God, have a conscience to judge them, are responsible for their public actions, and have become aware of it, this means that they are ripe for admission to the school of Christ and the kingdom of God. Christianity can deal with them. Christianity has a claim upon them. Christianity can supply them with the vital support and incentive they require. Just when it was being taken for granted in many quarters that nations have as such no religion, but are secular institutions, and it was assumed that national Churches had outlived their period and historic function, the theory of national religion at least has received a remarkable rehabilitation through the unprecedented experiences and necessities of the time. For the pulpit as for the press the doctrine of the secular character of the State became untenable the moment it was realised how sacred was the charge committed to the free nations. The Church has its own sanctity, but the State is not therefore profane. Each institution has a distinctive mission to fulfil for God, and freedom is the right of each in order that it may fulfil it. So soon as the conscience of the Church was satisfied that the national cause was just and that our intervention was unmotived by aggression or ambition, the pulpits of all denominations with one accord made the cause their own, while a complete establishment of army chaplains was immediately organised, so that for the period of the conflict the nation had a *de facto* ecclesiastical union. Not only at the front, but back at home, differences were promptly sunk under the pressure of a common ideal and a common apprehension, and in a real measure all Churches linked themselves to the threatened State and accepted a real though partial establishment. Was it to be wondered at that our Scottish Field-Marshal, remembering what had been accomplished in Church federation and in State connection under his predecessor's and his own command, made use of the opportunity of his first public appearances in his native land after victory to address to all the Churches a soldierly and patriotic and statesmanlike appeal? During the war they had risen above prejudice and aloofness and rivalry, and had proved that for a great end they could both stand together and march shoulder to shoulder. They had found in the defence of the Empire and of humanity a common aim sufficiently great and urgent to obliterate all minor differences. Were they to return to the old parochial and provincial rivalries? Would the Empire mean less to them once it was safe? Was their war-time fellowship and unity to become a mere memory, a fire burnt out on the national hearth?

There was much that was memorable in Earl Haig's public utterances during those closing days of May 1919. They were addressed primarily to Scottish audiences, academic, civic, and ecclesiastical; but they appeal to thoughtful men throughout the world as the grave exhortation of a devout soldier, schooled in the doctrine that with God all things are possible, and fired by public and patriotic enthusiasm. The war had ended. The Scottish Churches had taken a momentous step on the way to union. In front of the speaker were men who had sunk their traditional differences in the interests of unity, efficiency, liberty, justice, and peace. "The chaplains of all denominations," he said, "did splendid service. . . . They taught our soldiers of all ranks the great lesson of comradeship, the value of unity of effort and purpose. . . . Inspired by one aim and object, following a single noble ideal, they brought the strength of religious fervour and conviction to the aid of our nation in arms. . . . Now that the ordeal of war is over, I believe that the Churches, if they will but combine and act together, have a great and unequalled opportunity to secure and preserve for all time, to the lasting advantage of our race, that capacity for common effort, spirit of fellowship, and community of ideals which by their teaching and example they did so much to foster during the war. I am here to-day to ask you to take that opportunity, to take it now while it is yet within your reach, while the lessons of the war are still fresh in the minds and hearts of the nation. I am a soldier and, I hope, a man of action. I know that there are difficulties in the way of Church unity, and that with all these difficulties I may not be fully acquainted. None the less I have been taught that difficulties exist only to be overcome, and that there is no difficulty of human creation which cannot be overcome by goodwill and resolute action."

"I have seen in my own sphere of activity," he proceeded, "the working of a General Staff. I understand how, without interfering with the discretion of those on the spot in matters that concern them and them only, it is yet able to give singleness of purpose to diversified operations in many theatres, . . . yet more particularly, how it is able to instil life, energy, resolution, and drive into the actions of all, inspiring all with the feeling that they are working to a common end, that their efforts are interdependent, their failure involving more than their own ruin, and their success guaranteeing the victory of others. I want to see established a General Staff for the Christian Churches of the Empire, some body at least analogous in the ecclesiastical sphere to the position held by the Imperial General Staff in the military organisation of the Empire. There need be no interference in the internal economy of the Churches, whether on their spiritual or their temporal side. What it seems to me is needed at once is a strong representative body, not too large for energetic action, which can direct the general policy of the Churches, infuse them with new energy, and strengthen their resolution in the great crusade of brotherhood, on the long road on which the war has set our feet. This central body must proceed to the further development of an organisation suited to the needs of the Empire. We are entering, we hope, upon an era of peace, bought by vast sacrifices. The object of every one of us is to make that peace secure and permanent. To my mind, the one means by which that end can be achieved is to develop—not merely in Scotland and England, but throughout the whole of the British Empire and the whole world—the spirit of brotherhood born of war. For that great work we need the active help of a strong, vigorous, national Church—a Church which has risen superior to the forces of disruption, and is itself a living embodiment of the principles of fellowship and unity.

"I desire to see a beginning made in Great Britain itself by forming a United National Church. Then I look further afield, and desire to see a great Imperial Church—a Church in and through which shall be maintained, in a far more adequate way than is at present possible, the great decision and determination of the many peoples who together form the British Empire—the free peoples who, organised in one united Army, lately fought to maintain justice and right. If we can succeed in doing this in the British Empire, we shall benefit the whole world. . . . National Churches, we know, have their dangers if in their outlook they do not see beyond the confines of the Nation, or in their allegiance own no higher authority than that of the State. These, however, are dangers which Scotland at least has known how to overcome;

and if the other parts of our Empire are in earnest, as I am sure they are, to carry on in peace the work their soldiers have begun so well, then they too will readily join hands with us in our attempt to organise one Imperial Church. . . . It rejoices me to hear that Scotland may be expected soon to give expression, in a way which shall be a glory to herself and a model to all the world, to her great ideal of a Church at once National and Free—a Church which shall carry into the future the heritage of a glorious past, rich in the affections of her own people, and commanding the respect and admiration of the whole world. Yet it will not be enough to have a great United Church of Scotland. What Scotland shall have successfully gained for herself, she must help the whole Empire to achieve. To attain this end it will be necessary for all the Churches of our homeland to combine and enter together upon a great crusade. In such a crusade no Church is better qualified to take the lead than the grand old Church of Scotland, pre-eminent as she is in intellect, in broad-mindedness, in practical ability and good sense.

"The time for action is now. . . . We have had our speeches; now let us come to deeds. Never in all our national history was there greater need than there is to-day that all the forces that make for brotherhood should be gathered together and directed actively upon a definite policy for the social improvement and general uplifting of our race, and, after, other peoples of the world. Never for many centuries have the minds and hearts of men been so well prepared for a movement which shall carry them to higher and better things. At such a time all ranks look to their Church to give a clear and definite lead. It is because I believe that any lead they give must necessarily lose in effectiveness so long as our people are divided up among several Churches, with no single directive body to urge them to combined effort, that I submit that immediate steps should be taken to bring about unity of purpose and endeavour among the Churches themselves. For this reason, too, I entreat our ecclesiastical leaders of all denominations to lose no time in giving us, in Britain and throughout the whole Empire, a vigorous United or Federated Church. We do indeed live in a day of great opportunities. To-day all things are possible to men who have a passionate faith in the 'things that are worth while'—and back up that faith with courage, resolution, and the spirit of mutual confidence and goodwill. To-morrow the opportunity will have gone; and who knows when it will return, or by what suffering its return must be bought? If, as a result of all that our people at home and abroad have gone through together in those terrible years of war, we do not carry forward into all departments of our national life a new spirit of unity and brotherhood, then all that we think we have gained in the war will be lost. Then must we assuredly look forward to other world-wars, only on a yet vaster and more terrible scale, as the certain fate of succeeding generations. Only the creation of a great Imperial Church, with some central organisation to guide its policy, embodying all that is best and soundest in the Empire, will enable us to come safely through the great testing ordeals of peace, just as the spirit of comradeship and true faith enabled our armed forces to rise superior to the testing ordeals of war."

In a subsequent address to Scottish ministers who had served with the Army, the Commander-in-Chief drove home his message with terse vigour: "I am convinced that you have such an opportunity now as may not recur for centuries. The iron is hot: let us strike while it is still malleable and can take shape under our blows. For the machinery a small body is wanted, small but representative, composed of men with ideas and with the courage to take responsibility upon themselves. I have seen enough to know the futility of big committees which exist to maintain the self-importance of the verbose. If we are in earnest in our desire to get something done, we must be content to give the executive power to a few, and to work loyally and with all the energy that is in us to carry out their directions. Our general policy is accepted. We aim at unity, and in the first place at the unity of the Scottish Churches as a stepping-stone to a wider unity which shall embrace all the Churches of the Empire. That, as a general scheme, is sufficient for us to act on: let us hasten to get together our executive to work out the details of our 'special idea.' Let us not be afraid to aim at big things. It is given to few men to carry the whole of their objectives; but if we direct our course at the stars, at least we shall carry the mountains in our stride. Aim high: perchance ye may attain. . . . The object of our endeavour is by the spread of brotherhood and comradeship among men and peoples to prevent the recurrence of world-wars such as that through which we have just passed. That is pre-eminently the task of the Churches. . . . That prosperity may follow in the train of peace is our earnest hope; but the destiny of Britain is something far greater than this, something far beyond anything yet attempted by any race in history. Our country's mission is to maintain 'peace on earth and goodwill among men.' To attain this we must first of all make sure of ourselves, but having done so, and in doing so, we must carry our own ideals to all whom they have not yet reached. It is an end which cannot be attained merely by wishing for it, which cannot be achieved merely by temporal means. It is a matter which concerns mind and spirit as well as factors economic—which in themselves are secondary and dependent on the more important moral factor. Each of us must do his very utmost to help to reach that goal. . . . Let me summarise the objects of our endeavour. First, there is the unity of the Churches in Scotland. That is already begun. Then the unification of those of Scotland and England; and thirdly, of the Churches of the British Empire. I do not wish you to wait to start on these last two objects. Men's minds are now ripe for them, and there is no time to be lost if we are to reap the full advantage of the moment. Prepare your scheme at once, and if your beginnings are but small, at least begin. I believe that the task will prove easier than you think. Finally, you have to carry the same doctrine to all the nations of the earth. It is a crusade to which I urge you—a crusade not having for its object the redemption of a single city, however holy, but the freeing of the whole world from the devastating scourge of war. It is a task worthy of any Church, and one clearly laid upon ourselves. For the Gospel of Christ is the world's only social hope and the sole promise of world-peace."

More than a year has elapsed since Earl Haig addressed these dignified and statesmanlike sentences to the Churches of Scotland and of the Empire. A swift response could not have been looked for. But there is a danger that his words may be forgotten amid the crowding impressions of an ever-changing and preoccupied world. I make no apology for quoting their substance and calling fresh attention to them. In the interval since their utterance the march of events has reinforced their urgency. Happily, the Churches have been stirring. The congress of Anglican Bishops has met again at Lambeth, and after long deliberation has issued an appeal to the Churches of the Empire and beyond, and an advisory instruction to the clergy and people of its own communion. While the Bishops were in conclave, Presbyterians from twenty countries and representing thirty Church organisations were in earnest conference at Lausanne, reviewing with deep sympathy and concern the European situation after war, and endeavouring to turn to spiritual account the lessons of recent history. Immediately afterwards a great and notable gathering of Church representatives assembled in Geneva, the seat of the new League of Nations, to deliberate in the frankest manner on Faith and Order in relation to the problem of Christian unity, preparing the way for an ecumenical congress at a later date. Leaders of Eastern and Western Churches were present in strength, including representatives of nations recently at war, the Roman Catholic Church alone holding aloof and declining a courteous invitation to take part. A similarly impressive gathering of representatives from the same communions met later at St Beatenberg under the auspices of the World Alliance to promote International Friendship through the Churches. This at least may be said, that sound foundations are being laid for a consolidation of the divided Churches. All over the world federations have become the rule, not only for kindred Churches holding essentially a common system, but for Churches less intimately related which are awaking to the world's profound need of common action on their part. Theology, once a divider, has powerfully aided this *rapprochement*, for religious scholars have long been working in friendly association. The social activities of the separated Churches have still more powerfully disintegrated hereditary barriers. And now it has become plain to the dullest perception that, if the Christian Church is to play its appointed part as the arch-peacemaker in the world, its divided ranks must be closed, its militant energies confederated and co-ordinated and re-directed, its inward unity expressed in some external fashion, so that the world may take cognisance of its world-mission on behalf of peace and goodwill and reckon upon its undivided influence. Among Churches which are as yet strangers to each other, whose leaders are as yet mere names to one another, perhaps not even names, unity and union are, of course, unthinkable. A working fellowship is only beginning to be realised. The conditions upon which alone an honourable understanding and a hearty friendship can be based are only coming to be appreciated. Churches, greater and smaller, which have "made good," which have manifestly received the Divine blessing and have evidently been a power for good to the human race and an honour to the sacred name which they profess, still have their orders and credentials questioned by antiquarian or dogmatic scruples. But the atmosphere is steadily clearing. The test of fruit-bearing will in the long run overshadow the test of pedigree. Fruit-bearing in the Christian spirit may indeed come to be recognised as the true mark of legimate descent. Parties to union or reunion will not be expected to confer except on equal terms and with open minds, in order that each may bring to the other's future endowment the whole of the gifts of grace and of experience which it has received. Better a world of honest separation than a world of make-believe unity. No Church, no group of bishops or administrators or leaders, can, without direct and unreserved conference with the other parties concerned, lay down the terms of any valid union-settlement. It is the palpable defect of the proposals of the Lambeth Bishops not only that they represent the mind of one order alone of the Anglican Clergy and contain no expression of the mind and heart of the Anglican laity, but also that they emanate from a council-chamber in which the other communions concerned had no voice. In a word, they dictate a policy, however courteously that policy is phrased, instead of offering to go in search of one in concert with the separated fellow-Christians who are in view. Neither minima nor ultimata are in place at such a stage. Formal risks such as attend open conferences have to be faced. They have a way of resolving themselves, however, in the atmosphere of responsible discussion between men and Churches prayerfully desirous of union. Sectional apprehensions and party feeling can only be allayed through frank and serious meeting round a table. The Church of England cannot know, and ought not to think it knows, on what terms it can unite with other Churches until it has met them face to face, without reserve, in a venture of devout faith. In many respects it holds a unique position for mediation in the Christian world, a position unique in its embarrassments as well as in its advantages. Very naturally it fears to take any step which would prejudice its standing or orders in the eyes of the Greek Orthodox or the Roman Catholic communions. Very naturally it defers to their antiquity, although all Churches have an equally ancient descent in the things which matter, just as all men have Adam to their father,—and to their numbers, although together their membership includes most of the surviving illiteracy of the Christian world,—and to their orthodoxy, although it is based too often upon unreasoning loyalty and is merged too often in pathetic superstition. The working piety of the Anglican Church, its scholarship, its ideals of education, its lay sentiments, its attitude to the problems of modern life and the discoveries of modern science, in a word, its spiritual instincts, lay as well as clerical, are notoriously far more closely akin to those of the great Protestant communions, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Methodist, Congregational, than to any of the branches of the Church Unreformed. But it has been tempted to show greater consideration to the susceptibilities and prejudices of the latter than to the sensibilities of the former, which after all live at its own door, and have shared its history, and speak the same language, and have faced with equal spirit the same anxieties of modern thought and modern democracy. The ultimate question is one of truth rather than expediency or policy or antiquity. Orders, worship, government, dogma—are they right, are they true, are they efficient, are they sole and exclusive? Everyone knows that the mass-opinion of the Anglican world does not share the Roman Catholic or the Oriental Orthodox traditional view of these things. Yet the danger is that through fear of schism, and that on the part of the denouncers of schism, a sectional point of view may be allowed to dominate the situation, even though the result must be that a greater schism will be left unhealed.

But, to return to the general issue, it is clear that a league of Churches devoted to the peace of the world is an urgent necessity. At great expense the nations, great and small, maintain their diplomatic and consular services. They would rather be beggared than go unrepresented at the courts and chancelleries of other peoples. The diplomatic apparatus for keeping peace is primitive enough in its essentials, even when it is employed by master minds. It offers bribes to nations, it delivers threats, it contrives to ally or to separate, as national self-interest may dictate. But without the press, or against the press, it can accomplish little. Its staff may be accomplished men, persuasive, attractive, intellectual, personally disinterested; but behind them power must be felt, the power of armed force, or of economic force, and, in either case, of public opinion ready to act. Crisis after crisis, conflict after conflict, has disclosed to suffering humanity the slenderness of all these official restraints upon the engineers and engine-drivers of national rivalry and enmity and passion. The press has extraordinary power, but it also has its limitations, its own self-interest, its own peculiar temptations. The Church must intervene, not merely nationally as in the past, but internationally. It must review and widen its conscious mission. In the name of the Prince of Peace it must not only preach and teach the gospel of peace and goodwill, but it must stretch reconciling hands across the frontiers of national life. It is too late, when the dogs of war are unleashed, to look around for olive branches.

Neither red crosses nor olive branches are permitted in war to cross and re-cross closed frontiers. And, in fact, when wars break out, with singular and pathetic uniformity the Churches of Christ in all lands become at once the stretcher-bearers and the standard-bearers of their nations' cause, for a thousand reasons unable to stand apart either to criticise or to pray, unable to mediate between the combatants, content to wear a military uniform for the time being, each of them a mere unit in a national array under secular command. Even the world desires the Church of Christ to achieve and occupy a worthier position. A higher service the Church may render. But in time of war it can do nothing if in time of peace it has not already been an international force, knowing at least the spiritual representatives of other countries, in touch with their life and aspirations, enjoying their confidence, and able accordingly to influence them. I believe the Church requires, and is called to create, some effective counterpart to the diplomatic service of the State. In addition to its Home Mission and its Foreign Mission it has an International Mission to prosecute, and nowhere more urgently than in Europe, the seat of historic Christianity. Already the way is opening. The war has shattered many prejudices, racial and religious. University life is very largely emancipated from ecclesiastical restraint. Even in Central Europe and the Balkans the clash of creeds is assuming a new aspect, the rival Churches are confronted by novel conditions and common dangers, the adherents of different systems are learning suppressed or forgotten facts regarding one another. Not only the Roman Catholic and the Oriental Orthodox Churches, but Presbyterianism and Lutheranism, have already an extensive international organisation throughout large tracts of Europe as well as in America. Other Churches also defy the limits of national life. And not least, either in fact or in promise, there is a powerful federation of Christian students in the universities of the world, and a world-wide organisation of branches of the Young Men and Women's Christian Associations. A new opportunity plainly offers itself to the Christian conscience and imagination, and a very solemn call is sounding. Men look to Alliances of Nations, to the League of Nations, to Labour Federations, to Socialist combinations, to bring in the political millennium of international peace. Have they not a right to look also to the Christian Churches, to the Church, incomparably the completest organisation in the world, with the highest potentialities and the deepest obligations for the service of reconciliation? The problem is essentially a spiritual one. Not money, not force, not expediency, not even intelligence or humanity is an adequate instrument for the enterprise. Moral and spiritual persuasion alone will suffice. The horrors of war, the barbarity of war, the suicidal exhaustion of modern war between conscript nations, the costliness of war, the anachronistic folly of war—men may be persuaded of these features of the ghastly business and yet be impotent to save posterity from its renewal. Beyond and above these all too fleeting impressions and convictions, which spring up in the agony of each cruel crisis and anon are forgotten, to be re-learned by each successive generation at an ever-increasing cost, the Christian spirit must be invoked, and its unique estimate of the value and purpose of the solidarity and sanctity of human life brought home to the hearts of men. With tedious and monotonous reiteration the apologists of Christianity have asserted that Christ came to break down the barriers that separate nations and continents, and that Christianity knows no distinctions of race or language. It is time, high time, that a new chapter of practical and unanswerable apologetic should be written by the fingers not of scholars but of Churches. Let the Church, which avows itself the Body of Christ still incarnate, obey His Spirit and glorify His name by inscribing this work upon the page of history as a *fait accompli*.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

EDINBURGH.

THE CALL OF THE BISHOPS

AS HEARD BY AMERICAN PROTESTANTS.

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No one can read the solemn "Appeal for a United Christendom," issued by the Lambeth Conference, without recognising the sincerity of its intention and the candour of its declarations. It proposes, with genuine humility and generosity, an "Adventure of Good Will." It confesses the share of the communions under Episcopal authority "in the guilt of crippling the body of Christ" by a "condition of broken fellowship." It approaches the particular problem of recovering the "visible unity of the Church" with full recognition that "the great non-Episcopal Communions" stand for "rich elements of truth, liberty, and life which might otherwise have been obscured or neglected." No note of ecclesiastical arrogance mars this impressive "Call to all Christian People." It should be welcomed as an unprecedented indication of magnanimous and fraternal hope.

When, however, one turns from cordial appreciation of this lofty eloquence and genuine comity to the definitions prescribed for Christian faith, and the remedy proposed for disunion, it becomes the duty of Protestant Christians to express, with not less fraternal candour, the sense of inadequacy, and even of misdirected effort, which this notable document conveys; and it is possible that one who is not associated with any of the "great non-Episcopal Communions," but who has had the privilege of life-long intimacy with many of their leading representatives, may report without prejudice or prepossession the impression which is likely to be made on their minds.

In the first place, the definitions proposed seem inadequate to represent a "genuinely Catholic" Church. Who is a

Christian? Christians, affirms this great assemblage of Bishops, are "those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ and have been baptised into the name of the Holy Trinity." But is this in reality an adequate description of a disciple of Jesus Christ? Is it not obvious that great numbers of persons, though baptised in infancy and still repeating the great affirmations of the historic creeds, may not be Christians at all? Is a Christian to be known by his external conformity or by the fact that in unconscious infancy he was baptised? Are there not baptised persons who are practically heathen, and unbaptised persons who are Christian saints? All American Christians are at this moment reassured of the vitality of their faith through the unremitting and self-effacing service of the American Quakers in the desolated areas of Europe. Yet not one of these devoted men and women has been baptised. Are they not to be reckoned as members of the "Universal Church of Christ"? Did not the Master whom they serve say of such labours as theirs: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. . . . Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me"?

The same inadequacy is met when the acceptance of a creed is identified with the faith of a Christian. Every reasoning creature has a creed, but his creed is an intellectual formulation, while his religion is a decision of the will and a direction of the life. A creed is essential to a Christian, but a creed does not create a Christian. The obvious fact is that one might accept almost every article of the historic creeds without thereby pledging himself to the most elementary qualifications of a Christian. To believe that Jesus Christ was miraculously born, that he descended into hell, rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, does not forthwith guarantee to the believer the blessing that is promised to the peacemakers or the pure in heart.

A similar impression is made by the enumeration of conditions of unity which occur later in this stately document. These conditions are described as "the whole-hearted acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as the record of God's revelation of Himself to men, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith"; of the Nicene Creed as the "sufficient statement of the Christian faith"; of the divinely instituted sacraments of baptism and the Holy Communion; and of a ministry, "possessing the commission of Christ." Here again the Christian Church is described as a form of organisation, with its constitution, its governors, and its authority. Nothing is here of conduct, service, sacrifice, or love. Indeed, nothing is here of faith, in the sense given to that word by Jesus Christ. "Thy faith hath saved thee," he said to many a repentant or responsive life, which knew nothing of the Nicene Creed as a "sufficient statement of the Christian faith." In short, the "whole-hearted acceptance" here proposed is directed to a law, a government, a system, not to repentance, brotherhood, or faith. It is not because such external conformity is meaningless that great numbers of the "non-Episcopal Communions" have come to subordinate it as a condition of unity, but because the essential nature of the Christian religion is expressed, not in conformity but in consecration, not in ritual but in righteousness, not in creed but in life. A member of the "Universal Church of Christ" belongs, according to this view, to a much larger fellowship than is proposed in the "Call of the Bishops." That fellowship includes, indeed, many of those who regard the creed commonly called Nicene as the sufficient statement of Christian faith, and who have been baptised into the Holy Trinity; but it is a fellowship which is much more inclusive and catholic. A Christian, in this view, is simply a loyal and consistent disciple of the Master. "If any man has not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his," and correspondingly, if any man has that spirit, he is an acceptable member of the Universal Church of Christ, though he be a Nonconformist concerning the Nicene Creed or a Quaker concerning baptism. All this is becoming increasingly plain to the "great non-Episcopal Communions." They are, at every point, breaking the barriers of dogmatic tests, and promoting an inter-Church unity of service, sacrifice, and power. To propose at such a time a plan of unity which appears to despiritualise the tests of discipleship and to define the Christian Church as an organisation, perpetuated by rule, confession, or tactual transmission of authority, seems to suggest a retreat from the more comprehensive movement, already far advanced, toward a unity of spirit which is the only bond of peace.

When one passes from these matters of definition to the practical programme which the Bishops present for "recovering Christian unity," one is again profoundly impressed by the generosity and sincerity of their intention. There opens before their minds a plain path of mutual conciliation and co-operation, and they point to it with solemn hope as to "a new call for wider service in a reunited Church." As one scrutinises more closely, however, the practical procedure suggested, it proves so illusory that it is difficult to understand how it could have commended itself to men of experience and wisdom as either conciliatory or reasonable. The plan proposed is, in brief, the acceptance of the Episcopate as "the best instrument for maintaining the unity and the continuity of the Church"; the giving of Episcopal ordination to Nonconformist ministers with "that grace which is pledged to the members of the whole body in the Apostolic rite of the laying on of hands"; and, on the other side, the acceptance by "Bishops and Clergy of our Communion of a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their [non-Episcopal] congregations." Concerning the Episcopate as an instrument of efficiency, there is no doubt much to be said; but it should be noticed that it is not the Episcopate as a form of organisation alone which is here commended, but rather that specific type of Episcopate which is, to use the Bishop's phrase, "possessed" by the Anglican and its affiliated communions. The Methodist Church, for example, numbering approximately seven times as many members in the United States as the Protestant Episcopal Church, is also an Episcopal Communion. Indeed, its bishops have a degree of authority unapproached in the Anglican Communions. Shall Methodist bishops, then, as representing the Episcopate, be accepted as competent to exercise their functions in the Protestant Episcopal Church; or, on the other hand, must they be required to submit themselves for reordination before their ministry is recognised? Is the Episcopate, that is to say, to be regarded as an "instrument" or as a "possession"? It becomes obvious that no identity of procedure is proposed. Non-Episcopal ministers are to be reordained; Episcopal clergy are "to accept a commission." In one case the candidate admits his disqualification until a bishop's hands have touched him; in the other case there is an arrangement by mutual consent. The Nonconformist receives a divinely transmitted authority; the Episcopalian receives a neighbourly welcome.

It may be urged that the Anglican Episcopate is a matter of sacred principle to its adherents while the practice of non-Episcopal Communions is merely a matter of convenience; so that, as an American theologian has remarked, "the principle of the sacramental and supernatural priesthood is outraged and threatened by any such passing to and fro between the Church and organised schism." This suggestion, however, only indicates how slightly the convictions of the Nonconformist conscience are appreciated or even understood. The Baptist Churches, for example, number not less than six times as many members in the United States as does the Protestant Episcopal Church. They maintain that baptism by immersion, after mature decision and repentance, is the only method of initiation into the Christian Church which conforms to the teaching and practice of Jesus Christ. Here is as definite and sacred a principle as is the authority of the Episcopate to the Anglican Communion, and one which has at least an equal endorsement in the records of the primitive Church. Is it possible, then, that, for the sake of the great cause of unity, certain bishops and clergy of the Anglican connection would offer themselves for baptism by immersion at the hands of their Nonconformist brethren, precisely as they ask those brethren to accept Episcopal ordination for the same great end? Such a suggestion is sufficient to indicate how the proposal of reordination affects the minds of ministers in the non-Episcopal Communions. Either it is a meaningless rite, to accept which would be a sacrilege, or it is a divinely instituted form whereby its adherents are set quite apart from the main movement of the Protestant Churches. The Protestant Communions hold their ministry to be Scriptural, valid, and justified by its fruits. A proposal of reordination seems to them like a proposal of remarriage. A discrimination between the Church and the sects appears to them not only ungracious but unhistorical. They are not, in their own opinion, sects, cut off from the Church, but members of the one body of Christ; and one cannot say of another, "I have no need of thee." In short, the real issue here raised is not concerned with the Episcopate as an "instrument," but with the Episcopate as transmitting the peculiar sanctity of an Apostolic succession. It is not an issue which is pressed by the "great non-Episcopal Communions." They have their own work to do, and, as the Bishops generously say, "their own God-given means of grace." Some of them, like the Pilgrims and Puritans, abandoned Anglican rule because of dissent from its sacramentalism; others, inheriting other traditions, have always regarded the doctrine of Apostolic succession as of dubious historical authority, and as tending to substitute an external for a spiritual Catholicity. With cordial recognition, then, of the fraternal spirit in which the Anglican Episcopate is commended as the "one means of providing such a ministry" to "those communions which do not possess the Episcopate," and with warm appreciation of the priceless contributions made to the Christian life through the order and beauty of Anglican administration and worship, it would seem necessary to say that there is not the least possibility of this path to unity being taken by the "great non-Episcopal Communions."

What seems to the Bishops an open road confronts the great majority of their Protestant brethren with the sign, "Private way." In fact, the movement of united Protestantism has already advanced a considerable distance in quite another direction, toward a unity of the spirit and a religion of practical discipleship of Jesus Christ; and the question of the transmission of the Episcopate already appears to those who are on the way to this spiritual unity to belong to a past era, when questions of ecclesiastical authority were of real interest, and the world had not been summoned to weightier matters of co-operation, sacrifice, and service.

The Bishops, with great suggestiveness, set at the head of their Appeal the majestic prayer of Jesus recorded in the Fourth Gospel: "That they may all be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee." The Protestant Communions gladly repeat this prayer; but they do not conceive that a unity which is to be in any degree after the pattern of the unity of Jesus with the Father can be a unity of external conformity or organisation. However incomplete that unity may be, it must, at least, be a spiritual communion, a unity of motive and desire, a complete conformity of will which may in some slight, human way, offer a dim reflection of the Divine unity of which their Master spoke.

This vast enterprise of spiritual unity has already become conspicuous and promising throughout the Protestant world, and the tragic experience of war has in an unprecedented degree encouraged a new and genuine fraternalism. If, therefore, any communion, with its own precious treasures of thought and life, deliberately chooses to stand aside from this great enterprise, and to claim for itself an exclusive authority of tradition and practice, then the march of Protestantism, though sadly obstructed, must proceed, with keen regret but with undiminished determination, on its own "Great Adventure of Good Will"; where those who walk in the spirit find themselves moving on converging lines toward the longed-for consummation, when, in God's time, the prayer of their common Master may at last be fulfilled, and "All may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may all be one in us."

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THE USE AND ABUSE OF ORGANISED RELIGION.[1]

Mrs J. W. WOOTTON.

> "Destroyers we create;
> Creating we undo.
> All things that have been great
> Out of destruction grew"[2]

appears to be the motto of the present generation. The sympathetic emphasise its creative, the unsympathetic its destructive aspect. May not our organised religion have this in common with other of our institutions, that it stands in need of re-creation by a process partly destructive? Enough is now heard, on the one hand, of the failure of organised religion to grapple with the problems of the day, and to transmute the man in the street into the man in the church, and the man in the church into the man in the street; and on the other hand, of the protestations of those who speak in the name of the Churches, that never again will they be what they acknowledge themselves to have been in the past, upholders of privilege, men befogged by unrealities and wholly out of sympathy with the sufferings and hardships of vulgar humanity. With cry and counter-cry of this kind echoing in our ears, we do not need much thought to be quite sure that there is something wrong somewhere. The question is, what is wrong, and where? Are our particular forms of religious organisation at fault? or does the evil lie deeper, and is organised religion in general, and organised Christianity in particular, bound for ever to fail just in those respects in which it is most anxious to succeed?

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[1] The substance of an address given before the Student Christian Movement in Cambridge.

[2] With this quotation Mr G. D. H. Cole prefaces his volume on *Labour in the Commonwealth.*

Undoubtedly every known religious organisation is imperfect, and fails partly by reason of its imperfections. Undoubtedly, too, every religious organisation might be improved, as many have been, and many more, let us hope, will be. An enlightened Church will have greater attractive power than a Church that persists in hiding such light as it has under a bushel. Those who labour within the Churches and without them for more light, for deeper spiritual life, for more reality, for better organisation, are labouring beyond question in a good cause. But the question that they and we have to ask ourselves is this. Are we not perhaps attempting the impossible? Can we ever have an organised religion which is not irritatingly imperfect? And shall we not succeed best in our efforts to establish a living Church if we realise the paradoxical hopelessness of our task? Imperfection is least painful when it is not also disappointment. And if there is truth in the view that the Churches fail because they are Churches and not because they are bad Churches, we had better make up our minds to face the prospect squarely and see the failure in its just proportions.

What I would suggest is simply this—that organised religion, being a contradiction in terms, is an inherently unsatisfactory conception. The ineffectiveness of the religious bodies in our midst, while it may increase or decline with the enthusiasm of their members and the sympathy of non-members, is in the last resort ineradicable. Religion, when most truly itself, cannot be organised. Is not that the secret discovered by those men in whose lives the essence of religion has been best realised? And is it not from realisation of this that these lives have derived the influence which they have wielded over their less spiritual fellows in their own day and after their death? The history of great religions, or of the movements of fresh life within the fold of any one religion, seems everywhere to exhibit the same features and to play out the same tragedy. Great religions and great religious movements are personal. They originate with founders of no common clay, and they spread by virtue of that infectiousness of good things, which Providence has mercifully implanted in a disordered creation. But just because of their personal character they are not immune from the limitations of personality as we know it in temporal conditions. The founder dies, and when the salt of the earth is thus taken away, wherewith shall it be salted? For personality, organisation is substituted; for the spirit, the letter; and for life, death. Humanity is not rich enough to allow of the founders of religions gathering about them disciples who are worthy of the heritage which is to be bequeathed to them. The disciples, conscious, or perhaps more often unconscious, of their own inability to preserve the spirit of their master, strive to case it about with organisation. Thus Churches are born and religions die. And, to make the tragedy the more complete, it is often true that the better a disciple a man is, the more certain he is to damn the spirit which it is his whole purpose to save.

Such has been the history both of Christianity in general and of particular Christian sects. Instead of Christ we have Christianity; upon St Francis follow the Franciscans. Such is the history of religious movements which in more modern days have been built up to embody the teaching of a departed founder. Instances will readily occur to the mind, but I will mention none by name, lest, in a selection which is purely illustrative, invidiousness be suspected. It is no answer to say that organisation is a relatively modern growth and appropriate to modern conditions. True, that growth in size which is the prevalent test of progress does necessitate in religion as well as in politics a growth in complexity of organisation also. But organised religion is, for all that, in no sense a new development. The—wholly disorganised—life of Christ is a supreme example of a revolt against organised religion. It is the best example of what may be found in many another life—namely, religion fulfilling its natural function of rebellion against the trammels of organisation, by which would-be religious man defeats his own ends. It was not the circumstances of the time which made Christianity the irregular, revolutionary spirit that it was at birth. It was its own essence that gave it this character; and it is to a large degree the loss of that essence which has so fundamentally transformed this character since. Whatever its date, a great faith is mightier than an organisation, and will soon find organisations against which to range itself in opposition. And this is no accident. It is inevitable in the nature of things. Religion is an untidy thing. It can neither be written in a minute-book nor embodied in a secretary. The ultimate absurdity of the conception of organised religion is best realised by reading for it organised love. If there is anything in our protestations (to which our actions give painfully little colour) that the most generally accepted religion of Western civilisation at this moment is based on a belief that love is divine, then there is neither more nor less absurdity in organised religion than in organised love. But organisation can never control the divine rebelliousness of the heart. Love has heat enough to melt the prisons of method and order; it is personal, wilful and passionate. And so with religion. The organisation gains in prominence as the faith, hope, and charity which it professes to express lose their fervour.

From this ultimate contradiction, more perhaps than from the faults of the particular types of religious body in our midst, arise our present discontents. To be condemned for ever to struggle with the impossible is not the best condition for a healthy existence. It is therefore not surprising that signs of unhealthiness should make themselves felt in religious organisations, if the function which is their *raison d'être* can never be fulfilled.

Such signs there are. And if we examine their nature we may perhaps see that it is just this fact, that religion never can be truly religious when it is organised, that explains their presence. We are, for instance, familiar with the large part which organising work plays in any present-day religious association. It must be so. But the danger that the means will become the end is never very far removed. The letter is essential to the expression of the spirit; but the letter killeth when it ceases to convey spirit, and is only written for the pleasure of admiring its own form. In such wise do non-essentials encroach on essentials; and sectarian arrogance replaces the love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, and temperance that are the fruit of the Spirit. Intolerance is the infirmity (but not the last infirmity) of minds not noble enough to preserve their heritage without its aid. It is equally the inevitable consequence of the attempt to organise religion.

Again, a half-realisation of their own inadequacy leads our religious bodies to efforts often as undignified as they are unsuccessful to stimulate religious zeal. Aware that our organisation deadens our spirit, we are apt, I think, to attempt to goad the spirit into a precocious vigour instead of clearing away the lifeless erection which impedes its natural development. In the great majority of cases a religious instinct is very real, but grows slowly, and needs the encouragement of a healthy atmosphere rather than a hothouse. One cannot help feeling that the fervour of the appeals which from time to time the Churches make to the public is unnatural. It is certainly repellent to minds which cannot be called irreligious. It is forced because those who make the appeal are—usually, one imagines, unconsciously—goaded by their own failure into an exaggerated enthusiasm which only makes that failure more certain.

The same sense of impotence in its more conscious form is responsible for that morbid self-consciousness which seems to be a characteristic feature at any rate of modern religious organisations. The ministries of our Churches are genuinely anxious to discover and remove the reason why they have so far lost touch with large masses of the populace. They and the more alert spirits outside the ministries devote much print and a great deal more thought to this matter. But their attitude tends to degenerate into the morbidity of the man who never gets on because he is always wondering why he doesn't get on. To take one illustration. A small religious society[1] addressed some while ago a *questionnaire* to a few persons who were likely to have had some experience of its activities. Of these questions the first was this: "What, if any, impression has this society made upon you?" Such a question may well produce in the minds of those to whom it is addressed a sense of repulsion not unlike that which we should probably all feel, if an acquaintance were to write and ask us, "What, if any, impression have I made upon you?" The comparison is not entirely fair, but it is not wholly unfair. There is a strong presumption that a society is not healthy if the effect which its activities produce on outside spectators is prominently before its mind. It lacks the spontaneity of faith at its best; and it is at least in danger of posing. So also with much of the literature which spokesmen of the Churches have produced, especially since the war. The highly representative volume on *The Army and Religion*, to which cleric and lay alike have contributed, demonstrates a consciousness of failure in the past which by its very keenness, perhaps, actually endangers the chances of success in the future.

Moreover, organised religious bodies are characterised by an extraordinary ineffectiveness even when they most wish to be influential. Rightly anxious to avoid partisanship, they end by being unable to express any opinion at all on the matters which most vitally affect the communities in which they live. In response to appeals to the Churches to come forward with a definite policy in this or that matter, or to denounce this or that abuse, the Churches either are dumb or speak with a divided voice. In consequence, their influence becomes negligible, and men do not stop to ask what is the view of religious organisations. In illustration of this kind of ineffectiveness we may cite the Report of the Committee of the Lambeth Conference on the Church and industrial problems. It is, and if it is to be non-partisan it must be, so non-committal in tone as to reduce to the level of the ludicrous the whole effort to keep in touch with things concrete, which is a main reason for the Report's existence. Witness in particular the paragraphs relating to security against unemployment, to the employment of women in industry, to the provision of "reasonable leisure." These are matters about which men really care and which arouse genuine passion. For that very reason organised religion feels it cannot leave them untouched. But to handle them in anything approaching an effective manner would mean opening up the whole field of political controversy. The Churches therefore find themselves condemned to the enunciation of perpetual platitudes. There is an open road to the hearts of us common folk though our opinion on the conduct of that everyday business of life which for the vast majority of us is called industry. Organised religious bodies can take that road; or pass it by and so forfeit a great opportunity. But if they do take it, they inevitably bar their own progress by erecting a barrier of commonplaces. Here is a dilemma indeed.

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[1] I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the then President of the Society in question, by whose courtesy I am permitted to refer to this matter in print.

To intolerance, artificiality, morbidity, and ineffectiveness we have to add excessive conservatism. Religion is revolutionary, organised religion is stagnant. And again the cause of the evil is the same. The disciples create an organisation to preserve the spirit of their founder. They fail to see that circumstances alter cases, and that religious conventions must change with the changing ages. Often the more earnestly we endeavour to carry out to the letter, to-day, injunctions that were given one hundred or nineteen hundred years ago, the more certain we are to lose the spirit of these injunctions. We are none of us great enough to read the spirit of Christ into our own age. And so, if we are devout Christians, we defeat our own ends by a literal discipleship which has not even the merit of thoroughness. There may or may not be progress in human affairs; but there is movement. The one thing that it is impossible to do in life is to stand still; and that is what religious organisations try to do. The pathos of the attempt is intensified by the fact that it alienates the very minds which have that real religion that ought to be in the Churches. Men do not pour new wine into old bottles. The new wine goes into new bottles that are often of vastly inferior quality, with the result that the new wine is spoiled and the old bottles are left empty. The new wine of young enthusiasm goes into the new bottles of materialism; and religious organisations meet with the proper fate of old bottles.

Such and such are our dangers—grave enough and real enough. But, like other dangers, they are probably graver when not realised, and gravest of all when we are ignorant of their cause. They are, I think, the inevitable concomitant of the attempt to organise religion. In passing we ought to notice that the men who, by entering the ministry or otherwise, make this attempt, have a right to be judged with the charity due to those who face the impossible for noble motives. In the words of a modern novelist, "To organise religion a man should have the talents of the devil"[1]—which most of us unhappily have not. The judgments passed by the laity on the clergy are frequently harsh; and their harshness encourages the very self-consciousness which it condemns. The parson's lot, like the policeman's, is not a happy one, or an easy one either. The greatest among us are not equal to the task of organising religion; and for the reason I have tried to indicate, it is not always the greatest minds who are impelled to try. Let us remember this.

Yet, when all is said, we cannot do without our organised religions. With all its inherent dangers and inevitable failures, organised religion has, in a paradoxical world, a real function to fulfil. I have tried to argue that religion at its best cannot be organised. But to the great majority of us religion at its best is a sealed book; to all of us parts of it are sealed. It is for the sake of the weaker brethren—that is, for the sake of most of us—that the impossible has to be attempted and religion has to be organised. Churches are a concession to the principle of sacramentalism, which is as fundamental as any principle in our nature. As such they have a part to play, and a part which they will only play well so long as they fully realise the essential subordination of the outward and visible sign to the inward and spiritual grace. Organised religion must be the voice which gives expression to the spirit that in most of us would otherwise be dumb. The most fundamental things that we know, love and birth and death, mean more to most of us than all the Churches that have ever been; and so surely they ought. It is in the face of these simple matters that our being is most deeply stirred; and the emotions to which they give rise are probably in very many cases more genuinely religious than a great deal that is more frequently described as such. It is therefore a right instinct that causes most Churches to intervene on the occasions of birth, of marriage, and of death. The baptism of infants, the marriage ceremony, and the funeral service are all concessions to our sacramentalism, whatever controversies may have raged over the narrower question how many of them may properly be termed sacraments. But the part which organised religion can play in these great events is essentially subordinate. The Church can touch the great things of life, but only as their handmaid; and she will be the better handmaid if she knows her position.

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[1] From *What Not*, by Rose Macaulay. The full quotation runs: "To organise religion a man should have the talents of the devil, or at least of the intelligent Civil Servant."

In the second place, there is opportunity for organised religion in the fact that humanity, in the last resort inexpressibly lonely, is also profoundly social. Organised religion is needed as a framework for the fellowship which goes as deep down in us as our sacramentalism. The more profound our religious feeling, the more certain it is to seek at times those forms of expression which are social in character. And it will, in our present state, need the assistance of organised religion in these social aspirations. We cannot make a solemn music alone: but if we are moved by religious feeling it is extremely probable that we shall want to make a solemn music. It is the business of a religious body to provide the means whereby we may devote to the glory of God all the good gifts of sound that we possess. And when we want to glorify God in co-operation with our fellows, it is the business of a religious body to provide opportunity for obtaining that co-operation. Yet even in service of this kind the organisation will serve best when it is least obtrusive. The mightier the faith, the less the organisation.

Closely allied with the openings which our social nature gives for the use, and not the abuse, of religious organisation are those further opportunities which arise from the fact that a crowd is greater than the sum of its parts. This fact is important; and it is also extremely liable to misconstruction. There is no need to emphasise the extent to which emotion gathers force from the presence of a crowd; and this of course is as true of religious as of any other emotion. Many of us, especially if we have a smattering of psychological knowledge, are wont to be a little ashamed of emotion of this kind, and to dismiss it as an exhibition of "herd instinct" and a part of that animal nature of which we have little reason to be proud. But there is little to be said for thus adopting the attitude of the superior person. If we are to condemn an emotion on the ground that it is of brutish origin, we shall find ourselves condemning the good and the bad together. For

> "A man, however well-behaved,
> At best is only a monkey shaved."

Our best is the beast sublimated, as our worst is the beast running riot. Moreover, *corruptio optimi pessima.* The loftiest emotion that we know is in origin as physical as anything in us; is most liable to perversion and most bestial when perverted. It is, therefore, in no way derogatory to an emotion to show its connection with our animal nature. The religious fervour of a great gathering *is* a herd instinct. It does not deserve our sneers for that. And there is need for Churches to provide, as it were, the herd which will exercise this powerful attraction over its members. An organised religious body should form a centre, on which we may focus the profound capacities for devotion which are latent in this part of our nature.

In such ways as these we may perhaps look to see organised religion a useful feature of our spiritual life for a long while to come. But if there is truth in the view I have tried to present, organised religion ought to occupy an essentially secondary place. Instead of being an institution which is destined to grow in size and splendour, it should take rank with those institutions which work towards their own undoing. The Churches will have succeeded best, and will have most command over our respect, when they have largely deprived themselves of any function to fulfil. In this respect I would class them with political government, with industrial organisation, with the social or economic reformer, with (if the expression be allowed) the militant pacifist, and a host besides. The self-destructive nature of the work which these persons or institutions perform is not good cause for withholding our allegiance from them in the present order. But a recognition that their work is self-destructive will endow our allegiance with a truer sense of proportion than it else would have. We are for ever mistaking the means for the end—not least, perhaps, because it is so much easier to agree about the means than about our ultimate end. But we do ourselves no good this way, in things religious, in things political, or in things industrial. The Church is a means; as an end it becomes ludicrous because it is an attempt to combine two incompatibles—religion and organisation. But the nearer we approach to the end, the less should be the prominence of the means. And whether the end is near or far, we should never let it become so remote from our imagination that we mistake the means for it. For by so doing we suffer a double injury. The end is lost to view entirely, and the means becomes perverted and useless. In other words, organised religion is a glass through which we see, darkly indeed, but still, if we use it aright, more clearly than if we had no window at all. But if we devote all our energies to polishing the glass—if, becoming window-cleaners, we look *at* it and not *through* it—then indeed the fair prospect upon which it opens is for ever lost to us.

Organised religion no longer occupies the place in our national life which once it held. Especially is this the case with the more educated sections of the populace. The nominal membership of Churches and of other religious bodies may rise and fall, and their active membership may vary also. But I do not think we can dispute that the influence of the Churches is perceptibly waning. Their own agitations on the subject bear sufficiently cogent testimony. But the distress of the spokesmen of religious organisations is largely due to the belief that the decline and fall of organised religion must also be the decline and fall of religion itself. Were that necessarily so, then indeed they would have cause for alarm. But it is not necessarily so. We probably are less religious than we once were. It is not to be expected that, after embracing for six years the methods of materialism in the dealings of nation with nation, we should emerge with strengthened spiritual ardour. But in other ways our very indifference to organised religion may be a sign of a new birth of religion in forms which we have hardly yet learned to recognise as truly religious. There are departments of our life in which we need to be dragooned and regulated by ordinance, in which failure to comply with established usage would be a sign of real delinquency. But our religion is not such. Our faith is perhaps the one sphere in which the old human desire to be "let alone" may rightly reign unchallenged. And if some of us are saying to the Churches that we want their ministrations either not at all, or only in a secondary capacity, it does not follow that there should be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. Religion is like the wind which bloweth where it listeth. Build shelters to catch it, and you will find that in them there is no blowing at all.

CAMBRIDGE.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

MY NEW-THOUGHT BOYHOOD.

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When the social historian comes to write the story of religion in America, I, for one, hope he will devote some pages to "New Thought," as a phenomenon peculiarly significant and American. It is because I feel this very strongly that I am tempted to outline, for the readers of the Hibbert Journal, the impressions made upon me by one of the numerous "sects" which swept the United States in the nineties of the last century. In my story—at least so it seems to me—the social historian aforesaid will learn something of America not recorded in the history of Protestantism, at least in the more orthodox forms.

"New Thought," as I now perceive, came into our little suburb on a flood-tide of business and culture, what I am tempted to call "culturine." A big department store—the first of its kind in the country—had sprung up in our raw, windy Western city, and the suburb threw out a rattling, hideous elevated railroad across the intervening territory to meet it. This brought us "within thirty minutes of the city," and yielded us up, before we knew it, to forces we had never met before. That department store unsettled all the ideas—economic, æsthetic, social, and, ultimately, religious—which the community had heretofore enjoyed.

Before that department store came into our existence we were linked uncomplainingly to the past. The furniture in our homes was old stuff, shipped from old homesteads to the new homes in the West. The new which we bought was conservative, modelled for the most part on lines familiar for generations. But the department store changed everything.

Every day it brought in from Michigan, and sold, a whole train-load of machine-made furniture; gilt, spindle-legged chairs came in; onyx-topped tables; pretentious plush-covered "parlour sets" which wore bare in a season and had to be periodically re-covered. It brought in cheap coloured pictures, vastly alluring to a generation brought up on family portraits, steel engravings of "The Stag at Eve," and worsted mottoes. It brought in pyrography, an epidemic of burnt-wood book-racks and of burnt-leather sofa pillows. It taught us to buy and give to one another "The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam"!

All this didn't come in, I admit, without a bitter struggle. What we chiefly resented was the dilemma presented to us; we wanted everything as cheap as we could get it, and we were disturbed at the wholesale character of the process of manufacture and distribution which gave us that cheapness. Was the thing "common"? That was the paralysing question. We had two categories, as I recall it; a thing was either "nice" or it was "common," and the struggle to classify canned pictures, canned furniture, canned culture of all sorts, was the most unsettling single influence in our suburb when "New Thought" came in.

When "New Thought" came in we had four Protestant churches in our suburb: the small and socially superior Protestant Episcopal church, which unscrupulously combed the other churches for choir-boys; the big humming Methodist church, whose sermons you could hear through the open windows clear out on the side-walk a hundred feet away; the Baptist church, whose pulpit, to the common scandal, was sometimes filled by the Professor of Church History at the big Baptist university near-by, whose theology was reputed to be no better than it should be; and my own church, the Presbyterian. There we had in the pulpit, as I realise now, the first exponent in that part of the country of "muscular Christianity," a youngish middle-aged man who declared impressively that there was nothing molly-coddle about Christianity, and who gave us boys boxing lessons in the big round primary-room with lithographs of a meek Christ on the walls. The Unitarians had not invaded our neighbourhood then, and the only Catholic church was many blocks away—at a distance which was universally approved even though it detained our maids and jeopardised Sunday breakfasts in the suburb.

Of theological controversy or discomfort there was practically none. I do not recall a single young person who had a moment's disturbance over any article of faith. Church lines were drawn strictly, perhaps a trifle jealously, but if the conversations on the front porches were any criteria, there was a universal relaxation in belief, an amiable desire to reduce creed and formulas to their simplest and least pretentious terms, to make shift somehow with a minimum of personal and collective discomfort. I remember only one flare up, when our somewhat too progressive Presbyterian preacher invited the Catholic priest to occupy his pulpit one Sunday night; this was resented, but chiefly on the grounds that it wasn't an equitable transaction, it being obviously impossible for Father Hissian to return the compliment. One of the vestrymen, who had formerly belonged to the "A.P.A." and who still had a barrel or two of pamphlets on "The Whore of Babylon" in his attic, resigned from the church in protest; but this action, as I remember it, brought a prompt revulsion of feeling in favour of the minister. There was such a thing as carrying your convictions too far!

But if in matters of theology there was a general deliquescence going on, I know now that there was considerable yearning and unrest. But it was fundamentally economic. There was scarcely a family which was not being pinched between the small, rigid income and the steadily rising prices. That department store played the very devil with our peace of mind. It multiplied enormously the apparent necessities of life, and brought the luxuries just without our reach. It turned our own thrift against us.

Now on this absorbing question, that of making ends meet, the four orthodox churches had nothing to say. The organist of the Episcopal church lived diagonally across the street from us; she was driven to "keep roomers" as the suburb expanded, and I noticed curiously, as a boy, that in spite of the social superiority of her church she was in her own conversation as much obsessed by the economic problem as was my hard-pressed Presbyterian mother. The Baptists and the Methodists were shameless bargain-hunters. In short, we were all in the same plight, and we were all equally tender of our religious faiths. I mean that, until "New Thought" came in, we all acted exactly alike in regarding religion as something to be held off, away from the economic struggle.

Then there came filtering into the suburb bits of a new and almost incredible gospel. There were rumours of new sects springing up which made the largest, stiffest claims regarding the relationship between religion and health, and religion and prosperity. Of these sects the Christian Scientists had the most prestige, but they were handicapped somewhat in our suburb by two things—the persistent newspaper attacks upon Mrs Eddy, and the sense of recurrent scandal occasioned by the aggressive prosecution of Christian Science "practitioners" whose patients had died. In those days the newspapers were quite vigorous in running down such cases and in insisting upon criminal prosecution. All this rather tended to daunt us, in our suburb, where respectability was *sine qua non.* Nevertheless I have to report several conversions to Christian Science, and the slow emergence of a "practitioner" or two.

But "New Thought" came definitely into our suburban consciousness through the "Christ Scientists," a sect which differentiated itself carefully from the Christian Scientists in title, ecclesiastical structure, and in what the suburban fathers crudely called its "lingo." The chief exponent of "Christ Science" was a former Congregational clergyman named Van Epps, a rather frail, agreeable gentleman who impressed everybody favourably, he seemed so intellectual and so free from the least trace of the charlatan. Somehow or other—I have quite forgotten how—he established local connections, borrowed the use of a private home for Sunday services, and finally set up a regular church which met every Sunday morning in the little auditorium of our suburban clubhouse.

I shall never forget the stir his sermons created. His services were of marked simplicity—indeed, quite severe in their details,—but he was easily the most quoted man in the town. At first only the bolder or more restless spirits ventured out to hear him; it was an affair of some delicacy, since your presence at his church was quite likely to be reported at your own; but sooner or later a large proportion of the community had sampled "New Thought," and was deep in the discussion of it.

Some, of course, were promptly impressed with "New Thought" because it was "new." I don't know why, exactly, but somehow the "new" had a prestige in those days which it doesn't seem to enjoy to-day. We believed in Progress, and I guess we were pretty artless about it. Look at the advances in science, we would argue; for that matter, look at the changes in the town itself! Look at the elevated railroad; above all, look at the department store eight miles away, offering unheard-of economies—that bankrupt the whole community! The old was well enough, but the fact is that Truth is like a procession which moves simply and majestically on. It was this sense of the cosmic process which led the plump Miss Fulton to subscribe so promptly to the new faith. Miss

Fulton, if she had been a man, would have been called a "joiner."

Somewhat akin to Miss Fulton in type were those doughty souls, of whom there were several in our suburb, who were drawn to this "new and despised sect" from a secret and romantic desire to recapture the spirit and the experience of the early Christians. They couldn't be told, outwardly, from their conventional neighbours, but inwardly they burned with a flame. They gloried in the contrast between what they conceived to be the potential power of "New Thought" and its statistical unimportance. A dash of martyrdom would have made it quite perfect!

But the thing which most deeply stirred our suburb was the frank and uncompromising way in which "New Thought" addressed itself to our bread-and-butter problems, the problems posed for us by that amazing department store. "New Thought" promised economic redemption in this world, and we were vastly more startled at that—really, I am measuring my words when I say this,—we were vastly more startled at that than we were at the most lavish and specific assurances regarding salvation in the next. Remember, dear reader, as you loll gracefully on your dividends, that for us the old order had changed, only yesterday, as it were; that the old traditional security, open to all thrifty, hard-working folks, had disappeared, and that in its place was a bewildering struggle to adjust rigid incomes to ascending prices. Not a pulpit in our suburb had addressed itself to this plebeian anxiety, this perpetual concern, until "New Thought" came in.

Given the right attitude of mind, said Van Epps (an attitude, I may explain parenthetically, to be secured from him in twenty lessons for ten dollars, with an "advanced course" of ten additional lessons for "students and teachers") and you could tap the boundless resources of the Universe. Most sermons, I have discovered, are exercises in synonyms; those of Van Epps rang the changes on "reservoir" and "storehouse" and "abundant life." Every Sunday morning he held up over our heads, in his frail scholarly hands, a vast cornucopia from which he poured out—bathing us in it—health, wealth, harmony, energy, abundant life. I want to give Van Epps his due—never in my life have I seen faces so transfigured as were the faces of those who left the secular atmosphere of that suburban clubhouse every Sunday morning.

Take Langdon, for example. He was the "Western representative" of an Eastern "concern"—happy nomenclature!—under a contract which ran for three years at a stretch. Every time it was up for renewal Langdon and his wife went through a perfect hell of worry. They had been through five of them, and Langdon's head was grey at forty. Twice out of the five renewals he had succeeded in securing an increase in salary; twice he had been refused, coldly and flatly; and once, I believe, the unequal contest had ended in some sort of a draw. When I knew the Langdons, it is scarcely too much to say that they were living three years at a time, their minds averted from the future.

Langdon worshipped in the Presbyterian church, three pews behind us and over to the right. He was counted a good churchman; I think he was clerk of the board, or something busy like that. But what, I ask you, did Langdon really care about "muscular Christianity"? What did he care how many boys the minister taught to box? What did he care for the sportsmanlike theology which the headmaster of Rugby had worked out for the pacification of English schoolboys, and upon which we were fed, willy nilly? The answer is that he didn't fundamentally care a straw, except possibly during the year following the renewal of his contract, when he was in such high spirits that he would have subscribed cheerfully to anything!

Our whole suburb was made up of "Western representatives," of "sales managers," of "chief clerks," of struggling doctors and lawyers. Langdon's plight, in one form or another, was the common plight. When the spiritual Van Epps declared flatly that security and health and abundance were the privilege of all, he struck a chord to which every heart in our town thrilled.

Nevertheless, of course, there was a big fight on. The invasion was not one to be endured. That classic jibe about Christian Science—that it was neither "Christian" nor "Science"—did yeoman duty all that first winter, I remember. The literal and unhumorous response to this, invariably, was that what Mr Van Epps preached was not Christian Science, but "Christ Science"! The thoughtless promptly challenged you to make clear the distinction, which gave you a fine chance to weave around them that gossamery materialism which, as I look back upon it, seems to me the essence of "New Thought."

Van Epps and his intense little wife did quite a bit of "mental healing"—to the great disdain of the young M.Ds. in our town. Their method was to sit, for half an hour or so, at the bedside of the patient, in unbroken silence, apparently inwardly absorbed in removing those "mental conditions" which they held primarily responsible for the physical state. But the most striking demonstration which the Van Epps made was one which had little or no observable relationship to their metaphysics. One afternoon Van Epps took his wife to one of the homes where an advanced study class was to meet. He left her there, and went on his way to the University some eight blocks distant. He had been gone about fifteen minutes when some metaphysical question arose in the class, and somebody expressed the wish that Van Epps himself were present to elucidate the point. Mrs Van Epps promptly said she would call him. She stepped out on the front porch and stood, so the story goes, with her hands on the railings, staring fixedly in the direction of the University. Van Epps was blocks away, indistinguishable. Not a sound came from her lips. In three or four minutes she returned to the class. "He has turned back," she announced calmly. "He ought to be here in ten minutes." In ten minutes or so the door-bell rang and Van Epps entered. He turned to his wife: "Did you call me?" he said.

Well, that episode simply tore the town in two. You either believed, or you didn't believe, and wouldn't! The feeling aroused was intense. Those women who were so fortunate as to have been there when the thing occurred, had to repeat the story, on demand, a score of times. Those who belonged to Van Epps' congregation looked upon the incident, logically or not, as clear unmistakable evidence that this man had the "Truth."

What does the Good Book say about the people, how they seek a sign? I suppose it is a universal trait. I know that there were Presbyterians who, for several weeks after that, struggled with the disloyal idea that somehow "muscular Christianity" was a rather sterile thing, sterile in signs, at any rate. They looked at the minister's tan—he never had time, in between his long, strenuous open-air vacations, to get a proper pastoral pallor!—and wondered at the local paradox, that it was he who was now preaching the Christian acceptance of sickness and suffering and the frail Van Epps who harped on health and abounding energy; that it was substantial he who now insisted that religion should be a matter of immaterial values, and the pale scholarly Van Epps who declared roundly that it should be a matter of red blood and corpuscles, of suburban houses and lots, of vulgar increases in salary. The episode, with one thing and another, jarred Langdon loose from the Presbyterian church, and with him went Leonard, a tall gaunt commuter who was envied because he had "as good as a life job" with the Standard Oil Company, and four or five women, including my mother. I went along too, but I was too young to be counted by either camp as a loss or an asset.

Van Epps' sermons were—I don't know how to describe it exactly—somehow very "regular." He was a great lover of formal logic, a born metaphysician. You may think that his ideas were absurd and irregular, but I know they didn't seem so to him. His mind, to him, was swept and garnished; poverty was abolished in a syllogism; pain and failure were neatly negated; adventure was either eliminated or reduced to comfortable proportions!

But, my goodness, while this was true of him, it was scarcely true of us! With the best intentions in the world, he shipped us off on a chartless sea. Pamphlets began to stream into the house, and little piebald journals, all of them advancing confidently some new and engaging aspect of the "Truth." My sister bought a Ouija board and literally scraped acquaintance with an "Indian guide" who, I am pained to relate, was wholly unsuccessful in guiding me to the spot where I had lost my sweetheart's opal ring. My mother stumbled upon "Karezza" as the solution of all marital difficulties, and spent several strenuous years, just before her death, in trying to lead my old-fashioned father into the acceptance of that distinctly *fin de siècle* version of the blest tie that binds. I myself went in for Ralph Waldo Trine's *In Tune with the Infinite*, one of the "best sellers" among "New Thought" books, which sold by the thousands in that department store before the regular, orthodox book-stores woke up to the demand. I also dabbled a bit, contentedly, in some of the large, useful-if-true assertions of the Rosicrucians, and had a pleasant winter in a course of study, by mail, under a "New Thought" teacher who lived in Florida and was afterwards caught—quite unjustly, as I still believe—in the rather cheap and wholly gratuitous prosecutions of the Federal postal authorities.

Death overtook Van Epps—I fancy the man had been fighting him off for years—and Mrs Van Epps moved silently away. Langdon, now a minor stockholder in that Eastern "concern" and the bell-wether of our flock, moved on into the Christian Science church, where he looks neither to the right nor the left upon the field where the more reckless browse; the Leonards became spiritualists; the plump Miss Fulton remains, I believe, eclectic in taste and, no doubt, is still happily browsing. After a year of boredom I moved painlessly out into a state of happy nescience. I suppose it will take me fifty years to precipitate a philosophy after what I have gone through!

Shams? Well, no, not exactly—merely part of the characteristic mental furnishings of the period, I should say, a sort of department store religion, a vast hodge-podge of promise and half fulfilment, the shopper's El Dorado, dedicated shrewdly, honestly—in its way, reverently—to the everlasting exploitation of the New!

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RELIGION & IDEALISM, AS PRESENTED BY GIOVANNI GENTILE.[1]

ROMOLO MURRI.

THE great modern nationalities sprang up, in the course of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, out of a religious revolution. But Italy's religious revolution is yet to come; and attention to this fact will go far towards explaining the vacillations, the weaknesses, and the internal contradictions that afflict her and so strangely encumber her path.

There is more. Throughout the Middle Ages and on into the Renascence the attitude of Italians towards the Papacy and the Church of Rome showed a marked independence of judgment; and fresh springs of the religious life often rose from the bosom of the popular consciousness independently of any direct ecclesiastical impulse. We have only to think of Francis of Assisi, of Catherine of Siena, of Dante, or of Savonarola. But on the other hand, subsequently to the great religious movement of separation initiated by Luther, Catholic Italy was forced with ever-increasing stringency to carry the weight of the papal interests and the spirit of the counter-reformation, till gradually every flicker of spiritual freedom was quenched. It was not till the time of the Napoleonic hurricane, and just after it, that the temporary collapse of the *anciennes régimes* left the country open without further obstacle to the influx of ideas from abroad, under which the religious life recovered a certain initiative, contemporaneously with the movement for national independence and unity.

Mazzini is, first and foremost, a spiritual prophet and a religious reformer. The scrupulously Catholic Manzoni lifts the standard of a Christianity of gentleness, goodness, and renunciation. Gioberti's and Rosmini's unsparing exposures, keen polemics, and projects for practical reform lashed the abuses of the Church, but at the same time stirred in her bosom a fresh impulse to philosophical speculation. Yet, broadly speaking, all interests of a purely religious character were subordinate to the overmastering demand for political independence and unity. It was this that determined Cavour, whose example was followed by all the non-revolutionary liberals, to treat the internal freedom of the Church and of the Papacy with a scrupulous respect that kept pace with his zeal in stripping off their temporal powers so as to exclude them from direct influence upon politics. This went so far that, on the passage of the Law of the Guarantees,[1] Bettino Ricasoli (twice President of the Council, after Cavour) could declare that the New Italy was sacrificing and slaying, as the price of peace with the Papacy, that very religious liberty which it had seemed to be her mission to establish. Meanwhile the Left and the Mazzinians, overtaken by the rising stream of a frankly materialistic trend of thought, lost all feeling for religious questions and surrendered to a dogmatically atheistic movement which still further impoverished the already feeble Italian spirituality.

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[1] Translated by Philip H. Wicksteed, Litt.D.

It is not till we come to the very last years of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth that we can note, in Christian Democracy and Modernism, any stirrings of a fresh awakening. And even the Christian Democrats contemplated from the first a political objective beyond their primary cultural mission; for they hoped to reintroduce the Catholics into the currents of the civic thought and life of the country, from which they had withdrawn in sullen isolation, under the impression that their political abstention and negation might serve the cause of the political and temporal revindication of the Papacy. But when the hostility of the Papacy itself, though at first doubtful, had become pronounced, and had repudiated and condemned the movement in its leading characteristic (its affirmation, namely, of the political autonomy of the Italian Catholics), Christian Democracy was driven back upon the original impulse of its idealistic aspirations and was transformed into Modernism, that is to say, the critical re-examination of the values of historical Catholicism. The feebler and more timid of the Christian Democrats returned to the orthodox fold, and the rest broke up to carry into all the varied cultural and political movements of the time the ferment and leaven of spiritual renovation.

Meanwhile, in this first decade of the century, there was spreading a new movement of philosophical idealism. It was but of recent origin, and it found its expression in the works of Benedetto Croce (now a Senator, and the Minister of Public Instruction) and of his contemporary and colleague in the review *La Critica*, Giovanni Gentile. Their teaching was labelled as a form of neo-Hegelianism, and such indeed it was. But it attached itself more immediately to Italian thinkers who had brought rich powers of originality to bear on their task of interpreting the German transcendental philosophy—a Rosmini, a Gioberti, and still more a Bertrando Spaventa. Indeed, it went still further back, behind Hegel and Kant, to the divinations of that great Italian student, Giambattista Vico.

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[1] See Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity*, vol. ii. pp. 380 *seq.*—TRANSLATOR.

When Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile found themselves in the presence of Italian Modernism and had to reckon with it, their first judgment was harsh and unsympathetic. These Moderns were a guileless folk, wavering between Catholic orthodoxy and free criticism, with a taste for provisional reconciliations that paid little heed to logic, and who tried to put on the drag by picking up and reserving suggestions that had already run their full and fruitful course in the channels of modern culture with no assistance from Catholicism.

But gradually Modernism came to clearer consciousness of itself; and the two philosophers, on their side, were developing their philosophy in the direction of reaching out beyond concepts, in their diversity or unity, and beyond the dialectic of categories and oppositions, into the living movement of the spirit itself. And so it came about that Croce and Gentile modified their first judgment and began to speak of religion and of Christianity with more lively sympathy and understanding. To the two thinkers moving along differing lines of approach, religion came to be seen no longer as a mere *philosophia inferior*, but as the expression and the designation of a perennial factor of spiritual impulse, the "will for the universal," or the "ethical will";—so Croce called it, declaring that the moral doctrine of Idealism found marvellous expression in the eternal symbols of the Gospel, and that since the advent of Christ it had been impossible for the morality of the civilised world to be other than Christian in the ground tissue of its ethical life, as related to the essence of the Gospel. Giovanni Gentile, too, dated from the rise of Christianity the birth of that concrete idealism which he regards as the full and consistent revindication of the moral life and the freedom of the spirit, asserting itself against the abstract idealism of Plato and of the Greek philosophy.

Gentile has gone on to develop his conception of religion with progressively increasing clarity and precision in his *Sommario di pedagogia*, his *Lo spirito come atto puro*, and finally in the *Discorsi di religione*, published in the current year,[1] to which this brief study is more immediately directed.

If we accept the conception of religion that has hitherto prevailed and regard it as a relation of the soul to God—a God already fully and completely there, as the sum of unmovable reality, inaccessible to the finite spirit of man; and if again we are to regard the spirit of man itself as a concrete thing, or existence, an object amongst objects; and if, finally, we are to regard religious truth as a revelation that comes to the human spirit from without, conveyed to it by physical means, and demanding passive acceptance, then Gentile must declare that "actual idealism" (which is the name he gives to his system) is frankly unreligious, and even, in the orthodox use of the word, atheistic.

But then he will at once bid us note that we have only defined the religious attitude of the spirit, or religion itself, in terms of a certain philosophy and as one of its functionings. We have made confession not of a religious faith but of a philosophical system, and that system pre-critical, naturalistic, based on the principle of attraction.[2] Now, neither this Aristotelian God (the immobile first mover, already full and complete in himself, without internal movement or development, external to the human spirit and separated from it by an infinite distance), nor the supreme Good (that Platonic celestial idea, from which the soul is exiled, but of which it retains an obscure impression, and to which it must win its way back, so as to contemplate it at last in its beatific fulness), really pertains to spirit at all, but rather to objective nature, that is to say, to the other-than-ourselves, wholly diverse from us, complete and accomplished in itself, external to our thought, and such that our thought can never be it—that is to say, can never grasp it, make it truly its own, *know* it. And this soul—which in its turn is a being, a thing, a reality distinct by its very constitution from other realities—itself again pertains to objective nature; that is to say, is something external to the act of thought, coming from we know not where. Thought struggles in vain to grasp it, since it belongs by definition and essence to that region of "otherness" which exists in itself and not in me, the unknowable, the ungraspable, that which precedes thought and is external to it. And just as the "thought" which presupposes a reality external to itself (complete and made up in itself before thought comes upon the scene), so that thought must confine itself to passively reflecting it, is in truth no thought of anything that really is—nay, since the real existence lies outside it, does not truly exist at all,—just so the moral act which has to follow a law given from without, and has to actualise a Good already there in its full integrity, which no finite act can either add anything to or take anything from, is not really moral at all, that is to say, free. For it has its model outside itself, and by hypothesis is only good in so far as it conforms to that model, that is to say, to a goodness which is not intrinsic to itself, or established by itself, but which comes from without, and consists in conformity to an external model, which model alone is truly good,—and yet, after all, we must likewise exclude goodness from it too, since it is in itself the whole made-up sum of reality, the totality of absolute necessity, objective nature, not spirit.

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[1] Vallecchi, Florence.

[2] "Attraction" must here be understood in its widest etymological sense, as any kind of material or immaterial pull to which any kind of conscious or unconscious trend answers. Such trend may manifest itself as the movement, or impeded tendency to movement, of elemental or elementally organised substances, or as the desire, delight, or other "motion" of a consciousness, or as the voluntary physical movements of an animated being, prompted by his desires, etc. But in every case the pull must be exercised by something that is external and objective to the subject in which that trend exists.—Translator.

These conclusions are logical developments of the fundamental conception of Gentile's philosophy, according to which thought presupposes no datum, or reality external to itself, whether you call it space or nature, but *knows* just in so far as it precipitates out of itself the object of its knowledge. For, since it cannot pass out of itself (and it is unthinkable that it should), it contains transcendentally everything in itself, and the thought is no other than the act of that which thinks, regarded as object, distinguished from the subject and set over against it in the act of thought, though in reality identical with it. But note what we are to understand by "thinking" an action that is also a becoming, *i.e.* auto-consciousness which can be equated with autoktisis[1]—

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[1] κτίσις = founding, establishing, positing, creation. Gentile's own forms of the words, *autocoscienza* and *autoctisi*, are to be illustrated by such terms as "automobile," or, better, "auto-suggestion," and not by the αὐτοάνθρωπος or the αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν of Greek philosophy.—TRANSLATOR.

a favourite word of Gentile's, this last, and one pre-eminently expressive of his thought.

And note again that thought is essentially identical with will, notwithstanding that the vulgar opinion makes the will an activity distinct from thought, devoted to alienating the spirit from itself, transforming it from ego into an ego, from subject into object; and, notwithstanding, that the naturalistic philosophy (which, as we have seen, includes every system which distinguishes between thought and reality) regards the will as engaged in making something which is already made, which already exists, and in virtue of its accomplished existence defies, in its absolute immobility, the possibility of being anything but what it is.

This is the central point of Gentile's philosophy, which we must grasp and hold firm if we are to understand all the logical deductions from it. He drives it home by a penetrating analysis that reveals all philosophy as nothing else, in its perennial principle, than an attempt to resolve reality into thought. He shows that no philosophy, even though it start from a naturalistic presupposition and thesis, can really help announcing itself, in the very act of its emergence, as a veritable and complete resolution of actuality into the very thought which envisages it as distinct from itself, though in truth it is, all the time, of its own precipitated *intellectum*, and only so can be said to be acquired and secured by it. Even scepticism, in declaring reality to be unknowable, posits so much knowledge of reality as is involved in declaring it to be unknowable, and thereby affirms its existence as the unknowability—which it knows! In possession of this existence, as its stock in trade, scepticism goes on to build up a world of its own, wherein, after the first belying of a thought which, in the very act of denying, it affirms, it goes on to a second, by annexing will and action. For is not action based on the practical certainty of a correspondence between the internal and the external reality, between the subject and the object?

It was only with Descartes that philosophy began to disentangle itself from the inextricable contradictions by which the object, though constituted by the subject in the actual moment of philosophising, proceeded to detach itself therefrom and to shut itself up in impenetrability and incomprehensibility. And even Descartes, though his *cogito ergo sum* makes thought the starting-point of being and resolves being ideally into it, yet himself immediately falls back into dogmatism by referring the evidence for this primal, original, and creative act of thought to a something outside itself, which it neither constitutes nor does nor creates. Thus thought falls back upon itself, as a form without content, with no reality left to it. The demand reasserted itself successively in Leibniz and Spinoza, who were feeling for a complete and absolute rationalising of the real; and with Berkeley, though he too, for all his *esse est percipi*, still leaves the reality of objective nature, opaque and obscure, outside the *percipere*. Kant made a further advance by reducing the real, together with space and time, to *a priori* categories in the spirit, and, in his *a priori* synthesis of the spirit, affirming the identity of thought and reality; but then he let reality escape him again, by emptying the categories themselves of the *noumenon* which lay within and behind phenomena. In like manner reality evades Fichte, whose transcendental *ego* never succeeds in drawing the *non ego* into itself. It evades Hegel, who posits Space and Nature antecedently to actual thought, and so falls into the hands of anyone who chooses to assert that before and outside actual thought, or thought in action (thought, that is, which is just the coincidence of being and making, and nothing more), there is some kind of reality, or necessity and factor of reality, which cannot be resolved in its totality and without residuum into the actual thought itself, as an interior logical factor, ever denied and ever reaffirmed in the process of becoming or making.

But how does religion emerge from this doctrine, and what place has it therein?

Note, before proceeding further, the wonderful resemblance, nay rather complete identity, between what Gentile says of his pure act and what the Schoolmen, treading in the footprints of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, say of that pure act which is none other than God.[1] To Gentile and the Schoolmen alike "pure actuality" is the absolute totality, originality, and creativity, unconditioned itself by the time and space which it posits as the modes of existence of concrete and empirical individuality. It knows no past or future, save as internal oppositions, relations, and gradations within the actuality itself, pullulating there in infinite alternations. In a word, it is just —absolute actuality.

The difference between the one and the other pure actuality lies just here:—The scholastic pure actuality is conceived as ultramundane and supramundane, external to the finite thought (which nevertheless is actually thinking it), *interminabilis vitæ*

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[1] "Relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate" (Aquinas).—TRANSLATOR.

tota simul et perfecta possessio,[1] immobile in its absoluteness, pure being and infinite negation of becoming; whereas the things which it creates, external to itself, are bound in by their finiteness, are multiplex, are closed up by their very existence as individuals against any real possibility of union. Gentile's pure actuality, on the contrary, is not absolute being but absolute becoming. It is a process, a relation continuously re-establishing itself as the unity of things distinguished and the synthesis of things opposite. Things and nature and concrete empirical individualities are not outside it but in it, are itself in its perennial self-making. Its being is this very self-making itself, and is embraced, absolutely without mediation, in the act of thought itself, the primary and transcendent actuality, auto-consciousness and autoktisis. Thus, all that we think and see to exist has its reality in the reality of that which thinks, and which is, because it makes, the universe—and that universe its own.

And just because this act is not a station but a process, not pure subject nor pure object, but subject-object, spirit objectifying itself (whence nature), and reality spiritualising itself (whence consciousness), and just because this process is included in the very act of constituting subject and object alike, as factors in all concrete becoming, distinguishing them but reuniting them in the auto-consciousness wherein philosophy consists, just for this very reason, I say, we can understand how religion rises in the life of the spirit, and what is its function there.

When the spirit conceives itself as subject and transfuses itself into things, endowing them with its conscious presence and making them its own expressions of itself, this is art. It is pure subjectivity and lyrical expression. But the spirit, in the very act of feeling itself as subject, particularising itself, entering completely into the individual and expressing itself in it, becomes aware of its own limitation, and longs to escape from itself, from the factor of the particular moment in which the original infinity is individualised, and which was originally infinite though individualised, but which has now all at once become a throttling sense of the pressure of limitations. So then it seeks to escape from itself again in the reverse direction, posits and affirms itself as an object, but asserts the absolute objectivity, the totality of things, as something not its own and not itself, transcending it and every other particular factor of existence, infinite, eternal, unmovable. And under pressure of this sense of the limits of the subject and the unlimitedness of the object, the spirit bows down and surrenders itself, and would fain cancel and lose itself and vanish away. Here then we have the factor of mysticism, which Gentile, with a few felicitous examples and citations, sets forth as characteristic of religion, and specifically of Christian religion, exemplified in Paul and the great mystics.

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[1] Boetius. It is the definition of eternity accepted as classic by the Schoolmen; here applied to the eternal Being.—TRANSLATOR.

But if this were all, and if the spirit really obliterated itself in this affirmation of objectivity and lost consciousness of itself therein, then religion would mean neither life nor morality, but rather the negation of both. For morality is free activity, the making of good; and therefore it involves the affirmation of the worth of the subject as capable of acting freely and creating good. So if the various factors of the spirit should come to be understood statically, and not in their dynamic movement—the reciprocity by which each factor, as soon as constituted, loses and at the same time realises itself in the other, to which it is united by a relation at once transcendent and immanent,—then we should have to rule out the religious factor in the name of philosophy. But it is not so. For philosophy has her being in the unity of opposites, in subject-objectivity and object-subjectivity, in synthesis, in actuality which continually asserts itself in the alternation of subject, object, and the synthesis of the two.

Hence religion, a factor of the spirit seen under the light of spiritual dialectic, is a self-losing of the subject in the object from which there arises an ulterior and higher affirmation of the subject. It is the mediating intervention of the particular in the universal, wherein the soul loses itself to find itself again. Or, in less technical language, it is the sense of reverence and devout humility and dedication that our empirical and ephemeral personality, conscious of its limitations and its penury, feels for reality and life and absolute spiritual values considered as full and complete in themselves, as eternally and infinitely valid, worthy to claim that every particularised interest or volition or form of being should accept them as divine truth and transcendent and unchallengeable will, should annul itself before them, should deny *itself* in its concrete particular, to affirm and glorify *them* to infinity. In this act of glorifying, the ego, yea the individual and empirical ego, reaffirms itself, but only so far as it feels itself one with that absolute and eternal ego which it began by venerating as transcendent.

Gentile, then, has every right to declare that his actual idealism "does not deny religion, but only the interpretation which religion[1] gives of herself, or rather of her object. It

[1] Were it not more accurate to say, "the theologians in the name of religion"?

looks to a conception of reality on which the mind may rest with the same faith in which it abandons itself to God in its sincerest religious experiences." The difference between idealism and dogmatism lies in the philosophical connotation, conceptual and verbal alike, of reality; their identity, in the act and value of religion itself.

But perhaps all this may look like mere philosophical subtlety, appealing only to speculative students trying to give themselves a distinct account of life and religion. Sincerely and practically religious souls may well look with suspicion on this idealism, and may challenge it as to its true relation to religion on another line. "Do you really believe," they may ask, "that this doctrine of yours is capable of inspiring a line of practical conduct, a vital spirit of action, corresponding to that which religion at large, in its purest inspirations, and Christianity in especial, prompts and imposes on its followers? Can it, for instance, say with full conviction: 'Consider your neighbour as you would consider yourself'? In other words, can your principles yield a moral norm, a religious training? If so, let us have them and let us see what we are to think of them." It is precisely this challenge that Gentile takes up in the third of his *Discorsi di religione*, which I regard as his most interesting and novel contribution to philosophy, and of which a very free epitome here follows.

I need hardly premise that the main objections which idealism has to meet are two. Firstly, there is the idea that it resolves into thought the reality of nature and of the "external" world, of sensation and perception, and in general of all reality save the ego, which it leaves in solitary possession of its realm of shadows. Where is there room in it, we are asked, for right and for morality, which consist in relations to some other, whether God, our neighbour, or nature? And secondly, there is the suspicion that, by transferring goodness, morality, and religion to the transcendental field (that is to say, by transforming them into absolute categories realised by the spirit in its dialectic movement, just because it is spirit, or consciousness of subject, consciousness of object, consciousness of subject-object), you simply obliterate moral good and evil. For does not moral good—so runs the protest—mean something that man can do but so often fails to do, the will for good with which he sets about correcting the determinism of nature and instinct, by grafting on them a higher principle of life—one act of love, as Pascal put it, being mightier than all nature? Is it not the ideal that has to be realised and can only be realised by free, that is, contingent action, by the determination and the will of man? And surely there is no room or *raison d'être* for these things in your system. Or at any rate they are something far other than what you have now been talking about. For, by your very assumption of a transcendental interpretation of religion, that to which you give the name is a factor of every form of human activity, since all alike consist of the mediation of the particular in the universal, the final and immanent resolution of the subject in the object and the object in the subject, and the synthesis of the two terms in the ego. According to this, the act of the spirit will never be anything else than making the universal concrete by limiting it, evil will be no other than a dialectic factor of good, and the "ought to be" of the ideal no other than the "is" envisaged as a "becoming."

To the first objection Gentile answers that it only rises when idealism is regarded from the point of view of the pre-critical mentality, that is to say, with the mind fixed on the real as object, datum, nature. For in idealism, rightly understood, the object is every bit as real as the subject, the reality which the thought thinks is as true as the thought itself, and everything is left in the order, hierarchy, and sphere in which it stands to the realist; which order and hierarchy and sphere, however, cannot be, and, truly conceived, never have been, any other than such as thought itself gives to reality; for any other order or gradation which should stand outside thought would *ipso facto* be unintelligible. So if ethics—the spirit as morality, or freedom—finds its realisation not in the individual man but in human society, in the relations of men to each other, and further in the relations of men themselves to God and nature, this means that the sense of otherness and multiplicity is intrinsic to the dialectic of the spirit itself as it becomes good and feels the command to seek unity in love, and to think of God as being this unity, which unity would be inaccessible were it not already fundamentally present in the very spirit that wills it; would be inaccessible, therefore, if men were, as the old philosophy imagined, completely made up and stereotyped by the very fact of their existence, monads all external to each other, just as the monads of Leibniz would be, were it not for that "pre-established harmony" of his—a supplementary or corrective unity imposed upon thought from outside, and therefore never really entering into thought at all.

If I am bidden to love my neighbour as myself, says Gentile, it is because in reality—in that reality which is my own inmost ego, transcending the superficial and ephemeral multiplicity—that neighbour is my very self. Both in yourself and in your neighbour you are to love humanity; you are to love that self of yours which is absolutely and eternally valid, and which therefore transcends the fluctuating particularisations of time and space and all that finds its place in them. *Transcende temetipsum* if thou wouldst seek God, said Augustine. But to transcend yourself is an impossibility, it is a mere empty phrase, if that reality in which we are to abide by transcending ourselves is not our self after all, our highest, truest, fullest self. Just as nature is the passage from the one to the manifold, so love is the return from multiplicity to unity, actualised as freedom and morality.

More serious, perhaps, is the second difficulty; for it strikes at the Kantian formalism, and tells, it would seem, still more heavily against the more consistent and complete formalism of actual idealism. Because to Kant the moral category still had a world other than itself and inferior to itself to moralise, to wit, the world of phenomena and of the utilitarian and empirical will. Whereas Gentile's formalism, having nothing else to work upon but the spirit itself, really is the "absolute formalism" which it proclaims itself to be; which means that it definitely rejects the conception of any made-up and established Good which is to be the standard of the goodness we are to develop in ourselves. To Gentile there can be no *norma data*, antecedent to the free act, to which that act must conform—and by that very fact must itself cease to be free! Still less can there be a reference of the spirit to any shred or form of the concrete and particular which it is the very business of the spirit and of morality to absorb into universality and the consciousness of universality. In any such reference, the norm, the law, the letter may be there, but the essence is gone, and has left behind it—what St Paul means by sin.

We can now formulate more precisely the difficulty of which we have been speaking. If universality is an act, how can it also be a norm? If reality is, transcendentally considered, spirituality, and is at its every moment complete and absolute spiritual actuality, what is the sense and what is the use of saying to us, as Benedetto Croce does,[1] "Be spirit," or as Giovanni Gentile does, "Act so that thy actual will may be the universal will"?

I confess that, after carefully reading and pondering over Gentile's writings, I still think that this point deserves further elucidation. But Gentile himself has shown the direction in which we must look for fuller light; for what is wanted is greater precision in determining the relation between the empirical and the transcendental ego, between the unity that lies so deep within but never ceases to be the actuality, and the concrete visible multiplicity not only of men, but of passions, instincts, impulses, promptings of the will, and states of mind that multiply and contend within one and the same individual and all the time bear the flower of his moral personality as their unity and synthesis, never made up but always on the toilsome path of establishing itself, in a conflict which is always on the balance, and in which the victory must be continuous, since opposition springs up from victory itself.

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[1] In his *Filosofia della practica.*

"That," says Gentile, "is a moral action whose axiom can be regarded not as the law of your phenomenal subject but of your pure ego, that ego whose affirmation and development is the principle of concrete and absolute universality. The phenomenal and particular subject, like all phenomena that alternate and jostle each other in space and time, belongs to the world of multiplicity. But the pure and transcendental subject is unity, and because unity universality."

If, then, to the transcendent subject the good is a category as transcendental as itself, a dialectic factor that absorbs and resolves evil into itself,—absolute creative freedom,—this good must present itself to the empirical ego as the forcing down and conquest and painful transcending of multiplicity, and the evil that has to be overcome will have just so much reality as has this multiplicity itself, as has the flesh, the law, the world. And it is here, in this consciousness of strife, of the subjection of the spirit to the flesh, and the forceful victory that must break it—it is here that we find the seat of that sense of sin and of redemption, and of that opposition between the spirit and the flesh, that makes us sigh for the divine, for the divine unity and freedom and fullness of life. Here is the field of religious experience. And this experience would be vain, unreal, unthinkable, if we chose to regard it as a special faculty of the spirit, a supernatural intuition or consciousness which had for its proper object a divine reality external to the spirit, immobile, infinite, intrinsically inaccessible. Were such an experience and such a God-nature conceivable, there would indeed be an irreparable cleavage between religion and philosophy; for religion would mean total alienation of the concrete and limited human spirit into God, an alienation wholly unconscious and self-contradicting; whereas philosophy can never be anything else than the assumption of reality in thought, the resolution of reality into thought, and the resultant establishment of reality-thought. Such a reality does not transcend the spirit, but is itself the creation of a spirit that transcends all its own concrete forms and factors; whereas the Aristotelian God can never be the God whom John and Paul affirmed, whom the mystics sought insatiably, whom religion promises to man when it promises him the *vita eterna*, the absolute life beyond which is nothing, and which is itself beyond the time and space which itself has established as its own internal factors. *Dii estis*. And since there are no Gods but one, *Deus estis*.

But being, that is, becoming God, is the spiritual tragedy of life. The spirit is the universe, but this its universe is a hierarchy of values, of things transformed into values; and every concrete universe, every human act which is its own universe to itself, is moral, is religious, is subject to that very valuation which it implies and actualises. So the individual, in this act, has to make his own universe, and has to assign its place therein to everything—to past and future, to nature and God, to the loftiest ideal and the least significant requirement of the moment: a responsibility in which his empirical ego is subjected—by its own will, which yet in the very act of willing is recalcitrant—to an infinite and absolute norm of duty, which is the spirit itself, working in it as universality and absoluteness, sacrificing to itself, in itself, every ephemeral and empty particularisation, and determining that sacrificed it shall be. This is the inmost core of the conception of the sacred and of sacrifice ("sacred-making"), in which all religion lives and moves.

The act of the spirit, then, which conceives itself in the light of absolute value is, by definition, a religious act. But this religion is integral to philosophy. It is no adjunct to it but is lost in it—if philosophy is indeed the auto-consciousness in which empiricity and universality, object and subject, the ephemeral and the absolute, fuse themselves together; and in which free action creates the reality of that living unity which is reality indeed, reality absolute.

"And so," concludes Gentile, "the deathless life may be called a deathless death; not the death in which the weary soul of Lucretius finds repose, but the death in which repose is never to be found; for thus to die is to live, and the death of religion is the life of the spirit that takes up religion into its own life by transcending it, and in transcending it realises the good and accomplishes its eternal mission."

ROMOLO MURRI.

ROME.

CROCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

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An alliance between philosophy and history is no new idea in this country. Most Englishmen who know or care anything about philosophy have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the "Greats" school at Oxford; and the distinguishing mark of this school is the connection which it maintains between the study of ancient history and that of ancient philosophy. It is this connection that gives Oxford philosophy its chief merit, a fine tradition of scholarship and interpretation in Plato and Aristotle; and it is, perhaps, the failure to extend the same principle to the study of more recent thought that has led in this school to a much lower standard in the interpretation of modern philosophy, unsupported as it is by any study of modern history.

The ideal of a combined study of philosophy and history is energetically supported by Croce. Himself a philosopher of eminence and an accomplished historian, he feels acutely in his own person the profit which each of his pursuits in turn derives from the other. The historian must study the philosophy of his period if he is to understand those forces which ultimately shaped its destiny; if he does not follow the thoughts of the men whose actions he is studying he can never enter into the life of his period, and can at best observe it from outside as a sequence of unexplained facts, or facts to be explained by physical causes alone. And the philosopher must in his turn study history. How else is he to understand why certain problems at certain times pressed for solution on the philosopher's mind? How else is he to understand the individual philosopher's temperament, his outlook on life, the very symbolism and language in which he has expressed himself? In short, if the philosopher is to understand the history of philosophy he must study the general history of humanity; and a philosophy which ignores its own history is a philosophy which spends its labour only to rediscover errors long dead.

History without philosophy is history seen from the outside, the play of mechanical and unchanging forces in a materialistically conceived world: philosophy without history is philosophy seen from the outside, the veering and backing, rising and falling, of motiveless winds of doctrine. "Both these are monsters." But history fertilised by philosophy is the history of the human spirit in its secular attempt to build itself a world of laws and institutions in which it can live as it wishes to live; and philosophy fertilised by history is the progressive raising and solving of the endless intellectual problems whose succession forms the inner side of this secular struggle. Thus the two studies which, apart, degenerate into strings of empty dates and lists of pedantic distinctions—"To seventeen add two, And Queen Anne you will view," "Barbara celarent darii ferioque prioris"—become, together, a single science of all things human.

This is the point of view from which Croce proposes, and in his own work carries out, a closer union between philosophy and history. It is a point of view which must interest English readers; the more so as in these days, when the pre-eminence of classical studies in English education is a thing of the past, the position of philosophy as a subject of study demands the closest attention. In the past the Oxford "Greats" school has stood for this ideal of the cross-fertilisation of history and philosophy, even when the co-ordination of the two sides has been worst, and the undergraduate has seemed to be merely reading two different schools at once, under tutors who regarded each other as rivals for his attention; but in the future the whole question will be reopened, and philosophy may either contract a new alliance with the natural sciences, or retire into single blessedness as an independent subject of study like Forestry or Geography, or force herself into the company of Modern History, disguised perhaps under the inoffensive name of Political Theory. To solve this problem in the best way it is necessary to have a clear idea of what philosophy is, and what are its relations to these other subjects of study. These, of course, are controversial questions, on which no one can lay down the law; but the conclusions of Croce demand at least our attention, and we propose here to discuss his views on the nature of history and its relation to philosophy. As our purpose is rather to criticise than to expound, we shall select some of his views and examine these as typical of the whole.

The book in which he expounds them is the *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* (Bari, 1917), which, like many of Croce's books, falls into two sections, a theoretical and a historical. The relation between the two is close; the ideas which are discussed in the former are exemplified in the latter, and the process of development followed in the latter is only intelligible in the light of the principles laid down in the former. Our concern here is especially with the theoretical section; not because it is the most striking—the historical section is a rapid but extremely brilliant survey of the progress of historical thought, in which the characteristics of succeeding periods are set forth with a penetration and fairness which could hardly be bettered—but because our present business is the explicit statement of theoretical principles.

In order to arrive at a clear concept of what history is, Croce begins by telling us what it is not. It is not annals. That is to say, it is not the lists of dates with which a superficial observer confuses it. To the outward eye, a book may consist of mere chronological tables; but to the historian these tables mean real history, not because they are, but because they stand for, the thought which is history. History goes on in the mind of the historian: he thinks it, he enacts it within himself: he identifies himself with the history he is studying and actually lives it as he thinks it, whence Croce's paradox that "all history is contemporary history." Annals, on the other hand, belong to the past; the schoolboy learning a list of dates does not live them in his thought, but takes them as something alien imposed upon him from outside—brute facts, dead and dry; no living reality such as his teacher, if he is a good historian, can enjoy in reading the same list. Annals, then, are past history, and therefore not history at all. They are the dry bones of history, its dead corpse.

This is illuminating, and satisfactory enough until we begin to reflect upon it. History is thought, annals the corpse of thought. But has thought a corpse? and if so, what is it like? The corpse of a organism is something other than the organism itself: what, for an idealistic philosopher like Croce, is there other than thought, in terms of which we can give a philosophically satisfactory definition of the corpse of thought?

Croce's general "philosophy of the spirit" supples him with a ready-made answer. Nothing exists but the spirit; but the spirit has two sides or parts, thought and will. Whatever is not thought is will. If you find some fact which cannot be explained as an instance of thought, you must explain it as an instance of will. Thought is the synthesis of subject and object, and its characteristic is truth: will is the creation of an object by the subject, and its characteristic is utility. Wherever you find something which appears at first sight to be an example of thinking, but which on inspection is found not to possess the quality of truth, it follows that it must be an example of willing, and possess the quality of usefulness. Such, in a rough outline, is the principle of analysis which Croce applies in this book and elsewhere. History is thought: there is here a perfect synthesis of subject and object, inasmuch as the historian thinks himself into the history, and the two become contemporary. Annals are not thought but willed; they are constructed—"drawn up"—by the historian for his own ends; they are a convention serving the purposes of historical thought, as musical notation serves the purposes of musical thought without being musical thought; they are not true but useful.

This is the answer which Croce gives, or rather tries to give, to the question we raised. But he does not really succeed in giving it. He cannot bring himself to say that annals are simply devoid of truth, are in no sense an act of thought. That would amount to saying that annals are the words, and history their meaning: which would not be what he wanted. So he says that annals are (p. 9) "sounds, or graphic symbols representing sounds, held together and maintained not by an act of thought which thinks them (in which case they would once more be supplied with content), but by an act of will which thinks it useful for certain purposes of its own to preserve these words, empty or half empty though they be." "Or half empty." This is a strange reservation. Are the words of which annals are composed, then, not empty after all? Are they half full, half full, that is, of thought? But if so, the distinction between the act of thought and the act of will has broken down: annals are only history whose words mean less indeed than the same words as used by history proper, but still have meaning, are still essentially vehicles of thought. And Croce would be the first to admit and insist that a difference of degree has nothing to do with a philosophical question like this.

This is not the only passage in which Croce's clearness of vision and common sense break through the abstractions of his formal philosophy. He tries to maintain a philosophy according to which every act of the spirit falls under either one or the other of two mutually exclusive heads (theoretical and practical), subdivided into four sub-heads (intuition and thought; economic willing and ethical willing), so related that the second and fourth sub-heads involve the first and third respectively (thought is also intuition, ethical action is also economic action), but not *vice versa*. Now this formal philosophy of the mind is purely psychological and empirical in character; it is what Croce himself calls "naturalism" or "transcendence." And with that side of himself which never ceases to combat all kinds of naturalism, he combats this philosophy of his own with the rest. To go into this fully would involve a detailed analysis of Croce's other works, and we shall not pursue it here. But we must refer to it, and insist upon this general principle: that there are two Croces, the realist, dualist, empiricist, or naturalist, who delights in formal distinctions and habitually works in dualistic or transcendent terms, and the idealist, whose whole life is a warfare upon transcendence and naturalism in all their forms, who sweeps away dualisms and reunites distinctions in a concrete or immanent unity. A great part of Croce's written work consists in a debate between these two, one building up dualisms and the other dismantling them; sometimes failing to dismantle them. This we shall find throughout the present book. In fact, at the end of our inquiry, we shall see reason to suspect that this double-mindedness has now become so intolerable to Croce himself that he feels impelled to destroy altogether a philosophy so deeply at variance with itself, and to take refuge in a new field of activity.

The dualism between history and annals is really, if I understand it aright, an expository or "pedagogic" dualism, confused by the attempt to interpret it as a real or philosophical dualism, to which end it has been mistakenly identified with the distinction between a symbol and its meaning. An expository dualism is a common enough device: in order to expound a new idea one frequently distinguishes it point by point from an old, thereby developing what looks like a dualism between them, without, however, at all meaning to imply that the dualism is real, and that the old conception has a permanent place in one's philosophy alongside of the new. Thus the antithesis between the flesh and the spirit, developed in order to define the term spirit, is misunderstood if it is hardened into a metaphysical dualism: so again that between mind and matter, art and nature, and so forth. In such cases the two terms are not names for two co-ordinate realities, but an old and a new name for the same thing, or even an old and a new "definition of the Absolute," and the new supersedes the old: if the old is compelled to live on alongside the new, it sets up a dualism whose effect is precisely to destroy the whole meaning of the new conception and to characterise the whole view as a naturalistic or transcendent philosophy.

This is curiously illustrated by Croce's chapter on "History and Annals." "History is living history, annals are dead history: history is contemporary history, annals are past history: history is primarily an act of thought, annals an act of will" (p. 10). Here again the word *primarily* gives everything away; but, ignoring that, it is strange that the category in which annals fall is indifferently, and as it were synonymously, called *the past*, *dead*, and *the will*. Here—and numerous other passages could be quoted which prove the same thing—Croce is really identifying the distinction of thought and will with the distinction of living and dead, spirit and matter. The will is thought of as the non-spiritual; that is to say, the concept of dead matter has reappeared in the heart of idealism, christened by the strange name of will. This name is given to it because, while Croce holds the idealistic theory that thought thinks itself, he unconsciously holds the realistic or transcendent theory that the will wills not itself but the existence of a lifeless object other than itself, something unspiritual held in existence by an act of the will. Thus, wherever Croce appeals from the concept of thought to the concept of will, he is laying aside his idealism and falling back into a transcendent naturalism.

But now the idealist reasserts himself. A corpse, after all, is not merely dead: it is the source of new life. So annals are a necessary part of the growth of history: thought, as a philosopher has said, "feeds saprophytically upon its own corpse." Annals are therefore not a mere stupid perversion of history, but are essential to history itself. Annals are a "moment" of history, and so therefore is will of thought, matter of mind, death of life, error of truth. Error is the negative moment of thought, without which the positive or constructive moment, criticism, would have nothing to work upon. Criticism in destroying error constructs truth. So historical criticism, in absorbing and digesting annals, in showing that they are not history, creates the thought that is history. This is idealism; but it stultifies the original dualism. The distinction between history and annals is now not a distinction between what history is (thought) and what history is not (will), but between one act of thought (history) and another act of thought of the same kind, now superseded and laid aside (annals), between the half-truth of an earlier stage in the process of thought and the fuller truth that succeeds it. This is no dualism, no relation between A and not-A, and therefore it cannot be symbolised by the naturalistic terminology of thought and will; it is the dialectical relation between two phases of one and the same development, which is throughout a process of both thinking and willing.

The same fundamental vice underlies the very attractive discussion of "pseudo-histories." We all know the historian who mistakes mere accuracy for truth, the "philological" historian; and him who mistakes romance for history, the "poetical" historian; and him who imagines that the aim of history is not to tell the truth but to edify or glorify or instruct, the "pragmatic" historian. And Croce characterises them and discusses their faults in an altogether admirable way. But he wants to prove that he has given us a list of all the possible forms of false history, and this can be done by appealing to the list of the "forms of the spirit." But the appeal not only fails in detail—for his list of pseudo-histories tallies very ill with the list of forms of the spirit—but is false in principle.

For "poetical" history, to take an example, is only a name calling attention to a necessary feature of all history. Croce shows how Herodotus, Livy, Tacitus, Grote, Mommsen, Thierry, and so forth, all wrote from a subjective point of view, wrote so that their personal ideals and feelings coloured their whole work and in parts falsified it. Now, if this is so, who wrote real history, history not coloured by points of view and ideals? Clearly, no one. It is not even desirable that anyone should. History, to be, must be seen, and must be seen by somebody, from somebody's point of view. And doubtless, every history so seen will be in part seen falsely. But this is not an accusation against any particular school of historians; it is a law of our nature. The only safe way of avoiding error is to give up looking for the truth.

And here, curiously, Croce breaks out into a panegyric on error, as if conscious that he was being too hard on it. The passage is a most interesting combination of naturalism and idealism. Error, says Croce, is not a "fact"; it is a "spirit"; it is "not a Caliban, but an Ariel, breathing, calling, and enticing from every side, and never by any effort to be solidified into hard fact." This image implies that error does not, as such, exist; that is, that no judgment is wholly or simply erroneous, wholly devoid of truth: which is orthodox idealism, but quite contrary to Croce's general theory of error. But it also implies that error as such is valuable and good: he speaks definitely of the "salutary efficacy of error"; and this conflicts not only with the description of pseudo-histories as "pathological"—and therefore, presumably, to be wholly avoided—but also with Croce's own idealism, and with the view which surely seems reasonable, that the indubitable value and efficacy of errors belongs to them not *qua* errors but *qua* (at least partial) truths. An error like historical materialism is, as Croce says, not a fact; that is because, its falsity discovered, it is banished, it becomes a memory. Also, as Croce says, it is, or rather we should say was, useful: it superseded a worse error, historical romanticism. But it was once a fact, and then it was a truth—the best truth that could be had then, anyhow; and then, too, it was useful, as an improvement on its predecessor. To-day it is not a fact (except for historians of thought), nor true, nor yet useful. The passage is confused because Croce is assigning to error as such the merits of truth; which is an attempt to express the fact that error as such does not exist, and that what we call an error is in part true and therefore has the "salutary efficacy" which belongs to truth alone. This confusion is due to the vacillation between naturalism, for which some statements are just true and others just false, and idealism, for which truth and falsehood are inextricably united in every judgment, in so far as it creates itself by criticising another, and becomes itself in turn the object of further criticism.

This vacillation is the more interesting as much of Croce's treatment of error is purely naturalistic, and shows no trace of idealism. His general theory of error, in the *Logica*, is absolutely naturalistic. Thought, he there argues, is as such true, and can never be erroneous: an error, whatever it is, cannot be a thought. What is it, then? Why, an act of will. We need hardly point out the absurdities of such a theory. We only wish to point out its naturalistic character; to lay stress on the distinction implied between a truth, as containing no error, and an error, as containing no truth, correlative with that between pure thinking and pure willing, and based on the same naturalistic or transcendent logic. So again his inquiry into the varieties (phenomenology) of error, in this book and elsewhere, and the list of pseudo-histories, are purely naturalistic; and so again is a highly "transcendent" type of argument not uncommon with him, which traces the origin of a philosophical error to the baneful influence of some other activity of the spirit. Thus philosophical errors, which by their very nature can only have arisen within philosophy itself, are ascribed to science (p. 45, the fallacy of the independent object) and religion (p. 51, the dualism of *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths), errors whose only connection with science or religion is that when philosophers believed in them they applied them to the interpretation of these activities: whereupon Croce, having rejected them as general philosophical principles, uncritically retains them as adequate accounts of activities to which he has not paid special attention, and thus credits these activities with originating them. The result is a kind of mythology, in which Philosophy or Thought takes the part of a blameless and innocent heroine led into errors by the villains Science and Religion. These flights of pure naturalism in Croce have a curious eighteenth-century flavour; it is difficult in reading them to feel ourselves in the forefront of modern philosophy; for Science and Religion, the villains of the piece, represent precisely that Caliban of embodied factual error whose banishment from philosophy has just been ratified by Croce himself.

The same naturalism colours the chapter on the "Positivity of History." Here the doctrine is expounded that "history always justifies, never condemns." History always expresses positive judgments, never negative; that is, it explains why things happened as they did, and this is to prove that they happened rightly. "A fact which seems merely bad is a non-historical fact," a fact not yet thought out successfully by the historian, not yet understood. The historian as such therefore always justifies: if he condemns, he proves himself no historian. What is he, then? Why, a partisan; one who acts instead of thinking, serves practical instead of theoretical needs. The historian as such is a thinker; "the history which once was lived is by him thought, and in thought the antitheses which arose in volition or feeling no longer exist." To condemn in thought is to "confuse thought with life."

Here as usual we sympathise warmly: we know the historian who regards history as a melodrama, and we do not regard him as the best kind of historian. But we are trying at present to think philosophically; and the dualism between thought and life makes us a little uncomfortable. Life, we are told, is the scene of value-judgments, judgments of good and evil, which are products of the will; thought knows only the truth, and in the eye of thought everything that is, is justified. Partiality is proper and necessary to action, impartiality to thought. The statesman calls his opponent wicked or misguided, because, being a man of action and not a man of thought, it is not his business to understand him, but only to defeat him; the historian, understanding the motives of both, calls both alike wise and good.

This is the same tangled skein of idealism and naturalism. The underlying truth, that no historical event, no act and no person, is merely evil, and that it is the duty of the historian to discover and express the good which our hastier analysis of the facts has failed to reveal—this is an important doctrine, and it is an idealistic one; but the terms in which Croce has stated it are naturalistic. The distinction between theoretical and practical men, activities, or points of view is pure naturalism, and here it leads Croce into plain and obvious misstatements. It is monstrous to say that partiality is right and necessary in a statesman and wrong in a historian. Each alike ought to be as impartial as he possibly can in the process of balancing claims and forming a judgment on them; and each must be partial in asserting his judgment, when he has formed it, against his opponent's. The statesman ought to show all the impartiality he can in judging the claims of capital and labour, or agriculture and industry, however energetically he supports his own bills and denounces those of his opponents; and if the historian is impartial in balancing evidence and understanding motives, we do not expect him to be so impartial as to declare a rival's view of the character of Richard III. as good as his own. Because thought must be impartial, are there to be no more controversies?

Controversies, yes, it may be said, but not condemnations. We may refute Mommsen, but we must not condemn Julius Cæsar. But this is quite unreasonable. If I may think a German professor wrong, why not a Roman general? If, as a historian of warfare, I must accept all Cæsar's battles as impeccable, then as a historian of the history of warfare I must accept all Mommsen's accounts of them as impeccable for the same reason. Controversy is for contemporaries, no doubt: *de mortuis nil nisi bonum.* But as Cæsar's historian I am—is not Croce forgetting it?—Cæsar's contemporary. When a man is dead, the world has judged him, and my judgment does not matter; but the mere fact that I am rethinking his history proves that he is not dead, that the world has not yet passed its judgment. In my person, indeed, it is now about to pass judgment. Croce's contention is that I am forbidden to pass any but an exclusively favourable judgment. Why is this? It is because Croce is here assuming a "transcendent" theory of knowledge, according to which judgment has already been passed in a court outside the mind of the historian, a court from which he has no appeal. He can only write down what he finds written on the page of History.

Thus the idealistic principle that there is a positive side in every historical fact is combined with the naturalistic assumption that the positive side excludes a negative side; the principle that nothing is merely bad is misunderstood as implying that everything is wholly good, and not bad in any sense at all. And this naturalistic misinterpretation of an idealistic principle confuses the whole argument to such an extent that it actually necessitates a naturalistic and transcendent theory of knowledge. Only in the light of such a theory can it be maintained, as Croce here maintains, that every historical event is right, and therefore everyone who thinks otherwise is wrong, as if the opinions of these poor creatures were not also historical events.

The dualism of thought and life is thus pure transcendence, a formal contradiction of Croce's own theory of history. Thought is life, and therefore the historian can never be impartial; he can only struggle to overcome one prejudice after another, and trust to his successors to carry on the work. The progress of thought is always negative in that it means a continual controversy with oneself and within oneself. The abstract "positivity of history" is a delusion, bred of a naturalistic philosophy.

In the same spirit Croce proceeds to expound his conception of progress. There being no negativity in history, that is to say, none in the world of reality, all is progress, every change is, as he says, "a change from the good to the better." There is no such thing as decadence; what appears to be so is really progress, if only you look at it from the right point of view. True; there always is such a point of view, and it is of the utmost importance that we should not overlook it. But there is the opposite point of view too. A change that is really a progress seen from one end is no less really a decadence, seen from the other. It is true to say that the decay of archery was the rise of firearms; but it is not less true to say that the rise of firearms was the decay of archery. Here is one point of view against another: which is the right one? Croce answers emphatically that one is altogether right and the other altogether wrong. But why? Is it the historian's duty always to take the side of the big battalions just because they win? Is he always to side with the gods against Cato? Or do we not rather feel that it was just by siding against Cato that the gods proved themselves no true gods? The historian's duty is surely not to pick and choose: he must make every point of view his own, and not condemn the lost cause merely because it is lost. The fact is that Croce is here again taking a transcendent attitude, asserting the existence of a criterion outside the historian's mind by which the points of view which arise within that mind are justified and condemned.

It is the less surprising to find this transcendence emerge into full daylight at the end of the chapter. Croce is saying that when a historian fails to maintain a properly "positive" attitude, fails, that is, to maintain that whatever happens is right, he does so because he has attached himself so blindly to a cause, a person, an institution, a truth, as to forget that every individual thing is but mortal; and when his foolish hopes are shattered and the beloved object dies in his arms, the face of the world is darkened and he can see nothing in the change but the destruction of that which he loved, and can only repeat the sad story of its death. "All histories which tell of the decay and death of peoples and institutions are false"; "elegiac history" is always partisan history. This he expands by saying that immortality is the prerogative of the spirit in general: the spirit in its determinate and particular forms always perishes and always must perish.

Here the transcendence is explicit and unequivocal. The "spirit in general" is presented as having characters (immortality, absoluteness) which the individual spirit has not; the whole is the negation of the part; the absolute or infinite is something over against, contrasted with, the finite. The Christianity at which Croce never ceases to gird for its transcendence is here, as often, immanent exactly where he is himself transcendent. It knows that life is reached through death and found in death, and that to live without dying is to die indeed.

The whole discussion of the "positivity of history" is, in fact, vitiated by naturalism. The truth which Croce wishes to express is the same which Hegel concealed beneath his famous phrase, "the real is the rational." What happens, happens for a good reason, and it is the business of history to trace the reason and state it. And that means to justify the event. But this truth is grossly distorted if it is twisted into the service of a vulgar optimism which takes it for the whole truth. Hegel's view of reality, as Croce himself has insisted, was no such vulgar optimism, but a tragic view; and yet the common charge of optimism brought against him is not unfounded, for he, like Croce, had in him a streak of naturalism which at last overcame him. The point of view here maintained by Croce, from which every change is for the better, and all partisans of lost causes are fools and blasphemers, is neither better nor worse in itself than that from which all change is for the worse, and all innovators are Bolsheviks and scoundrels. A history which was merely a tragedy or a series of tragedies, like the "Monk's Tale" in Chaucer, would be a misrepresentation of reality; but to hold that all tragedy is delusion and error, and that reality contains no tragic elements at all, is to misrepresent it not less gravely. To imagine that the choice lies between these two misrepresentations, that a positive and a negative moment cannot coexist in reality, is just the kind of error that characterises a transcendent or naturalistic philosophy.

We are now in a position to consider the relation between history, science, and philosophy. Science Croce identifies with the generalising activity of the mind. History is the internal and individual understanding of an object into which the mind so enters that subject and object can no longer be separated; it is real thinking. Science is the external and arbitrary construction of abstract types, and the manipulation of them for practical ends; it is not thinking at all, but willing. This is Croce's distinction. It falls, we observe, within the competence of Croce the naturalist, appealing as it does to the abstract scheme of thought and will. What does Croce the idealist say to it? For it is evident that he cannot assent to it.

He answers the question tacitly in a chapter on "Natural History." Here he denounces that kind of "history" which proceeds by making abstract classifications and then spreads out the classes over a chronological scale; for instance, that kind of history of language which imagines that language began by being monosyllabic, and then went on to polysyllabic forms, or that history of morals and society which begins with pure egoism and goes on to "deduce" altruism, and so on. He shows that this type of fallacy, in which temporal sequence is used as a kind of mythology for logical or spacial interrelation, is found not only in the sciences of nature but also in the sciences of man. In both alike, he says, we classify and arrange our facts, and make abstract generalisations which can, if we like, be arranged along an imaginary time-scale. But also, in both alike we can do real thinking: we can enter into the individual and understand it from within. The object, whether "a neolithic Ligurian or a blade of grass," can be penetrated by thought and lived by the thinker.

This simply destroys the distinction between science and history. It proves that as science (abstract classification) enters into the work of the historian, so history (concrete individual thought) enters into the work of the scientist. We are generally told that the business of the scientist consists of classifying and abstracting: this, we now see, is not the case. A scientist is intrinsically no more concerned with generalising than a historian. Each does generalise; the geologist generalises about classes of rocks, as the historian generalises about classes of manuscripts; but in each case the generalisation is the means to that thinking which is the man's real work. The historian's real work is the reconstruction in thought of a particular historical event; the geologist's, the reconstruction in thought of a particular geological epoch at a particular place. If the anthropologist's aim is to be a neolithic Ligurian, the botanist's is to be a blade of grass.

Croce does not say this explicitly, but it is all implied in what he does say. He is in the habit of maintaining, formally, the naturalistic distinction of science and history, as concerned with generalisations and individuals respectively; but what he calls science is only one fragment of what he knows history to be, and equally it is only one fragment of what science really is. But, not being perhaps so deeply versed in science as he is in history, he readily misunderstands the true nature of scientific thinking, uncritically swallowing whole the naturalistic logic and mistaking one subordinate aspect of science for the whole.

The relation of philosophy to history is a subject often touched on in this book, but in the end left extremely obscure. The obscurity is due to a vacillation between two views; the idealistic strain of Croce's thought maintaining (with Gentile, to whom this side of Croce seems to be not a little indebted) the identity of philosophy and history, and the naturalistic maintaining that philosophy is a component part of history.

The two views are held side by side, without any attempt at reconciliation: probably without consciousness of the discrepancy. But no one who collects the relevant passages can fail to be struck by the contrast. Thus, on p. 17 "philology" (*i.e.* fact) "combines with philosophy" (*i.e.* critical thought) "to form history"; on p. 71 "philosophy is history and history is philosophy"; on p. 136 philosophy is "the methodological moment of history"; and on p. 162 "there is no way of distinguishing historical thought from philosophical." The two views seem to alternate with curious regularity.

The view that history and philosophy are identical is derived from reflections like those with which this paper began. Each without the other is a lifeless corpse: every piece of real thinking is both at once. This is Gentile's view. But the view that philosophy is a mere subordinate moment in history has quite different motives. It seems to indicate that historical thought is conceived as real or absolute thought, containing philosophy complete within itself; while philosophy by itself is an inferior form, abstract and at best only half true, which requires to be supplemented by "philology" or the study of fact, and so converted into the perfect form of history. We are reminded of Vico's alliance between philosophy and philology by the language here, and of Hegel's dialectic by the thought that one form of activity is inherently imperfect and requires to be transformed into another before it can be satisfactory.

It is to this latter view that Croce seems finally to incline. In an appendix written some years after the body of the book he states it definitely: philosophy is the "methodological moment of history," that is, the working-out and critical construction of the concepts which history employs in its work. And this is an immanent methodology—it goes on not outside history, in a separate laboratory, but within the process of historical thinking itself. The philosopher and the historian have returned from the ride, in fact, with the philosopher inside.

This seems to me to indicate two things: the triumph within philosophy of Croce the naturalist over Croce the idealist, and the shifting of Croce's own centre of interest from philosophy to history.

The naturalist triumphs over the idealist because the synthesis of philosophy and philology in history implies the naturalistic conception of philosophy and philology as two different and antithetical forms of activity, which again implies that ideas or categories, or whatever is the subject-matter of philosophy, are something different from facts, the subject-matter of philology. Such a dualism of idea and fact is wholly impossible to an idealist; and yet only on this assumption can it be maintained that philosophy is immanent in history while history is transcendent with reference to philosophy. Naturalism, transcendence, is the last word.

Further, Croce here shows, if I read his meaning aright, that he is gradually deserting philosophy for history. He appears to have come to the conclusion that philosophical truth is to be attained not by direct fire—by the study of philosophy in the ordinary sense, which he now pronounces a delusion—but indirectly, as a product of ordinary historical work. Philosophy in his mind is being absorbed in history; the two are not poised in equilibrium, as with Gentile, but one is cancelled out entirely as already provided for by the other. This is made clear by the appendix on "Philosophy and Methodology," which consists of an enumeration of the advantages which he hopes to gain from the new concept of philosophy—solid advantages for the most part, from which philosophy will be the gainer, but all, as he states them, tinged with a very visible weariness of philosophical work.

If this is really the case, and if Croce gives up philosophy to devote himself to history and to the reform of Italian education, it is not for us to repine. It is impossible not to observe in this book (and one sees the same thing in his other books) how his philosophy improves when he turns to handle the more strictly historical problems: how such a sophism as that concerning the "positivity of history" is calmly ignored, or rather the underlying truth of it unerringly seized upon, when he comes to assign their value to the various historical periods, and how the naturalistic element in his thought purges itself away when he becomes a historian, leaving an atmosphere of pure idealism. To say that Croce is a better historian than philosopher would be a misstatement of the truth, which is rather that the idealistic philosophy at which he has always consistently aimed is unable to penetrate the naturalistic framework to which, as a philosopher, he seems to have irreparably committed himself, and is only free to develop fully when he shakes off the associations of technical philosophy and embarks on work of a different kind. The necessity for this change of occupation he is tempted to ascribe to something in the very nature of philosophy and history; but this is an illusion, itself part of the very naturalism from which he is trying to escape. The real necessity for it lies in himself alone, in his failure to purge his philosophy of its naturalistic elements.

If this is so, Croce's desertion of philosophy for history may be only an unconscious step forward in philosophy: a kind of philosophical suicide by which, casting off the abstract "philosophy of the spirit," which by now has become intolerable even to himself, he can reach the point of absolute idealism to which his successors Gentile and De Ruggiero have already carried his thought.

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IS CONSCIENCE AN EMOTION?

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THE Dean of Carlisle has done me the honour to choose me as representative of a certain school of ethical thought and, in a small book entitled *Is Conscience an Emotion?* which appeared in 1914, to criticise my account of the development of moral personality. The outbreak of war and the arduous duties of the Army Medical Service cut short my preparation of a reply and have prevented its execution until the present time. I wish now to examine the Dean's position in all fairness of spirit and openness to conviction. The Dean attaches great importance to the maintenance of the ethical theory which he defends, because he believes it possible to deduce from it the truth of the belief in a benevolent God. Let me say at once that I am only too willing to accept any such proof; to any evidence pointing in that direction my mind is not only open but strongly predisposed. It is, then, in no spirit of hostility to the Dean's theological conclusions that I undertake this inquiry. If he or anyone can prove, or adduce arguments which shall seem to me to point to, the reality of God, Freedom, and Immortality, I will joyfully accept that proof or those arguments. This is a great advantage which may be claimed at the outset for this particular controversy. For too often in the past such controversy has lacked this initial agreement; the theologian has started out with the avowed determination to prove the articles of his faith; his opponent, while professing a scientific openness of mind, has been almost equally committed to a negative attitude, has been moved by an almost equally strong and passionate desire to prove the theologian's conclusions and prepossessions to be false or baseless.

The Dean divides all writers on ethical topics into two great classes, the emotionalists and the rationalists. He points out that a strong tradition in ethical thought tries to show that "Conscience" is a moving principle of our nature, a motive force comparable in many respects with the emotions and sentiments and impulses that impel us to think and act and behave in certain ways. This is the emotionalist tradition. On the other hand, he points to another strong tradition, the rationalist, which will have it that "Conscience" is essentially a manifestation of Reason, that, as he says, "'the moral faculty' is essentially Reason." He holds that it is of supreme importance to refute the former doctrine and to establish the latter; for only if this can be achieved have we, in his view, any firm ground from which we may infer the Goodness or Morality of God.

Let me here at once offer an apology to Dr Rashdall. He complains that, in briefly discussing his views in my *Social Psychology*, I have misrepresented them. And he has now a further ground of complaint in the fact that, since the appearance of his book, I have allowed the publication of new editions of my own without any change of the paragraphs complained of. My excuse is that I have not, until recently, had time to apply myself again to the study of his writings. I shall hope to make the needed alterations in a later edition. For I admit error of two kinds. First, my all too brief remarks do not give an adequate impression either of the number or of the distinction of those moralists who belong to the Rationalist school. Secondly, I criticised him as holding an attenuated form of the "Moral Sense" doctrine; whereas he has devoted a very large number of pages to the refutation of the "Moral Sense" theory, which he regards as belonging to the emotionalist tradition. Nevertheless, although I see that I was in error here, I still think that he has, in many passages of both his *Theory of Good and Evil* and his recent book, given some colour to this charge. For, though it is the main thesis of both books that moral judgments are the pronouncements of Reason, he repeatedly uses expressions which imply that the Reason which pronounces such judgments is also a power which impels to right conduct, that it of itself supplies an impulse to, or creates a desire for, such conduct. He uses expressions which imply that the idea of right, of duty, or of the good is not only, as he so often affirms, a purely intellectual notion, an ultimate unanalysable concept, a category of the Reason, but is also at the same time a tendency, an impulsion, towards good conduct. If these expressions are to be taken literally, my criticism is justified; and they appear not only in *The Theory of Good and Evil*, but are repeated and defended against my criticism in his later work. It is, I think, fair to demand that Dr Rashdall shall not attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds in this matter, but shall make his renunciation of the impulsive power of Reason quite explicit; for, until he does so, he will remain open to the charge of inconsistency, of adhering to a modified form of the "Moral Sense" theory while expounding the Rationalist principle and basing momentous conclusions upon it. The passages I refer to may be illustrated by the following examples. On one page he contrasts moral ideas with purely intellectual categories.[1] On another he says: "The intellectual notion of right and wrong is present, and may *strengthen* whatever other motives might otherwise impel him to choose one course of action rather than another. There is such a thing as . . . the desire to do what is right and reasonable as such." He speaks of "the desire to obey Reason" and of "the desire to act rationally." Further, he asserts "that the desire to do right is created by the intellect," and denies that in moral action "any other desire need be present except the desire to do right."

These and similar passages lend colour to the view that for Dr Rashdall the idea of right, the ultimate unanalysable notion of right, is at the same time an impulse or a desire to do right. For, if it is not, how can it strengthen other motives for choosing the right, other desires for those things which are good? And this interpretation is further supported by a curious passage in which he contests my statement that to create desire is a task beyond the competence of Reason. He says that this is a dogma rather than an argument;[2] and he defends the competence of Reason to create desire by pointing to the problem of the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle. "If," he says, "the desire to know whether those angles are equal or unequal springs up subsequently to, and in consequence of, the intellect's apprehension of the idea of an isosceles triangle and of the problem about the equality of its angles, *would there be any harm* in saying that the Reason creates the desire to solve the problem?" To this I reply: "No, there would be *no harm* if this statement were made in a sermon or in a popular address; but, when it is introduced into a philosophical argument by which it is sought to establish the most momentous conclusions about the nature of God and the World, then there may be much harm. We are entitled to ask—Is the statement meant to be taken literally, and not merely as a popular mode of speech in which there is

[1] *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 94.

[2] The whole of my book is my argument in support of this "dogma."

no harm? For the nature of Dr Rashdall's doctrine of Conscience turns upon his answer to this question.

The same inconsistency is implied by the fact that Dr Rashdall continues to use the expression "Practical Reason" and to imply that the "Practical Reason" is something different in nature from Reason pure and simple. If this is what Dr Rashdall means, if his ultimate unanalysable idea of right, or his "Practical Reason," impels to right action, then it is "Conscience" in the sense of Butler and Hutcheson, a faculty of a unique order which we can only believe to have been implanted in the human soul by a special divine act, and from whose special nature and position in the soul we can justifiably argue to the existence of a Moral Ruler of the Universe.

There are, however, abundant grounds for believing that Dr Rashdall does not mean to accept this view. But I must insist that he cannot have it both ways. He must say "yes" or "no" to this crucial question. What he has written justifies, I think, the statement that he has not hitherto faced the question and taken up a definite attitude towards it, has not chosen his answer, "yes" or "no." That when confronted with the issue he will reply "no," seems to be indicated by the following facts.

He does not follow Butler and Hutcheson in directly deducing the Moral Ruler from the alleged nature of Conscience as an impulse to the Right. Rather he distinctly repudiates at great length the notion of a special moral faculty or Conscience in this sense. His argument to the moral nature of God is less direct and more subtle. I shall examine it presently. He shows himself in some passages much concerned to purify the Reason which is operative in moral judgments from every least taint of contamination with emotion, desire, or impulsive power; thus, "Moral judgments are a kind of thinking, not a kind of emotion or feeling or desire."[1] He wishes to identify Conscience with Reason only; for "if Conscience means Reason, we have every ground for supposing that whatever Conscience approves is approved by God."[2] Again, "It is only upon the assumption that our ultimate moral judgments represent real deliverances of Reason . . . that we are justified in using them to interpret to ourselves the nature and meaning of the Universe in which we live. . . . If our judgments of value are valid pronouncements of Reason, we have the right to claim that in the moral consciousness of man at its highest there is contained a true revelation of the rational Will which expresses itself in nature."[1] Yet again, "The belief in a righteous God is in the main an inference based upon the perfectly clear and definite pronouncement of the moral consciousness—that moral consciousness which . . . is no mere sense or emotion, but a particular activity of that self-same Reason, the validity of which is presupposed by all our knowledge."

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[1] *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 138.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Thus it is essential to his theological argument that the Reason which finds expression in moral axioms, notions, and judgments shall be Reason pure and simple, Reason undefiled by emotion, impulse, conation, desire, or will. For all these are subjective, are notoriously the variable expressions of our natures, differing from one individual to another, and in the same individual according to the accidents of time and place. Reason alone stands above these subjective influences; and only when uninfluenced by them can it yield purely objective judgments valid for all minds, all places, and all times, such as are required by Dr Rashdall's argument.

It seems clear, then, that this is really Dr Rashdall's view of the function of Reason, and that those passages in which he seems to imply the contrary view, namely that Reason is a motive or impulsive power, are not to be taken literally. This view of Reason hangs together with the now thoroughly discredited ideo-motor theory, according to which every idea is not only an intellectual conception, but also a tendency to action. If Dr Rashdall repudiates it, he does but come into line with modern psychology. But it is to be hoped that he will make quite explicit his repudiation; for this remnant of the "Moral Sense" theory haunts his pages like a ghost which he has not had the courage to lay, or of whose presence he is perhaps hardly aware.

Having apologised for my misrepresentations and endeavoured to explain them, I lay my own complaint against Dr Rashdall. He has done me the honour to name Professor Westermarck and myself as the leading contemporary exponents of emotionalism in Ethics, the doctrine to the refutation of which his recent book is devoted. Further, he is kind enough to say that "a far stronger case [than Dr Westermarck's] for the emotional view is presented"[2] by myself. It might, then, have been reasonably expected that Dr Rashdall would have made a careful examination of my view, and would have at least shown evidence of having comprehended its main features.

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[1] *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 50.

[2] *Conscience*, p. 56.

But he has done neither. His recent book is occupied in the main with renewed arguments against the "Moral Sense" theory, hedonism, and other old-fashioned doctrines which, I imagine, no serious person wishes any longer to defend; for they are based on flagrantly untrue psychological assumptions. And, in the chapter devoted more especially to the demolition of Dr Westermarck and myself, he does little more than expose some of the psychological slips and errors of which Dr Westermarck, who is primarily an observer and collector of anthropological data rather than a psychologist, has been guilty. There is no adequate indication of my view and no attempt to come to close quarters with it. On the contrary, the reader must, I think, obtain the impression that I have asserted and attempted to justify the following propositions:—that Conscience is an emotion; that the idea of duty, of right, or of good, can be analysed or explained away into an emotion or a group of emotions; that Reason plays no part in bringing about moral conduct, or in forming our moral judgments; that our moral judgments are emotions. For, in the pages devoted to the refutation of the views which I am said to represent, Dr Rashdall repeatedly denies all these absurd propositions, asserting with fervent emphasis and in many forms the self-evident proposition that concepts and judgments are not emotions.

No serious person contends that Conscience is an emotion, or denies that Reason has played a great part in building up and refining the moral tradition and the moral character of persons. The view which I have endeavoured to expound at some length is that Conscience is the whole moral personality, a vastly complex system in which all the elements of personality work harmoniously together towards the supreme end of right conduct and more complete moralisation of the self. And I have endeavoured to show how the growth of such a Conscience or moral character takes place; how it can advance beyond the merest rudiments only by perpetual absorption of the moral tradition, under the influence of admired personalities who most fully embody this tradition. Of all this Dr Rashdall gives no hint in his book, which, from its title onwards, indirectly but seriously misrepresents my exposition. The only pages in which Dr Rashdall deals directly with my views are a small-type appendix to his chapter on the Morality of Savages. In these he does little more than attempt to overwhelm me by arraying against me a host of great names, from Mr Bradley to Dr G. E. Moore. I am not at all intimidated, though I admit that I am surprised to hear that so many distinguished living persons can be claimed as supporters of the Rationalistic theory.

I wish to go as far as possible with Dr Rashdall, to see whether I can follow his argument and derive from it the firm belief in a Moral Ruler of the Universe which it is designed to engender and establish. I will not delay to criticise what seem to me weak points in his psychology; for, in spite of his Rationalism, Dr Rashdall is a very reasonable man, and his mind is open to the influence of the facts of life and human nature, as he shows by his outspoken repudiation of the extravagances of the extreme rationalists. But this very reasonableness makes his views very difficult to criticise in detail; for almost every statement that seems to me to fly in the face of psychological fact, is corrected or compensated for by some other truer statement to be found on some other page of his two ethical treatises.

What, then, is Dr Rashdall's argument by which he seeks to establish the moral nature of God? It is nowhere concisely stated by him; but I believe that I have grasped it, and he must forgive me, and will, I hope, correct me where necessary, if I attempt to state it concisely.

If any moral propositions can be shown to be absolutely true (or false), or capable of being absolutely true (or false), this can only mean that they accord (or conflict) with some moral ideal which has objective existence or subsistence, that is to say, which exists or subsists otherwise than in human minds only. Such objective subsistence of the moral ideal can only be subsistence in the mind of God, and God is therefore a moral God.

The problem for the rationalist theologian is, then, to show that some of our moral judgments are absolutely true or false. Dr Rashdall attacks this problem in two ways. First, by the aid of certain ethical axioms, as follows. Reason is capable of revealing certain truths, such as the truth that 2 plus 2 = 4. This, together with the whole system of mathematical truths for which it stands, is absolutely and eternally true. It was true before any man discovered it, and will remain true when the race of men shall have passed away. That is to say, man has not made these truths; he has merely discovered truths which in some sense and manner subsisted before man's discovery of them. Where then did they exist? They must have subsisted in some mind which is eternal like themselves, the Eternal Reason.

But if there are moral axioms, which also are discovered by man rather than invented by him, they are, equally with mathematical truths, valid pronouncements of Reason, unalloyed and uncontaminated by the lower and merely subjective aspects of mental activity. Therefore such moral axioms must also have subsisted before man was; they also are eternal truths, and must have subsisted in the Eternal Reason. It follows that the Eternal Reason is moral, and we may legitimately identify it with the traditional God of our religious systems and feel sure that God is not only Reason but Moral Reason; and, since we can conceive of morality only as righteousness and love, we conclude that God is righteous and loving.

This, I believe, is a fair concise statement of Dean Rashdall's first argument. The Dean admits that moral conduct does not proceed from Reason alone. "It must not," he tells us, "be supposed that Morality can ever become purely rational."[1] He seems prepared to admit that actual moral conduct may in all cases be the issue of such factors as I have described, namely the moral sentiments of men organised within the character under the influence of the moral tradition. But, though we *act* morally from such imperfect and merely subjective principles, we *know* morality from the higher principle of Reason. "The question at issue between Rationalists and Emotionalists is not what impels me to do a virtuous act but how I know it to be virtuous."[2]

The Dean's first argument requires, then, that certain moral axioms, or at least one moral axiom, shall be absolutely true. And it can only be truly axiomatic and absolutely true if it be an immediate pronouncement of Reason alone, such that its rejection is impossible by any rational mind. If such axioms can be discovered by Reason we can deduce from them the morality of God. The argument, unlike the argument of Professor Sorley for the existence of a Moral God, which depends in part upon the empirical fact of the existence of good men and good actions in the historical world that we know, is independent of any realisation of morality, of all existence of moral character and moral conduct. Even though the world never had contained a single example of a good man or a good action, even though it were a world of devils wholly devoted to evil, Dr Rashdall's argument would be just as convincing as it is in the world we actually know, because those devils would be compelled by Reason to admit the truth of the moral axioms, if only they can be discovered.

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[1] *Conscience*, p. 112.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

In examining this argument one might begin by inquiring into the alleged objectivity of the mathematical truths discovered by men's Reason, and the deduction of the eternal Reason from them. But I am willing to waive the examination of this position, and to grant for the purposes of this discussion the validity of the deductions. Only remarking that even mathematical axioms are not universally admitted to be of a different nature from postulates, I will concentrate upon the question of the moral axioms.

What, then, are these moral axioms on the validity of which Dr Rashdall's first argument wholly depends? He gives us several examples: "The greater good ought always to be preferred to the less." This is the first and, I think, the most indisputably axiomatic of all the examples furnished. It is, I think, indisputably true. Reason compels us to admit its truth, even its eternal truth. But why? Simply because it is a tautological proposition. For if we try to define the meaning of the term "greater good," as thus abstractly used, we can only say that it is that which ought to be preferred. Dr Rashdall offers us another "self-evident axiom, that the more good is always greater than the less good."[1] I agree again that this is irrefutable and axiomatic, and just for the same reason, namely, that it is tautological. It means merely that the greater good is greater than the smaller good; and it is equally true if we leave out the word "good" and say the greater is greater than the less, or substitute any other word for the word "good." There is no limit to the number of such moral axioms that may be constructed, *e.g.* the greater evil is greater than the lesser evil, or the more selfish action is always more selfish than the less selfish action, or the best is better than the worst. So long as we do not play fast and loose with the meanings we attach to words, such moral axioms are eternally and absolutely true.

But Dr Rashdall attaches equal importance to another axiom, "the axiom of equity which pronounces that one man's good ought always to be treated as of equal importance with the like good of another."[2] This is a statement of a different order. It is not a tautological proposition. But is it axiomatic? Does Reason compel us to accept it as soon as we conceive it? I think not. To me it seems a most disputable proposition. And I imagine that I am not peculiar in this. Suppose that, during a shipwreck, I see two men struggling in the water, on the point of drowning; that I have in my hand a life-buoy just large enough to support one of them; and that, by throwing it to one of them, I may save his life and consign the other to death. And suppose I know that the one is a good man strongly attached to life, a man deserving of highest esteem and even veneration, and that the other is a low type of criminal, who has led a consistently wicked life and whose malicious act has caused the destruction of the ship and the loss of hundreds of lives and untold suffering to innocent persons. The "axiom" forbids me to throw the life-buoy to the good man. Either I must cut it in two, and throw to each an ineffective fragment; or I must hold my hand; or I must toss a coin and abide by its decision. It forbids me to exercise my natural, my subjective, preference for the good man. It is then no axiom, but merely a good general rule of conduct, but one too abstract to be of much value.

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[1] *Conscience*, p. 182.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

I submit that every genuine and therefore indisputable moral axiom which can be stated can be nothing more than either a tautological proposition or a moral postulate. I challenge Dr Rashdall to produce one which is not of this nature. He himself seems to be obscurely aware of this state of affairs; for he observes "that these axioms will never tell us what particular actions are right or wrong till we have settled what is this 'good' which ought to be promoted equally or impartially for all mankind. And, therefore, at bottom, the real ethical judgment is the judgment of value which affirms that such and such things are good."[1] This seems to be a frank admission that the so-called moral axioms are not propositions which express real ethical judgments. Moral value inheres only in two things, namely, character and conduct. If Dr Rashdall will admit this proposition we shall discuss more profitably. Real moral judgments, then, can and should always be expressed in propositions concerning conduct or character. So long as they are axiomatic they are tautological, such as—good conduct is better than bad conduct, or, the good man is better than the bad man. As soon as they cease to be tautological, they cease to be axiomatic and are rather highly disputable; and at the best are founded upon experience of good and evil, or simply deduced from other propositions so founded.

The basis of Dr Rashdall's first argument is therefore narrowed to the following dimensions. It is possible to formulate tautological propositions about conduct and character, propositions which cannot be denied without breach of the fundamental law of Reason, the law that two contradictory statements cannot both be true. This is a slender basis on which to found so great an argument.

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[1] *Conscience*, p. 43. I have, I think, heard it suggested that the statement, "Pleasure is good," is a moral axiom. If the word "good" is meant in the sense of morally good, then the statement is plainly false; it is axiomatic only if by "good" is meant "pleasant," when it becomes tautological.

For myself, I would prefer to deduce, from my belief that good men exist and that good actions are done, a belief in the reasonable probability of the Moral Governance of the Universe. A belief, I say, not knowledge; for, if I am challenged by Dr Rashdall to say how I know that good men exist and good acts are done, I reply: I do not know it, I only believe it; and accordingly I must content myself with at the best a belief or a hope in the Moral Ruler of the Universe. That He exists and rules can never, I submit, be demonstrated with the certainty of a tautological proposition; to attempt to deduce knowledge of Him from such tautological propositions seems to me futile, no matter how moral nor how firmly founded on Reason they may be.

I turn then to the second argument. Dr Rashdall knows in the depths of his own soul that these moral axioms are an absurdly slender, a ridiculous, thread on which to hang his momentous conclusions.[1] Accordingly, there runs throughout his book a second argument, never explicitly stated, but frequently implied. Beside the argument from the validity or truth of the moral axioms, which I have examined, there runs the argument from the "objectivity" of real moral judgments, judgments of actual moral value. He tells us that "the belief in the objectivity of our moral judgments is a necessary premiss of any valid argument for the belief either in God, if by that be understood a morally good or perfect Being, or in Immortality."[2] In many other passages he insists upon this objectivity as all-important to his argument: "Can we really persuade ourselves that there is no such thing in our minds as the sense—or to speak more accurately—the consciousness of an objective duty? Is not this idea of objectivity just the most fundamental of our moral convictions?"[3]

How then does Dr Rashdall propose to prove the moral nature of God from the "objectivity" of our real moral judgments? He never tells us, he never states the argument explicitly.

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[1] He has himself admitted that the moral axioms "are not merely comparable to the axioms of Mathematics, they are simply particular applications of those axioms." *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 147.

[2] *Conscience*, p. 194.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

In order to understand the nature of Dr Rashdall's argument it is necessary to know what he means by "objectivity." In spite of the immense importance assigned to "objectivity" of moral judgments, and the frequent appearance of the word, I can find no definition of it in the smaller book. But turning to the larger treatise I find some light on this all-important question. I find: "The important thing is that we should recognise that moral judgments possess an absolute truth or falsity which is equally valid for all rational beings; and, if that is recognised, it seems most natural to ascribe them to Reason."[1] This seems to invert the procedure of the other book; instead of asking us to regard them as absolutely true or false because they are the work of Reason, he invites us to regard them as absolutely true or false and on that ground to ascribe them to Reason. But he further offers us something very like a definition of "objectivity." "The Objectivity of the moral judgment does not mean the infallibility of the individual, or even of a general consensus of individuals at a particular time and place. What is meant is that, *if I am right* in my approbation of this conduct, then, if you disapprove of it, you must be wrong."[2] This is the nearest approach to an attempt to define "objectivity" that I have been able to find; and it is in harmony with the passage last quoted. On another page (151) he equates "objectivity" with "universality."

It appears, then, that the "objectivity" of a moral judgment means, not that it is true or absolutely true, but that it is either true or false, absolutely and universally. The important word here is "absolutely." It would not suffice to assert that moral judgments are either true or false, for that is a peculiarity which they share with all judgments or, more strictly, with all propositions in which judgments are expressed. The important property of moral judgments claimed for them by the term "objectivity" is that they are absolutely true or absolutely false.[3] If this can be shown to be their nature, it follows that their truth or falsity depends upon their agreement or lack of agreement with some absolute standard, some absolutely true moral proposition, some absolutely valid moral ideal; from this it would follow that some such absolutely true moral proposition or judgment, such an absolutely valid moral ideal, actually exists. If it exists, it can only exist in the mind of God; therefore, if moral judgments are "objective," the moral nature of God can be confidently inferred.

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[1] *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 166.

[2] *Ibid.*, i. p. 145.

[3] This "objectivity" which Dr Rashdall claims for them is, of course, not claimed as peculiar to them; it attaches to all judgments or propositions which are capable of being tested by reference to some universally accepted standard, such as judgments of length or of weight, and the "objectivity" would seem to depend upon the existence of such standards. The peculiarity of the moral judgments in this respect is that, whereas the "objectivity" of such judgments as those of length and weight is proved by the existence and universal recognition of standards of length and weight, the "objectivity" of moral judgment cannot be established in this way. Dr Rashdall's argument is an attempt to prove their "objectivity" in a different way (namely, by showing them to be "pronouncements of Reason"), and then to deduce the existence of the standards from the "objectivity" of the judgments.

That, I believe, is an absolutely fair concise statement of Dr Rashdall's second argument. I think it is a good argument, in fact a very strong argument, if he can succeed in establishing the "objectivity" of real moral judgments (not of the so-called axioms) in the sense defined. But has he succeeded in this? How does he attempt to establish this "objectivity"? Merely by insisting that such judgments are pronouncements of Reason. This is the ground of his anxiety to overcome Emotionalism in Ethics. He is not afraid that Emotionalism may impugn the truth of his moral axioms; for he knows that tautological propositions are immune from the infection of all emotion. It is real moral judgments that he wishes thus to defend from its infection. It is with this end in view that he insists that the moral judgment is a pronouncement of Reason, and is not a mere feeling, and is not determined by feeling or emotion. This proposition is repeated again and again in both books with well nigh every possible variation of its formulation. But mere reiteration will not suffice to establish the proposition. Unless he can show that real moral judgments are pronouncements of Reason alone (whether it is called pure or practical matters not) in the same sense that the genuine moral axioms are immediately guaranteed by Reason, the whole argument falls to the ground. But Dr Rashdall hardly makes this claim for real moral judgments. He is too honest and too open-minded towards facts, too reasonable in short, to be a real and thorough-going Rationalist. Rather he tells us that "there is an element in the moral judgment which cannot be reduced to mere subjective feeling or emotion, and which must be regarded as belonging to the rational or intellectual part of our nature"[1]—a proposition which no intelligent person will attempt to deny. On another page he tells us: "I have very definitely admitted that in all cases some feeling is, in part, the ground of the (moral) judgment. That being so, the judgment could not be made without the feeling."[2]

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[1] *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 150.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

In face of this admission, that Reason is only an element in moral judgments and that feeling is another and necessary element or factor, it is useless to contend that they are pronouncements of Reason alone. It can hardly be contended that the "objectivity" of a judgment is established by the mere fact that Reason plays some part in the formulation or pronouncement of it; for this is true of all judgments, and it would follow that all judgments of every kind are "objective."[1] Unless Dr Rashdall is prepared to maintain this, it would seem that his second argument fails entirely. But he has one more string to his bow. "Moral judgments," he tells us, "possess a universality or objectivity. So much is involved in the very idea of Morality or duty or moral obligation."[2] That is to say, he maintains that the "objectivity" of moral judgments follows from the validity which he claims for these ideas or moral categories—Morality, duty, moral obligation, right, good. We must therefore briefly inquire into the meaning of the alleged validity of these categories. Let us confine ourselves to the category of duty, which seems to be the chief of them. The category or idea of duty is said to be valid; it is a distinct, ultimate, unanalysable category of thought and (in spite of its unanalysability) its validity implies or involves the "objectivity" of all judgments in which it figures. This is, I believe, the real crux of the whole matter. How then is the validity of the category of duty to be established? By asserting that it has just as much title to objective validity as any other of our ultimate intellectual categories, quantity, substance, cause, and so forth. Now I cannot myself attach any meaning to the expression, "the validity of a category or idea," if the idea in question is really ultimate and unanalysable. Only if by analysis we can discover that such an idea implies or involves a proposition can it be said to have validity; and then only if the proposition is true. Consider a moment the category of causality. What is meant by saying that this category is valid is, not that it is unanalysable, but that it involves or implies some such proposition as that every event is caused by antecedent events. And merely to assert that the category is ultimate or unanalysable or distinct does not establish the truth of this proposition. I remember that some ten years ago Professor Karl Pearson exhorted the philosophical world to reject the idea of causation from their stock of working ideas, on the ground that even in physical science it has done its work, is now no longer useful, but misleading and obstructive, and can with great advantage be replaced by the category of correlation. And I seem to have heard that Professor Bergson, Mr B. Russell, and other distinguished philosophers have made some complaints against the same category. Also I notice that the Neo-Vitalists complain that in biology the dogma of the universal validity of the category of causation has always been and, at the present time especially, is a serious bar to progress; and I for one feel sure that only its rejection and the substitution for it of the category of purpose can open that road. The same is true of other categories; unless they involve or imply propositions, there is no meaning in asserting that they are valid; and if they do imply propositions, the proposition involved in each must stand the testing to which all propositions must be subjected before they can be accepted as true (*i.e.*, of course, if they are not tautological).

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[1] Including such "subjective" judgments as "I am not so tired as I was yesterday," or "Names are more difficult to remember than numbers," or "I am in better health than I was last year." In the formation of all such judgments Reason plays some part, but that does not render them "objective"; they remain incurably subjective.

[2] *Theory of Good and Evil*, p. 151.

Now, the proposition involved in the category of duty is, according to Dr Rashdall's own showing, the proposition that moral judgments concerning duty are objective; and this proposition in turn involves the proposition that there exists some absolute standard or Moral Ideal of duty by reference to which the absolute truth or falsity of the proposition can be shown, or in principle could be shown.

Dr Rashdall's argument is, then, I submit, nothing more than this. He asserts the validity of the category of duty, because he feels that it is valid and strongly desires that it should be valid; but this assertion of its validity involves the assumption of the truth of the very propositions which he wishes to deduce from the assertion, namely, the objectivity of moral judgments and the existence of the absolute moral Ideal or Standard. The three propositions hang together; if one of them can be established or is accepted as a postulate, the other two follow from it. But nowhere does he offer more than a bare assertion of the truth of the first and second of them, namely, the propositions that the category of duty is valid and that moral judgments are objective.

Dr Rashdall's argument may be and has been inverted. We may start with the postulate of a Moral Ruler of the Universe, and we may legitimately deduce from this the truth of the three propositions, namely, the existence of the absolute Standard, the objectivity of moral judgments, and the validity of the category of duty. And if it can be shown that only thus can the world, including as it does the facts of our moral life, be made intelligible, and only thus can the authority of the moral laws be maintained, then the postulate is a reasonable one to make. But by starting at the other end, as Dr Rashdall does, we cannot establish the moral nature of God; though, if we make the *postulate* that the category of Duty is valid, we may deduce it from that postulate.

In conclusion I would say that, in spite of the best will to be convinced, I can find no power to help me to such conviction in Dr Rashdall's argument. In spite of it and of the array of great names which Dr Rashdall is able to marshal upon the side of Rationalism in Ethics, I continue to believe that the account I have given of the nature of our moral judgments, as well as of our moral actions, is substantially correct. I do not maintain that Conscience is an emotion, nor that any judgments, propositions, axioms, categories, ideas, notions, or concepts are emotions or can be analysed into emotions. But I maintain that Conscience is identical with the whole moral personality, with moral character; that moral character is always a very complex mental structure, slowly built up in the individual under the influence of the moral tradition; that in it the forces which determine both action and judgment are the same fundamental conative forces which, working on a lower plane of organisation, determine our ordinary judgments and actions, namely, they are the innate instinctive tendencies which are common to all members of the human species, and which, when they operate in relatively crude and violent fashion, are felt as the primary emotions.[1] That Reason plays a part in guiding the development of moral character I do not wish to deny. Nor do I deny that it has played a great and increasing part in developing and refining the moral tradition, in purifying it from inconsistencies, and in rendering it a systematic whole. This moral tradition, which has been slowly built up during the course of not less than 10,000 years by the efforts and self-sacrifice of the best men of all times, is the most precious possession of mankind. Without its influence, no man, no matter how strong his Reason nor how amiable his native disposition, can achieve such a level of moral character as could be called even a rudimentary conscience.[1] Beside the grandeur of this moral tradition, the ethical axioms propounded by Dr Rashdall, by Kant, or by Henry Sidgwick, and proclaimed by them as the highest achievements of the moral Reason, appear strangely insignificant, if not wholly worthless; for, when they are not merely tautologies, they are highly disputable propositions, and of little value by reason of their highly abstract quality. Though the moral tradition is the greatest thing we know and the most valuable thing we possess, and though it deserves our deepest veneration and solicitude, it is nevertheless incurably infected with that subjectivity so abhorrent to the Rationalist; and our business as moralists is not to disguise the fact by a cloud of words, but, recognising it, courageously to follow in the footsteps of the moral leaders of all time, endeavouring by our reason to refine and improve it a little, and by our conduct to secure for it an increasing influence upon the character and conduct of all men.

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[1] Dr Rashdall has given a definition of conscience which closely agrees with my account of it and which I find entirely acceptable: "Practically the power of deciding between right and wrong involves many emotional elements, and these are certainly included in what is popularly spoken of as Conscience. Conscience or (to speak more scientifically) the moral consciousness [or, I would suggest—still more scientifically—the moral character], may be held to include not merely the capacity of pronouncing moral judgments, but the whole body of instincts, feelings, emotions, desires which are presupposed by and which influence these judgments, as well as those which prompt to the doing of the actions which they prescribe." *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 175.

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[1] I doubt whether Dr Rashdall makes any mention of the moral tradition in either of his two books. I can find no reference to it in the index or table of contents of his larger treatise. Certainly he does not give adequate recognition to this supremely important factor of all moral life. In a large part of both treatises, what he is really combating is individualism in Ethical theory. If he had himself realised fully the part played by the moral tradition and the fact that societies rather than individuals are the bearers of this tradition, he would, I think, have spared himself much anxiety and his readers much perplexity. Whether the gradual development of the moral tradition can be "naturalistically" explained or requires for its explanation the postulate of supernatural intervention, this is a question which may be debated with some hope of reaching a decision as our understanding of the process of development grows clearer.

MIRACLE INCONSISTENT WITH CHRISTIANITY.

MISS DOUGALL.

WE know how, when Jove shook his hair and nodded, impossible things happened on earth for the benefit of his favoured suppliants; and in the great prayer in the Apocalypse of Baruch (liv.–lv.) Jehovah is thus addressed:—

> "Thou alone, O Lord, knowest of aforetime the deep things of the world,
>
> . . . .
>
> For whom nothing is too hard,
> But thou doest everything easily by a nod."

This is the first natural human hypothesis about God. It emerged early as a childish conception when the sphere of Divine activity was conceived as paltry, and became august when the human grasp of mind was enlarged. When there were many gods, each limited by all the rest, the activities of the tribal god were small because the tribal activities were small; but later the One high God, who could always easily compel all earthly agents to His will, became supremely worthy of reverence.

> "The king's heart is in the hand of Jahveh, . . . he turneth it whithersoever he will" (Prov. xxi. 1). "Isaiah the prophet cried unto the Lord; and he brought the shadow ten degrees backward, by which it had gone down in the dial of Ahaz" (2 Kings xx. 11). "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places" (Ps. cxxxv. 6).

The difficulty in accepting this conception of a God who can always do easily exactly what He wills, faces us in every victory of chaos over order, of evil over good. It is the time-honoured dilemma:—if the sorry scheme of things on earth is fashioned to God's desire, God is not good; if God is good, He cannot be powerful enough to fashion the world to His will. But the religious mind ceaselessly insists that God must be both all-good and all-powerful, and has devised more than one scheme of the universe with a view to resolve the dilemma.

The solution first offered consisted in explaining all welfare as the reward of virtue, all failure and misery as the punishment of offence against Deity, the Divine goodness consisting in rewarding the good and never sparing the guilty. When this solution was perceived to be too crude, it came to be held that the miseries of the good were sent for the testing and embellishment of their characters, while the prosperity of the wicked was attributed to the kindness and longsuffering of God, who sought their repentance because, if they did not repent, He must ultimately destroy them. This was a noble conception of God's ways with men, but it was necessary to distort many facts of life in order to fit them into it; and the good, being single-eyed, will ultimately observe facts. Taking the story of Job's sorrows as a type of the misfortune common to nomad life, men naturally ask: If the character of Job was tested and ennobled by his afflictions, what effect had the proceedings of Satan, God's agent, upon the characters of the Sabeans who stole his oxen and asses and slew their herdmen? What of the triumphant sin of the Chaldeans who stole his camels and slew their drivers? And what of the servants and sons and daughters who were slain? What reason have we to believe that their sudden deaths were either the fit reward of their sins or the consummation of their characters? The drama of Job tells a story the like of which has happened a thousand times in the world's history, and men have long recognised that the afflictions that may instruct one strong soul commonly involve the crimes or misery of others. The writer of that great drama was concerned only with the problem presented by his leading character, and, wiser than many of his interpreters, he does not force the facts of inoffensive suffering into any theory that justifies God as the afflictor. He can only show the inadequacy of the religious conceptions of his day and reiterate in his own way what all saints have said, that God can impart Himself to those who seek even while their heart's question remains unanswered.

But the problem remains:—how can God, while able always to intervene "easily by a nod," allow the faithful to call upon Him in vain? It is the failure that often meets the missionary efforts of the best men that, more than all else, refutes the doctrine that the sorrows and disappointments of the good are always blessings in disguise. One large factor in their difficulty is precisely the Christian belief that when man is in distress it is useful to appeal for aid to the mercy of God. For the Christian especially, any satisfying conception of God must be in harmony with the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth concerning prayer. "Ask and ye shall receive," is the burden of all that Jesus said on the matter.

There is a story of a good man who travelled into the then unknown north-west of Canada with an Indian tribe, and there taught them, developing all that was best in their own religion and imparting to them all that they could understand of the Christian faith. He won their love, and they learned the simple arts of a cleaner civilisation. There grew up in the wilderness a garden of which the noblest fruits were the Christian hearts of the Indian braves and the better condition of their wives and children. It all happened, as the missionary thought, as an answer to constant and trusting prayer. But then adversity came. Hostile tribes threatened; food supply failed. He sent messengers for help to the nearest towns, and no help was sent. A little thing—a very little thing—might have turned the scale of fortune as between war and peace, food or famine, help or neglect. But, alas! although constant in prayer, firm in belief that God would in some way save, this good missionary and his disciples were finally beaten down by the enemy, and the women and children were massacred or captured. Where the light of love and Christian truth had shined, darkness closed over. The record of this man's daily prayer and ceaseless faith, with the brief jottings of all that had come upon them, was found buried deep in the earth, and with it a New Testament containing the boundless promises to faithful prayer. Whether this story be fact or fiction, is it not typical of religious tragedy? In the two thousand years since those promises were first proclaimed in Galilee, how many missionaries have thus worked and prayed and trusted, and fallen with the downfall of their life's work! It is only of the successful mission that the world takes count, because it alone can commonly preserve its records.

In the areas round the Mediterranean basin, how many countries that were once Christian have fallen or been driven back into the more "beastly ways" of lower religions? Taking the north of Africa alone, the communities which produced an Origen and an Athanasius, a Tertullian, a Cyprian, and an Augustine, must have arrived at no small degree of good living and sound thinking. There must have been many mothers like Monica: what of their prayer and faith? As early as the third century, councils of seventy and eighty African bishops met at Carthage. Can we suppose that these fathers in God failed to pray for the Church in their native lands? What befell? Must we affirm that the harem which has succeeded the domestic hearth of Christian families in those regions is as good in God's sight?

There was a good man recently connected with an English-speaking university who had three promising boys. The parents, as the result of some crisis in their affairs, became truly religious. That their sons should lead high-minded Christian lives was their greatest desire. It cannot, of course, be asserted, in any such case, that the training given by the parents was the wisest, or the environment the best; but the parents gave themselves to prayer for wisdom and for blessing on their sons, in which others, like-minded, joined them. All the sons went to the bad. This is not a usual case—such effort is most frequently rewarded—but my point is that one such case disproves the easy belief that the disappointment of such parents was ordained of God for their good. However excellent the result on their own characters, it could not counterbalance the loss of character in the sons or the harm they did in the world.

Another theory advanced to reconcile God's power and goodness is that the counsels of God are so inscrutable that we cannot possibly know what is good and what is evil in His sight. It is therefore man's highest duty to accept all things that take place as the will of God without complaint or question. This, the Stoic virtue, is paganism *in excelsis*: it is also the religion of the good Muhammedan: it is not Christianity. True Christians have always at heart rejected this fatalism, although often rendering it lip-service. For it is obvious that man can enter into no real relationship of prayer and faith and missionary endeavour with a God who may or may not approve of any human purpose, who may or may not respond to faithful prayer.

The accumulated results of thought and observation have led multitudes to believe that if they are to preserve their faith in God's goodness and mercy they must give up the belief that He can at all times intervene miraculously in human affairs. Three further answers to our problem have been suggested, which all accept the limitation of Divine power.

One of these assumes two orders in the universe—a natural and a spiritual. The natural order, once started by God, spins on down its grooves of change without influence from on high, while God acts only in the world of spirit, and freely gives, to those who ask Him, "spiritual" blessings. Two difficulties appear to face this easy answer. In the first place, the failure of missionary effort can hardly be called a spiritual blessing, even when it comes as the only apparent response to long and faithful prayer; for no missionary with the spirit of Christ could suppose the refining of his own soul more important than the elevation of the multitude around him. But, in the second place, it commits us to a dualism entirely unchristian. For Christianity involves a belief in God immanent in man and in nature as well as transcendent. This God is not a God who has wound up the universe like a clock and left it to go by itself. If God clothes the lily, if He fosters the whole creation groaning and travailing till it comes to triumphant sublimation, if God manifested Himself in human flesh, the order of nature cannot be exclusive of spirit.

Again, it is now frequently maintained that God works miracles in the physical sphere, but will never coerce the free will of men; and all the suffering of life is held to be caused by the sinful choice of men. At first sight this seems a most helpful solution, but it cannot, so to say, be brought to face the music of the spheres. "In the beginning," pain was born before sin. When the morning stars first sang together, the universe had become a system in which sentient choice could not be independent of physical conditions. To say that human free-will is the *only* limitation to God's interference in nature does not solve our dilemma. The doom of some of the highest efforts of man has often been sealed by a bad harvest or other natural catastrophe. Communities struck by famine or plague, by fire or flood, cannot make the same moral choice possible to them under normal conditions; and, however free we may hold ourselves to be, this same relation of physical cause to spiritual effect is part of all our life. Either the material misfortunes which necessarily paralyse much good endeavour are the direct will of God, and manifest His character, or His power of interference in lower nature, as well as in human will, must be limited. If self-limited, the limitation none the less holds good even against what we might call the wish or desire of God. For if God does not desire the spiritual welfare of every community in every time and place, He is not the Christian's God.

The last, and, as it seems to me, the only, answer which is consistent with the Christian revelation, is that God has chosen to work through nature, never performing His own will in spite of natural sequences, but taking upon Himself the whole burden of the universe that in some way emanates from Himself. Such a universe could not be mechanical, and must be thought of as in all its parts alive and interpenetrated with spirit, but with spirit which is not God nor wholly in harmony with the transcendent Spirit of God. This spirit in nature—untamed but tameable—would be everywhere and in all things open in greater or less degree to the influence of God, manifesting His beauty. In this belief all things that have a material nature have, in their own degree, a spiritual nature; and these two natures are not two things but one thing, just as man—spirit and body—is not two but one. The spirit that is in all things and attains personality in every man, is not God, but is open to the influence of God, and when yielded to that influence becomes the perfect agent of God. So that, although we may speak of God as immanent in man and in all things, and manifest when these are wholesome and good, yet all things are the object of His transcendent love, and He is the object of the love of all things and all men; yet lover and loved are not one but two. If God so loved the world as to give it part of His own freedom, seeking from it some better thing than could be got by compulsion, if He seeks to win and foster the highest by forgoing the right to interfere or compel, He may still be believed to be the loving all-Father revealed by Jesus Christ. If He is thus conditioned, He may still be believed to be responding by ways of His own to every sentient cry, although at times no outward sign can be given to show that He does not forsake His best beloved when their cause and His lies in the dust.

With such a conception of God and His universe, prayer as taught by Jesus, in all its simplicity of childlike petition, would still be the breath of life; for nature, thus conceived, is no closed system of fixed habits or sequences; it is living and growing. But although we cannot at any time say what is possible or impossible, we are not environed chiefly by uncertainty; but so slow and orderly is development that many things are always certainly possible, *i.e.* to be calculated on as proceeding from other relations of things. Science is the knowledge of all that is calculable and reliable; it cannot deal with all that element in nature which is beyond.

Here is a linnet perched upon a twig. Science is every day learning more things that are certain about linnets and twigs, but it cannot tell us to which side the bird will flit, to which spray its little feet will next cling. Some men of science may say that if they knew all about linnets and bushes they could certainly forecast all future flittings; but that assertion, resting upon no evidence, is not scientific. It is a theory—as much a matter of inference and interpretation of fact as any religious theory.

Science can only know anything by abstracting certain aspects for examination. By this partial knowledge the world has gone forward to cleaner and easier conditions by leaps and bounds. But science can know nothing of the whole of anything, still less of the whole of all things.

Christian faith constantly affirms that in reality spirit cannot be abstracted from matter, nor matter from spirit; that God, who must be able to know and do all that is possible, is concerned with the growth of the flower, the fall of the bird, and the cry of the child for food, no less than with the search of the soul for the unsearchable riches of His grace. It has also maintained that out of these riches, out of His own inexhaustible fund of joy, God, when He cannot consistently relieve His children, can amply compensate them for their temporal suffering.

There are few chapters in Church history more moving than the record of the pioneer life of the Pilgrim Fathers upon the harsh New England coast; but out of their sometime failures and misfortunes and sometime successes grew the simple proverb, "God always answers in the letter or for the better." This childlike jingle reflects the whole high Christian faith in petitional prayer, as the vast and splendid pageant of the morning is reflected in a drop of water that falls from the housewife's bucket on the moss of the well.

But to the observant and musing mind such a faith is impossible if it must be harmonised with the belief that God can at all times do anything that He will, "easily by a nod."

For this reason it appears to be a misfortune that a group of young Anglican clergy, in many ways progressive, should be heading a revival of faith in miracle.

In Canon Temple's new magazine, *The Pilgrim*, no less than two complete articles and some paragraphs in a third are given to the defence of miracle as thus defined: "This is indeed the only intelligible definition of miracle, viz. an act of God directly intervening in the natural order."[1] Canon Temple has himself written in the same sense in *The Challenge* and *The Oxford Magazine*. This group assert that God has performed and does perform, at certain times, marvellous acts, otherwise called "special interventions," or "invasions of," or "irruptions into, the natural order." They do not, indeed, claim that God can do *anything*; the recognition of some limitations has long been part of the orthodox position; but they say that the chief proof of God's activity in the world is "the irruptive action of God, such as orthodox Christianity believes to have taken place at the Incarnation, and to be repeated (or perpetuated) in the Sacramental system."[1]

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[1] Canon Oliver Quick in *The Pilgrim*, Oct. 1920, p. 96

But as we look about us we see that it is those who have themselves felt the power of God manifested in Christ and in the Sacraments who believe, in the orthodox sense, in the miraculous nature of the Incarnation or the Sacraments; and we suspect the real belief of such people to be based, not on their belief in miracle, but upon their religious experience, which is incommunicable. On the other hand, to those who have not yet had this personal experience—and each generation in its childhood must belong to this majority—this insistence upon the miraculous nature of Christ and of the Sacraments raises the problem of God's non-interference in an acute form. As far as can be gathered, this group do not face the problem of Divine non-intervention; but it is to-day a more urgent question than ever, owing to the fact that the sense of justice and some knowledge of history are more widely diffused than ever before. Explicit or implicit in the world's mind is this question: If God's relation to us is such that at any time He could have miraculously inaugurated a new system of salvation, why were the ancient civilisations, one after the other, allowed to go down into the dust without this help? What of that brave and beautiful attempt to establish an ethical monotheism in ancient Egypt? What of the noble traits in the religion of Hammurabi, superseded by what was more base? In almost every country there is evidence of a period or periods in which a high religious ethic emerged only to be lost. Where was God's "special intervention"? Or again, since Christ came, what of the millions of men and women who have been left without the miraculous help of the Christian Sacraments? Probably the advocates of miracle would at once reply that God sent the Christ in the earliest stage of human development in which His Gospel could be received. But if God waited upon the processes of development—the long processes of physical and spiritual development—before He manifested Himself in Christ, are we not bound to believe that He chose to condition His power to save men by these very processes of natural development? It is not going much further to believe that He always chooses thus to condition His power, and this is all that is maintained by those who deprecate the insistence upon miracle. The Church has gradually receded from the belief that God's power of action is unlimited. The actions of God, which by St Paul are likened to the potter's arbitrary control over the clay, are in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas represented as subservient to consistent purpose and the limitations of possibility. To maintain that God always works through the order of nature, including human nature (for man cannot be separated from nature), is thus a consistent development of orthodox doctrine.

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[1] Canon Temple in *The Oxford Magazine*, Nov. 6, 1920.

"Artifex," in the *Manchester Guardian*, calls attention to Canon Quick's article, and remarks: "Mr Quick has what in politics is called a cross-bench mind. . . . When quite first-rate, as in Mr Quick's case, it is priceless." With such a recommendation from such high source we may fairly take his article as a consistent statement of the position. Canon Quick's contention (apparently shared by Canon Temple, as he inserts in his magazine another article which expresses the same difficulty more crudely) appears to be that unless God works miracles we should find it difficult to believe that He is active in the world, for without them we could never detect His working, or say how or when or where He worked. Put in simple language, he would seem to urge that we could never believe God sent us our daily bread through bakers if He did not sometimes send it by a raven. The bulk of Christian experience cries out against this. Most religious people believe that what is good comes from God because they believe in God and not because they have first believed in miracles. But further, it must be pointed out that all that can be seen in a miracle is the result. God cannot be detected at work. We cannot say how any miracle is performed. If we could see a dead man raised to life, we could not see God doing it, or be sure that some combination of natural processes could not have produced the result. Those who would insist that the result was a miracle would be insisting that nature is a closed system and adequately understood.

That God should be universally invading the universe everywhere, at all times, with the constant pressure of His inspiration, seems to Canon Quick to be almost equivalent to cancelling the Divine action anywhere. In this connection it may well be remembered that in the whole biological system there are no duplicates. Every living thing, vegetable or animal, is a special and particular life. Any personal care that God bestows upon each must therefore, to meet the need, be special and particular. Our Lord, when He said that no sparrow fell to the ground without God, did not apparently mean that God exercised miraculous intervention, but that He did care for each individual sparrow. When God clothes the lilies He clothes each a little differently. It is true that His way of acting in the matter would be somewhat difficult to detect, but a high faith says, and will always say, that everything of beauty is clothed with the beauty of God, while no one thing is like another. In human life this is far more obvious. Every soul has a different experience of God. To say that God is always speaking to all men is not to say that He is saying to each the same thing, or to deny that to each soul his word is different every hour. Faith must believe that God adapts Himself to each; that for each He has a separate revelation of Himself and a separate vocation; and for each, if the revelation is rejected and the vocation neglected, God must suffer a special and particular grief. It is only in very abstract and scientific thinking, such as is a good deal of the thought of orthodox theology, that a universal activity is conceived as a vast sameness. For example, when our Lord prayed that Peter's faith might not fail, it would appear that He asked for the particular help of God. But the particular help is not necessarily miraculous help. When St Paul thanked God for the way in which the Thessalonians had received his message, is it necessary to suppose that in thanking God for a special gift of grace he imagined that a miracle had been wrought, except in the sense in which all religious life is a miracle?

The moral appeal of this advocacy of miracle is derived from the belief that without it God will come to be regarded rather as a Principle than a Personality. "The obvious danger is lest God come to be conceived simply as a meaning, an explanation, an ideal, and nothing more; lest His existence cease to be thought of as substantive and concrete altogether, and appear merely as adjectival to the world of things, because we cannot realise substantive, concrete existence except in terms of the particular and material."[1] In answer to this we would ask whether the writer of the twenty-third Psalm is describing the miraculous activities of God, or his own sense of God's personal care in every detail of his common life? If he conceived of God in His saving activity as substantive and concrete, who taught him? Was it not God Himself? The constant cry that belief in God's personal care will fade from the earth if some precise doctrine is not accepted, leaves us uninterested because of its radical unfaith in the power of God to reveal Himself to men whenever and wherever they lift up their souls. God is not passive or inert: what He teaches does not return to Him void. If, as we believe, God has revealed Himself in Christ, it is only God Himself stirring in men's hearts who can teach the meaning and force of that revelation; and to insist that we know precisely how He will do this, and to assert that He can only do it in one way, is to have small idea of the resources of the living God. Personally, I believe that whatever is truth concerning God cannot fail from the earth, because I believe that the activity of self-revelation is of His essence.

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[1] Canon Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 104. *Cf.* definition of miracle quoted above, p. 302.

Finally, the view which I have tried to maintain does not deny any event which the Church has affirmed to be miraculous; it is the miraculous nature of the event it denies—miracle being defined as something independent of natural processes. Whether these events took place in fact or in reverent imagination is a separate question. We are so ignorant of the forces of life that no really liberal theologian would claim to know all that is possible in any aspect of life. That claim is left to those who insist that certain events, if actual, must be miraculous. All that is maintained by the liberal critics whom Canon Quick criticises is that, if Christ came in the likeness of God—if God be indeed, in love and mercy, like Christ—then something other than God's will or desire must prevent Him from effectively saving the world from all that is base and ugly and false, and that something must be the limitation of nature, because all religious experience goes to show that God is working in and through nature, including human nature. That, for some high end, He manifests Himself only in our nature, is the very pith of the doctrine of the Incarnation. That God suffers in all the evil that the process of development includes is the doctrine of the Cross. The old, pre-Christian faith in a God who at times breaks in and does all that He wills, has grown with the higher faith, as tares grow up with wheat; but as tares and wheat grow together, the difference gradually becomes plain: the one will support life, the other will not.

But the splendid ambiguity with which Canon Quick uses his word "intervention" makes it very difficult to grasp. He says: "Every time we act voluntarily and freely at all we intervene in the order of natural events and thereby influence its subsequent course. The doctrine of miracle asserts simply that God has acted in an analogous way."[1] In this sense of the word "intervention," everyone who accepts the revelation of God in Christ believes that God with supreme power can do and does all good things that are possible in the sphere of life, and thereby is always influencing its subsequent course. If man, being evil, knows how to give good gifts, how much more God! But how often does man know the agony of impotence to relieve or save! He stretches forth his hand, but in vain. He would give his life for the objects of his love, yet they sink before his eyes in physical or moral degeneration. The whole course of human nature, the life of Jesus Christ—if this reveal God at all—reveal Him as taking upon Himself an analogous impotence, and waiting for the intelligent co-operation of men through whose understanding and zeal He can alone accomplish His will on earth.

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[1] Canon Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

The analogy between God's free action and man's must be correct, or God could not have revealed Himself in the Divine Man. Man's free action is strictly conditioned by the scheme of nature, and it is impossible to conceive of God both as good and doing whatever He will "easily by a nod." Man's freedom reveals to us that God may always be acting freely, acting definitely in place and time, and yet be accepting the limitations of the nature in which He works.

We may not believe in miracle, and yet believe in the Incarnation as a particular act of God at a definite time and place—an act made possible by many generations of Jews who had sought God's friendship continually. Just because of the perfect co-operation of our Lord Jesus Christ with the Father, in intelligence and feeling and will, He was the supreme manifestation of the Divine activity on earth.

CUTTS END, CUMNOR.

LILY DOUGALL.

THE MIRACLES OF SADHU SUNDAR SINGH.

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THOSE who are in touch with religious movements in India have been aware of the emergence of a very remarkable personality in Sadhu Sundar Singh. He is a Sikh of high birth, who, after a period of bitter opposition to Christianity, became a convert at the age of sixteen. He at once adopted the life of a Sadhu, a wandering "holy man," without possessions or ties, whose life is from the first dedicated to the service of religion, in the narrower sense of the term. As such he has travelled in Tibet, as well as in India and Ceylon, bearing his testimony to the power of Christ.[1] Wherever he goes, crowds flock to hear him, and he has recently been addressing meetings in England, making a profound impression. In the course of his earlier journeys he met with an extraordinary series of hardships and persecutions, and his deliverances have been regarded by many as strictly "miraculous." The object of this paper is to examine the records of these events: our inquiry will cast a good deal of light on similar Biblical narratives.

I should wish to emphasise very strongly that there can be no question of the complete sincerity and *bona fides* of the Sadhu himself. These qualities impress themselves the moment one sees him and hears him speak. And all who have come in contact with him agree absolutely on this point. Nor, again, is there any doubt of the reality of his religious experiences or of his remarkable power as a preacher of the Gospel. To the writer of this paper he is in truth a "man of God," in touch with the living Spirit of Christ, and one whose influence on the conversion of India to Christ is likely to be very great.

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[1] The Sadhu was born in 1889, converted in 1904, and the journeys cover the period 1908 to 1917.

In view of this, it may seem a little cold-blooded to analyse and criticise the story of his experiences. But he himself speaks of them publicly, and the account has been given to the world in books which are widely read in India. They must be open to examination as other similar records, past and present, and any clearing of the ground in this direction will only serve to deepen the impression made by his personality. And the questions at issue are fundamental for religion. Does God help a man of special sanctity by direct miraculous interventions, or by methods which are in harmony with general natural and psychological laws? Does the form assumed by such stories in our time throw any light on similar narratives of the Old and New Testaments?

There have been several accounts published of the Sadhu's adventures.

(1) *A Lover of the Cross*, by Alfred Zahir, Sub-Warden, St John's Christian Hostel, Agra (North India Tract and Book Society, Allahabad, 1917). A revised edition, published in 1918, makes the following claim:

> "The new edition is entirely different from the former in that it presents the picture of Sundar Singh's life in its natural hues. In this all danger of marring the simple beauty of his life by decking it with the borrowed plumes of charming words and bewitching style and language has been avoided. Nor has fictive imagination been given a chance to alter the narratives in order to add to their force and beauty."

A comparison of the two does not, however, show much difference in essentials, though we shall note a few points where the earlier account is toned down.

(2) *Sadhu Sundar Singh: Called of God*, by Mrs Parker (Christian Literature Society for India, Madras, etc., 1918). Here the language is far less flamboyant, and the miraculous is less strongly emphasised, but the incidents are substantially identical.

(3) *Saved to Serve*, by Alfred Zahir (C.M.S. Mission Press, Sikandra, Agra, 1917). This is an account of a visit paid by Sundar Singh to an aged Himalayan saint, and of what he learnt from him.[1]

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[1] Of these books, apparently only Mrs Parker's can be obtained in England. A study of his life and teaching, with an account of his mystical experiences, by Canon Streeter and Mr A. Y. Appasamy, is now in the press, and will be published by Messrs Macmillan under the title *The Sadhu*.

All these books are based on conversations with the Sadhu himself, and Mrs Parker's contains a special testimonial from him, testifying that she had been guided by the Spirit of God, "so that she had written it without any mistake."

I understand that the first reports of the miracles current in India came from travellers, and were even more exaggerated than the published stories. We find, too, that the later narratives (the 2nd edition of *A Lover of the Cross* and Mrs Parker) tend to be more cautious with regard to supernatural explanations. This is, of course, a reversal of the ordinary process, familiar to students, whereby the miraculous is usually heightened as time goes on. The explanation is obvious. So far as the West is concerned, this is a critical age, and the instinct now is to analyse and explain such stories. And the hero himself is still living: though he does not seem himself to be affected by what he would regard as "scepticism" of the miraculous, he is absolutely honest, and is ready to help his friends to get at the actual facts. He is further very much alive to the danger of sensationalism, and refuses to allow himself to be exploited by the curiosity of those who are merely attracted by tales of the supernatural.

It may be pointed out that, though the source of most of the stories is the Sadhu himself, he never kept any diary or written record of his travels. Further, he is soaked in the New Testament, and particularly the Gospels. The influence of these on the record of his experiences is obvious, and affords a good parallel to the influence of the Old Testament on the record of the life of Christ as we find it in the New.

The greater number of the extraordinary events which we shall consider fall under the head of help and deliverance coming mysteriously and ascribed to angels. The best known of these is the story of the delivery from a blind well.[1] At a village called Rasar, in Tibet, the Sadhu was arrested for preaching heresy, brought before the Lama, and thrown into a well used for the execution of prisoners. It was full of dead men's bones, and was completely closed by a heavy iron gate above, which was padlocked. "For three whole days he lay agonising with hunger and writhing with pain in the whole body, and specially in the arm, which had been intentionally fractured by a blow from the sentry's club." Suddenly during the night he heard the gate opened and found a rope let down. With difficulty he was pulled up; the gate was padlocked and his deliverer suddenly disappeared. "I greatly marvelled at this mysterious help, but I now know that it was only one of the many instances in which Jesus Himself came to save me." His helper touched his broken arm and it was healed instantaneously. The Sadhu hobbled to the village and, when his escape became known, was at once rearrested, like the Apostles on a famous occasion. The Lama, "reddened to the ears with offended dignity, and frothing at the mouth with anger," inquires who has had the key, since the padlock could be opened by no other means than its own key. It is found hanging to the Lama's own girdle, and, "overawed with superstitious fear," he entreats the Sadhu to depart at once.

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[1] See *A Lover of the Cross*, pp. 61 ff. (references are to the 1st ed., except when otherwise stated).

In the later accounts the "three whole days" are omitted, being toned down to "on the third night." The sense of time must obviously be vague under such conditions. The 2nd edition of Zahir mentions the fractured arm, but Mrs Parker only speaks of it as "injured,"[1] in which case a sudden cure under the stress of strong emotional faith is more intelligible. In both the later accounts Jesus becomes simply "a friend," "the man," or "his deliverer." I have, however, heard the Sadhu, when telling the story, insist strongly that it must have been an angel; he seemed much impressed by his sudden disappearance. Most readers will agree in surmising that either some secret sympathiser stole and replaced the key, or else the Lama himself secretly delivered the prisoner. He would have the haunting suspicion that this might really be "a holy man" after all, and was evidently glad to find an excuse to send him away, if not unharmed, at least alive. The parallel with the story of the imprisonment of Paul and Silas at Philippi, and still more with the deliverance of Peter by the angel,[2] is obvious, and we shall not be overstating the case if we say that it is at least probable that here too the explanation is to be looked for along the lines of human agency.

There are other stories of the same type which it is hardly necessary to repeat in detail. Sundar Singh is banished from villages, left starving and alone in the jungle; mysterious hands bring him food and drink, carry him over an unfordable stream, or undo the bonds by which he has been tied to a tree.[1] Having performed their errand, the ministrants vanish as suddenly as they came. Sometimes these are definitely regarded as angels; at others, this is left to be implied, or the possibility is left open. It is, however, always sufficiently obvious that we have once more to do with unknown sympathisers, attracted by the personality and need of the Sadhu, but fearing to risk the hostility of their fellows by appearing openly. A state of exhaustion induced by prolonged meditation and fasting does not lead to accurate observation of bare fact.

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[1] "Almost broken," said the Sadhu himself at a meeting in Oxford.

[2] Acts xii. The story as it stands raises a grave moral difficulty. Peter is released by a special divine interposition, but the guards, who on this hypothesis are quite innocent, are allowed to be executed. It is one thing to say that God does not interfere in the course of events to prevent innocent suffering; quite another to suppose Him interposing at one moment, and then leaving others to bear an undeserved punishment which is the direct consequence of this interposition.

Of special interest is the incident given by Mrs Parker (p. 61). Driven from a village, he takes refuge in a cave and sees a number of men approaching him with sticks and stones. When within a few yards of him they suddenly hesitate and fall back, whispering together. They then come forward and ask, "'Who is the other man with you in bright garments, and many more who surround you?' The Sadhu replied that there was no man with him, but with awe the men insisted that they saw a host of bright ones standing all round the cave. Then the men besought the Sadhu to accompany them to their homes, and going with them he spoke of Christ, so that they feared and believed his words. The Sadhu then knew that God had sent His angels to protect him." There are obvious Biblical parallels,[2] and the incident throws a vivid light upon the attitude of mingled hostility and fear with which such a "holy man" is regarded. It also illustrates the suggestion that his release from the well was due to the Lama himself.

During the course of his wanderings the Sadhu resolved to retire into the jungle for a forty days' fast. The account of this is clearly influenced, as indeed was the actual attempt, by the Gospel narratives of the fast of Christ. In *A Lover of the Cross* (2nd ed., p. 66), the fast is definitely described as lasting "for forty days," but Mrs Parker (p. 37) makes it clear that the actual duration was quite uncertain. The Sadhu knew he would lose count of time, and tried to keep it by collecting forty pebbles and dropping one each day, but after a time became too weak to continue doing this. He tells us that during his increasing physical weakness he felt "a great quickening of the spirit," and that "matters of intense spiritual importance were revealed to him." He was discovered in a state of exhaustion by some bamboo-cutters, and nursed back to life by the devotion of friends.

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[1] In one case a gold coin is found in a cake, given him at a mission bungalow where he has received a very cold welcome. This enables him to complete his journey in comfort at a time when he was nearly at the end of his strength. (*Lover of the Cross*, p. 47.)

[2] In particular, we may compare the story in 3 Maccabees, where the vision of angels which terrifies the elephants is seen only by the enemies of the Jews—a very unusual feature.

There are several adventures with animals which illustrate the well-known influence of certain "psychics" over animals. Twice he sleeps with a panther beside him, and once with a cobra, without receiving any injury. "Never to this day,' he says, "has any wild animal done me any harm." On one occasion he missed his balance while crossing a *khud* and dislodged a rock, which fell on a huge cobra, crushing it to death. Three cowherd boys at once greet him as a great *rishi* or holy man, since no one has ever been able to kill this cobra or to use the path on which it lay. The villagers welcomed him warmly and listened eagerly to his message. The setting reminds us of St Paul at Malta, though there are obvious differences. In other cases of his escapes from animals, which are more parallel, the results on the witnesses are just the same.

Another story of a somewhat different type is quoted in *A Lover of the Cross* (p. 8), on the authority of a letter from a Hindu witness. "One day when we were reaping corn in the field a Sadhu [Sundar Singh] came up to us and began to preach religion. We all felt very annoyed at his interference in our work and showered some curses upon him. But little heeding our curses and threats the man went on with his talk. At this my brother took up a stone and hit the man on the head. But this good man unmindful of the insult closed his eyes and said, 'O God, forgive them.' After a while my brother who had flung the stone was suddenly caught with a splitting headache and had to give up reaping. At this the Sadhu took my brother's scythe and started reaping the corn. . . . After he had gone we noticed an amazing thing. The field where this good man has reaped has never yielded so much corn as it has this year; we have gathered two *maunds* above the average this time."

It will be noticed that, though this and the killing of the cobra are miracles attributed to the presence of the Sadhu, there are no miracles attributed to his own deliberate action or word; he is not himself a miracle-worker. In particular, there is no record of his figuring as a healer—a feature which we should certainly have expected. This may fairly be

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[1] I am told that the Sadhu did cure a certain boy in Ceylon, but, finding that the result was to attract popular attention away from his message to his personal powers, refused to comply with further requests for healing.

claimed as testimony to his personal humility and to the desire to avoid sensationalism of which we have already spoken.

Unfortunately, we cannot pass over in silence the account given in the book *Saved to Serve* of the interviews with the hermit. While touring through Kailash, Sundar had a fall and found himself "at the mouth of an enormous cave wherein sat a hoary old creature, something between a man and a beast. . . . Closer examination of this object revealed it to be an old man who sat with his eyes closed, as though in deep meditation. Long streaming hair covered practically every part of his body, and formed a natural covering for it. His beard was so long that it swept the floor, while his eyebrows dangled over his eyes like a screen." The Sadhu has long conversations with the hermit, and is informed that he is a convert from Mohammedanism, born 318 years ago, and converted by Jernaus, a nephew of Francis Xavier. He reads from a MS. New Testament dating from the time of Constantine, and knows twenty-one different dialects. The saints are constantly with him; "only a little time before your arrival here S. Francis of Assisi, Polycarp, and Linus were present with me in the spirit. This Linus is the real author of the world-renowned book, *The Imitation of Christ*." The Maharashi, or hermit, has a precise knowledge of the details of Sundar's life and doings, and is able to leave his body at will and travel to heaven. He narrates interviews which he has there with the son of the widow of Nain, John the Baptist, and others, and conversations between Christ, angels, Adam, Moses, and others. The animals complain in heaven, "Oh, Lord, it was Adam who sinned: why then do we also suffer death, seeing that we are innocent?" (Someone seems to have been studying Baruch or 4 Esdras.) There are revelations about the near approach of the end of the world, the day of Judgment, and the Millennium, all connected with the Great War. Christ constantly travels about in England in human form. The hermit also explains that the word "sin" represents his past state, but the *I*, which stands for self, has been removed, and "*O*, which represents the illimitable being, has come in, so that now instead of *sin*, which was my former state, *Son*, that is the Lord Jesus, dwelleth in me." It is interesting to find this Indian hermit playing upon English words and familiar with a type of blackboard lesson very popular in Evangelical circles.

It is obviously not worth while criticising the details of all this. We are in the region of sheer nonsense, and somewhat dangerous nonsense. Nor is it necessary to ask how much of it is to be attributed to a possible cave-dweller, to the Sadhu himself, or to Mr Zahir, the writer of the book. But it is frankly to be regretted that a missionary Press in India should publish such a work. The cause of real Christianity and the final conversion of the East cannot really be advanced by such methods, however well-meaning and whatever their immediate success with the uneducated masses.[1]

It is a relief to pass from this extravagance to a consideration of the Sadhu's own visions and mystical experiences, which bear the mark of sanity and reality. The story of his conversion will take its place among classical examples of such experiences. After a period of hostility, during which he attacks Christianity with great fierceness, he finds himself increasingly unhappy and begins to study the Gospels. The study develops into "a passionate devotion"; he reads words such as, "Come unto me, all that travail," "So God loved the world," and a strange voice within him seems to say, "At length thy trials are ended and thy peace is come."[2] According to a later account,[3] he determines to put an end to his anguish, either by reaching a solution or by throwing himself under a passing train. At the decisive moment he sees a vision: "My room became suddenly lighted with a glorious light, and in the midst of it I beheld a Figure with Hands upraised. I recognised this Person at once. His hands and feet were pierced, and a crown of thorns adorned His brow. I had seen pictures of Him in some Christian books. This person looked wistfully at me and said, 'How long, yea, how long wilt thou deny and persecute me?' I heard these words and fell down to worship Him, and confessed my sins."

No doubt here, as in similar cases, there is much which might be said as to the distinction between the underlying spiritual reality and the outward form in which the experience is clothed. The question may also arise how far subsequent reflection on this experience has coloured the Sadhu's recollection of what he actually felt at the time. It will have been remarked that here the earlier account is the shorter and less detailed. The words "How long wilt thou deny and persecute me?" have clearly been influenced by the narrative of St Paul's conversion; in speaking of his early life as a persecutor the Sadhu constantly brings out the parallel, and uses language derived from the Epistles and the Acts. It is possible, then, that the impression of the words has formed itself in the Sadhu's mind as the result of his meditations (we note, of course, the parallel with what probably happened with the writer of the Fourth Gospel), or else that they really were part of the conversion-experience, mediated by his previous study of the New Testament. We have just the same alternatives with regard to St Paul's mission to the Gentiles, the consciousness of which it has been common to suppose was really subsequent to his conversion, while Loisy and others now regard it as strictly synchronous. We may hope that some of those who have been in close touch with Sundar Singh may be able to throw some light upon the extent of the original experience. It ought, *e.g.*, to be possible to verify the determination to commit suicide, of which the 1st edition of *A Lover of the Cross* says nothing.

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[1] Mrs Parker glides somewhat cautiously over the Sadhu's relations with the Maharashi of Kailash, and quotes a warning that common interpretations can never disclose the meaning of the visions, since the saint has to clothe his ideas in language which cannot be taken literally. But this does not really ease the situation. Zahir's book is not written as an allegory or a record of "imaginary conversations," but as an account of actual psychic experiences and revelations. The Sadhu is inclined to depreciate the importance that has been attached to this incident.

[2] *Lover of the Cross*, 1st ed., p. 20.

[3] *Ib.*, 2nd ed., p. 31. Mrs Parker mentions the vision briefly, and says nothing about either of the voices.

But, apart from the details, if a new life and the enhancement of the personality are the tests of conversion, here is a conversion beyond cavil, a conversion to be ascribed, as is that of a Paul or an Augustine, to the living Spirit of Christ, working through whatever channel.

In other cases we seem to have to do with mystic experiences in which the Sadhu's vivid sense of the inner Divine companionship projects itself into the impression of a "Companion" walking by his side. A man with a lamb thus accompanies him for some way, speaking "words of wisdom and admonition," and suddenly disappears, lamb and all. "I am fully persuaded that he was some angel of God who had been sent for my instruction."[1] A similar story[2] reminds one strongly of the walk to Emmaus.

Again, on the principles of religious psychology we shall have no difficulty in accepting the very impressive accounts of the Sadhu's joy and inner peace of mind under intense suffering. Nailed[3] on a flat board, his body covered with leeches, and hanging in agony all through the night, "he was quite happy and spent the time singing hymns of praise and glory to God." This is only one example of many, and illustrates in a familiar way the power of a strong emotion to inhibit pain. The appearance of the Sadhu presents the health and vigour which we should expect to find in one who has discovered the joy and peace of the Divine companionship. There are, again, few better examples of the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount and the power of the Gospel in action than the Sadhu's habit of "non-resistance" when faced with insult or violence, and the resulting converting power of genuine love.

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[1] *Lover of the Cross*, p. 37.

[2] *Ib.*, p. 66.

[3] "Nailed," so Zahir. Mrs Parker, p. 38, "fixed . . . in stocks."

We have, then, in all this the opportunity of studying a contemporary example of the way in which the popular mind reacts to an impressive personality which seizes its imagination. We can watch the actual working of the belief in the miraculous as it produces this series of stories on the borderline between the normal and the supernatural. There seems no reason to doubt that in most cases something remarkable, whether by way of coincidence or otherwise, really did happen; it is not a case of pure fiction or myth. It is, however, obvious to the careful reader that there is nothing which cannot be explained by human agency or on the lines of the principles of modern psychology, especially in its study of the phenomena of trance, intense concentration, and auto-suggestion. But it is equally obvious that in a less critical age the stories would have received just the slight additional touches required to make them unequivocally supernatural, and that this could easily have happened during the lifetime and without the encouragement of the person chiefly concerned. Indeed, in certain circles in India this stage seems to have actually been reached. Probably the average religious reader halts between two opinions, and is ready to accept either interpretation according to the mood of the moment.

We have suggested that the incidents and the experiences before us are readily explicable by human agency and on the recognised principles of psychology. But this does not mean that we are debarred from accepting in a quite true sense the Sadhu's own explanation that it was God who guided and delivered him. The choice is not between chance and Providence, but between two ways in which God can be thought of as working.[1] Does He help or protect His servants by sending "an angel" or by the operation of His Spirit on the heart of men? The special interposition of a supernatural agency may at first sight be attractive to some, but is it not a far grander conception to think of the Spirit of God as working through the personality of such a one as the Sadhu, and so drawing out the response and the latent powers of good in his fellow-men? We rejoice to see the hand of God in the courage of those unknown friends who in face of public opinion, and perhaps at considerable risk, rescue or feed him in his hour of need, and we find in what they did the answer to his prayer of faith. And, if in his mystic experiences we find an element which we attribute to the subconscious working of his own mind, we do not therefore explain them away as subjective or hallucinatory. For we do believe that "there is Some One there." The Divine Spirit "passing into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets," and, working within the limits of that mind of man which is His own creation, is able to thrill and touch them with the immediate consciousness of the presence of "the Beyond that is within."

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[1] See on this whole question Miss Dougall's essay, "God in Action," in the volume *The Spirit*, edited by Canon Streeter (esp. pp. 35–40).

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A CHRISTIAN SCEPTIC OF THE FOURTH CENTURY: SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN ARNOBIUS AND PASCAL.

MARGARET LEIGH.

WE do not often read Arnobius, but in passing over his seven books *Adversus Nationes* we miss perhaps the most interesting and original apologetic work in Latin between Tertullian and Augustine. The style has all the vigour and vividness which distinguishes the best African literature of the period; the matter is never dull or technical, though much of the argument is addressed to philosophical or semi-philosophical readers; and the text is not overweighted with quotations from Scripture. Indeed, the absence of biblical quotations, and the curious doctrine of the soul as not actually immortal but capable of immortality by grace, which Arnobius attributes to Christ himself, together with other points of doubtful orthodoxy, suggest that the book was composed in a hurry before its author had thoroughly assimilated the teaching of his new religion. The most interesting part of his work is contained in the second book, where he tries to rear a system of faith upon the basis of pessimism about human nature and scepticism about the possibility of knowledge. Not only in the general trend of thought, but also in smaller details of expression, the reader is constantly reminded of the *Pensées* of Pascal. Arnobius is a man of slighter mental calibre than Pascal, and trained in less severe studies; but he has the same moral earnestness, the same mistrust of human reason, the same tendency to doubt and passionate desire for faith. Pascal had no doubt read Arnobius; but given two men of so similar a temperament, parallel passages need not be the result of borrowing or suggestion. In the parallel between Arnobius ii. 8 and Pascal Art. xxiii. 10, Augustine is referred to, and he may be the intermediary in other cases.

The book is not systematically arranged, but the process of thought seems to be something as follows. Arnobius is impressed with the impotence and corruption of man, the feebleness of his intellect and the impossibility of any knowledge about final things, the wastefulness and purposelessness of the natural order. Consideration of all these things leads him into universal scepticism; but, finding that every action implies some kind of belief, he thinks it better to adopt a hypothesis which brings hope rather than one which brings despair, and proposes Christianity as a working explanation of the world which will make morality worth while and justify preoccupation with salvation, He frankly admits ignorance, and substitutes faith for reason. Roughly speaking, this is Pascal's position. It will be interesting to compare some passages in detail.

The impotence and corruption of man is a constant topic with both writers. Arguing against the arrogance of the Neoplatonists in supposing that the souls of men are divine, Arnobius (ii. 16) asks them to explain in what way we are so far exalted above the beasts that we scorn to be numbered with them. We are made of the same flesh and blood, we are born and die in the same way, like them our main concern in life is to get and keep our food. But we are said to excel them in reason (*ratio*). What is this reason we boast of so much? If it is merely the ingenuity which teaches us how to build houses and protect ourselves from heat and cold, we share it with birds and insects; and whereas this faculty comes to them naturally, we have only acquired it after a long period of toil and misery (ii. 17, 18.)

If men had any true knowledge of their own nature and of God's, they would never suppose that there was anything divine in the power of making baskets, swords, breastplates, and ploughshares (ii. 19), but would show their excellence in good living, which they manifestly do not (ii. 17). Superficially, the arts and sciences, geometry, grammar, logic, music, seem to be signs of the supposed dignity of man; but even these, far from being innate, as Plato imagined, are only acquired with much labour and study (ii. 19). As a counterblast to the slave in the *Meno* with his innate knowledge of mathematical truths, Arnobius (ii. 21) supposes the case of a child, offspring of a Plato or a Pythagoras, who had come to manhood in a subterranean chamber to which no sights or sounds from outside could penetrate, tended by a naked nurse who never spoke. Imagine that such a person were released at a mature age and questioned. Far from showing any knowledge of mathematical properties, he would not understand the uses of the commonest things, or know that water is wet and fire burns, nor would he be able to produce anything but formless sounds. Instead of trailing clouds of glory, this divinely-born creature would be more brutish than the lowest of the brutes.

Arnobius is so deeply convinced of the abject state of man that he is led into a disproportionately long attack upon the Neoplatonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. His objections are partly metaphysical and partly moral. He insists upon the difficulty, familiar to students of Plato, which is involved in the "participation" of material objects in the ideas. If the soul is immaterial, how can it have any connection with the material body? How can contact with the body cause the soul to forget the knowledge it had before (ii. 26–28)? If the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be affected by anything done in the body, and morality is superfluous (ii. 29) To avoid these difficulties Arnobius supposes that the soul is of an intermediate nature (*mediæ qualitatis*, ii. 35), not naturally immortal, but capable of receiving immortality by the grace of God as the reward of righteousness. This odd doctrine commended itself to Arnobius because it humiliated man to his due place, and made morality supremely important and salvation the main concern of a man's life.

In another passage (ii. 37) he asks what could have been God's purpose in sending immortal souls into the world. The course of nature would have continued unchanged if there had been no race of men. What difference would it have made to the world if there had been no kings, generals, orators, professors, poets, or cooks? (ii. 38). Perhaps we are to suppose that He sent them into the world to undergo the squalors of generation and corruption (ii. 39); to lose their innocence in sin (*ibid.*); to be distracted by the bewilderments of philosophy (*ibid.*); to wring from the earth a bare living by the sweat of their brow, while all other creatures are fed and clothed without toil (ii. 40); to seek distraction from their labours in the cruelties of the amphitheatre and the immoralities of the stage (ii. 41, 42).

We have not to seek far for similar passages in the *Pensées*. "We need not," says Pascal (Art. i.), "have a very exalted intelligence to realise that there is no real and abiding satisfaction to be had in this world; that all our pleasures are but vanity; that our misfortunes are infinite, and that in the last resort the death which threatens us at every moment must inevitably, within the space of a few years, force us to make the horrible choice between eternal annihilation and eternal torment." In another passage (Art. xvi. 11), "Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature. . . . It needs not the whole world to arm for his destruction; a vapour, a drop of water, is enough to kill him." Everything in nature demonstrates the truth of the doctrine of original sin.

Arnobius' theory of the soul as intermediate between mortality and immortality suggests several passages in the *Pensées* in which Pascal speaks of man as being half way between two extreme states (Art. xvi.)—that he occupies an intermediate position between angels and brutes, and in consequence his attitude must be a mean between despair and pride (Art. iv.).

Not only the misery of man, but the purposelessness of nature, is food for the pessimism of Arnobius. Apart from the problem of evil and pain, which he very wisely does not attempt to solve, and the dilemma in which it places everyone who believes in a God who is at once good and omnipotent, he is puzzled by the apparently useless multiplication of natural kinds (ii. 59)—doubtful whether God could have made noxious insects, such as locusts, centipedes, and cockroaches (ii. 52). "Why," he asks, "when it would have been better for us to receive light by several eyes, so as to guard against the risk of blindness, have we only two?" What useful purpose is served by flies, spiders, thorns, tares? Why should there be so many varieties of corn? (ii. 59).

The argument from design, which can never have convinced anyone but a born optimist in easy circumstances, would have brought little satisfaction to Arnobius, nor did it bring any to Pascal. He says (Art. xiv. 1) that it is useless to tell persons without faith (*i.e.* who are not convinced already) that they have only to contemplate the least things around them to see God revealed. Try to prove the existence of God by the course of the stars and planets, and they will only think that the proofs of Christianity are remarkably feeble.

The scepticism of Arnobius is complete. "What," he asks (ii. 7), "are we able to know by our own power, even if all the ages were given up to research? We whom some unknown and envious power has made so blind and arrogant that, though we know nothing, we completely deceive ourselves, and are puffed up with the idea of our own wisdom? Can anyone explain the mystery that baffled Socrates in the *Phædrus*—the nature and origin of man with all his multiplicity and contradictions, the purpose of his creation, the nature of his creator, his function in the world, the reason of his subjection to countless evils? Can anyone explain whether we evolved from the slime like worms or were moulded by the hand of a creator; whether our real life is passed in sleep or in wakefulness; why our hair becomes grey gradually and not all at once?" He jeers at the eagerness of philosophers to assert their own dogmas and contradict anyone else's, although only one of the various opinions can be true. "It is all lost labour to bring forward an opinion as if it were knowledge, or to maintain a doctrine which, even it were true, is capable of being overthrown, or to take as true something which is perhaps false and no better than an illusion" (ii. 57). He challenges philosophers to explain the simplest natural phenomena, and justifies scepticism as the only possible attitude for a reasonable man. "What is there blameworthy in being ignorant of anything, or in admitting your ignorance without any affectation of knowledge? Which is the more open to ridicule—the man who professes ignorance of some obscure question, or the man who claims to have certain knowledge of things that transcend human conceptions and are wrapped in mystery?" (ii. 51).

Arnobius understands the impossibility of absolute scepticism, and realises that the simplest practical action is based on some assumption. No sailor, he says (ii. 8), undertakes a voyage without believing that he will return home; no farmer sows without expecting to reap; no general joins battle without the hope of victory. All philosophers (ii. 9) believe in their own theories, in the *ipse dixit* of a master; even the sceptics have faith in Carneades, and inconsistently believe their own doctrine of universal doubt. Since it is clear that we cannot live without assumptions of some kind, Arnobius urges his readers to stake everything upon the hypothesis of hope. If the authority of Plato or Pythagoras is worth following, why not Christ's, who promises eternal life? (ii. 11). These promises refer to the future, and things yet to come admit of no proof. "Is it not better sense," he says (ii. 4), "when confronted with two alternatives equally doubtful, to choose that which offers some hope rather than that which offers none? For if what is alleged to be at hand turns out to be without foundation, our mistake involves no danger; but if in due course it proves to be truth indeed, we shall suffer the greatest loss of all—I mean the loss of salvation." Let us then simply admit our ignorance of ultimate questions, and substitute faith for reason, believing the promises of Christ (ii. 60).

The parallels in Pascal include some of the best-known passages in his book. "A reasonable man must inevitably put the matter to himself thus: 'I do not know who has sent me into the world; I do not know what the world is, nor what I myself am. I am in a terrible state of ignorance about all things. I do not know what is my body, what are my senses, what is my soul, or even that part of me which thinks what I am saying. I see the awful spaces of the universe which close me in on every side, and I find myself fixed in one corner of this vast expanse without knowing why I am placed in this spot rather than in another, or why the short span of my life has been allotted to this point rather than to any other in the infinite series which has preceded me or will follow me. . . . All that I know is that I must soon die; and least of all do I know the nature of that death I know not how to escape. I know not whence I come, nor whither I go; I only know that when I leave this world I shall fall for ever either into nothingness or into the hands of an angry God, without knowing which of these two conditions will be my lot for all eternity. This is my state, full of misery, weakness, and obscurity'" (Art. i.). Again, at the beginning of the same article, he praises the Christian religion because it teaches that men are in darkness and in alienation from God, who has hidden Himself from their knowledge, and can only be found by those who seek Him with all their hearts. The war between Pyrrhonists and dogmatists will last as long as humanity itself (Art. xxii.). Everyone must takes sides, for neutrality is Pyrrhonism *par excellence.* And yet either alternative seems unreasonable. It is absurd to claim certain knowledge when the smallest shock makes us let go our hold: on the other hand, no one has ever been a consistent practical Pyrrhonist. Would you have us doubt that we are awake, that we are being pinched, that we are on fire, that we exist, even that we doubt?

There is nothing left to us but to act on probabilities, as all the world does. "If we ought to do nothing for the uncertain, we ought to do nothing for religion, which is not certain. But how many things, voyages, battles, are undertaken in spite of the uncertain issue!" (Art. xvi. 85).

It is uncertain whether the soul is immortal or not. And yet it is our first interest and our first duty to enlighten ourselves on this question, because the whole conduct of our lives depends upon the answer we give. "The immortality of the soul is a thing which touches us so profoundly that a man must have lost all feeling if he is not interested in knowing the truth about it. All our thoughts, all our actions, will take such different courses according as we have eternal goods to hope for or not, that it is impossible to make any reasonable advance without keeping in view this point which ought to be our ultimate objective" (Art. i.). The chance of losing eternal salvation is too great to risk, even if it were infinitely small. We are forced to choose between the yes and no of God's existence; to proclaim ourselves neutral is to vote with the noes. If we say yes and win, we win everything; if we lose, we lose nothing. But if we say no and lose, we lose everything. The wise man, since he is forced to choose, will obviously choose yes. This famous passage (Art. ii.), too long to quote, is a development of the idea in Arnobius. The inevitableness of the choice is more clearly brought out, and characteristic use is made of the mathematical conception of infinity, which adds force to the argument. The wager has often been objected to as so much sordid calculation of gain and loss, possibly because its critics have been put off by a candour and clearness of thought a little disconcerting to those who prefer indefiniteness in religion, and have given a narrow interpretation to the "eternal goods" (*biens éternels*) to be hoped for. After all, Pascal's argument is only a more closely reasoned version of a modern writer's definition of faith as the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis—a definition in which the idea of staking all on something uncertain is present, though less baldly expressed.

Attention has been drawn to some striking resemblances in method between Arnobius and Pascal: to attempt a criticism of this method would be outside the scope of a short article. I would only say in conclusion that an apology for Christianity based upon Pascal would have a special power with the younger generation at the present time. Most of us are no longer satisfied with the facile explanations of the world and human nature given by neo-Hegelians and Liberal believers in progress. The melancholy experience of the last five years has brought disillusionment. We want to face the facts, and have a theory, if there is such a thing, that will fit them. We do not want a theory that flatters our vanity by assuring us that we are naturally disposed to good or capable of understanding everything, because such a theory does not seem to fit the facts. After all the triumphs of humanity and enlightenment, we are not much nearer the solution of the problems which matter. If religion is not to be merely an ostrich attitude to life, it will have to take account of these facts, and base its apologetic on scepticism and to a certain extent on pessimism, and in so doing it will blunt the edge of many of the objections to Christianity.

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CATHOLICISM AND CIVILISATION.[1]

G. G. COULTON, M.A.

MR BELLOC here, within the space of scarcely more than a dozen review articles, covers all European history from the Christian era to the Reformation; and thence, more briefly, down to our present day. His main thesis, repeated more than once in practically the same words, is that "Europe will return to the [Catholic] faith, or she will perish. The Faith is Europe. And Europe is the Faith" (pp. 6, 321, 331).

This plea has been commended to us by German historians with a great show of documentary evidence, which will seldom bear verification. Mr Belloc gives no references and seldom appeals to documents. His very first pages go so directly to what is really the root of every discussion between Catholic and non-Catholic, that it is worth while to quote from them at some length. This first chapter is headed, "The Catholic Conscience of History," and it begins:

> "I say the Catholic 'conscience' of History—I say 'conscience'—that is, an intimate knowledge through identity: the intuition of a thing which is one with the knower—I do not say 'The Catholic Aspect of History.' This talk of 'aspects' is modern, and therefore part of a decline: it is false, and therefore ephemeral: I will not stoop to it. I will rather do homage to truth and say that there is no such thing as a Catholic 'aspect' of European history. There is a Protestant aspect, a Jewish aspect, a Mohammedan aspect, a Japanese aspect, and so forth. For all these look on Europe from without. The Catholic sees Europe from within. There is no more of a Catholic 'aspect' of European history than there is a man's 'aspect' of himself. Sophistry does indeed pretend that there is even a man's 'aspect' of himself. In nothing does false philosophy prove itself more false. For a man's way of perceiving himself (when he does so honestly and after a cleansing examination of his mind) is in line with his Creator's, and therefore with reality: he sees from within. . . . A Catholic, as he reads [the story of Europe], does

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[1] *Europe and the Faith*, by H. Belloc (Constable, 1920: 7s. 6d. net).

> not grope at it from without, he understands from within. . . . He is not relatively right in his blame, he is absolutely right. . . . I say again, renewing the terms, The Church is Europe; and Europe is the Church."

Let us admit freely that there is some real truth here, only underlining for both parties that all-important parenthesis, "*When he does so honestly and after a cleansing examination of his mind.*" But in this absolute form of a self-evident proposition in which Mr Belloc states his thesis, it lends itself too easily to Dr Johnson's famous parody: "Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat." Superficial resemblances do not make for real comprehension; and the Catholic may be hypnotised by the mere superficialities which he has inherited from his past. It is true that much which is familiar to him becomes comprehensible to others only after patient study and by a strong effort of imagination; a good deal, perhaps, is never understood. But it is equally true that the reckless Catholic understands the Middle Ages no better than the reckless Protestant; he suffers from what Mr Belloc rightly stigmatises as "the fatal habit of reading into the past what we know of its future" (p. 277). Because such a Catholic has been born and bred among the same words as his remote ancestors, he vainly imagines himself to be living among the same things; and though, in the schools, he could pass a far better examination in these things than his adversary, yet, in the face of realities, he is heavily handicapped by the ignorance of his own ignorances. Mr Belloc, for instance, appeals to Justin Martyr (p. 78): "He was as near to the Crucifixion as my generation is to the Reform Bill—and he gave us a full description of the Mass." Yet what Justin actually describes is a service far more nearly resembling an ultra-Protestant Communion than the modern Roman Mass; we may, of course, read all kinds of other things into it as a pure flight of fancy; but, so far as "full description" goes, Mr Belloc writes like a man who has never seen Justin's actual words. No doubt he has; but the present hypnotises him; he thinks inevitably (when he thinks carelessly) in terms of the modern Mass, the only conception of the Eucharist which he has ever really grasped. Even well-informed Roman Catholics naïvely take for Protestant innovations a good many things which Protestants have inherited from the Middle Ages; and it is difficult to say which is more mistaken, the modern Catholic who believes he is living as he would have lived in the thirteenth century, or the sceptic who boasted that he "knew nothing of the ages which knew nothing." The subtle temptations to exaggerate Catholic continuity may sometimes prove even more fatal than the grosser delusions of anti-clerical historians.

And there is another Catholic disability which is even more frequently ignored—that of comparative Bible-ignorance. The most distinguished University professors in that communion, men in Holy Orders, sometimes fail to recognise quite familiar phrases from their own Vulgate.[1] The very President of the present Papal Commission for the Correction of the Vulgate Text has not only blundered thus over well-known Pauline passages, when met with in other contexts, but has actually committed himself to ludicrous mistranslations of common Latin words occurring in the Vulgate, such as *præco*, *expers*, *consummare*. The whole story of this Vulgate revision is, indeed, almost incredible. Charles the Great, with Alcuin's help, did what no Pope or Council had attempted during the four centuries since Jerome, and produced as good a text as the circumstances permitted.[2] Yet the negligence of the higher ecclesiastical authorities suffered rapid contamination of these good texts; and, after more than four centuries again, we find Roger Bacon protesting to Clement IV. that a thorough revision of the Vulgate was one of the crying needs of the day. He complained that even the greatest of his fellow-philosophers, such as Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, were partially at the mercy of corrupt texts; and that the fitful efforts of his contemporaries (for the Friars had brought new life into Bible-study) had only made confusion worse confounded. "I cry unto God and unto your Holiness concerning this textual corruption; for you alone, under God, can bring a remedy. . . . For, if the letter be false, then are both literal and spiritual senses falsified."[3] But, even if Clement had lived longer, he would have done nothing effectual. The only really scientific "correctorium" of the Middle Ages was produced by a private scholar of Bacon's school; and it exists now in very few MSS. When, long after the invention of printing, Cardinal Ximenes attempted a revision, this was a great step forward. The first official Papal edition came out in 1590; it was commended solemnly to the faithful, under anathema, as the only true text; yet in 1592 a fresh edition was published by Clement VIII., with equal solemnity, differing in more than 3000 places from its predecessor. "From 1592 to our own day, scarce any attempt has been made to revise the true text of the Latin Bible; and the Vulgate, even at the present moment, is the worst published and least known book in Latin literature."[1]

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[1] I may refer for details to the Appendix to the 2nd edition of my *Medieval Studies* (1st series) and to my *From St Francis to Dante*, 2nd edition, p. 356.

[2] *See* S. Berger, *De l'Histoire de la Vulgate en France* (Paris, 1887), pp. 3 ff.

[3] *Opus Tertium*, ed. Brewer, pp. 92 ff. The Dominican Denifle, perhaps the most learned medievalist of our day, confessed the justice of this criticism.

Although, then, a considerable Bible-ignorance is common to the Roman Catholic Church of Bacon's day and of our own, yet it puts the modern Romanist at a great disadvantage in studying his forefathers. For a considerable number of exceptional men, like St Bernard, knew the Vulgate, and thought in terms of the Vulgate, as truly as Bunyan possessed the letter and the spirit of our English version. It might be argued, indeed, that the *élite* of really educated and earnest medieval ecclesiastics knew their Bible, as a whole, better than their modern representatives. And, beyond this, a great deal of medieval thought—even legal and political—was based upon Biblical words and ideas which may not always have been recognised as directly Biblical by those who used them. Therefore, although the enormous majority of the faithful laity, and even a majority of the priesthood, were more ignorant of the sacred text than it is easy for us to conceive,[2] yet Bible-ignorance on our part is almost as fatal to the complete comprehension of those people as our historical ignorance would be to a comprehension of their historically-ignorant minds.

And this is a still worse disadvantage when we attempt to compare medieval with modern religious thought, and to estimate the social significance of post-Reformation developments. Mr Belloc, therefore, is no judge, but simply a passionate advocate, when he tells us of early Protestantism that "for authority it could find nothing but a printed book, a translation of the *Hebrew* Scriptures."[3] He show astounding ignorance of familiar Pauline texts in contending: "It is important to remember that [the ordinary Roman of from A.D. 190 to 270] would never have regarded the legal distinctions between slave and free as a line of cleavage between different kinds of men. It was a social arrangement and no more" (p. 58). Writing under these limitations, he misses a great truth which was plain to Michelet, that the Englishman or Scot, who has so often been ready to go everywhere "avec sa Bible et son Anglaise," has found in these two things, if nowhere else, enough spiritual and domestic comfort to fill his whole life. The Catholic is at least as much tempted to ignore what the Bible has done for society, as we are tempted to undervalue the Church.

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[1] Berger, *l.c.*, p. 16: this was written in 1887.

[2] See M. Deanesly, *The Lollard Bible* (1920), especially chapter vi.

[3] P. 311; italics are mine; *cf.* p. 323.

It is difficult for us to conceive the horror with which even so broad-minded a scholar as Sir Thomas More regarded any revolt against the only Church he knew. To him, heresy seemed essentially subversive of all society, civil as well as religious; he was convinced that the triumph of Lutheranism would spell not only damnation in the next world but bankruptcy and barbarism in this.[1] Therefore even this extraordinarily broad-minded, learned, and humane man thought the existing penal laws not severe enough; he had already done God service by burning heretics, and was ready to burn as many more as should be necessary. If they should multiply beyond the control of sword and faggot, if heretics should ever be bold and numerous enough to take up arms in self-defence, More had no doubt of the issue; the orthodox would arm themselves and exterminate them. All this was natural enough in More, who, with all his greatness and saintliness, was a man of his time. When Mr Belloc boasts that "the sword fits the hand of the Church, and Catholicism is never more alive than when it is in arms" (p. 297), here again we make allowance for his mood; he speaks loudly to encourage himself. But it is very difficult to understand how he, with all the history of the past four centuries to instruct him, can write almost as More would have written: "The Reformation is simply the turning back of that tide of Roman culture which, for 700 years, had set steadily forward and had progressively dominated the insufficient by the sufficient, the slower by the quicker, the confused by the clear-headed" (p. 294). He is here claiming ground which the clear-headed Newman took care not to claim;[2] nor does he, so far as I can see, make the least attempt to justify this tirade by any historical evidence except cheap, vague, and tedious abuse of Germany, and by a strangely perverse enumeration of Roman and non-Roman populations to which I shall presently return. He practically ignores Christ's own test: *By their fruits ye shall know them.* He constantly exhorts us to use our imagination: let us for once appeal to his own. Suppose a visitor from another planet to go round the Western world (including, of course, the two Americas) in order to discover which of these populations, four centuries ago, had broken away from God's direct guidance, had ceased to obey God's Vicegerent on earth, had committed themselves to a revolt of barbarism against culture, and had been suffering all these centuries from moral and spiritual anarchy. Would not our visitor's first difficulty be to find any obvious and decisive symptoms of this barbarism? and, if we compelled him to judge between population and population, would he always put the Catholics on the better side?

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[1] More's *English Works*, 1557, pp. 866 *c*, 870 *c*, 901 *b*, 992 *b*.

[2] See especially No. VIII. of his lectures on *Difficulties felt by Anglicans*.

Nor need we appeal only to the imagination; for we have historical facts. In all the things that matter most in life (leaving the disputed point of religious faith aside), did post-Reformation France gradually outstrip, or did she fall behind, England, in comparison with what those two countries had been under a single faith? Do not the 5th and 8th of Voltaire's *Letters on England* express real and serious inferiority on the French side? And, if these contrasts are no longer true in our own day, does the France of our day still hold to the Faith of the Ancien Régime? Mr Belloc, turning away from this and other equally obvious questions, asks us to accept a theory paradoxical in itself, and supported by assertions partly only doubtful, partly quite untenable. For him, the main significance of the past nineteen centuries is that of Roman civilisation; the nations of "ancient Roman stock" were clear-headed and civilised; the rest were muddle-headed and barbarous; the Reformation was a revolt of these barbarous masses against their natural masters; and the very existence of modern Protestantism is an open sore which civilisation can no longer tolerate.[1] The one disaster which turned the scale in that revolt was the defection of Britain. This, however, was an "accident" (p. 285). Ireland, though not of ancient Roman stock, remained true to the Pope; but this, again, was "an accident, inexplicable or miraculous" (p. 27). Even the Greek Schism, for which such obvious theological reasons can be given, was "an accident, mainly geographical" (p. 290). That Poland, with still less Roman civilisation than Ireland, should be among the few Catholic populations of to-day, seems to pass even this facile explanation of accident or miracle; I cannot find that Mr Belloc makes any real attempt to account for it.

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[1] Except in so far as a few of them may serve the purpose of drunken helots; or, rather, of a prey for the Catholic eagle to whet his beak upon. Spain and Portugal "did not enjoy the religious wars which revivified France; and it may be urged that Spain would be the stronger to-day had it fallen to her task, as it did to the general populace of Gaul, to come to hand-grips with the Reformation at home, to test it, to know it, to dominate it, to bend the muscles upon it, and to re-emerge triumphant from the struggle" (p. 298). One of the great enemies of the Faith is "the indifference which is always common to a society long and profoundly Catholic and ignorant of heresy, or, having conquered heresy, ignorant at any rate of a struggle for the Faith" (p. 307).

The arguments by which he strives to prove that England is of ancient Roman stock are often very inconclusive; but this is a point which will interest most readers far less than it interests Mr Belloc. The real crux comes when he attempts to explain the "accident" of the English Reformation. He confesses, of course, to a good deal of corruption in the Church; but he writes as one who cannot realise, even remotely, the comparative forces of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, either here or on the Continent. His choice of the demand for communion in both kinds as a typical protest, and the proof he builds upon it of the absence of "any philosophical driving power behind heresy" (p. 275), would suffice in itself to prevent our taking his picture of the medieval Church seriously. Fortified with this and similar preconceptions, he is able to convince himself that the bankruptcy of the Ancien Régime in religion had little to do with the English Reformation. This revolt he traces to three peculiar causes, of which the second (which he admits to be of minor importance) seems merely doubtful. His two main causes seem worse than doubtful. Stated in the loose and rhetorical language which Mr Belloc affects, and appealing not only to a religious party but also to the present discontents of the proletariat,[1] they have a superficial plausibility which vanishes under that "special attention" which the author claims for them (p. 300).

The first cause is, that the English "squires had already become too powerful"; "an oligarchy" had acquired "considerable power over the Courts of Law and over the soil of the country"; "a rich avaricious class was already empowered to act in Britain." This class was "tainted with atheism" (pp. 301–303). But who are the men whom Mr Belloc here discredits under the insidious designation of squires and oligarchs? Does he mean *all* the English landlords? or the greater landlords only (*i.e.* the barons)? or only those who stood between the baron and the yeoman — the Squire Westerns and the Squire Pastons? If he means *all*, his generalisation is patently false; the landowners of England had been more truly an oligarchy in earlier centuries, and had had more power over the soil and the law courts, than under the Tudors. If Mr Belloc means the *barons* only, the same objection holds good. If he means the third class, the simple squires and smaller knights of the shire, he must produce some sort of historical evidence for his contention. Nobody who has studied the Paston Letters can imagine that those Norfolk squires had the same power in the law courts as the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk and Lord Moleyns; indeed, their failure to get legal protection and redress against the most obvious injustices of those great men is one of the commonplaces of social history. They were at an equal disadvantage in questions of power over the soil or the tenantry. Their class constituted far less of a powerful oligarchy, in any true sense, than William the Conqueror's lords, or the barons who rose against John and Henry III. Their wealth was not comparable to the wealth of those barons. Their atheism is simply a flight of Mr Belloc's fancy; we find far more infidelity in the great centres of Italian culture, and at the University of Paris, than anywhere in England. That, indeed, is another obvious difficulty which Mr Belloc simply ignores; the hotbeds of pre-Reformation heresy were far less the "barbarous" districts upon which he would fasten the guilt of the Reformation than the centres of European life and thought—Tuscany, Lombardy, Languedoc, and the great cities of the Rhineland, with their unbroken centuries of Roman and medieval civilisation; together with universities like Paris and Oxford, Bologna and Padua. In England, London and most of the great cities were Lollard centres; while the pro-Catholic rebellions were confined to the far West and North (always the most barbarous parts), and to Lincolnshire, which had less of Roman culture than the counties which sent their contingents to support the King. Where Mr Belloc, again, talks of the Reformation as being the sort of thing to affect "certain mountain valleys in Switzerland" (p. 285), he is at variance with the plainest facts. The cities of Switzerland welcomed the new ideas; Catholicism has survived mainly in the mountains. Therefore, even though his classification of Roman and non-Roman populations were far more accurate and less arbitrary than it is, the logical conclusion would be very different from that which he draws. We should be compelled to decide that Catholicism is a delicate creed suited only for peculiar conditions; barbarism bluntly revolts against it, and the highest culture pays it lip-homage, but smiles. Mr Belloc's peculiar thesis does less real justice to his Church than the more reasonable of the Protestant theories, which always allow to the Roman Catholics an honourable place *inter pares.*

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[1] With which, it may be well to explain, I sympathise as strongly as Mr Belloc; I only repudiate his diagnosis of the causes and his suggested remedy. He is practically developing William Cobbett's well-worn thesis, but without that downright farmer's excuse for a narrow view.

No less mistaken is his second main cause of the Reformation—Tudor despotism. The "New Monarchy" in England was only despotic in comparison with later Plantagenet monarchy; it was far less so than that of orthodox France. The English were not tricked or bullied out of their faith by Henry VIII.; and their change of religion is not answerable for present social and economic inequalities. Those tendencies against which we are struggling to-day are far older than the Reformation; and Henry's breach with Rome was popular in two senses: first, that many had hoped for it long before he was born, and secondly, that, when the crisis came, far greater numbers were perfectly willing to stand by and see the change accomplished. Professor A. F. Pollard and Mr H. A. L. Fisher have brought this out so plainly that no man writing in the year 1920 has any right to ignore their evidence without producing a single rebutting reference or quotation. While Continental princes had great standing armies to enforce their will, Henry had only a bodyguard of a hundred archers.

It only remains to note one more of Mr Belloc's "causes," which, however, to do him justice, he does not class with these other two as absolutely essential to our comprehension of the subject. Henry "blundered" into the breach with Rome through carnal lust (pp. 304–5). Yet there was nothing to prevent his indulging in the same promiscuous and open concubinage which characterised the courts of orthodox princes in this and many succeeding generations; and, at one point, the Pope actually proposed as one possible solution that Henry should have two wives simultaneously.[1] So far as Henry's divorce was responsible for the breach, the root must be sought not in his libidinous desires but in his political necessities; he needed a legitimate male heir to secure his throne. It is strange that we should be driven so often to repeat this very obvious correction.

Let me end by briefly opposing to Mr Belloc's thesis the reflections of a student of medieval documents who never hestates to admit that the Church was, on the whole, the most beneficent institution of the Middle Ages; but whose main complaint is that she has never patiently suffered the co-existence of rival missionary institutions.

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[1] *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII.*, vol. vi. No. 6627; *cf.* 6705 and App. 261. It is extremely probable that the Pope's proposition was only a ruse; but even this would be enough to destroy Mr Belloc's contention. This, again, is so clearly brought out by Professor Pollard that there can be no excuse for ignoring it.

(1) On the one hand, we find a series of complaints from the greatest and most orthodox churchmen, for at least four centuries before the Reformation. These ecclesiastics represent the corruption of their own Church as intolerable; they cry bitterly for radical and immediate reform; and they often prophesy some catastrophic revolt as the only alternative. Frequently, also, they assign as one of the main causes of heresy the evil lives of the clergy, from the Pope downwards. (2) On the other hand, reforms were attempted; but these were always partial and short-lived; some had even no very deep root of sincerity, like the monastic reforms of the notoriously unchaste Pius II. or Wolsey. (3) Meanwhile, the only thing that kept heresy within bounds was persecution—increasingly cruel and systematic in proportion as milder or more sporadic efforts failed. (4) Such persecution was logically defended then, and is often palliated by modern apologists, on the plea that the truth of Catholicism is not relative but absolute; that this creed could not be content with a mere *primatia inter pares*, even though such a primacy were granted; that it holds in a unique sense the keys of heaven and hell, and that the alternatives of heaven and hell are so awful as to outweigh all ordinary considerations. (5) Therefore, as a necessary consequence, persecution became more and more cruel and systematic in proportion to the growth of heresy: this is one of the few directions in which medieval civilisation did not advance, but went steadily from bad to worse for three centuries at least. (6) Though the Protestants, at first, were only one degree less intolerant than the orthodox, yet the very existence of large Protestant populations, who soon showed themselves inexterminable except by such wholesale and repeated slaughters as no civilised community could contemplate (and who, in the last resort, might even have conquered the Catholic powers in open warfare), began to reduce religious persecution on both sides to an absurdity; so that, in its cruder forms, it is almost unknown at the present day. (7) It yet remains to be proved—and Catholic apologists very seldom attempt to prove except by dogmatic assertions and *ex-parte* appeals—in what respects the world is worse for its present belief that even the best religious denomination is only *primus inter pares*; that one creed is not separated from another by all the distance between heaven and hell; and that all creeds will best commend themselves to humanity by abandoning the ancient methods of force, bluster, or pious fraud.

These points, so far as my experience goes, are almost universally ignored by modern Catholic writers on the Reformation.[1] They are not denied or combated; they are simply left alone.[2] Yet, if such things could be said of the history of any other great institution, would not its modern representatives hasten to put themselves right with the world by frankly avowing the general justice of past revolutions, and by making the best of a modern civilisation which, with all its imperfections, can no longer be fairly described in the language which St Bernard or Grosseteste applied to their own times? It is the rigorous chain of Infallibility which prevents the modern Roman Catholic from thus laying aside the weight of his own past, and running with patience the race that is set before us all. The case cannot be put more trenchantly than it was put by Newman, after nearly twenty years' experience of his new Church, to a friend who was anxious to found a Catholic Historical Review. "Nothing would be better" (replied the future Cardinal) "than an Historical Review for Roman Catholics—but who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one's facts, one would be thought a bad Catholic."[3] Monsignor Duchesne, perhaps the greatest of living Catholic historians, has seen his principal work put upon the *Index*. Their scholar of profoundest learning, Mabillon, very nearly shared the same fate, and was in fact compelled to suppress a preface in which he had unobtrusively hinted at strong evidence for monastic corruption as early as the twelfth century.[4] Mr Belloc, in spite of himself, is mainly dependent on what Newman called "doctored" history; his elaborate generalisations rest upon sand.[5]

G. G. COULTON.

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[1] Perhaps the most learned, and certainly the most candid, of these writers is P. Imbart de la Tour, who shows only the natural bias of an honest advocate, and who does not ignore the weight of the evidence against him. The only two who can compare with him in learning are J. Janssen and L. Pastor; but a closer scrutiny shows that they depend to a great extent on second-hand material, often untrustworthy and often undigested.

[2] Except so far as the corruption of the fifteenth-century Church is admitted; but even this is often so minimised as to render the apparently candid admission more misleading than a flat denial.

[3] *The Month*, Jan. 1903, p. 3.

[4] *Mélanges Mabillon* (1908), p. 101; E. de Broglie, *Mabillon* (1888), vol. ii. pp. 218 ff.

[5] *P.S.*—The above had already gone to press when I received, by the author's courtesy, a copy of Father W. H. Kent's article on "Catholic Truth and Historical Truth" (*Catholic Historical Review*, Oct. 1920, p. 275). While gladly confessing my agreement with very much that he says, I feel bound to add that he seems hardly to meet my main contentions.

ANTI-SEMITISM IN ENGLAND.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

THE growth of anti-Semitic feeling in England is one of the painful by-products of the War. Bitter things are said about the Jews now which would, I think, have been unheard of in any respectable quarter twenty years ago. One or two of the great London daily newspapers, and one of the most sober and venerable of the London weeklies, often indulge in disagreeable anti-Jewish observations and remarks. A famous monthly is even more openly and virulently "anti-Semitic." The causes of these phenomena are numerous and various; some are even inconsistent with others. But if you once heartily dislike anybody or anything, any stick will serve with which to beat the dog.

Racial, religious, and economic causes all contribute to the undesirable result. I cannot investigate these causes fully, for to do so would take far too long, and I should not be allowed the space. Moreover, I want to look at the matter in a somewhat different way.

European anti-Semitism largely depends upon the actual presence of Jews in the countries of Europe, and upon their claim to, or their possession of, complete civic, religious, and political equality. Let us assume that all the Jews of Europe chose to leave Europe, and to settle in an empty province of China, or in a large empty island in the Pacific Ocean. Let us assume that not a single Jew, whether by race or religion, was left behind. Anti-Semitism would obviously decrease. It would hardly come within practical politics. The hatred of the Jew is due to his contiguity and ubiquity, to his claim and desire to be a European, and to his actual presence in Europe. (For the sake of simplicity, I am taking no notice of America.) Few people hate the Chinese, so long as they are in China, and stay there. But if there were seven million Chinese who wanted to live in Europe in the same way, and on the same terms of perfect equality, as the Jews now live, or claim to live, in Europe, the feelings of Englishmen as regards the Chinese would undergo a change. So, too, if the same thing were to happen in the case of Zulus or Hottentots. Then, in spite of all the grand phrases which are used about the brotherhood of man, universal philanthropy, or the love of enemies, there would probably be much hostility, bitterness, and even hatred.

Now, hatred is one thing, but hostility is another. Hatred of persons is, perhaps, never justified; but there may, perhaps, be justified hostility. Let us set out some of the reasons why, in the assumed case of Chinese, Zulus, or Hottentots, such hostility and bitterness would arise. First of all, there would be the question of colour. And with that would go the dislike of a large group of men and women of a supposed lower or inferior race living in our midst, and claiming civic and political equality. For it would be said that these men and women have other ethical ideas and ideals than ours, and that ours are higher than theirs. They have also other religious ideas and ideals than ours, and ours are higher than theirs. Again, if they marry exclusively among one another, they are an alien body in the State, whereas the citizens of a given State should, so far as possible, be homogeneous. If, on the other hand, there is any mixture of races, the result is even worse. The progeny may, likely enough, have the vices of both parents and the virtues of neither. Economically, the presence of the alien group is bad, because they tend to undersell, and to work under evil conditions. Moreover, they would probably have a lower standard of comfort, and would tend to become larger in numbers as the years went on. France for the French; England for the English. There is now, in the most literal sense, no *room* for generosity to the alien.

Such would be the arguments. And can we say, with complete candour, that there is nothing in any one of them? A book such as Stoddart's *Rising Tide of Colour* may be exaggerated, but that its fears and its opinions are wholly negligible, he would be a bold man who would assert.

The question, therefore, presents itself: Can the case of the Jews be rightly regarded as on all fours with the assumed case of the Zulus and the Hottentots, or even with the assumed case of the Chinese? Are the Jews to be rightly put on a level with those others? If so, there seems something to be said for anti-Semitism and for the anti-Semites. Hardly, indeed, is there much to be said even then for the bitter hatred, and for the often hardly veiled incitements to pogroms in Eastern countries, which distinguish the most rabid of our western anti-Semites. But there *would* be a case for the dislike of having large bodies of Jews on equal terms, and on footings of complete freedom, in European countries.

Writing as a Jew, am I, then, to suppose that Jews are as different from Europeans as the Chinese, and as inferior to Europeans as the Hottentots?

Let me briefly go through the reasons which, in the assumed incursions of Zulus, Hottentots, and Chinese, would cause a more or less justified hostility.

The colour reason falls to the ground. Jews are no less "white" than their fellow-citizens of other creeds. They are neither yellow nor black, neither brown nor red. Then comes the question of race. It is very doubtful how far the Jews of Europe can be regarded as all belonging to one and the same race. It is doubtful what percentage of them, and what percentage of the blood of any one of them, could rightly be described as purely Semitic. Whether, however, the races, whatever they be, of which they are to-day composed, are lower in the scale of excellence than the "Alpine" or the "Mediterranean," not to mention the great "Nordics" themselves, I cannot discuss. Nor can I touch on the possibility that, among the infiltrations into the original Semitic stock that have happened through the ages, there are not, among existing Jews, some strains of all these various European races. What I think we may safely aver is that, be the original race or races of European Jews what they may, their blood has not prevented them, or does not now prevent them, from acquiring the virtues and the faults, the ideas and the ideals, the capacities and the limitations, of the Europeans among whom, for such a very large number of generations, they have continuously dwelt. The difference of race need make no material difference in mental endowment or in ethical outlook. It would seem to be true to say that the original or basic Jewish race was not so far removed from the original race or races of Christian Europeans as to prevent Jews being, or becoming, as good and valuable citizens of the European States as those in whom no trace of Semitic blood could be discerned.

Let us, however, look at the matter in a less theoretic, and much simpler, way.

It is possible that it may be accurate to speak of the Jews as possessing certain faults and certain virtues, but it is very doubtful how far these virtues and faults are due to race, and not far more due to environment, circumstance, or education. It is certain that both special virtues and special faults tend to disappear where the Jews live in a continuing environment of liberty and emancipation. In such an environment the Jews tend somewhat rapidly to acquire both the faults and the virtues of their neighbours, so that not only do French Jews tend to become different from English Jews, English Jews from Italian Jews, and so on, but French Jews tend to become much more like Christian Frenchmen than like English Jews, English Jews tend to become much more like Christian Englishmen than like Italian Jews, and so on.

It is doubtful whether the Jew is by "nature" more of a materialist, and less of an idealist, than the European Gentile. His "materialism," when it exists, is due to other causes than to blood. The long-continued persecution, degradation, and ostracism, from which an enormous percentage of European Jews has suffered for so many generations, have produced effects in character which cannot be effaced in a year. It is, indeed, wonderful how rapidly, in the sunshine of equality, these effects—the bad ones frequently, and occasionally, alas! the good—tend to disappear. There are special virtues and special vices which persecution, degradation, cruelty, and hatred are calculated to produce. At the one end of the scale, you get heroes; at the other end, you get scum. When the immensity of Jewish sufferings is considered—for no people, no religious community, has suffered as they, and yet survived—the marvel is that the scum is as small as it is, and that the spirit, courage, capacity, and joyousness of the "race" have not been broken and dulled for ever.

It is needless to specify the vices generated by persecution: the hunted, hated, and despised animal tends sometimes not to show towards his tormentors the virtues of truthfulness and affection. Even when the persecution is relaxed, the human nature may be warped. It is the next generation only who can acquire the virtues of equality. But if active persecution is supplanted by active hatred, it is more hard for these virtues to spring up. Anti-Semitism causes the very evils of which it then proceeds to complain. The alleged materialism of the Jews, their "loudness," their vulgarity, their love of money and jewellery, their ostentation, are also largely, though not entirely, the result of secular persecution and degradation. The Jew had only one idealism, his religion. Besides this he could have no other ambition, no other joy, no other relief from misery, than money and "external goods." When emancipated, and more especially when his religious belief is weakened, his unbroken spirit tends to rush to the full enjoyment of material things. But this tendency will disappear with better education, continued equality, the full participation in all other human idealisms and creations of the spirit, and, above all, with a religious revival. It is possible, though not certain, that the European Jew needs religion even more than the European Gentile—needs it, I mean, even more in order to keep pure and "spiritual" and simple and sweet. That is why the present writer is so tremendously keen on Liberal Judaism. That, however, is another story. But even as things now are, few will venture to say that the Jews *as a whole* are "morally" inferior to their Gentile neighbours. Nor are they physically degenerate. Give them a chance, and they soon become fond of athletic exercises and games. And if there is one native and indelible tendency in the Jewish race, it is their affection for their children and the willingness of the parents to make sacrifices for their offspring.

Anti-Semitic writers and newspapers in England to-day make great capital of the part which, as they allege, has been played, and is being played, by Jews in the Bolshevist movement in Russia, and in anarchic and anti-social movements throughout the world. The most frantic efforts are being made to ascribe the murder of the Czar and of his family entirely to Jewish agencies and to Jewish hands. That, in the event (which most decent persons desire) of the downfall of Bolshevist rule, such efforts will assuredly lead to the massacre of thousands of wholly innocent persons, is presumably not altogether to the distaste of those who make them.

Now, assuming that there is a certain sprinkling of Jews in the Bolshevist movement and in the anarchic and anti-social movements all over the world, and assuming, which is by no means certain, that among those who compassed, and among those who connived at, the detestable murders of the Czar and of his family was a small percentage of Jews, what follows as regards the general question of Jewish morality? Very little. At present, the Jewish Russian is, for his numbers, better educated than the Gentile Russian. In every Russian party which was, or is, antagonistic to the old *régime*, Jews were, or are, therefore, to be found out of proportion to their numbers. The deeper explanation of the presence of Jews among the Bolshevist party is to be sought in the continued persecution and degradation which Russian Jews have undergone. On the whole, the Jew is not revengeful or cruel, and it is a Talmudic saying that he who is unmerciful is no descendant of Abraham. But, as I have already urged, persecution breeds scum. If there are some men of Jewish race (not of Jewish faith, and not, therefore, by Jews recognised as Jews) who have yielded to the lust of revenge, is it for the Gentile, whose systematic persecution has brought this about, to marvel? Should the Gentile, by the virulence of hatred, add fuel to the fire? He who is ostracised from human society, and forbidden to be a citizen of the country in which he lives, may sometimes sink into becoming the enemy of all society and of every organised state. Forbidden the joy of patriotism, he would destroy patriotism throughout the world. Again, the Russian Jew, like his Gentile brother, has too often abandoned religion. But the Gentile has other spiritual resources; the hunted and persecuted Jew has none. It has, moreover, to be freely admitted that the higher fruits of liberty—order, self-control, moderation—are not to be won in a day. Transplant a Russian Jew of twenty to London or New York, and the heady wine of freedom may make him mistake licence for liberty. He may use freedom for evil ends. It speaks well for the Jews as a whole that such abuses and perversions are exceptional.

In any case, such instances of "Jewish iniquity" are no evidence against "Jewish" morality. One might more legitimately argue that it is Jewish morality which has made them few.

It may, however, be said that, though Jewish morality is a high morality, it is not the *same* morality as the morality of Christian Europe. The States of Christian Europe need one and the same type of morality throughout their borders. Here the anti-Semitic argument from morality becomes inseparably mixed up with the argument from religion.

I do not think that this argument can be regarded as not worthy of full respect and serious consideration. Europe *is* Christian. England is certainly a Christian country. It would not be unreasonable that Christians should dislike the presence in this country of a compact group of persons, claiming and possessing full civic and political rights and privileges, who belong to a religion wholly different from Christianity, and with moral ideas and ideals gravely different, even if not grossly inferior. Such might be the argument not unjustly used against the Hottentots and even the Chinese.

Against Judaism and the Jews the argument has, I think, little value. For the moral ideas and ideals of Christianity and Judaism are very nearly the same. The *highest* things in the

Old Testament, which, as a matter of fact, constitute the ethical elements in the religion of modern Jews, are in tune with the best ethical elements in the religious teaching of the New Testament and of Christianity. I do not deny that we find in the New Testament the command: "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you," but it is hardly for the anti-Semites to object to a religion the sacred scripture of which does not contain these sublime injunctions. *They*, at any rate, cannot think that these commands are of any practical importance. There is, without irony or sarcasm, just *enough* difference in the ethical teachings of Judaism and Christianity to be of stimulating value; there is *not* enough to cause the presence of the dissentient minority to be of the smallest ethical danger or disadvantage to the majority. If the Jew can rightly learn to admire and to appropriate the ethical ideals and efflorescence of the New Testament, the Christian could rightly learn to appropriate more fully the highest ideals and delicacies of the Old Testament and of the Rabbis. Does the one need to take to heart the saying: "Love is the fulfilment of the Law"? Does the other never need to obey the order: "Thou shalt love the resident alien as thyself"?[1] It is sometimes said that Judaism is *this*-worldly, while Christianity is *other*-worldly. The antithesis is false; but if there were anything in it, if it were true that Judaism was specially keen on making *this* world into a true kingdom of God, then Judaism would be entirely congruous with the prevailing spirit of modern Christianity. The truth is that the teaching of modern Judaism and modern Christianity as to this world and the next world ("the vestibule and the hall," as an old Rabbi called them) and their relations to each other have, to all intents and purposes, become the same. It would be idle to ask people with violently buzzing bees in their bonnets, such as the regular anti-Semites, to adopt any reasonable course. But if those who have milder prejudices would only consent to learn what modern Judaism actually teaches and holds, they would find that there is no ethical objection to the presence of Jews in Christian environments. The Congregational Union has recently issued an interesting liturgy for optional use in the Congregational churches. Among the prayers which they have incorporated is a long litany written not more than eighteen years ago by the late Rabbi Simeon Singer for the services of the Jewish Religious Union. That does not look as if the spiritual and religious ideals of modern Jew and modern Christian were so very different from one another. Would the readers of this Review like to have before them another very brief prayer from the same gifted pen? Is it of Hottentot level?—

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[1] Leviticus xix. 34. The Hebrew word "ger," translated "stranger" in the Authorised Version and Revised Version, means literally "resident alien."

> "Thou whose infinite power and wisdom are reflected in the infinite varieties of Thy creation, we see Thy handiwork also in the differences that prevail in the minds of men. We pray to Thee for all men, Thy children, our brethren. Take them all under the sheltering wings of Thy love. And may we, recognising that divergences of thought and belief are of Thine implanting, strive the more zealously to be one in charity and forbearance, one in the desire to know and do Thy will. Amen."

But even if the religious objection falls, the "foreign body" argument remains. The Jews refuse to marry their Gentile neighbours, and an unassimilated and unassimilable foreign body in the State is considered a disadvantage. The extremer anti-Semites find objections in both directions, for if and when the Jews do marry "Gentiles," it is alleged that the purity of the Gentile race suffers. The Jew is once more equated with the Zulu or the Chinese, and the offspring of Jew and Gentile is regarded as the offspring of white and yellow, or white and black. I will not touch upon this objection, which I believe to be unfounded and inadmissible, but as one who, for purely religious reasons, still desires the Jew to mate only with the Jew, or with the proselyte to Judaism, I will confine myself to the other.

Now, if the Jewish reluctance to marry the Gentile had any other than a religious root, Christian hostility would be perfectly justified. For then it might be argued that this very reluctance proves that a Jew cannot be a perfect French, Danish, or German patriot, as the case may be. But it has *no* other root than religion. A small minority can maintain its identity and distinctiveness in no other way. Let Jews intermarry freely with men and women of other faiths, and in a few generations Judaism must disappear. And a good thing too, would say the anti-Semites. Yes, but those who believe in Judaism and its mission cannot say so. Yet the purely religious reason for the reluctance to intermarriage takes away its political sting. It does nothing to impair the fullness and intensity of Jewish patriotism. To the Jew (except to that dangerous modern creation, the nationalist Jew), what makes a man a Jew is religion; and just as he who abandons or denies Judaism is to the Jew no Jew, be his race and ancestry what they may, so is he who has adopted Judaism a Jew in the fullest sense of the word, be his blood and lineage Aryan or Semitic. I will not waste words as to Jewish patriotism. It is difficult for an English Jew to write upon the subject with restraint. Suffice it to say that the blood which the Jews shed for England in the Great War was no less gladly offered than the blood of the purest Aryan or "Nordic" in the land. Treat the Jews as equal citizens, and you will have no cause to regret it; you will soon have reason to appreciate the fervour of their patriotism. What is rather wonderful is that in thousands of cases the patriotism has not been wanting, even when the citizenship was in default. It cannot, however, be denied that the volume and intensity of anti-Semitic hatred have in some quarters inclined some Jews to despair, and to throw up the sponge. Hence the growth of Zionism and of Jewish nationalism, which, at bottom, are a surrender to our enemies and to their contention that the Jews themselves admit that they cannot become, and that they do not want to become, citizens of the countries in which they dwell. Whatever the future of Palestine, the welfare of the immense majority of Jews depends upon those who refuse to surrender or to despair. Citizens we are, and citizens we claim to be; and not only citizens, but worthy citizens, who love, and mean to love, their European country and their European homes.

A few words must suffice as to economic objections: these, to some extent, cancel one another.

On the one hand, the Jews are disliked because they are capitalists and financiers, lovers of wealth and of money; international financiers, moreover, who promote militarism, reaction, and darkness. On the other hand, they are disliked because of their poverty, their low standard of comfort, their prolificness, their tendency to sweat and be sweated, to undercut and undersell. But they are also, as we have seen, disliked because they are the too violent enemies of the capitalist, because they are wild and anarchic socialists and communists, the plotters of red revolution and of ruin. So far as there is any truth in one, or other, or all of these allegations, they are the fruit and issue of disabilities and degradation. What occupations and professions were open for centuries to the Jew except the lower forms of acquisition? When other occupations and professions are open to them, it is not found that Jews are slow to take advantage of these newer opportunities.

They soon learn the higher standards of comfort; it is even curious that among the Jewish critics of themselves there are some who think that Jews have a tendency to raise this standard unnecessarily high. Give the Jews freedom and justice, and even a short respite from hatred and prejudice, and there is no reason to suppose that these various products of disabilities and persecution will not entirely disappear. If a group of men have *no* country, how can they learn loyalty to *any* country? Where every man's hand is against you, you may be tempted to hit back. It does no good, but you may yield to the temptation. And these evil passions cannot be overcome by all in the twinkling of an eye. Is it too much to ask from Christendom, in return for centuries of persecution, a few years of patience? Certain ugly characteristics of the hunted animal — fear, cunning, untruthfulness — may have shown themselves in a few Jews who had not yet learnt to love and care for England. But the Jew learns very quickly. Indicate to him that you *want* him to learn, that you will *welcome* his learning. Even as things are, the learning is going on apace. At this very moment, in the far east of London, taught by one of the finest Jewish Englishmen alive, the sons of the alien are learning

> "to set the cause above renown,
> To love the game beyond the prize."

They are learning

> "to count the life of battle good,
> And dear the land that gave them birth,
> And dearer yet the brotherhood
> That binds the brave of all the earth."

Give them only a little encouragement; a little surcease from suspicion and hatred; a little breathing space; a little time.

Anti-Semitism tends to make the people it hates at last worthy of hatred. For hatred will at last breed hatred, and suspicion will breed suspicion. Equality, fairness, love: these are curative. To make the Jews as like you as possible, treat them as you treat any other English citizens. They will soon resemble you—in your very failings as well as in your virtues!

Meanwhile, the lesson for the Jews is always the same. First: Cast not off religion; for in religion—in a living harmony of religious belief and religious practice—lies your true salvation. Secondly: Never despair; keep to your old ideal—Englishmen of the Jewish faith: nothing less, nothing more.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

London,

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SCIENCE AND LIFE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1920, p. 101.)

I.

Dr Schiller, in his interesting and racy article on Professor Soddy's book, *Science and Life*, has dealt with what he takes to be the real aim of the work, viz. to show us how to take life scientifically. He has also touched upon the professed aim of the work—"to tomahawk the humanities"; and it is on this aspect that I wish, if I may, to add a few supplementary remarks.

Professor Soddy is one of those vigorous and provocative writers who use words as hoplites to smash an entry for ideas by violence. The method has its advantages, though it is not always necessary to launch a punitive expedition of a heavily armed troop of words to batter down an unoffending reader's preconceptions and prejudices without so much as an attempt at preliminary negotiation. Such expeditions are not invariably successful. Moreover, the time is past when the originator of a new or unpopular view need fear with Harvey "lest he have mankind for his enemies." Therefore, to many, Professor Soddy's onslaught on the "humanities" and the older learning will appear unnecessary. His strong and urgent advocacy of the claims of science at the expense of the gentler learning will needlessly antagonise those more moderate thinkers who are in sympathy with his main thesis, and who fully recognise the increasingly important part which science is playing and must play in the affairs of to-day, but who are unconvinced that it cannot attain its rightful place except at the price of their much-loved "humanities." It is an inspiring spectacle, this latter-day, dim, mysterious battle of the Arthur of science to wrest from Nature, on behalf of mankind, her ultimate secrets. It would be not a whit less inspiring if the knights of the Round Table of science were to emulate not only the courage of a Lancelot but also his gentleness.

Yet, when the smarting has a little subsided, if we emulate the example of Lewis Carroll's character and "look again," I think we shall see that the instrument of chastisement in the Professor's hands is not really a tomahawk but a vigorously wielded slipper. It is, of course, very humiliating to be slippered, but devotees of the humanities may take comfort when they remember that the great Hercules himself had to submit to certain "stimulations of his muscular integument" from a similar instrument (or what corresponded to it in those days) brandished by Omphale. But Professor Soddy does lay on a little too heavily when he says that science owes but little to the past. Even "philosophies" that have come down to us from not much later than "the day of the wooden horse of Troy" have more than once proved a source of inspiration and encouragement to a new and original mind of a later day. The frank acknowledgment by Copernicus of his debt to Pythagoras and Aristarchos is a well-known case in point. Old wine is not necessarily unfit for new bottles.

The thought of man is not to be likened to the old atomic conception of matter as a series of detached and indivisible entities. It is rather a continuum, a flowing stream, originating in and fed by unnumbered streamlets; now coursing smooth and tranquil, now in turbulent spate from the accession of some sudden flood of waters. But it is the same stream. The cold light of science takes on a warmer glow when the worker is sympathetically aware that the same questionings which he is engaged in answering revolved with lesser radius in some distant brain of long ago. So to think is a corrective of that common mood of chill aloofness which seems to regard the history of the generations as that of a series of dead bodies "which time hath piled up at the gate of death." Rich generalisations yet lie buried in our histories of science, awaiting the advent of what Coleridge termed the "esemplastic" type of mind. There is something dim and mysterious to be sensed in these records, and it is irresistibly suggested to a reader that there are laws governing discovery other than those generally admitted, the clear enunciation of which might do much to clear the path and shorten the labours of the moderns. And we want more, not less, imagination, even in science, as Professor Soddy has himself admitted in a remarkable passage in another work. The story of science is full of instances where an investigator, after long voyagings, found himself apparently marooned on a desert island of fact cut off from all access to the main continent of truth. Yet the means of communication all the time lay open before his eyes, had they not been holden so that he could not see. The disciplined imagination in such cases might have taken on the function of a third and clearer eye. And what better nourishment for the imagination can be provided than that accruing from a study of the despised "humanities"? Perhaps there will yet come a time when the poet will assist the scientist in his laboratory, and a Lucretius may yet earn his salt!

Even if the only result of a *rapprochement* between some of our scientific workers and the politer learning were to be the gradual dawn of a conviction that good science need not necessarily be written in bad English, we might yet welcome a "crowning mercy" greater than Worcester.

It is impossible to resist one final piece of banter. It has been jestingly said that there are not more than seven original plots. It would appear that there are not many more original ideas. For his sins, Professor

Soddy, in enunciating his theory of what may be termed "the conservation of souls" (*Science and Life*, pp. 151–152), might almost be paraphrasing certain passages in the *Phædo* and the *Republic* (cf. *Phædo*, ch. xvii.; *Republic*, book x. ch. xi.).

E. W. ADAMS.

II.

This interesting article touches the very foundation of our being, with its plea for the treatment of science *as a whole*, instead of in parts. But when Dr Schiller points out the necessity for self-control to go hand-in-hand with the development of science, as we understand it, and observes that "this would demand the construction of a really efficacious science of ethics, which would not be content to rehearse time-worn platitudes about (inapplicable) 'principles,' but would be willing to tackle *la bête humaine*, and, in co-operation with an operative psychology and a eugenical biology, would remould man into a creature such as he never yet has been, viz. one able to control and harmonise his passions," I think an example might be found amongst Hindus.

If we listened less to missionary tales of the side of Hinduism which rightly or wrongly shocks our Christian instincts, ceased to refer to the Hindu as a "native" (which word carries with it a world of ignorant contempt), and if, instead, we made a scientific study of their mode of life, eugenics (which help to produce their wonderfully developed brain-power, and comparative freedom from lunacy), diet, as affecting character, and system of hygiene, we might discover that the Hindu had actually achieved the remoulding of man to a large extent, and that he *has* learnt to control and harmonise his passions. He alone seems to have grasped the science of being, and to see things *as a whole*, and not in sections. But he does not give away his knowledge, unless it is asked for (see *Anglo-Indian Studies*, p. 21, S. M. Mitra).

Our pride of conquest causes us to imagine that we cannot learn from a people outwardly conquered by force of arms, but the fact remains that there are unexplored mines of knowledge relating to *la bête humaine* and to the essence of life, if sought for from that ancient but virile people.

LONDON.

D. CHAPLIN.

"MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 776.)

I SHOULD like to state that I am in agreement with the first criticism passed by R. H. Thouless on my article. The assertion that "*every* experience the individual has passed through is stored within the psyche" is too sweeping. At the same time it would, I think, be acknowledged by psychologists and psychotherapists that when an attempt is made to revive lost memories, some one of the methods employed, by no means always the same one, almost invariably succeeds.

With regard to the second criticism, my article was written in the full understanding that Freud uses the term "sexual" with an extended meaning, and including the psychic as well as the somatic instinct. I do not in consequence hold that it covers, or can be made to cover, everything included in the word "love," even as ordinarily understood. The love between parent and child, or between brother and sister, is not, in normal persons, of the same kind as that between men and women who are "lovers"; and to regard the pleasurable experience of a baby sucking at the breast as sexual, honestly appears ridiculous to most people. Further, if my critic will re-read the second paragraph on p. 784 of the July *Hibbert Journal*, he will find that I there give the reason why Freud's unmodified conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, viz. because the first subjects of psycho-analysis, those on observation of whom he founded his conclusions, were in a morbid condition either of body or mind, or both. I quote the few sentences of my article referring to this part of the subject: "Such extreme conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, and they have probably arisen because all the first subjects of psycho-analysis were in a morbid condition. It is not wise to generalise from such premisses alone; nor even when normally healthy subjects are also taken into account is there certainty with the Freudian school that knowledge of mental states ascertained to be true in those whose conditions were pathological, has not unduly influenced the conclusions reached with regard to the healthy. It is the case that many psychologists of eminence have been unable to accept extreme Freudian conclusions."

I cannot agree that there is "no lower or higher in human nature," although it is true that the "lower" instincts, namely, those which we share with animals, are as entirely innocent in us as in them on one condition: that in us they are kept under voluntary restraint and control, otherwise they degenerate into the licence which is the worst foe of liberty. It is not exclusively for the sake of society that the sexual instinct needs restraint. To the individual also its unrestricted indulgence would be inimical, not because it is unholy—nothing natural is that—but because it is not really *human* unless it transcends and transforms that in the natural which is below the human stage.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

"A TEACHING CHURCH."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1920, p. 123.)

THE article by Dr A. C. M'Giffert, in the October *Hibbert Journal*, contains (p. 131) the following amongst many other interesting passages: "The Vatican dogma of papal infallibility, from which so much was expected by many of the faithful, seems only to have condemned the successor of Peter to inglorious silence."

I think this sentence evinces a misunderstanding of the dogma in question, and therefore—especially as the subject is important not only in itself but also as affecting the divisions amongst Christians,—I would suggest the following considerations.

In the first place, ought not the doctrine to be regarded, not as an isolated thing, but in its historical perspective? The sentence which I have quoted above would seem to imply that the Vatican Council's definition was the conferring of a new prerogative on the Holy See, and that therefore things previously unknown might have been expected to result. No Catholic theologian would look upon it, however, as anything of the kind, but all would say it was simply a clearer verbal explanation of a function belonging to the Holy See from the beginning. "The Vatican Council," say Wilhelm and Scannell (*A Manual of Catholic Theology*, vol. i. p. 94), "[was] completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, the Second Council of Lyons, and the Council of Florence, and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas." Indeed, the *catena* could be carried further than this, and could be linked on to our Lord's words recorded in such places as Matt. xvi. 18–19; John xxi. 15–17; Luke xxii. 31–32, etc.; but my object here is not to elaborate Scriptural or other arguments, but simply to draw out the correct meaning of the 1870 definition, in view of a misapprehension. That definition merely explained the nature of an always-existent prerogative; new, strange, or startling results could, then, hardly be expected of it.

"Papal infallibility is a negative protection. We are confident that God will not allow a certain thing to happen; that is all." "God will take care that he [the Pope] does not commit the whole Church to [error]" (Father Adrian Fortescue, *The Early Papacy to the Synod of Chalcedon*, p. 22).

"Infallibility does not mean inspiration, . . . but that *when* the Pope decides a point of faith or morals *ex cathedra* he shall decide it truly" (Father Ryder, *Catholic Controversy*, 11th ed., p. 32).

"The Vatican Council only requires us to believe that God protects him [the Pope] from error in definitions of faith or morals when he imposes a belief on the Universal Church" (Addis and Arnold, *Catholic Dictionary*, ed. 1917, p. 676).

From this it will be seen that those who looked upon the 1870 definition as beginning a new and "magically oracular" stage of Church history were viewing the matter wrongly both in theology and in relation to historic perspective.

With regard, however, to the idea that the result has been "inglorious silence," surely this statement overlooks a fundamental factor. In Church history there have, of course, been numerous actual personal definitions by Popes: as late, for instance, as the Immaculate Conception in 1854 (? and *Apostolicæ Curæ* in 1896). We must remember, however, that infallibility also extends to confirmations of the *de fide* decisions of Councils. "The infallibility of general councils, *so confirmed*, follows from that of the Church. 'What God,' says St Athanasius, 'has spoken through the Council of Nicæa remains for ever'" (Addis and Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 237). Considering the otherwise bewildering and contradictory history of Councils (Catholic and heretical), it seems plain that only by such confirmation (whether at once or ultimately) can the true be separated from its opposite. The Papal prerogative, then, far from being "ingloriously dumb," would appear as the key of Church history, and the guarantee of verity; and this is illustrated by the unity where it is believed as contrasted with the confused conditions elsewhere.

J. W. POYNTER.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

The Rev. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

The eleventh volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (T. & T. Clark) appears with welcome punctuality. It is a tribute to the perseverance and skill of its editors and publishers that this invaluable work is being carried on with unabated care and without any diminution of excellence. The present volume, "Sacrifice—Sudras," happens to include some of the most important subjects in theology. There are the usual number of articles upon philosophy and science, including two notable papers on the Sceptics and Socrates by Professor Burnet, an illuminating account of the Latter-day Saints by Professor I. W. Riley, and a useful survey of Socialism by Dr S. A. Mellor; there are also articles on Spiritism, as Mr Schiller prefers to call "spiritualism," and Second Adventism, by Professor S. J. Case, which are of real service, although the former is too compressed. But for the purposes of this survey it is only needful to call attention to the leading articles on various aspects of theology.

The Old Testament is illustrated by articles on the Samaritans, by Professor W. J. Moulton; the Scribes, by the present writer; the Sadducees, by Professor G. H. Box; and the Semites, by Professor G. A. Barton. Professor Box agrees with Geiger that the Sadducees originally were Zadokites, and regards the Zadokite documents as "the Messianic manifesto of a party or section of the Sadducees," thus denying Kohler's interpretation. In the composite article on Sacrifice, Professor R. A. S. Macalister deals with Semitic sacrifice in its forms and origin, while Dr Moses Gaster describes the Jewish ideas of sacrifice after the Fall of Jerusalem. The general attitude towards sacrifice in Israel is trenchantly discussed by Professor Kennett in *The Interpreter* (July, pp. 251–263), and in a small pamphlet, *Deuteronomy and the Decalogue*, which is issued by the Cambridge University Press at a preposterous price. He argues that Jeremiah the radical held aloof from Josiah's reformation, because it tolerated sacrifice at the central shrine, instead of abolishing it altogether. The king was antagonistic to the immoral practices which gathered round sacrifice, but Jeremiah considered it a bold lie to claim any divine sanction whatever for sacrifice. "A lying pen of scribes hath dealt falsely" (viii. 8), and this refers to J, recently published. The decalogue of Deuteronomy was meant to supersede the decalogue of JE, and therefore there is significance in the words "he added no more" (Deut. v. 22); the real decalogue was not accompanied by any Levitical legislation about obligatory sacrifices. If it is argued that Deuteronomy does contain some sacrificial elements, Professor Kennett replies that, "after the purification of sacrifice from its grosser associations, the school of Jeremiah that survived the prophet would not retain the evident antagonism to all sacrifice which he had felt, and might even be willing to acquiesce in the Deuteronomic law," content to have the emphasis laid on ethics instead of on ritual. But this evident antagonism hardly fits all Jeremiah's utterances, *e.g.* xvii. 26, and, psychologically, it is not essential as the clue to his position. However, it is useful to have this interpretation stated forcibly, and especially to be reminded that (*a*) "at least till the time of Nehemiah and indeed much later there was as great a difference of opinion among those who professed the religion of Jehovah as there is among Christians at the present time"; and (*b*) that "in the whole of the Old Testament there is not one single hint that sacrifice is a type of a more perfect method of atonement." In the *Revue Biblique* (October), Father Vincent publishes a historical and geographical study of Gen. xxiii. 1–20, which is valuable on account of its exact local knowledge; Professor Burney (*Journal of Theological Studies*, July, pp. 319–325) unearths an acrostic poem upon Judas Maccabæus in 1 Macc. iii.; and Dr K. Kohler (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, October), in an essay on "The Essenes and the Apocalyptic Literature," endeavours to show that the Essenes were not remote from the apocalyptic movement in pre-Christian Judaism, as is commonly alleged, but that they emanated from the "esoteric circle of the Hasidim." Dr C. Ryder Smith, in his *Bible Doctrine of Society* (T. & T. Clark), includes the New Testament, but the bulk of his well-arranged book is devoted to a survey of the Old Testament ideas and customs before, under, and after the monarchy. Dr Smith naturally deduces the sociology from the theology. He treats institutions and habits as they are found within Israel, not as they may have originated outside. He has an excellent chapter upon Accommodation, as necessitated by the presence of ideals which had been outgrown. Indeed, his handbook is of real educational value, in a province of research where there is apt to be a considerable amount of loose thinking and talking. The closeness with which it adheres to the text of Scripture will make it useful for teachers.

There is less than usual in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* that is specifically related to the New Testament, although Mr G. N. L. Hall, in a comprehensive study of Simon Magus, notices how historical analysis of the sources tends to "vindicate the authenticity of" Luke's account in Acts viii. 9–24. In *The Interpreter* (October), Dr R. H. Charles discusses "Christ's Teaching on Divorce," apropos of Mark x. 2–12 and the parallel in Matt. xix. 1–12, arguing that Mark "takes no cognisance of the case of adultery, but only of the other inadequate grounds advanced for divorce," and that Matthew's narrative, with its additions, preserves the real meaning of Jesus, who "allows the right of divorce on the ground of adultery, as well as subsequent re-marriage on the part of the guiltless person concerned, but forbids divorce on any lesser ground, as well as the re-marriage of those divorced on any such lesser ground." Mr G. H. Whitaker (*Expositor*, October, November), on "The Philology of St Luke's Preface," lays stress on πεπληροφορημένων. Instead of taking it as a sonorous equivalent for πεπληρουμένων, he reads it as meaning that the gospel-facts came to full fruit and development; ἀνατάξασθαι he takes as "to reproduce or reconstruct," πᾶσιν "may refer to the Acts, his second volume," and καθεξῆς alludes to the continuity, which "was to be a special, perhaps the special feature, of his work." Professor J. H. Michael (*Journal of Theological Studies*, October, pp. 14–15) rejects Dr Rendel Harris' rendering of ἐξηγήσατο in John i. 18 as intransitive, derived from Sirach xxiv. 6, and meaning "took or had the pre-eminence," and agrees with the present writer that ver. 15 is an interpolation. Professor Burney, however (*Expositor*, November), agrees with Dr Harris that the difficult quotation in John vii. 37, 38 is due to mistranslation of an Aramaic original; the Aramaic terms for "belly" and "fountain" are the same, unvocalised, and the quotation really ran, "rivers shall flow forth from the fountain of living waters," our Lord having in mind words like Joel iii. 18, Isa. lv. 1, and Jer. ii. 13. In *The American Journal of Theology* (July, pp. 436–455), Mr H. J. Cadbury examines Professor Torrey's hypothesis about Semitic sources for Acts, and advocates the alternative hypothesis that "Luke took over his material from sources which so far as they were written were written in Greek," only that he "recast all his material in his own style, but varied the style to suit the situation, and in particular in the case of lyric passages, dialogue, and public addresses he put into the lips of Jesus something of the Semitic idiom which was known to him from the Greek Old Testament." M. L. Dieu begins (*Revue Biblique*, 1920, pp. 555–569) an examination and restatement of the hypothesis that John Mark was the authority for Luke in Acts i.–xv.; and G. Baldensperger (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, pp. 5–43), discussing the influence of apologetic in the primitive Church upon the tradition of the origins and the Galilean ministry of Jesus, shows how the primitive missionary gospel was Messianic, how one of its tasks was to prove that the Messiah could come and had come from Galilee, and how this interest affected particularly the composition of a gospel like Matthew during the height and heat of the propaganda. It was not an apologetic true to the deep meaning of Christianity; with its emphasis on external proofs, "elle n'est pas suffisament pénétrée par l'esprit religieux et moral de l'Evangile."

In the early paragraphs of an article on "Saints and Martyrs," Father Thurston handles early Christian life and thought, as Mr L. D. Agate does in his felicitous survey of "Christian Slavery," in which he notes, by the way, how the early fathers of the Church found it "easier to say that 'the true slavery is the slavery of sin' than to grapple with the evils of an institution inseparable from ancient society." But otherwise, apart from the article on Simon Magus, to which I have already referred, and articles on Samosatenism and Semi-Arianism, this volume of the *Encyclopædia* has little that bears upon the development of early theology. We welcome heartily Dr A. Marmorstein's *Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinical Literature* (Jews' College, London) for its rich collection of Agadic material, illustrating the Jewish idea that man can acquire merit before God. The roots and ramifications of this belief are laid bare in a way that is most helpful to students of religious ethics in the early centuries. An equally welcome but much more comprehensive treatise is Mr Campbell N. Moody's *The Mind of the Early Converts* (Hodder & Stoughton). The title gives no idea of the range and freshness of this book. It is a remarkable study of early Church life, especially of the apologists down to Origen, in the light of the modern mission-field. Mr Moody shows how factors which are by no means "Greek" are producing among Chinese Christians what corresponds to the "Catholicism" of the early Church, and how it is still, as then, difficult for teachers and people to appreciate the depth of the Gospel. At point after point he throws light upon the significance of the apologists, in this connection. The book is the result of serious study; but it stands out from nearly all monographs upon the subject by its grasp of the actual conditions which determine theological effort. "We have in English no sufficient account of" Hermas, says Mr Moody. In a recent Survey (July, pp. 812, 813) I called attention to some fresh contributions of a sporadic nature, and Mr Moody himself has a chapter on *The Shepherd*, which is fully abreast of modern criticism, as well as illuminating from his particular thesis. Thus he writes, apropos of the disappointments which some of Hermas' contemporaries found in their Christian experience of prayer: "The *Shepherd* of Hermas gives the explanation that imperfect faith, or some unknown temptation or sin, was the cause of delay or failure. This explanation, however unsatisfying, is exactly the same as that which is given by Chinese Christians to those who are young in the faith." In his Donnellan Lectures on *Barnabas, Hermas, and the Didache* (S.P.C.K.) Dr Armitage Robinson describes the *Shepherd* of Hermas as "the earliest example of the application of the imagination on the grand scale to the enforcement of the Christian religion and morality." He accepts the tradition that the book was written when the author's brother was bishop of Rome. But the main interest of Dr Armitage Robinson's book lies in its re-statement of his theory that the *Didache* is dependent on Hermas and Barnabas, and indeed a late imaginative picture of what the writer thought the primitive Church had been. In his book, *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity* (Macmillan), Professor Kirsopp Lake declares that the *Shepherd* "has not been adequately discussed by modern scholarship," and (pp. 110 f.) notices its adoptionist theology. But neither he nor Dr Armitage Robinson grapples with the problem as Mr Moody does.

A convenient and scholarly edition of *The Sayings of Jesus* (Cambridge University Press) is published by Mr H. G. Evelyn White; it includes the Oxyrhynchite Logia, with introduction and notes. Dr W. H. Mackean's *Christian Monasticism in Egypt to the Close of the Fourth Century* (S.P.C.K.) gathers together the salient data for an appreciation of the special forms assumed by monasticism in Egypt. The subject is not so unknown in English as Dr Mackean suggests; there is, for example, the account in Mr H. O. Taylor's *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*. But this book has a place of its own as a reliable popular estimate. Virtue, as Pope admitted, might

"Dwell in a monk or light upon a king,"

and the advantage of Dr Mackean's pages is that they will open to many general readers and young students the amount of temporary justification for monasticism as a lay protest against the corrupted Church of the third or fourth century. Mr G. L. Marriott lays advanced students under a real obligation by printing for the first time, in *Macarii Anecdota* (Harvard University Press), seven homilies of this Egyptian Christian in the fourth century, *i.e.* if he is to be identified with Macarius Magnus or Macarius of Alexandria. The introduction discusses the question whether the relation of one of his homilies to the Lausiac History does not oblige us to place him later than A.D. 420. In the *Analecta Bollandiana* (tomus xxxviii. 1, 2), Delehaye's article on "Saint Martin et Sulpice Sévère" (pp. 1–136) is a detailed, exhaustive examination of Sulpicius Severus in the light of recent research, especially in view of M. E. C. Babut's critical study. The writer almost hesitates to criticise unfavourably the work of this brilliant young Frenchman, who died fighting in the war. But his arguments are courteously put; he makes out a case for Sulpicius Severus, as well as for Martin, in reply to M. Babut's searching attack. It is a specimen of keen, historical reasoning, which is full of stimulus and critical suggestion even where it is not convincing.

Professor Ephraim Emerton's critical study of "The *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio of Padua" (Harvard University Press) is all the more useful as this great mediæval pamphlet has not yet been published in a critical edition, and has never been fully translated into English. Marsiglio was a political theorist, who took a vigorous part in supporting Louis IV. against the Papacy; Professor Emerton deprecates the idea that his French friend John of Jandun had any share in the *Defensor Pacis*, and outlines Marsiglio's theory in that work. It was a plea for the reorganisation of the Church and the control of a General Council, which struck heavily against Papal pretensions, and profoundly influenced subsequent European thought. Professor Emerton, for example, thinks that Wycliffe must have "had before him the text of the *Defensor Pacis*." In the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 84–90), Lobstein has a few pages upon "Les Commentaires de Calvin," in connection with a recent work by M. Louis Goumez on *La Doctrine du Salut, d'après les commentaires de Jean Calvin sur le Nouveau Testament*. But we have to chronicle a first-rate monograph in Mr A. Mitchell Hunter's *Teaching of Calvin* (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co.). Mr Hunter shows himself to be well equipped for his task; he gives a modern interpretation of Calvin's work, which is critical and sympathetic; he writes lucidly, and altogether has made a fine contribution to the study of Calvinism. If a book like this were read, there would be fewer of the tiresome, unhistorical remarks about Calvinism which are still to be heard even in educated circles. "There is much need of popular illumination as to what Calvinism essentially is," says Mr Hunter. It is pleasant to think that we have now a competent and not too technical book which will dispel a number of vain shadows and conventional misunderstandings. On a smaller scale, M. Arnold Reymond's essay on "Pascal et l'apologétique chrétienne," which fills an entire number of the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (June–July), has the same original and incisive note. Descartes and Montaigne, he thinks, represent the two poles between which Pascal oscillated. He attaches Pascal's admiration for Descartes to the period of his first conversion, and suggests that later on Pascal drew away from Cartesianism; he analyses the effect of Pascal's scientific studies upon his apologetic, which rests on (*a*) man's misery apart from God, and (*b*) God's revelation in history, as seen in prophecies and miracles. Neither of these bases is tenable to-day; but, M. Raymond suggests, in an age when money is the practical god of many, the second basis might be furnished by a Church of men and women whose disinterested lives were an actual demonstration of God's presence. There is a discussion of the famous "wager" argument, and indeed the entire essay is a valuable comment upon the *Pensées*; it forms a useful supplement to Mr H. F. Stewart's Hulsean Lectures.

J. E. B. Blase's biography of *Johannes Colerus* (Ten Brink & De Vries, Amsterdam) is a detailed, illustrated, and original study of this Lutheran minister at the Hague, from 1693 to 1707, who admired Spinoza and wrote his life, though he preached against what he considered to be his detestable philosophy. English readers know his biography of Spinoza from the version in Sir Frederick Pollock's study of Spinoza. But Colerus played many other parts in the stormy ecclesiastical world of Holland. He was born in 1647 and died in 1707, after a vigorous and not unsuccessful career. This biography deals at length with his varying fortunes, and is certainly the fullest record of his activities.

The *Encyclopædia* has thorough articles on Salvation (Christian) and Soteriology by Professor T. B. Kilpatrick, and on Sin (Christian) by Professor H. R. Mackintosh, also on the Holy Spirit by Mr R. B. Hoyte, all sound pieces of theological reasoning. In the article on "The State of the Dead" (Christian), Dr Charles Harris shows how men are breaking away from traditional orthodoxy, by arguing that the parable of Dives and Lazarus implies that in the intermediate state torments are only temporary, and that repentance is possible after death. This new departure in eschatology is worked out with candour and ability in Professor R. G. Macintyre's book on *The Other Side of Death* (Macmillan), which insists on the need of modifying the conventional position and of presenting a reasonable belief about the future. Professor Macintyre re-states the hypothesis of Conditional Immortality; he prefers to call it Potential Immortality. "Orthodoxy professes to believe in a hell which it no longer dares to preach," and universalism weakens the decisiveness of the present life; the way out of the tangle is to make immortality ethically conditioned, and to admit that for many the first chance they get of choosing or refusing God will be in the next world, where God gives a further probation. The case for "conditional" immortality has never been put so persuasively or so weightily, and Professor Macintyre's book will require to be taken into serious account in all future discussions. Canon V. F. Storrs, in a pamphlet on *The Divinity of Christ* (Longmans, Green & Co.), meets the current dissatisfaction with the Chalcedon formula about the two natures by suggesting that, instead of over-emphasising the two natures, we might start by emphasising the reality and humanity of Christ's person, and apply to this consciousness the conception of growth. The lecture is open-minded and well adapted to guide the popular mind. Canon Storrs pays generous tribute to Professor Mackintosh's standard book upon *The Person of Jesus Christ*. Professor J. H. Snowden's *The Personality of God* (New York: The Macmillan Company) is a sturdy exposition of the idea of a complex, self-sufficient personality in God as the source of human faith and life. The repetition of the metaphor about human personality as a dewdrop reflecting the sun is apt to lead to misapprehension. But Dr Snowden makes his point clear. He argues that the Trinity "adumbrates a distinction imbedded in the constitution of God and is the necessary condition of his infinite life." The general lines of proof are familiar to readers of Lotze and Dr Illingworth and Canon Temple. What the problem involves, and what has to be done to render it less unintelligible, is indicated by Mr F. R. Tennant in *The Constructive Quarterly* (June), the first of a series of articles upon the reconstruction of theology. Mr Tennant has a refreshing aversion to muddled thinking, and his articles lay down unambiguously the desiderata in question.

Sometimes this is better than offering speculative solutions. Professor Clement C. J. Webb's introductory lecture on *Philosophy and the Christian Religion* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press) is a finely tempered statement of the relation between philosophy and religion, and particularly of the services rendered by Christianity to philosophy, *e.g.* in developing the notion of personality, "a notion of the profoundest importance, for which ancient philosophy had no special name at all." Signor Giovanni Gentile's *Discorsi di Religione* (Vallecchi Editore: Firenze) contains three lectures, the first a reprint from *Politica* upon the political question, the other two upon the philosophical and the moral problem of religion. Dr Johnson said of Addison, "He thinks justly, but he thinks faintly." Signor Gentile does not think faintly. He is an emancipated thinker, for whom religion renders itself largely into a matter of personal idealism, or rather of individual reflection asserting itself in a more or less mechanical order of nature. The intellectualistic bias of the author is severely criticised by his fellow-countrymen, Signor E. Buonainti, in an article in *Rivista Trimenstrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* (pp. 303–312)—an Italian quarterly, by the way, which we hail with pleasure. The critic will not allow that Gentile thinks justly. He points out severely, perhaps too severely, the evaporation of anything like real religion in Signor Gentile's view of culture. Professor J. B. Pratt's volume on *The Religious Consciousness* (New York: The Macmillan Company) is the most ample handbook on the subject which has appeared, full of information and suggestion. It is a psychological study, which aims at an objective delineation of the factors in the religious experience. He discusses subjects like religion and the sub-conscious, the various stages of religion in the individual, conversion, social expressions, worship, and mysticism. It is a merit that he analyses without theorising unduly, and, when one considers the range covered, it is remarkable that the volume maintains so high a level of impartiality. If the psychological method would only drop the *questionnaire* system, it would be more impressive, however,

Professor Pratt's closing chapter upon the place and use of mysticism contains, among other good things, a searching criticism of Miss Underhill's theory, and a passing reference to the fact that the Bible possesses for the mystic "a deeper meaning than its merely historical and superficial aspect." The attitude of mystics to the Bible deserved more attention. It is, indeed, an important matter, which is commonly passed over with a few general remarks about allegorism and the Song of Solomon. However, in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 44–72) M. Charles Dombre goes into it with some thoroughness. He points out how the mediæval mystics vary; John of the Cross, for example, knows, quotes, and uses the Bible, while others either ignore or depreciate it. Even among mystics who care for the Bible, it is only certain parts that make an appeal—not the prophets, not the epistles, not the life of Jesus except at the beginning and at the end. The influence of the Church is one reason, according to M. Dombre; the stress on direct intuition is another. It is quite rare, as he points out, for a mystical writer to notice any difference or difficulty in the Bible text. Dr J. H. Bernard's pamphlet on *Dogma and Criticism* (Longmans, Green & Co.) admits that difficulties are felt by many to-day with regard to specific historical statements in the Apostles' Creed, and over ideas and phrases in other creeds. The origin of these lies in the scientific study of the Bible, which refuses to bury its head in mystical sands. Dr Bernard admits that "if we were now rewriting the Athanasian Creed we should change some phrases"; he will not have anything to do with repressive measures against Christian scholars who cannot accept the letter of the Creeds at every point. But he will not hear of the Creeds being revised or replaced by others, on the double ground that they afford a basis for common faith among the Eastern and Western Churches, and that they preserve essential truths of faith and history, without which the Church would not be Christian. Mr Eric S. Robertson, in *The Human Bible* (Nisbet), is more bold. He hopes to see the Church emerging "out of musty song-mills like 'Hymns Ancient and Modern,'" but he sees the Church of England standing "largely helpless" in the land, because "it has, fastened to its neck, two mill-stones, its lovely Prayer-book, and its unlovely Convocation." He advocates a simple Christianity, purged of Pauline theology, and resting on the consciousness and teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom. This is the conclusion on which his exhilarating and exhaustive discussion of the Bible converges. The Old Testament is examined as a record of human aspirations, which are fully met in Jesus. Mr Robertson is well acquainted with the critical processes, and argues in no iconoclastic spirit; he writes briskly, persuasively, and with an eye to what he regards as the kernel of Christianity. Mr Edward Grubb's volume on *The Bible: its Nature and Inspiration* (Swarthmore Press) is much less radical. He outlines the structure and characteristics of the various books, and gives some sensible advice about the proper attitude towards the Bible. No better handbook could be put into the hands of ordinary people; it is cheap, well written, and modern in spirit, while true to the Christian principles. The same may be said of a larger work by Mr J. R. Cohu, *The Bible and Modern Thought* (London: John Murray), although it deals only with the Old Testament. Its "aim is to place before the reader the present attitude of Modern Thought towards the vexed problems of the origin, composition, and historical trustworthiness of the Old Testament." Mr Cohu is not content to analyse literature; he estimates it. His book shows very wide reading and, what is still better, sound judgment. A chapter like that on "The Religious Value of the Priestly Code" is a really valuable help to those who desire to understand the growth and genius of the Old Testament.

James Moffatt.

REVIEWS.

The Concept of Nature. By A. N. Whitehead, Sc.D., F.R.S.— Cambridge University Press, 1920.—Pp. viii + 202.

THIS book, with the exception of the last two chapters, consists of the first course of lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, under the Tarner Benefaction. The general outline of Professor Whitehead's theory of nature will be familiar to readers of the HIBBERT, either from his earlier *Principles of Natural Knowledge* or from the review of that work by the present writer. The main difference between the earlier and the later expositions is that in *The Concept of Nature* detailed mathematical deductions are avoided, and more attention is given to logical and epistemological considerations. Neither book can be dispensed with if Professor Whitehead's views are to be properly understood. The detailed deductions are needed to show that such premises as Whitehead's really do lead to workable definitions of the concepts used by mathematical physics. The epistemological discussions, quite apart from their intrinsic value, which is very great, are needed to show that some such interpretation as Whitehead's is not merely one possible alternative, but is the necessary way of analysing nature if we are to reach results that are intelligible as well as practically useful. In this review I shall confine myself mainly to logical and epistemological points.

It is a fact of observation that we can think about nature without thinking about thought. This remains true even if nature be in some way existentially dependent on the thoughts of ourselves or of God, as many idealists have held. Nature for the present purpose is defined as that whole of which—or of part of which—we become aware in sense-perception. Now, whether all sense-perception involves thought or not, it is certain that it involves a form of apprehension which is not thought, viz. sense-awareness. And it is also a fact of observation that we can think about nature without thinking about sense-awareness. This, again, is true without prejudice to the possibility that nature may in some sense be existentially dependent on the sense-awareness of ourselves or of some-one else, as Berkeley held.

The next point, then, is to explain how sense-awareness differs from thought. We often talk of sensing and thinking of the same object, *e.g.* red. What is the difference? To explain this, Whitehead distinguishes three components in our knowledge of nature, viz. "fact, factors, and entities." Fact is the whole object of sense-awareness, factors are the distinct elements of this whole which also become objects of sense-awareness, entities are "factors in their function as the termini of thought." The difference between sense and thought will therefore rest upon the difference between factors and entities, or on the difference between factors as such and factors treated as entities. Factors are of two different kinds, viz. events, *i.e.* bits of the whole fact which is nature, and objects that are not events, *e.g.* qualities like a definite shade of blue and relations like *between.* The latter are "situated in" the former. Now, any factor can be treated as an entity, and when this is done it is not merely sensed but thought about. An entity is treated as factor when it is merely demonstrated as a bare subject for thought. It is what answers to phrases like *this* and *it.* We of course meet with factors as elements in related wholes. And if they are events there will be qualities situated in them. Nevertheless, in thinking about them we drop the qualities and relations and think of the factor as a bare entity. This does *not* mean that we suppose that in fact it exists without qualities or relations. We do not. We treat the factor which we know to have qualities and to stand in relations as a mere peg on which to hang judgments. In dealing with other people we need to make them treat the factor, which we have turned into an entity, in the same way. This we can sometimes do by mere pointing. Yet generally we have to do it by using a descriptive phrase. Many phrases that appear to be merely demonstrative are elliptical and really involve descriptions. When we say: *That is a queer figure*, we are merely demonstrating. But when we say: *That man is a queer figure*, we mean, *That is a man, and has a queer figure.* The second statement would be contradicted by saying: *That is not a man but a scarecrow.* Thus we notice that when a descriptive phrase is used (*a*) we always do come down to a bare entity denoted by *that*, but (*b*) in order to make another man think of it we have to make an assertion about it which is not the assertion that we are principally intending to convey to him.

Now, Whitehead holds that a misinterpretation of the process by which thought treats factors as entities is the basis of the philosophical view of substance, and that the scientific concept of matter is a half-hearted attempt to combine this philosophic view of substance with the scientific question: What is nature made of? As regards the first point, entities without qualities and relations are regarded as the bearers of qualities and relations, and it is supposed that we only perceive the latter. The truth is that we perceive factors, and simply for purposes of thought treat them as entities. The second point is that science cannot rest in the philosophic notion of substances as entities without qualities or relations, and therefore gives to matter spatio-temporal qualities and relations, but refuses to give it any others. The other qualities are rejected because of the philosophic notion of substance; the spatio-temporal ones are kept because without them matter would be scientifically useless. The difficulties of such a view are not noticed. But clearly, if we only perceive attributes, it is only attributes that we have a right to regard as extended and standing in spatio-temporal relations. If matter be in space and time at all, we cannot identify its space and time with those in which we perceive attributes to be. No doubt the current doctrine of matter includes valuable elements; it expresses real facts such as permanence of mass of chemical constituents. Yet it expresses these facts in a muddled way, and the source of the muddle is the hypostatisation of entities.

The second chapter deals with Theories of the Bifurcation of Nature, and is extremely important. Bifurcation consists in dividing nature into two parts, a causal part—atoms, electrons, light-waves, etc.,—and an apparent part—colours, sounds, etc. The old naïve theory according to which we perceive the attributes of things which are bare substances is not itself a bifurcation theory in this sense. But the moment it is faced with the fact of the transmission of light, sound, etc., it tends to develop into a bifurcation theory. The colours that we do see are "apparent nature," the vibrations that we do not see are "causal nature"; nature splits up into "the dream and the conjecture," as Whitehead happily puts it. It seems to me that bifurcation theories are of two different types. Whitehead gives examples of both, and objects to both forms about equally, but he does not explicitly distinguish the two. The first is the theory of psychic additions. This is the view that when causal nature acts on mind, mind responds by creating apparent nature. The theory of primary and secondary qualities is an example of such a view. The second is the theory that when causal nature acts on mind, mind responds, not by creating, but by perceiving apparent nature. This second view can be stated so as to be completely self-consistent. It is most easy to do this on the absolute theory of space and time. Yet in any case it leaves the connection between apparent and causal nature unexplained; it makes causal nature conjectural, since we are never directly aware of it; and so it renders an ascription of spatio-temporal attributes to causal nature a mere far-fetched hypothesis. On both theories the fundamental difficulty is that we are not describing the relations of one bit of nature to another, but are talking of the causal relations between nature and the mind. In the one case we say that causal nature stimulates the mind to create apparent nature; in the other, that it stimulates the mind to perceive apparent nature. The fact is, as Whitehead says, that we do not believe in light-waves because they are just the sort of things that would be likely to stimulate a mind to create or to perceive colours. "The real question is: When red is found in nature, what else is found there also?" What we have to do is simply to exhibit the fundamental entities and relations in nature (*i.e.* the total object of perception), and to be sure that they are adequate to express all the observed facts. It is the inadequacy of the classical concepts used in dealing with nature that has led to bifurcation theories with their illegitimate introduction of the mind as a *deus ex machinâ*.

The third chapter explicitly deals with Time, but it also contains important principles of wider application. First, it explains what is meant by the notions of empty places and times. When we are aware of a part of nature in sense-perception, only certain features are distinctly discriminated and recognised to contain qualitative peculiarities. But none of these discriminated and qualified events are felt to be complete in themselves. They all refer to something beyond themselves which is not discriminated. The whole of which they are thus recognised to be fragments is a spatio-temporal whole. Now, we can think of other fragments of this whole, as definitely related to the discriminated fragments, without thinking of the particular qualities that reside in these other fragments. Thought of in this way, they are what we mean by places and bits of time. The whole of nature is in fact a spatio-temporal whole, and a bare event is a bit of this, thought of in its position in the whole, but without reference to the special qualities like colour, temperature, hardness, etc., which may reside in it.

Next, the whole of nature divides up into subordinate parts called durations. The content of any specious present, *i.e.* the immediate object of an act of sense-awareness, is a duration. But it contains thinner durations, and is contained in thicker ones which are certainly not within any specious present of ours. The notion of durations is fundamental for Whitehead and is very difficult to grasp. (i.) I think it is clear that the reference to a specious present is not a *definition* of a duration, but only an *example* of one. There are durations which do not, so far as we know, fall within any specious present. (ii.) I am not perfectly clear whether Whitehead regards the peculiar immediacy which belongs to durations that do fall within specious presents as a fact of external nature, or as a "psychic addition." There is no doubt whatever that the existence of durations is regarded by him as a fact of external nature; but this does not, of course, answer the present question. (iii.) Durations are said to be wholes all of whose parts are simultaneous. This sense of simultaneity does not imply "instantaneousness." And it is perfectly compatible with —indeed always coexists with—succession. I do not think that this can be regarded as a definition of durations. It would rather be true to say that Whitehead's sense of simultaneity is defined by reference to durations. Simultaneity, in this sense, is an irreducible *three*-term relation. The events A and B are not, as such, simultaneous; you can only say that they are simultaneous with respect to some duration C. With respect to thinner durations they will not be simultaneous. Time in nature is an expression of the relations between durations; space is an expression of the relations between events in a single duration.

Time is within nature in the sense that the measurable time of physics expresses the relations between durations, and durations are slices of nature. On the other hand, time extends beyond nature, in the sense that our mental acts succeed each other; what was perceived ceases to have immediacy and becomes merely remembered or quite forgotten. But the time in which the mind is cannot be identified with the time-series of nature, because mental events do not have those properties of natural durations which lead to a definition of physical time. Lastly, we must be prepared to recognise as a possibility (and, since Einstein, as a fact) that the whole course of nature contains many alternative time-series, each of which is as good as the rest. The whole course of nature can be analysed equally exhaustively into many different families of durations, just as a cone can equally well be sliced parallel to its base or to one of its generators, and so on. Each family defines a different and equally legitimate time-series.

In Chapter IV. the Method of Extensive Abstraction is explained. There are some improvements on the exposition which was given in *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. The sense in which the properties of an abstractive class of events converge to a definite limit as regards their numerical values, whilst the class itself does not converge to a limit, is made plain. Also the reason for the introduction of primes and antiprimes is explained; they are introduced in order to avoid irritating special cases of merely technical interest. The connection between puncts and event-particles is made clearer, and the useful distinction between the positional, the extrinsic, and the intrinsic properties of an event-particle is carefully pointed out. An event-particle derives its positional quality from the intersecting moments to which it belongs; it derives its intrinsic properties from qualities situated in the events that converge to it; whilst its extrinsic properties are simply the relations in the convergent series of events that belong to it. The necessity for passing beyond momentary spaces and defining timeless spaces is well brought out at the end of the chapter by the question: "What is meant by saying that Cambridge in the instantaneous space of 10 o'clock is 52 miles from London in the instantaneous space of 11 o'clock?"

The problem of timeless space is dealt with in Chapter V. As readers of the earlier work will know, its solution depends on the relation of "cogredience" between a "percipient event" and its associated duration. These two difficult notions are much more clearly explained in the present work than in its predecessor. In the first place, it is made absolutely plain that the percipient event falls entirely on the side of nature, and in no sense on that of mind. It is roughly the events that constitute the life of the observer's body. Now this, being a factor present in all sense-perception, is apt to be ignored. Sense-perception is *at least* a triadic relation involving the mind, the body, and external events. Cogredience is the relation between a finite event of any kind and a duration, when this event (*a*) lasts just as long as the duration, and (*b*) has a fixed place in the duration. In particular, the percipient event is cogredient with the duration which is the content of a specious present. This simply means that for a duration to be present the events in my body must (*a*) extend through it and (*b*) keep stationary within it, *i.e.* that there must be one sense of *here* just as there is one sense of *now* in the duration. Other events cogredient with this duration are *there* in one definite sense. When the *here* becomes another *here*, the *now* becomes another *now*. Probably the particular duration which is present to us is determined by the percipient event; when the percipient event is succeeded by a new one which is not cogredient with the old duration, a new duration becomes the content of a new specious present. And this duration need not even belong to the same family as the previous one, *i.e.* there may be no third duration which contains both. Obviously cogredience gives us the notion of rest; and from it the notion of movement and of timeless spaces, in which alone movement has a meaning, can be derived. What we see approximates to an instantaneous space. Now there is no movement in an instantaneous space. Yet we seem to see the path (*e.g.* a road) along which an object that we also see is going to move. But this path is in a momentary space, and therefore never will be traversed. The solution of the difficulty is that, if our expectation is fulfilled, the moving object traverses in timeless space that straight line which is "occupied" by the momentary line which approximately is what we see.

Chapter VI., which deals with Congruence, is philosophically a great improvement on the corresponding parts of the *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, though I hardly think that the mathematical statements in it would be intelligible to anyone who had not followed the detailed deduction in the earlier work. It opens with a most illuminating discussion of M. Poincaré's view that measurement is purely conventional. Whitehead first distinguishes identity of numerical measure from congruence of what is measured. The former presupposes the latter. He then points out that, when the axioms for congruence are laid down, there is a whole host of different relations which equally fulfil them. The choice of one rather than another would lead to entirely different judgments as to what is congruent with what. Now, Poincaré's position was that nature gives us no clue to choosing one relation rather than another. This must be carefully distinguished from the view that we are in fact confined to a small *set* of possible relations, and that we cannot say which of *these* has been chosen, because the resulting differences fall below the limits of observation. The paradox of Poincaré's view is that with all these alternative congruence relations open to us we should in fact have all chosen practically the same relation, as is shown by the almost complete agreement among our judgments as to what is congruent with what. The strength of his position is that, if space were really independent of time, as the classical view holds, there really would be nothing in nature to guide our choice. Whitehead's own position is that there are facts in nature which guide our choice, but they are facts about motion. They thus generate a theory of congruence both for space and for time. We judged that certain spaces and times were congruent long before the laws of motion were heard of; it is therefore absurd to suppose that our choice was guided by a desire to make the laws of motion as simple as possible, and that King Alfred judged that candles took equal times to burn equal lengths "out of a sentimental regard for Galileo, Newton, Euler, and Lagrange."

In the seventh chapter, which deals with Objects, we leave pure space-time, and enter the realm of matter. Objects are characteristics of events; they can exist in many times and places, unlike events themselves which cannot recur. Some objects can be perceived by the senses, but many cannot. All events in nature are situations of objects, but when the objects are imperceptible we call them empty. The general relation between an object and an event is called "ingression." Ingression takes various forms, including "situation" as a special case. Most difficulties about matter arise from three connected kinds of over-simplification:—(i.) The failure to recognise that there are many different types of object. The most important are sense-objects, perceptual objects, and scientific objects. All are equally real. (ii.) The failure to recognise that different kinds of objects are differently related to events, *i.e.* that there are different kinds of ingression. Even objects of the same kind (*e.g.* sense-objects) have different relations of ingression to different events. (iii.) The failure to recognise the existence of irreducible many-term relations. With these over-simplifications the problem of where an object is becomes hopeless; with a less simple-minded theory it becomes soluble. Every scientific object is, in a perfectly definite sense, everywhere. For an electron makes some difference throughout the whole of space and time. Yet it makes more difference to one event than to any others. This is called the event where it is situated. Still, the difference between situation and other kinds of ingression is mainly one of degree. A physical object is a connected set of sense-objects situated in a finite event. As a general rule the same event, or one not far removed from it, is also the situation of a scientific object. Multiple relations are specially needed for dealing with sense-objects. The ingression of a sense-object into an event involves at least (*a*) an active condition, which is generally an event occupied by a scientific object; (*b*) passive conditions; these really include the whole of nature, but most obviously include the event in which the sense-object is situated; (*c*) a percipient event, *i.e.* something going on in our bodies; (*d*) the event which is its situation. When the events (*d*) and (*a*) practically coincide we have normal perception, and the same event is occupied by other sense-objects and therefore by a perceptual object. This is the general rule, but there are plenty of exceptions. If (*b*) includes an event with the qualities of a mirror, the situation of the sense-object and of the event which is the situation of that scientific object which is the active condition will be widely different. In such a case we do still subconsciously perceive associated sense-objects in the situation of the one actually sensed. Thus this situation contains not merely a sense-object but also a perceptual object. But this perceptual object, being situated in a quite different event from the causal scientific object, cannot be counted as physical. We call it a *delusive* perceptual object. Its ingression in the event in which it is situated is principally due to the mirror and to the perceptual event. For this reason it cannot be perceived from most places, whereas a non-delusive perceptual object can be perceived by practically anyone from practically anywhere.

The book closes with two supplementary lectures, not delivered under the Tarner Benefaction. They contain a good summary of the whole theory, and are of special interest in bringing out Professor Whitehead's attitude towards the general theory of relativity which has become so prominent since the *Principles of Natural Knowledge* was written. The position is this. The transformations of the older theory of relativity are deduced by Whitehead from his own principles without any reference to the velocity of light. This is an enormous philosophic advantage. Purely spatio-temporal transformations ought to depend on the nature of space-time as such, and not on the properties of particular kinds of events in space-time. Conversely, Whitehead refuses altogether to regard gravitation as due to the properties of a non-homaloidal space-time. His view is that it is utterly impossible to give any clear meanings to congruence or to motion on such a theory. But he quite recognises that the traditional statement of the law of gravitation must be modified to meet the difficulty that "*the* distance between two particles," which appears in this statement, has ceased to have any one unambiguous meaning. He states that by using the tensor method he has succeeded in reformulating the law of gravitation, with no nonsense about non-homaloidal spaces, but with the introduction of two different potential functions in place of the single function of the classical theory. Mathematicians and philosophers will eagerly await the publication of this vitally important piece of work.

The thanks rendered in the preface by Professor Whitehead to the Cambridge University Press officials seem to me excessive. No doubt their hearts are in the right place, but they have passed at least six bad mistakes. On p. 51, l. 4, for *sight* read *touch*; p. 86, l. 8, for *external*, *eternal*; p. 148, l. 4, for *agree*, *argue*; p. 155, l. 17, for *sense-object*, *perceptual object*; p. 180, l. 4, for *universely* (a pleasant conceit!), *inversely*; and on p. 188, l. 9, for *by* read *from*. In conclusion, I must say that anyone who has read *Principles of Natural Knowledge* will find his understanding of that book much improved by reading *The Concept of Nature*; and that anyone who has read neither should go at once to his (or her) bookseller and order both.

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A Study in Realism. By John Laird, M.A.—Cambridge University Press, 1920.—Pp. xii+228.

PROFESSOR Laird's book will be particularly welcomed by those who take an intelligent interest in philosophy, but have not the opportunity for special study. It gives the reader a good idea of the history and of the implications of the realistic theory of knowledge; it is written in a lively style—perhaps somewhat elaborately lively—and it touches upon a number of extremely interesting and important topics. The range of subjects discussed is indeed so wide that few are treated with any degree of thoroughness; but the author's readiness to discuss them at all will constitute, I think, one of the chief attractions of the book for the general reader.

The fundamental contention of realism, we are told, is that the object of true knowledge is independent of our knowing it, and that knowledge is "a kind of discovery in which things are directly revealed or given to the mind." "There is nothing in the relation between the mind and things which of itself makes anything inacessible to knowledge." The process of knowledge always implies that the mind is confronted with an object; when that object is present and sensory, we have perception. If nothing intervenes between our minds and the thing which confronts us, perception may be said to be direct and immediate. What is it, then, that is directly perceived? Omitting answers which obviously contradict or are irrelevant to the fact of perception, Professor Laird goes on to discuss at some length the theory of "sensory atomism," according to which all we perceive are sense-data. This theory seems to him to be a true but incomplete account of the facts: sense-data certainly are perceived, but only as elements in a wider context. Particular shapes, colours, sounds, etc., are always "suffused with meaning" when we perceive them; they are signs as well as facts; and Professor Laird goes on to maintain that "meaning" is a characteristic of the things apprehended, and belongs to them as indefeasibly as do the qualities of hardness, extension, etc. This is a rather startling assertion, and perhaps the author is not really prepared to insist upon it, for in the same chapter he admits that "meaning may need a mind." The plausibility of the contention that meaning is an actual constituent of the perceived sensory complexes and is independent of mind rests, I think, on a confusion between "meaning" and "connection": it is argued that, since connections between real things are independent of our minds, and meaning presupposes connection, it too is independent of mind. Thus on p. 32 we read: "Meaning implies togetherness, but things may be found together as well as put together. A cow's tail is together with the cow, but if anyone was responsible for this conjunction, it was God." Quite so; but what of it? The connection between the cow and its tail certainly is objective and involves no reference to the apprehending mind; but we do not usually express this by saying that "a cow means a tail." And if Professor Laird really believes that meaning is "as radically objective as anything else that can be apprehended," how can he speak of "acquired" meaning? The "cold look" of the snow perceived at a distance can only be said to be an acquired meaning if we are considering the psychological development of the apprehending subject; so far as the objective order of fact is concerned, snow can no more have "acquired" its coldness than its whiteness. One cannot have it both ways: either meaning is as objective as colour or sound, and in that case it cannot be "acquired" by the mind, or it is essentially bound up with mind, and then it cannot be a feature of the external world waiting to be discriminated by the subject, like a simple sense-quality.

The sensory complex which in perception directly confronts the mind has the kind of meaning which is elaborated into the common-sense notion of a physical thing. In spite of the difficulties involved in the ordinary conception of thinghood, the author thinks that "the material world is, broadly speaking, what it is perceived to be, although there is much error and enormous risk of error in our perception." The fact of error is said to be inexplicable—though why, on Professor Laird's premisses, it should be so, I utterly fail to see. If knowledge were a mere reception of sense-data by "diaphanous" states of mind, it would, indeed, be difficult to see how error would be possible; but if knowledge consists in the subject discerning the object and bringing to bear upon it his previous experiences, then it is obvious that, our minds being finite and imperfect, we may either fail to discriminate that which is before us, or may introduce into the object features that do not belong to it—or may do both.

The facts of memory, expectation, mental imagery, and abstract thought do not, Professor Laird thinks, contradict the fundamental principles of realism. Memory, he maintains, is the mind's awareness of past things themselves: we may inspect the past as well as the present; expectation, on the other hand, involves no direct acquaintance with the future, but is a present fact representing or signifying the future. Knowledge of universals is as immediate as knowledge of the particulars; though universals do not exist but only subsist, yet they confront the mind and reveal themselves to it. They are independent of our thinking and are literally discoverable as they are in themselves. As to images, Professor Laird contends that they are "apprehended things confronting the mind, given to the mind like anything else that it discovers," that "they are really physical facts partly identical with perceived or remembered things." "The elements imaged at any time," he writes, "are literally the same elements as those formerly perceived." This interpretation of images is full of difficulties and is, I think, hardly consistent with Professor Laird's account of sense-perception. He insists that we perceive physical things, not percepts (*e.g.* p. 56); but in that case how can an image consist of literally the same elements as those formerly perceived? The essential characteristic of images is that they are "immaterial," and unless a physical thing be resolved into a mere assemblage of appearances there is simply no meaning in saying that an imaged mountain is made of the same stuff as a real mountain. It is indeed hard to resist the conclusion that the author has not quite made up his mind as to what the object of perception really is; from certain passages it would appear as if he meant that we perceive *both* the physical thing *and* the percept (*e.g.* p. 88), while some of his arguments can only have force on the assumption that we perceive appearances and not physical things. But the greater, and I think the more valuable, portion of the book is based on the view that the act of perceiving is always directed upon actually existing things. This view of perception is familiar enough, and a great deal of what Professor Laird says is merely a restatement of the theory worked out by Professor Hicks in "The Basis of Critical Realism"[1] and elsewhere.

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[1] *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1916–1917.

In the last three chapters of his book Professor Laird seeks to interpret the nature of mind, the problems of value, the facts of constructive imagination and of religious experience in the light of a realistic theory of knowledge. These chapters are extremely interesting and suggestive, and whether one agrees with the author or not, one can but admire his determination to come to close quarters with some of the most difficult questions that realism has to face. Briefly, his conclusions are that "moral value or its opposite belongs to human actions, character, and dispositions in the same sense as redness belongs to a cherry"; that beauty is a predicate of things that bring delight; that individual minds are substances and not adjectives of the cosmos; that mysticism is a mistaken theory because the identity which it assumes between being and knowing is impossible.

These conclusions and the grounds on which they are based are so far-reaching and controversial that I can do no more than refer to one or two points that first suggest themselves. There seems to be a curious lack of cogency in Professor Laird's treatment of æsthetic values. He urges—quite rightly, I think—that judgments of beauty refer to things and not to our feelings about them, and says that "it is not nonsense" to contend that "the Ninth Symphony would be beautiful if no one heard it, and that the frozen seas would still glisten with loveliness after all life has departed from the earth"; but this contention, he thinks, goes beyond the evidence, "for beauty in our experience is never appreciated without delight, and it would therefore be illegitimate to argue that beauty would still be beauty in the absence of any possible delight." But surely it must be either one or the other: if beauty in its very meaning implies delight, it *is* nonsense to speak of things being beautiful when no one apprehends them; and if it is *not* nonsense, then the inseparability of beauty and delight in our experience is irrelevant to the point at issue. One might as well argue that it would be going beyond our evidence to say that colour is independent of mind because in our experience colour is inseparable from our seeing it; and if Professor Laird is going to take that line, what becomes of his realism?

There is a difficulty, too, involved in his treatment of moral values. It is maintained that moral obligation is more than a mere feeling, that the reasons for it lie in the value of the end, and that morality stands or falls with the validity of judgments of value. Now this contention would be true even if there were no generally binding rules of conduct, and if each particular case had to be judged on its own merits. A judgment of value may be objectively true of a given situation, but, if that situation is perfectly unique, it would not be true of any other. Whether or not such unique situations are likely to arise is another matter; the point is that the objective and binding character of moral judgments does not prejudge, one way or another, the generality of their application. Professor Laird, I believe, would agree with this, and yet he bases his argument against subjectivism in morality on the fact that *some* rules of conduct at any rate are universally binding. His examples in this connection are not happily chosen; thus, *e.g.*, he remarks that "there must be some rules of property if human society is to exist at all." Is it not somewhat rash to assume that the institution of property is an ultimate condition of human existence?

As to mysticism, which Professor Laird weighs and finds wanting within the space of seven short pages, one would question the correctness of his interpretation of the mystics' position. There may be more to be said in defence of the philosophy of mysticism than the author appears to think.

It is characteristic of Professor Laird's general outlook that he insists on the discreteness of the world rather than on its unity, and is more concerned to vindicate the empiricial reality of concrete particulars than to dwell on their connection with the cosmic whole; and he appears to think that this is the characteristic attitude of realism as such. But the view that in knowledge we are "face to face" with reality leaves room for more than one interpretation of that reality, and allows full play to the thinker's individual or national predilections; and Professor Laird's distrust of a metaphysic that threatens to disturb the practical, "common-sense" conceptions of workaday life is so typically British that one is tempted to ascribe it not to the "temper of realism" but to the temper of the race.

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Primitive Society. By Robert H. Lowie.—New York, 1920.—Pp. viii + 463.

THE author of this book, Dr Lowie, of the American Museum of Natural History in New York, is a well-known authority upon the American aboriginal, and has done much work upon the social organisation and religious institutions of the Crow Indians. The book before us shows good evidence of an intimate first-hand acquaintance with the problems presented by the social organisation of savage and barbarous peoples. Until lately this has been a most backward branch of anthropology, a backwardness due largely to the fundamental place it takes in human society, so that it is far less obtrusive than the more superficial features of ritual or details of art and craft.

Dr Lowie has brought together in a most useful form existing knowledge concerning such institutions as marriage, kinship, the various forms of social grouping such as the family and clan (here called the sib), the position of women, property, government, rank, as well as those forms of association, secret and open, such as men's societies and age-grades, which form prominent features of so many human societies. It is natural that the facts of North America should be most fully described and classified, but other parts of the world are also thoroughly considered, Africa lagging somewhat behind the rest, however, in fullness and accuracy of treatment.

On the theoretical side Dr Lowie ranges himself with the historical as opposed to the unfortunately termed "evolutionary" school of anthropology, and is perhaps too scathing in condemnation of his countryman, Lewis Morgan, who, in spite of his many faults and mistakes, must always rank as the greatest of the pioneers in this subject. In his historical treatment, however, Dr Lowie cannot bring himself to reject the view, generally accepted in America, that that continent has escaped the widespread movements of culture which we now know to have been widely diffused over the earth.

Many features of the book show that Dr Lowie is beginning to nourish doubts concerning this "Monroe doctrine" of American ethnology. The half-way attitude detracts in some degree from the consistency and clarity of his treatment, but this is a small fault beside its many merits. At present the book holds the field without a rival as an introduction to the study of the social organisation of the less-civilised regions of the earth.

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Christian Socialism, 1848–1854. By Charles E. Raven, M.A., Fellow and Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.—London : Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xii + 396.

MR RAVEN, being himself obviously full of enthusiasm for his subject, has given us a study of Christian Socialism in England which it is an inspiration and a pleasure to read. There was room and need for such a book, if for no reason other than this, that a movement which flowed from such genuine spiritual loyalty and love, attracted men of such fine and noble character, and evoked for a time so much self-sacrificing zeal, deserves to be worthily recorded and remembered. It is more than probable that Mr Raven, in his own eager loyalty to the memory of great men, rather exaggerates the actual historical importance of the movement. It endured for a short time only. Its definite social experiments, especially the Associations of Producers, the self-governing, co-operative workshops, and so forth, ended in failure, if not in disaster. Upon what we might call the "Socialist" development generally, the movement exercised practically no influence at all, and no one would look in the accepted socialist philosophy of to-day for the slightest trace of such influence. It is extremely doubtful, too, whether Christian Socialism accomplished much within the Christian Churches; certainly, it did not do so in its own day nor immediately after; and though, probably, its spirit inspired a succession of Christian thinkers with the desire to make definite social application of the ethics of Christ and the Kingdom of God, and especially of the ethics involved in the doctrine of the Incarnation, the number of such thinkers has always been, and is to-day, quite small, whilst the mass of Christian believers remain rooted in the notions of a merely individualistic salvation and a kingdom of heaven that has singularly little relation with the kingdoms of earth. Christian Socialism converted very few Christians to socialism and still fewer socialists to Christianity. Though Mr Raven vigorously, and to a large extent rightly, protests (*cf.* pp. 340, 341, 369, etc.) against undue belittling of the significance of the movement, it does seem, on the whole, that the interest and value of Christian Socialism lie not so much in its results upon history, which were meagre, as in the sort of spirit that gave it birth and the uplifting character of the men who mainly supported it; and this fact Mr Raven's book, whether designedly or not, does actually emphasise. For the moving pages all through are not those which deal with achievements, but those which present to us the leading figures in the movement; and these pages, let it be said, are thoroughly well done. The best chapters in the book are chapters ii. to v. inclusive, where we learn, not what these great men did, but *why* they wanted to do anything at all, and *whence* they drew their power. They must have been a fascinating and wonderful group: Denison Maurice, whom Mr Raven boldly claims as the greatest Churchman of the century (p. 75), and Ludlow, to whom in this book full justice is at last done, and Kingsley, the fiery and unstable, a kind of Peter, and Hughes of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, and Neale, and others rich in talent, rich in enthusiasm, above all rich in the faith of Christ; and there is something, we are quite sure, which all reformers and revolutionaries have still to learn from that discipline of the "weekly Bible-reading," which, we take it, was a real communion with Christ, that kept these men going in all their thought and labour (*cf.* p. 134). Of course, there was very little in the movement that deserves the name "socialism," unless that name is used in some loose and casual way. Hardly any of the leaders of the movement, excepting Ludlow, had any particular acquaintance with genuine socialistic thought and philosophy. They were passionately aflame with indignation against the horrors of the industrial system and the callous brutality of *laissez-faire*: they believed, or at any rate Maurice believed, that the Gospel and Faith of Christ meant brotherhood in human life and the absolute value of each individual soul; but they never really advanced to radical criticism of the social system surrounding them, they were in no sense whatever revolutionary, the Alpha and Omega of socialistic philosophy, namely the attack on private property, did not concern them, and they remained to the end mildly reformist in their activities and their proposals. If they were socialists at all, they belonged to the gentlest utopian and emotionalist school. "Christian Socialism," said Maurice, "is, to my mind, the assertion of God's order. Every attempt to hide it under a great machinery, call it organisation of labour, or what you like, I must protest against as hindering the gradual development of what I regard as a divine purpose, as an attempt to create a new constitution of society, when what we want is that the old constitution shall exhibit its true functions and energies" (*Life of Maurice*, vol. ii. p. 44). That is hardly a socialistic sentiment, and the "old constitution" was, for Maurice, what some of us would regard as a very Tory and deplorable sort of affair. Socialism can never be reformist merely without ceasing to be socialism, and it is highly probable that a genuine *Christian* socialist philosophy, could we arrive at it, would be less reformist and more fundamentally revolutionary than any. True enough, the Christian Socialists were mostly on the right side in every conflict: they fought a good fight in the lock-out of engineers in 1852, and generally they stood firmly on the side of the workers—a fact which, to some minds, of course, may not be a recommendation. Nor does their failure to build up a really socialistic philosophy on a Christian basis detract from the value of the work they did, and still less from the value of the spirit in which they laboured. Mr Raven, it is true, wants to make them into real socialists and thorough-going revolutionaries, seeking the abolition of the wage-system, the total reconstruction of society, and so forth (*cf.* pp. 247–249, etc.); but we do not think he succeeds. There are isolated utterances on the part of Ludlow and Hughes which point beyond the general outlook of the movement, but that is all. In the end their most enduring influence was educational, and that not only in the "Working Men's College," so romantically instituted, so devotedly maintained, but also in the stream of thought, deep if not very wide, which started from them, and to this day continues and deepens, and perhaps also widens in the number of those it includes, within the Anglican and other Christian Churches.

Evidently Mr Raven has envisaged the episode of "Christian Socialism" against the background of his own loyalties and enthusiasms rather than against the background of history, especially socialist history—the history of socialism and socialist philosophy—in this country. We would not complain of this method; rather we accept it as explaining some of the highly controversial, partial, and almost, at times, unenlightened, references which the author makes to socialist philosophy and the socialist movement generally, and by which, through their accumulation, the final few pages of his book are rendered extremely unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the main task has been thoroughly well done; the enthusiasm of the book is refreshing; and those who care to read it will be thereafter grateful indeed to the writer.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

LIVERPOOL.

De la Discipline Intellectuelle (pp.191) and *La Paix des Nations et la Religion de l'Avenir* (pp.31). Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 1919.

THESE little volumes are supplementary to the author's *La Religion*. In the former he relates the discipline of the intellect to that wider discipline, moral, social, and religious, of the individual, which he dealt with in the last-mentioned essay. Like the moral, the intellectual discipline is secular and social, the result of aggregate social experience and effort One of the chief lessons of the intellect has been the knowledge of its own limitations, which it is very far, as yet, from having fully learnt. At the same time, faith in its powers, within these limits, is essential. This faith is justified by the achievements of Science in the sphere of practical application and invention. It is only so far as Science leaves this, its proper field, and begins to enunciate general world-conceptions, that it goes astray, and its worst error has been the pretension to create a new basis and scheme of morality (p. 49). No new foundation can be laid but that which is already immanent in the society and individual, the sense of duty, which has been of gradual growth; its early beginnings, like those of intelligence, being observable in the forms of animal life inferior to man. The moral sense covers a wider field than that of intellect, and therefore, though their union and interaction are necessarily intimate, the attempt to subject the former to the latter, or reduce it entirely to intellectual terms, is utterly contrary to their respective natures and relationship. Their unity and difference are manifested in the fact that, while each aims at different ideals, those of Goodness and Truth, neither ever fulfilled though in process of fulfilment, yet Goodness cannot be abstracted from an intellectual, nor Truth from a moral element (p. 46).

In the third chapter the author maintains that, while the dogmatism of the Church has done much to hamper individual thought, it cannot in the long run stay the march of Truth. On the contrary, all efforts directed to this end have had the opposite effect. On the other hand, there is the dogmatism of theoretical science (chap. iv.). Where this has been content to destroy the pretensions of theology, it has done a useful work in clearing away obstacles to knowledge. Where it has attempted to destroy, not only the superstructure, but the very foundations of faith, such action has recoiled on itself. For faith in the ideal is at the base of all morality, and all exercise of the intellect—faith in the correspondence of the moral sense and mental powers with Reality. And that Reality is what, in religious language, is called God (pp. 116, 117).

Such, however, is not precisely Loisy's view, since in this summary an important word has been altered. Instead of "Reality" Loisy has 'Human ideal,' and thus, while admitting transcendence in a certain sense, he yet limits it to its social manifestations, whether now or in the future. It is a kind of religious positivism.

With these views it is hardly possible for him to maintain that nice balance between socialism and individualism which he affects (p. 175), but which it is in any case difficult to adjust without inclining in one direction or the other. He is strongly opposed to individualism, and his stress is always on the rights of Society as against those of the individual. But Society is composed of individuals: in itself it is an abstraction, and the question can therefore resolve itself into a balance of conflicting rights and duties. At least this is an aspect which cannot be neglected. The subject occupies a larger field in *La Religion*, but here it is to be noted that, as part of his proposed transference of the moral and intellectual authority, once generally exercised and still claimed by the Church, to the National Teaching Body, he suggests (pp. 134, 135) a kind of moral inquisition, which might, if realised, easily develop into a new tyranny.

Yet, if there is any lesson to be learnt from history, it is that Society is by no means always right, and that if, in the main, it has progressed in the ideal direction, this is largely owing to the action of individuals. He does not allow enough for what theology calls "inspiration," and philosophy "intuition"; for the sudden emergence of the religious and moral genius, a factor so notable in the history of Israel, where, though circumstances doubtless helped to make the prophet, they stood, for the most part, in strong contrast with his teaching.

And, generally, it must be observed that the opposition is not, as Loisy maintains, only between the self and Society, or even idealised Humanity. There is also an opposition, at once deeper and higher, between the self and its moral ideals as such; ideals which doubtless have developed in and through Society, but which have transcended it mainly by means of individual activities. Society takes cognisance of, and imposes, civic and external duties, not the inward cultivation of the distinctively Christian virtues.

The short pamphlet on the "Peace of Nations" is the opening lecture of the course on the history of religions in the Collège de France, delivered 2nd December 1918. It consists in the main of an application of the principles of the foregoing works to a kind of International Federation—an ideal which the author is fully aware is a very long way from being realised.

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE, SUSSEX.

The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion. Bampton Lectures. By Rev. A. C. Headlam, D.D.—London: John Murray.—Pp. x+326.

WITHOUT any doubt the conscience of all serious Christians is made uneasy by the sight of our "unhappy divisions," but an equally potent instrument in stimulating the demand for reunion is the growing impotence of all

Christian Churches. In countries steeped in ignorance the power of the priest may still be fitfully exercised, but in all countries where freedom of thought obtains, official religion rests helplessly on its laurels, and calls on its past to redeem it from its present evil case. And the sense of failure is an even more effective goad towards working for reunion than that of duty.

Dr Headlam's contribution to the cause of reunion is in many ways the most notable of any made for many years past. For it is the work of a scholar and a theologian whose studies have equipped him admirably for his task. He possesses the advantage, too, of being in the confidence of many of the most sober and devoted members of his Church. And what is even a greater gift is his, that of a balanced judgment and a cool, equable, and sympathetic temper. With all these advantages, it is not surprising if we are given a course of Bampton Lectures which will not only mould thought, but also lead to practical changes.

The difficulties attaching to all proposals for reunion lie partly in our traditions, and partly in the nature of the case. Two principles have come down to us in stark opposition, the principle of freedom and that of order. The latter was paramount in the Middle Age and is still no negligible quantity. It dwells in the claims made for the hierarchy, and deduces the existence and nature of the Church from the powers of the priesthood. It rests on externals, and, therefore, on history and its documents, on unwritten traditions, and on prejudices which are not brought out into the open. Its most consistent champions are the Roman hierarchy, and those members of the English Church who lean towards Rome. Dr Headlam frankly gives up the former as hopeless. But will not the ears of the latter be equally deaf to his appeal?

There is then the principle of freedom, viz. that which puts the Church first and its representative ministry second; which regards the bishop as no bishop apart from his church, and the decrees of councils as valid only when ratified by the whole body of the faithful. This is the principle of ecclesiastical democracy, and it would seem incompatible with the principle of monarchy as held by Papalists, or of aristocratic government as taught by High Anglicans. Dr Headlam argues—and his arguments have solid ground in history—for the view which makes for freedom. On the other hand, he finds the principle of order allowed for sufficiently if we insist on the ministry and the Sacraments being used to fulfil the intention of Christ and His Apostles. "The Early Church recognised the value of the succession of Christian bishops as a guarantee of the correct traditions of the Christian religion, but had no theory of succession by ordination. What was believed was that the Sacraments were duly administered because they were the Sacraments of the Church and of Christ. The only condition for which there is any real authority in the New Testament is that ministers were appointed by laying on of hands and of prayer. It was natural and right that the Church should make regulations for the future administration of the Sacraments and should appoint the bishop as the proper minister of ordination, but the Sacraments depend not on the ministry but on the Church, and within the Church, if they are administered according to the teaching of the New Testament and with the intention of doing what Christ and His Apostles did, they are valid." That is well said, and it sums up in short compass Dr Headlam's main contention. But his plea for the recognition of this standpoint by our fellow-Christians at home is likely to be neutralised by his demand that, so soon as we have induced all bodies of Christians to reunite on the basis of all their orders being valid, then there should follow "the most careful adoption by the united Church of the historical Episcopate and the rule of episcopal ordination for all its ministry in the future." This demand may be made innocuous enough, no doubt, but it will not seem so to our sturdy Independents and resolute Baptists. The very word episcopate will have to be surrendered before these will ever consider its claims. Probably, too, we should come across many Episcopalians who do not regard episcopacy as a wholly blessed thing.

Where many of us would have liked Dr Headlam's further instruction is at a point where he frankly warns us not to look for it. He makes certain quite contemptuous references to critics or "certain scholars." These critics "find all sorts of reasons for rejecting" texts such as Mark x. 35–45 and Matt. xx. 20–28, and are told that "we cannot waste more space on such trifling." The decision seems lamentable on many accounts, for after all critics have their place, and some are of more worth than others. This unsympathetic tone towards criticism can but remind us of men like St Bernard who have stained their fame by their unwillingness to believe that faith and reason have a common purpose. Moreover, the heresy of one generation becomes the orthodoxy of the next. When *Lux Mundi* appeared a quarter of a century ago it raised a storm of protest. To-day its position is taken for granted. Who rails at criticism imperils Knowledge, and in the end will find that he tilts at windmills.

But this allowed for, we can but welcome Dr Headlam's Bampton Lectures as a hopeful sign of the times. They would have been still more useful if their author could have shaken himself free from the delusion of the concrete universal as applied to the Church. Even if Dr Hort be right in maintaining that to the early Christians their Church was but Israel in a new form, it does not follow that experience and reflection would affirm their judgment to be correct. And certainly, any doctrine which puts the Church first and the individual second seems to fly in the face of the direct message of Jesus. In any case, we cannot to-day accept the infallibility of the first disciples, but must take things as they are, and improve them as best we can where they need improvement. If the divisions of Christendom be an evil—and they are not wholly evil—and if better machinery will end the divisions—a disputable hypothesis—then federation seems the way out of our difficulties. Yet Dr Headlam will have none of this simple and straightforward method. W. F. GEIKIE-COBB.

CHURCH OF ST ETHELBURGA, E.C.

Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration. By Robert H. Murray, Litt.D.—London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1919.

IN this learned book Dr Murray has isolated one aspect of the Reformation movement for special study. With the growth of wide divergence upon questions of doctrine, toleration became a matter of critical importance, and its influence in public policy during the last four centuries has made it impossible for mediævalism to exist except as an exotic in the modern world. The Inquisition as an instrument for crushing heresy, or as the protector of a divine pattern of uniformity—it matters little from which point of view we regard it—is out of fashion. Few men would be so foolish as to revive the old argument that it is better to torture bodies than to damn souls. Even in presence of opinions which we regard as poisonous we still do homage to freedom of thought. For this change in public manners, resting as it does upon a profound change in theological ethics, we are indebted in the first place to the two dominating minds of the sixteenth century, Erasmus and Luther. Which of the two showed the greater force and originality on this subject? How far was their own insight blurred by temperament or the critical circumstances of their own time? These are among the questions to which Dr Murray tries to find an answer. The task has led him to a fresh handling of the abundant material, and of the permanent contrast in character between the teacher of a peaceful renaissance and the prophet of religious revolution.

There is no evidence in the case of Erasmus that his belief in toleration came as the result of struggle. His teaching about it is consistent. He is guilty of no passionate reactions against it. He claimed for himself and for others the freedom which is essential to every great searcher for knowledge. He was a humanist to his finger-tips. Toleration was native to his mind. Like the Alexandrines, he regarded the Greeks no less than the Jews as forerunners of Christ. "When I read certain of these great men," he writes, "I can scarcely avoid saying: Holy Socrates, pray for us." Or again, in reference to Cicero: "I cannot read his books on Old Age, Friendship, and Duties without stopping and kissing the manuscript. . . . He is inspired." This is the pure devotion of the scholar, with his love for the open face of truth and his scorn for whatever disfigures it. But blending with this there was also an element of Christian insight. For Erasmus, tolerance and the restraint which it imposes upon the clash of opinions were inseparable from the mind of Christ. When he unlocked the New Testament with the key of knowledge he confronted the harsh manners of his age with the image of Christ in the Gospels. The Church in its origin owed its existence to love, not to force. "Christ founded a bloodless empire. He wished it always to be bloodless. He delighted to call himself the Prince of Peace." He was prepared to take all the risks to traditional opinions of placing the Bible in its integrity in the hands of the common people, for "Salvation is not more common and left open to all than the doctrine of Christianity: it drives away none save him who drives himself away." In all this there is a noble spirit of consistency, which was not deflected from its course by ecclesiastical hostility or the vehement demands that he should support Luther in his open revolt and his final break with the Church. "I have always written," he says in a letter to Joachim Camerarius, "have always thought the same things." In the case of Luther the problem is much more baffling. The difference between the two men is hardly explained in Dr Murray's striking phrase, "Erasmus was a great humanist, Luther a great human being." Nor do we get much light, except upon the intensity of their personal misunderstandings, from the suggestive fact that Erasmus was a middle-aged man of European reputation while Luther was still young and unknown. At the same time, it would be hardly fair to say, as we are tempted to do, that Luther was only tolerant by accident; for Dr Murray's evidence, drawn especially from *The Freedom of a Christian Man*, and confirmed by numerous sentences from his letters and other writings—"I will have no forcing and compelling," "No man can or ought to be forced to believe, but everyone should be instructed in the Gospel and admonished to believe, though he is left free to obey or not to obey"—is conclusive to the contrary. The truth is that Luther had far more tolerance in his heart than he was ever able to practise in the revolutionary ferment of his own life. He saw the uselessness of force in religion; but he also saw the spirit of liberty which he had evoked running riot in undisciplined violence. This it is which justifies Dr Murray's conclusion that on the subject of toleration he was essentially opportunist. Sturdy common sense, the conservative instincts of his own nature, and the sublime confidence of the mystic determined his attitude to Carlstadt and Münzer. Like Cromwell in Ireland, Luther regarded himself as God's instrument in his dealings with the Peasants' Revolt. The mystic in politics has no use for mild principles of toleration, and does not even regard consistency as a virtue. It is, I think, open to question whether Luther's earlier teaching had much influence upon the progress of toleration, in view of this desertion of it for what Dr Murray calls pragmatic reasons. The Lutheran settlement of the problem of Church and State has been distinctly unfriendly to personal liberty in matters of faith. Its controlling principle, *Cujus regio ejus religio*, is simply an echo of Luther's own words, "In a country there must be one preaching only allowed."

All this is admitted by Dr Murray. He goes so far as to draw a parallel between Luther and Bismarck. "They believed," he says, "in the mass of mankind when the mass believed in them—but not for a moment longer. Both were anxious to influence the people, the one by his pamphlets, the other by his newspapers. Just as Luther tried to crush the peasants, Bismarck tried to crush the Socialists. As Luther in 1525, by his pamphlets against the peasants, became the involuntary and unwilling instrument of political revolution, so Bismarck in 1875, by adopting protectionism, became the involuntary and unwilling instrument of social revolution." And so we are brought to the strange conclusion that, while the calm statements of Erasmus on the subject of toleration are untarnished by the lapse of time and remain as ideal standards for the future, Luther helped the same cause chiefly by the destruction of unity, and thus creating violent oppositions of thought and practice, for which toleration was the only practical way of peace. It is not for us to say which has conferred the greater benefit upon the world. On the whole, Dr Murray seems to weight the scales on the side of Luther. It is the view which is likely to be popular in religious circles, though scholars and men of reflection will enter their own *caveat*. Of more value than these temperamental judgments is the desire to rise above them into the blissful mood in which ardent conviction and calm reasonableness do equal homage to Love, which is at once the finer breath of knowledge, the fiery core of faith, and the goal of all our strife. To such prophecy Dr Murray has nothing to say; it lies beyond his scope; but his careful and fascinating study of these protagonists of freedom, with their mingled strength and weakness, points the way to a solution of the problem of toleration which, by doing equal justice to every noble faculty of the soul, will set a term to the long conflict between humanism and faith. We cannot part with his book without a word of special gratitude for its excellent bibliography and index, and the wide and exact scholarship of its abundant references and notes.

WM. HAMILTON DRUMMOND.

LEWES.

The Revelation of St John. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary. With Introduction, Notes, and Indices, and the Greek Text and English Translation. By R. H. Charles, D.Litt., D.D. (International Critical Library). 2 vols.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920.

SHIPWRECK, as Dr Charles has elsewhere pointed out, is a fate which has befallen even the greatest scholars in the past who have attacked the problem of *Revelation*. It is some comfort, therefore, that the most distinguished of British apocalyptic students is able to announce in his preface the discovery of an insurance against it. A multitude of disintegrating theories have been propounded. "The bulk of these were due to their authors' ignorance of John's style. . . . With the utmost light-heartedness they excised from his text chapters and groups of chapters which are indisputably Johannine." In other words, they launched on the troubled waters of exegesis without first testing the timbers of their ships.

From such adventure Dr Charles guards himself by that exhaustive examination of fact which our native tradition of scholarship requires as an indispensable preliminary to theory. One can only wonder why, in these days of costly printing, he has devoted such disproportionate space to the out-of-date redactional conjectures of Spitta, Bousset, etc. The reason is probably because, as he tells us in his preface, he was himself tempted at the outset to a similar hypothesis. In the progress of his studies, however, he became profoundly dissatisfied, and increasingly convinced that the only safe guide was to be found in exact textual criticism. The writer of the Apocalypse had "created a Greek that is absolutely his own. This Greek I slowly mastered as I wrote and rewrote my commentary chapter by chapter." The most permanent result of this work is seen in a Short Grammar of the Apocalypse (Introduction, § xiii.), the need for which has been expressed by more than one modern scholar, but which has never before received such thorough treatment. With the help of this Grammar, Dr Charles, assisted by able collaborators, has overhauled the text minutely, and declares roundly for the "absolute pre-eminence" of Codex Alexandrinus as the basis of reconstruction. Here, as elsewhere, Dr Charles rather prejudices his case by over-emphatic language, but his judgment of the relative value of the MSS. and Versions is founded on accurate and acute reasoning. Confirmed by a reliable text, the Hebraisms set forth in the Grammar (many of these are pointed out for the first time) are undeniable. Whether their regular irregularity proves that "while John wrote in Greek he thought in Hebrew" is another question; but at least the timbers of the critical ark are sound, carefully chosen, and cunningly fitted together. Dr Charles is well prepared to launch out into the deep of exegesis.

Yet, once embarked, we are conscious that the shipwright's craft differs from the science of navigation. Not that Dr Charles is pedanticly dependent on the result of his textual criticism. When desirable, he rejects what it favours (*e.g.*, on xix. 12 *c*, "though the diction is Johannine this clause seems to be interpolated") or includes what is suspect (*e.g.*, on xxii. 8, "here apparently the editor has normalised the text"). In spite of this freedom, his commentary is the work of one who steers by the shape of the tiller rather than by the stars. For the whole exegesis is made to turn on a single text (xiii. 8), where "as many as should not worship the image of the beast should be killed" is interpreted as a prophecy of universal martyrdom. For this remarkable conception the only support which Dr Charles gives is Pliny's letter to Trajan. Yet he should have known (since he actually refers elsewhere to the context, vol. i. p. 198 n.) that the details of the persecution are to be found in 3 Macc. ii. 27, where Caligula (disguised as Ptolemy Philopator) decrees exactly the same penalties for refusal to sacrifice, namely, (1) death, (2) loss of civic rights, *without* exterminating the Jews.

An expectation of universal martyrdom being postulated, everything is made to centre on this culminating event in the history of the Church Militant. To it *all* the visions in the first thirteen chapters lead—except rather more than half! There are two pauses in "the orderly sequence" (the sealing in chapter vii. and the Angel of the Cloud in chapter x.), a proleptic vision (the two Witnesses, chapter xi.) and a retrospective vision (War in Heaven, chapter xii.), besides a "grotesquely ignorant interpolation" (the First Four Trumpets, chapter viii.). Thus exceedingly tossed with the tempest, we draw near to the quicksands of the Two Beasts (chapter xiii.). Dr Charles accepts (without discussion) Victorinus' identification of the Beast from the land with the heathen priesthood, adding the modern German limitation of the reference to the provincial Cæsar cult. Indeed, with universal martyrdom in sight, what other explanation can be given of the destroying power? Any Christianity outside the Roman Empire must be ignored, and the latter chapters of *Revelation* must be a prophecy of Nero redivivus heading Parthian hordes against the second coming of the Christ.

The one objection to this scheme (that it does not square with the facts) is fortunately of little importance to the modern exegete, who is familiar with a useful though generally short-lived tribe, originally also of Teutonic extraction. An Imbecile Editor has been at work. "This shallow-brained fanatic and celibate, whose dogmatism varies directly with the narrowness of his understanding, has stood between John and his readers for nearly 2000 years." Sexual self-sacrifice (and perhaps, according to the latest theories, even monogamy) are heritages from "pagan faiths of unquestionable impurity," whatever may be the opinion of Paul of Tarsus or of that Benedict in whose Abbey Church Dr Charles ministers. Forgetful of the dangerous homing tendency of curses, Dr Charles does not hesitate to adopt the violent language which is a master-shipman's privilege. But it gives his whole argument an unfortunate appearance of special pleading. When other reasons fail, a thing *is* so "clearly," or "incontestably," or "manifestly," or "beyond question." Any alternative is "against every reasonable meaning," or "absolutely impracticable." Dogmatism is always apt to create a prejudice in the reader's mind, and in this case the more apt because one cannot avoid an uncomfortable impression that something is being kept back. Why, for example, does Dr Charles give no note on N.T. prophecy when the two principal symbols of Revelation (the Lamb and the Bride) are attributed in the Fourth Gospel to the Baptist? Why does he not examine the use of the number Seven, with its even more important concomitants the Triad and the Eighth? Why does he not mention the Man on the White Horse (*El Khidhr*) in commenting on the Word Triumphant? Why has he re-written his note on viii. 12 in *Studies* so as not to show ignorance of Day and Night being astronomical concepts distinct from the heavenly bodies?

With the Imbecile Editor as pilot, our ship labours exceedingly. John, we are told, "did not live to revise his work, or even to put the materials of x. 1 to xxii. into their legitimate order." Dr Charles accordingly rearranges them. Since all Christians have been killed, the thrones of the First Resurrection (xx. 4) can have no occupants but martyrs. (The Imbecile Editor has thus added to his heresy by disparaging martyrdom as well as matrimony.) On similar grounds the City of God (xxii. 10) was originally a description of the millenarian "camp of the saints" in which the martyrs reign. Passages which do not fit this re-ordering are either grotesque interpolations, or, being written on separate pieces of parchment, are misplaced by John's "very unintelligent" disciple. However, "the reverent and patient research of the present age" has enabled Dr Charles to discover the true teaching of the great Christian Prophet. Restored to their original order, the contents of *Revelation* fall "naturally" into seven parts, of which the second occupies nearly two-thirds of the whole MSS., the fifth is built up of twelve verses selected out of three chapters, and the sixth is limited to five verses. Truly the hinder part of our ship is broken with the violence of the waves.

It is not possible in a short review to do more than indicate the cause of this disastrous landfall, namely, Dr Charles's almost total lack of interest in the history and geography of the Ægean, from an island in which *Revelation* is dated. For centuries before Greek history begins, East and West had been mingling along the great trade routes of S. Asia Minor, more particularly along the Cadmus track *via* Rhodes (which includes Patmos in its sphere), and thence north and west. Of the Semitic elements in the resulting commixture Hebrew culture is a secondary and late constituent. Dr Charles could have saved himself the lengthy discussion of the inconsistency between *Revelation's* First Heaven and Jewish tradition, if he had noted that at Cos (between Rhodes and Patmos) the seven λύχνοι, the two λυχνία, a throne with brazen κύκλος, and other significant ornaments were used in the sanctuary of the Tyrian Herakles (Ross, *Ins. Gk. Ined.*, No. 310). He would not have been so ready to conclude that the use of Hebraisms proves imperfect knowledge of Greek, if he had taken account of the possible kinship between the three "strong" angels of *Revelation* and the Kabiritic Triad, for in the cult of the latter at Samothrace (where Cadmus found his bride) "the autochthones used an ancient dialect of their own, of which much is preserved in the sacrificial ritual unto this day" (Dio. Sic., v. 47). Since this included the Semitic word *Kohen* for priest, the grammar of the Apocalypse is patient of explanation as an Ægean convention for mystic utterances.

With all humility, the present writer would express the wish that, should Dr Charles ever revise his commentary, he will reduce its over-positive tone outside those subjects where his twenty-five years' study of Jewish writings makes him peculiarly entitled to speak. Where his notes deal with that side of the problem, his work is superb (*e.g.* the masterly excursus on the Souls under the Altar, vol. i. p. 172). It is most distressing to find under the same covers arguments like the deduction from the order of the foundations of the City (vol. ii. p. 168), where he fails to notice that there is no reversal of the zodiac if the plan was made by an observer from below. He has, in fact, tried to prove too much. A great Hellenist (the late Bishop Hicks of Lincoln), discussing Sir W. Ramsay's studies in the *Expositor* some years ago, expressed to the present writer the firm opinion that "all is Hebrew." Dr Charles has given us an invaluable catena of references to apocalyptic literature and a notable monograph on the grammatical peculiarities of *Revelation*, but he has unconsciously demonstrated Hicks's judgment to be wrong. Hellenist alone and Hebraist alone here alike failed to bring the ship across the bar. There remains only the method of Comparative Religion—to check the observations of one by those of the other, and to cast anchor where they do not agree.

C. E. Douglas.

London.

The Power of Prayer. Edited by the Right Rev. W. P. Paterson, D.D., and David Russell.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.

This is a volume of twenty-one essays, two of which are contributed by the editors. The remaining nineteen are selected from 1667 essays received in response to the offer of £100 made in May 1916 by the Walker Trust of the University of St Andrews, for the "most widely helpful essay on the meaning, the reality, and the power of prayer." The competition was open to the world, and the widely varied points of view represented in the essays are reflected in the selection. Seven of the eight essays adjudged best are published in the volume, and are by Christian writers. The selection of the others has been chiefly determined by the design of the collection, namely, "to throw light upon the life and thought of the whole religious world of to-day, including the regions of ethnic and eclectic faith." The Theosophical point of view is expounded by Professor Mehta, whose essay is entitled "The Oriental Conception of Prayer," and is illustrated by quotation from the Christian Scriptures and Western writers such as Huxley and Emerson, as well as from the Bhagavad Gîta and the teaching of Eastern sages. There is "A Study of Bahai Prayer" by Dr J. C. Esslemont. Mr Wm. Loftus Hare traces the history of prayer in its more mystical aspects in the Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures, in the teaching of Christ, and in the writings of well-known Christian mystics. Chinese religious thought on prayer finds expression in an essay by a Wesleyan missionary. And Mr Edward Lawrence, writing "From the Anthropological Point of View," gives examples of the prayers of savage races, among the more advanced of which he finds petitions of a distinctly ethical character. As further illustrative of the variety of view might be mentioned a contribution from the standpoint of Christian Science on "Prayer in relation to Spiritual Law and Absolute Reality." The treatment, however, is more propagandist than scientific.

Another outstanding feature of the essays, as Professor W. P. Paterson remarks in his excellent introductory essay, is "a very distinct stamp of modernity." The recognition of the classic treatises of earlier divines is scant as compared with the ampler knowledge that is shown of current literature. The predominant tendency is to treat the subject philosophically, though the appeal to the authority of the Scriptures and to personal experience is by no means wanting. The prize essay, by Canon M'Comb of Baltimore, in which thoughtful treatment is combined with lucidity of expression and a high literary quality, will no doubt be found most popularly helpful. To the scientific reader, Dr Mellone's valuable essay will probably appeal more. Of similar interest are "A Modern Apology," by Pasteur C. A. Bourquin, and "A Chaplain's Thoughts," the latter having the further value of conserving the witness of the battlefield to the efficacy of prayer.

The personality of God is much discussed in the more thoughtful essays. Those, however, of a more pantheistic character hold that the belief in an impersonal deity is not incompatible with a prayerful spirit. The tendency in essays of this type is to interpret the Divine immanence in terms of the developing finite consciousness, and of the general evolution of mankind. But by far the more representative view is that the Transcendence of God may be believed consistently with His Immanence, which need not be interpreted in terms of an advancing and conscious world-process; and that the idea of Infinitude may be combined with that of God's fatherly care. Certain attributes involved in objections and difficulties are discussed—for example, the immutability of God in the question of the relation of prayer to the conception of the world as a fixed order, His wisdom and love in relation to the view that prayer is needless.

Along with a most marked agreement on the efficacy of prayer and the importance of its practice, there is a considerable divergence of opinion as to the relative value of the various kinds of prayer, its proper subjects, and its answer. And while in some essays, particularly the more mystical, petition is discounted and prayer viewed rather as pure adoration, the more common view, and surely the right view, is that petition is of the essence of prayer—"the natural form in which the sense of dependence finds expression." Appeal is also made, in support of the efficacy of petitionary prayer, to the authority of the Scriptures and the evidence of personal experience.

As to the proper subject of prayer, spiritual benefits have, of course, the consensus of opinion. Some strongly urge that *only* subjective effects, such as illumination and moral invigoration, should be looked for in prayer. This exclusion of prayer from the realm of material benefits is not, however, generally upheld. God is supreme, it is argued, in both realms, and wills to be sought of for all things that minister to His children's well-being, temporal as well as eternal. It is also urged that the objective and subjective realms are "closely interwoven." The difficulty occasioned by the scientific conception of the reign of law in the material realm is dealt with at some length by several writers. It is pointed out that the subjective realm also is under law, yet that fact does not preclude the communication of thought, feeling, and impulse in human intercourse. In illustrating, by human analogy, the possibility of the Divine communication of subjective benefits, much appeal is made to the "phenomena of telepathy," also to the significance in this respect of the modern doctrine of the Divine Immanence. Telepathy is also resorted to in dealing with the more difficult question of the granting of material benefits—in the case, for example, of a person in financial distress receiving help. A generous impulse, it is explained, may be divinely communicated to one in affluence.

Where, however, the bestowal of material good involves an apparent interference with the uniformity of natural laws, various hypotheses are offered in explanation. Sometimes the validity of the theory of an universally fixed natural order is questioned. "The uniformity of natural law," one essayist contends, should be understood hypothetically to mean only, that is to say, that given certain conditions certain results will follow. And may not God in answer to prayer by the fresh exercise of His creative power give rise to new conditions and so produce results in other than normal ways? The doctrine of the conservation of energy, it is held, is a "physical postulate" based on empirical grounds, and to which we are not warranted in giving the universality of mental or moral necessity. Moreover, it is further asked, if the reign of natural law does not preclude the exercise of human volitional agency, why should it be conceived of as limiting the Divine Will?

Professor Paterson mentions the attempt made by apologists of the nineteenth century to meet the difficulty by the predestinarian hypothesis, which, accepting the view that the "material realm is a closed system," holds that "God in the beginning had foreknowledge of all prayers, and so arranged the cosmic forces that at the appropriate moment they should work out the answers to those prayers which He decreed to answer." To the objection that this made prayer unnecessary, it was replied that prayer also was foreordained, or that, if foreordination made prayer superfluous, the same may be said of all human effort. Professor Paterson points out that this line of reasoning is markedly absent from these modern essays, and suggests the predestinarian scheme of thought may not generally appeal to the religious mind of to-day. Another theory meets the difficulty by regarding prayer as itself a force or law included within the system of cosmic energies and natural laws. "Prayer," writes one, "is a part of the order of the world and is as constant as this order. . . . If you say that all is law, we say prayer is part and parcel of the system, governed in accordance with law." But it is a "force which acts in harmony with the fundamental laws of the universe." Hence the implication that the scope of prayer is limited within the material realm. "It functions" only "in those regions of experience in which the accomplishment of the Divine Will waits on the co-operation of the will of man."

The Theosophic conception of "prayer force" as a kind "of vibrational activity," to quote an Indian writer, "set up in our mind in the time of deep and earnest sentiment, passing on its vibrations to the great ocean of mind power in which we live, and producing currents which travel on until they reach the mind of other individuals," may seem crude psychology, and may be objected to from the Christian standpoint on the ground that it reduces prayer to a kind of material or magical agency, especially when the theory ascribes to "mental force, shaping and directing energy, in the realm of atoms and cells," a significant feature in the wide recognition of the therapeutic value of prayer. While the increased interest in this aspect of prayer may be ascribed in part at least to Christian Science propagandism, its interpretation in the essays is more in accordance with traditional Christian teaching and recent scientific developments in Psychology.

Reference is made by more than one writer to the growing tendency to trace the subjective efficacy of prayer to the power of self-suggestion; but this, it is pointed out, must ultimately mean Divine reinforcement; that, as Mr F. W. H. Myers contends, "even the self-suggestion which refuses to appeal to any higher power, which believes that it is only calling up its own private resources into play, must derive its ultimate efficiency from the increased outflow from the Infinite Life."

What gives peculiar value to the volume is the striking unanimity of its testimony to the power of prayer, and its witness to the universality of prayer, and to the earnest occupation of the educated lay mind of to-day with the problems of religion. In addition to the essays there is a useful bibliography and a comprehensive index. The wealth of material, and the excellent way in which it is edited, render the work an invaluable help to the study of religious experience.

A. E. DAVIES.

CRICKLEWOOD, N.W.

THE
HIBBERT JOURNAL

RELIGION AND THE STATE.

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, D.D.,
Dean of St Paul's.

AN impartial consideration of the various forms of State which have appeared in human history, and of the various theories and ideals which thinkers have evolved in the course of their attempts to devise a perfect scheme of government, must lead the student to one conclusion. Good government is the hardest of all problems, and it has never yet been solved. History is an almost unrelieved tragedy, because there has never yet been a hopeful experiment that did not break down after a time; there has never been a constitution that did not bear within itself the seeds of its own decay and dissolution. Theocracy, which in theory is the organisation of mankind under the authority of divine revelation, has in practice meant the domination of a priestly caste ruling by superstitious fear and fraud, and extorting money by false pretences. The City State of Greece and mediæval Italy, unrivalled as a forcing-house of genius, and the mother of the arts and sciences, has been the shortest-lived of any form of polity. Nor have the philosophic structures reared on this foundation done much more than serve as the models for the impracticable Utopias which idealists of all ages have loved to build in the clouds. Roman imperialism and the dual world empire which was its heir looked imposing while "the world" meant the countries round the Mediterranean; but the Holy Roman Empire was a phantom, the ghost of the mighty power wielded by the Cæsars; and the Roman Church was never able to make good its claim to be the one legitimate embodiment of the Christian faith. Its pretensions were always far beyond its power to realise them; and now that its rival and counterpart has ceased to exist even in name, these pretentions have lost their intelligible explanation. The most powerful modern nations have repudiated their spiritual allegiance to Rome; and though the Latin countries are so far negatively faithful to the old *caput orbis* that they have shown but little disposition to adopt any other form of religion, their culture has in fact broken loose from ecclesiastical control, or where it has not done so, it has remained in a backward and mediæval condition. Roman Catholicism everywhere confronts modern civilisation as an enemy, and that is precisely why it has so much more political power than Protestantism. The opponents of "the ideas of 1789," and even discontented provinces which have no uniting principles except antipathy to the central government, tend to place themselves under the leadership of the Roman Church, and to take advantage of its incomparable gifts for organisation, discipline, and cunning intrigue. Protestantism has amalgamated far more closely with the development of secular culture, so that in Protestant countries it is impossible to form strong political parties of clericalists. Religion with us is no monopoly of Conservatives, Liberals, or Socialists; still less does it desire to be a "party of the Centre," separated from all of them, and devoted to the interests of an international corporation. The apotheosis of nationalism which marks the modern period has probably nearly reached its term. It was from the first morally indefensible; and it has ended by plunging the world in the greatest calamity that has ever befallen it—a disaster which has brought ruin and desolation to half the continent of Europe, and which has shaken the whole fabric of civilisation to its base. Nationalism in its extreme Machiavellian form is discredited; and the internationalism which offers itself as the alternative does not seem to have any promise for the future. For it is not based on any love for mankind, or any real desire for peace and good will. The two international organisations which confront each other are ultramontane Catholicism, which is the service of a militant corporation existing rather for its own ends than for the welfare of humanity; and international Labour, which is frankly based on a predatory class-war. There are other international forces such as finance, art, philosophy, and science; but these are not political organisations, and do not even aim at any new integration of society.

As Dr Bussell says in a recently published lecture: "The very root-principles of the man in the street are shaken, and no one knows to whom or to what he owes allegiance. The disappearance of monarchy, except in a few cases, has removed an intelligible principle of personal loyalty, leaving a void which no one at present even proposes to fill. Instead of a unifying influence, the government of the modern State tends to be frankly sectarian and partisan; it has no stability and no general popular support. It is at the mercy of plotters and anarchists no less than the older personal monarchies. While founded, at least in theory, on a popular franchise, it creates no affection or respect among the people. . . . Meantime, if government is weaker and more precarious in its tenure, it is asked to do more. It is saddled, by general consent or apathy, with duties and functions which it cannot possibly fulfil. It does not seem to be developing, here or elsewhere, into a responsible directorate of business men—a somewhat sordid but still working hypothesis for society and its rulers. It is still largely composed of amateurs detached, by an unreal public life and its catchwords, from any true knowledge of men and women. Those who demand its interference most warmly are the least confident of its motives and its ability. In the general chaos of thought to-day, nothing is commoner than to find the same treatise insisting on the universal control or competence of the State, and yet holding up as an ideal the unfettered freedom of the subject, his conscience and his movements. . . . The State is now stripped of its venerable trappings and exposed in all its nakedness as a hotbed of intrigue, waste, and self-seeking. No one cares or troubles to define democracy, and the old constitutional methods of vote and parliament and debate seem highly unpopular. The prevailing features of modern life are impatience, distrust, and an unwillingness to set to work until the meaning and worth of work are explained."

This analysis of our present condition seems to me entirely true, and I would lay special stress on the complete discredit into which ballot-box democracy has fallen. Those who still babble about the "general will" only want a stick with which to beat the life out of minorities, and an excuse for relieving politicians of all moral responsibility. It seems as though all the expedients for establishing an ordered human polity had been tried, and that all have failed.

But we may be reminded that this is the age of science, and that science has tried its hand at moral and political philosophy. Perhaps what we want may be found here. The new knowledge ought surely to have something new to teach us in the art and philosophy of government. This claim has been made. As Professor David Ritchie says: "Evolution has become not merely a theory but a creed, not merely a conception of the universe, but a guide to direct us how to order our lives." It is in this aspect that we have to consider the social ethics of science. Can we find in its teachings a realm of ideas which may form a standard for social life, to take the place of the supernatural sanctions which are no longer operative in the nations of the West? Can we retrace the steps of philosophy to its earliest beginnings in Ionia, when Thales and his successors sought to find in the ultimate constitution of matter and the laws of nature a basis for individual and public morality?

I do not think that the scientific school has produced any political philosopher of the first rank. Darwin wisely confined himself to his own subject, though it was Malthus on Population that first set him thinking on biological problems. Herbert Spencer, though he does not by any means deserve the acrimonious aspersions of critics who hate him on political grounds, started with strong prejudices—those of a Radical dissenter—and never corrected them by study of earlier writers on political philosophy. His education on this side remained very scrappy, and it is not difficult to trace some of his leading ideas to their source in the few books which he had read. "Morality," he said, "is a species of transcendental physiology." The adjective gave admittance to a mystical theory of "life," as a quasi-divine force, operating in all nature, from the highest to the lowest forms—a Plotinian doctrine which he probably borrowed from S. T. Coleridge. This loan from Platonism was given a peculiar character by combining it with a doctrine of universal evolution, which was then in the air, and which Spencer began to hold before the appearance of Darwin's famous book. The process of upward development, according to Spencer, is always in the direction of higher individuation. The higher organisms are more complex and more specialised. This furnishes him with a teleological standard of value, to which, as he supposes, all nature tries to conform. By a very superficial reading of history, he regards militarism as a lower integration of the social organism, and industrialism as a higher stage—a condition of differentiation. He looked forward to a time when this differentiation into independent units should be complete, after which he hoped that an "equilibrium" would be reached, and the individual would be free from all external control in a permanent and "static" paradise of unlimited liberty and low taxes. It is not easy to reconcile this ideal with all that he says about the social organism, nor to defend his rather absurd analogy between the State and the bodily organism, with nerves for telegraph wires, and so on. But it is his justification of competition, as "a beneficent private war, which makes one man strive to stand on the shoulders of another," which has made so many writers of the younger generation treat him as a personal enemy. Only a middle-class Victorian Englishman could have fallen into the error of contrasting militarism with industrialism, which, as Germany has shown, may easily be fellow-workmen and fellow-conspirators. Strauss, who goes even further than Spencer in his dislike of trade-unionism, advising that employers "should send to foreign countries for workmen, and then let the refractory see who will be able to hold out longest," defends military conquest as well as social inequality as right, because natural, and ridicules those who hope for or expect the abolition of war. Mr Clodd sees that militarism and industrial competition are equally war, though the weapons are different, and thinks that war, in one form or the other, is a law of nature. "Man's normal state is one of conflict; further back than we can trace, it impelled the defenceless bipeds from whom he sprung to unity, and the more so because of their relative inferiority in physique to many other animals. . . . The struggle was ferocious, and under one form or another ranges along the line to this day. 'There is no discharge in that war.' It may change its tactics and its weapons; the military method may be more or less superseded by the industrial—a man may be mercilessly starved instead of being mercilessly slain; but be it war of camp or markets, the ultimate appeal is to force of brain or muscles, and the hardest or craftiest win." It was indeed plain that the "survival of the fittest" can only mean that those survive who are fittest to survive, not the fittest by any moral standard; evolutionary optimism, though it continued to be preached by many, was an amiable superstition, based perhaps on the superficial Deism of the eighteenth century. And so, while Darwinism was applauded in Germany as giving the blessing of science to militarist government and Machiavellian politics, English Darwinians, unwilling to accept so unwelcome a conclusion, were driven to what a more theological age would have called Manichean dualism. "Nature," says Huxley, "is no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature." The "cosmic process" is frankly handed over to Ahriman, and man, who is endowed with an ethical sense which at every point revolts against Nature's methods, has been given, or has given himself, the formidable task of "resisting the cosmic process." Man is on one side a self-asserting natural organism, and on another a self-renouncing social being. But what is the foundation of this moral sense which flies in the face of Nature? Huxley gives no clear answer; Wallace, who felt the same horror at Nature's methods, was driven to postulate "an influx from the unseen universe of spirit," thus definitely joining the ranks of theism.

These scientific dualists were undoubtedly dismayed by what seemed to be the unavoidable conclusions to which evolutionary ethics must lead in practical politics. If "history is a good aristocrat," science seemed to be a very heartless kind of Tory, or even a Prussian militarist. This was so contrary to the main current of opinion at the time, which was pacifist and humanitarian, that science, which at one time in Queen Victoria's reign seemed to be in possession of the intellectual field, was assailed by new enemies from every side. The remarkable work of Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, gives a good survey of the miscellaneous host of allies—Neo-Kantians, Voluntarists, Pragmatists, Activists, and others—who have tried to subvert the foundations of the scientific world-view. These intellectual campaigns have been assisted by orthodox theology, overjoyed at finding such allies against its old enemy; by sentimentalists of every kind; and by the inheritors of the "ideas of 1789," whose *idola fori* were faring very badly at the hands of biologists. Further, the widening cleft between a philosophy based on physics and a philosophy based on the study of living organisms, with psychology as its crown, threatened to break up natural science from within, and was of great service to its enemies. The scientists, who not long ago claimed to be the dictators of morality and the expounders of the whole scheme of the universe, are in danger of being ousted altogether from philosophy, ethics, and politics, and being bidden to confine themselves to their laboratories. As an example of the language which is popular to-day, I will quote a sentence from a very able writer, Mr Ernest Barker: "It may still remain a matter of doubt whether ethics and politics, which belong to the sphere of mind, will gain by the importation into their sphere, in whatever way, of the laws of the natural world." The laws of the natural world, he implies, do not belong to the sphere of mind! What must be the hatred and dread of naturalism in politics which can entrap a philosopher and a student of Plato and Aristotle into so egregious a statement as this?

I have not the least doubt that this "reaction against science" is shallow, transient, and retrograde. No doubt the self-confident scientists of the last century brought it on themselves. They knew so little of metaphysics that they supposed the world as interpreted by science to be an objectively existing material structure, independent of the human mind. They attempted to interpret life by the laws of inorganic matter. They thought that they had disposed of Christianity by challenging it to substantiate miracles. They were (without a shadow of excuse) carried away by the popular delusion that the world is necessarily getting better, of its own accord; they were, many of them, quite incompetent outside their own subject, and they did not know it.

But there is no sign whatever of the "bankruptcy of science" which some of its enemies have been proclaiming. Its methods continue to work; they win new and signal triumphs every year; and can any thinker now be satisfied to cut the world of knowledge in two with a hatchet, and to separate religion, ethics, and politics from the study of Nature? It is a monstrous expedient, which could only end in absolute scepticism. It is not philosophers who are attracted by such a theory; it is politicians. They heap scorn on those whom they call "intellectuals," not because they are wrong, but because they are few. They ignore the fact that they have to deal with Nature herself, who, as Plotinus says, is not in the habit of talking, but who is in the habit of striking.

The new knowledge has, in fact, made many changes in religion, in ethics, and in politics. It has made an end of the supernaturalistic dualism which has been the philosophy of Catholicism. There are not two orders—the natural and the supernatural—dovetailed into each other on the same plane. We can no longer (unless we are on a coroner's jury) explain a mysterious event as an act of God, because (as has been said) we don't know what the devil else to call it. In ethics it has presented us with new duties. We know now that the so-called lower animals are our cousins, and we are coming to recognise that wanton cruelty to them, whether out of sheer devilry or in the service of fashion, is one of the most detestable and meanest of crimes. I trust that before long a woman wearing an egret plume will be made to feel that she is a repulsive object, and that the sportsman, instead of swaggering at railway stations, will try to hide his tools as a golfer who ought to have been at the Front hid his clubs during the war. Science has also taught us to look with a more discerning eye on the beauties of Nature. It has taught us that no moral duties are more imperative or more important than our duties to posterity. We do not want premature eugenic legislation;

but when the science is further advanced, we shall insist upon it. Many "false opinions" (ψευδεῖς δόξαι) have been undermined. The ridiculous statement that men are born equal is dead, if not buried. The "sanctity of human life" must give way to the obvious truth that a good garden needs weeding. The prohibition of euthanasia will have to be reconsidered. The question of population, which Huxley rightly discerned to be "the problem of problems," will have to be thoroughly investigated with reference to the health and welfare of the next and future generations. These are only examples of the ethics of the future, which modern science has made inevitable. The nation that learns these lessons first will lead the world in civilisation and good government.

It is a blunder to call scientific ethics "materialistic." The word is a mere term of abuse for anything that we do not like. If we believe in God, the laws of Nature are the laws of God for the world in which we live. We know them only through the reason which God has given us; and it is that reason which finds law and order in the dance of atoms which is all that can be said to be presented to us from without. The laws of Nature are a large part of divine revelation. If we disregard them and make, as Heracleitus said, a private world of our own, we shall not be "splendid rebels," but fools. And science is no friend either to selfishness or to hedonism. Self-sacrifice is part of Nature's law.

It is, however, a legitimate question to ask whether, besides the evolution of species, there is an evolution of ideas, which obeys the same law favouring the survival of the fittest, but is relatively independent of biological change. The question is important, because if human nature can only improve by the agency of natural or rational selection, the hope of measurable progress within so brief a period as five hundred or a thousand years would seem to be very small indeed, until we know enough of the laws of heredity to breed for moral improvement.

No one can deny the immense progress of knowledge, which, as we have seen, carries with it important ethical implications; nor the cumulative weight of experience, gained by the method of trial and error. And it is by no means easy to separate this kind of progress from improvement in human nature itself. To say that environment does not modify character is untenable. But the evolution of ideas is not necessarily towards a higher morality, any more than biological evolution is necessarily towards the production of "higher" or more complex types. "There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof is the way of death." Civilisation may pursue a course which brings present success and future ruin. Or ideas may stagnate, and cause a whole civilisation to stagnate too. There are several instances in history of a degeneration of ideas, comparable to the change of a freely moving animal into a parasite. The evolution of ideas is not a purely biological process; but it is strictly limited by the innate capabilities of each generation which acts as carriers to the ideas. A bad social organisation will produce a counter-selection—the worse ideas will tend to prevail.

The lower animals, acting from instinct rather than reason (though I cannot allow that these faculties are mutually exclusive), subordinate self-preservation to the instincts of the race. For us there is a conflict between self-regarding and external duties. We have to "save our own souls"—to make the best of our lives,—and we have to consider the welfare of others, especially of posterity. These duties conflict, except upon the highest plane; and purely scientific or naturalistic ethics cannot, I think, prevent them from conflicting. Nor can biology give us any clear answer to the question whether our duty is to serve humanity as a whole, or the particular national or social group to which we belong. In short, though science has revealed new duties, and has increased our knowledge of those laws of Nature which, in Bacon's words, we can only conquer by obeying them, it does not possess any dynamic which can lift our lives to the spiritual realm in which alone our higher natures are at home, and which alone can give us an absolute standard whereby to measure all human actions and aspirations. The neglect of scientific sociology is deplorable; but naturalism is an abstract and defective view of life, against which men will always be in revolt. We cannot accept a view of the world which practically leaves *us* out.

We are therefore compelled to reject the idea of a purely scientific State as the solution of our problem: not because science is "materialistic," for it is not; but because science concentrates itself upon a particular kind of values, leaving others out of account. And when an attempt is made to construct a rounded scheme of reality, those values which are excluded are virtually repudiated.

If I were asked to state in one word the cause of the failure of our civilisation, I should answer, "Secularism." There must surely be some very deep ground for the universal discontent and *malaise* which has overtaken Western civilisation.

There is but little happiness and content anywhere, and the reason is that we have lost faith in the values which are the motive force of our social life. Capitalism is in danger, not so much from the envious attacks of the unpropertied, as from the decay of that Puritan asceticism which was its creator. The glory of subduing the earth and producing something—no matter what—on a large scale; the accumulation of wealth, not for enjoyment, but as the means of increased power and the instrument of new enterprise—this conception of a worthy and God-fearing life no longer appeals to men as it did. The capitalist now is too often an idler or a gambler, and as such he can justify his existence neither to himself nor to others. The working man also has no pride and no conscience in his work. He works in the spirit of a slave, grudgingly and bitterly, and then ascribes his unhappiness to the conditions of his employment. He is becoming well educated; but he twists everything round, even religion, to his alleged economic grievances, and nothing else really interests him. Industrialism drags on, because the alternative is starvation; but the life and joy have gone out of it, and it seems likely to pass into a state of gradual decay. Civilisation presents the spectacle of a mighty tree which is dying at the roots. When masses of men begin to ask simultaneously, "Is it all worth while? What is the use of this great Babylon that we have builded?" we are reminded that the mediæval casuists classified *acedia*, which is just this temper, among the seven deadly sins. We had almost forgotten *acedia*, and few knew the meaning of the word; but it is at the bottom of the diseases from which we are suffering—the frivolous and joyless emptiness of life among the rich, and the bitter vindictive sloth of the hand-workers.

Troeltsch, writing about twelve years ago, after mentioning the decline of Calvinistic asceticism, the character of which he was one of the first to lay bare, names as "the final characteristic of the modern spirit," "its self-confident optimism and belief in progress. This" (he says), "was an accompanying phenomenon of the struggle for freedom in the period of illuminism, which without such a confidence could not have broken the old chains, and it then found confirmation in a multitude of new discoveries and new creations. The old cosmic conceptions dominated by the Fall, the redemption of the world, and the final judgment, have fallen away. To-day everything is filled with the thought of development and of progress upward from the depths of darkness to unknown heights. The despairing sense of sin, the sense of a great world-suffering imposed upon us for our purification and punishment, have been banished." Since Troeltsch wrote these words, the baselessness of this secular optimism has been thoroughly exposed. The loss of a faith, even of a fantastic dream like this, is a grave matter for humanity. But it was, after all, a will-of-the-wisp; and now that is gone, the path is open for a truer philosophy of history, based on a truer philosophy of life itself.

Troeltsch is confident that "a Church-directed civilisation" is no longer possible. This is certainly true, while the Church cannot make up its mind whether to go into politics or to stand aloof from them. A Church which allied itself wholeheartedly with Conservatism or with Revolution might conceivably "direct civilisation" again, of course at the cost of complete apostasy from the religion of Christ. And a Church which determined to combat spiritual evil with spiritual weapons, confronting "the world" with another standard of values, and offering mankind the blessedness promised by Christ to all who will renounce the world and follow Him, might also conceivably win civilisation to make trial, for the first time on a large scale, of those doctrines which would in truth solve all the gravest of our problems. But a secularised Christianity, such as is now preached from our pulpits, has neither savour nor salt; "it is good for nothing, but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men." It tries to please men who have obviously no conscious religious needs, no sense of sin, no craving for redemption from it, "whose god is their belly, whose glory is in their shame, who *mind earthly things*." St Paul's climax has come to sound in our ears as a bathos; but it is not.

Eucken, whose whole philosophy is based on a sharp opposition between the earthly and the spiritual life, thinks that there is a danger lest those who live as citizens of the Invisible State should withdraw from the visible world, and fail to set their mark upon it. He says that "Christianity was established in an age which was wanting in vigorous vitality, and was chiefly intent on gaining a safe harbour of refuge. It seemed that this could only be found in opposition to the confused activity of the world, in a supernatural order. . . . A sharp opposition runs through the whole history of Christianity, the opposition between an inwardness which withdraws from the visible world and an adaptation to this world, with the danger of an intrusion of the sensible into the spiritual." He is thinking, no doubt, of monasticism, which may be justified as a calling for a few, and which only becomes popular when the conditions of life in the world are thoroughly miserable and barbarous, as they were during the dark ages. At such times havens of refuge have a value for posterity, since they preserve some relics of culture from destruction. On the whole, I do not think that Christianity has ever quenched human activities. It has been the religion of the most energetic peoples of the earth, though I do not pretend that they have done much to recommend their principles. The Christian attitude may be summed up in the maxim, "Value spiritual things for their own sake, and the things of sense for the sake of the spiritual." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you." A whole philosophy is contained in these simple words. Those who in heart and mind are already citizens of the State Invisible, the Kingdom of God, will be inwardly detached from the external world around them; but just as the mind and will of God, which find complete expression in the eternal world, create continually, by an inner necessity, the world of time, in which the thought of God is transmuted into vital law, and the will of God into an interwoven complex of finite purposes, so the soul of man, in the act of contemplating the eternal order, creates, by an inner necessity, a copy of that order in the scene of his temporal probation. We are not to regard this world as an end in itself; its deepest reality is the complex of divine purposes which are being worked out in it; and since those purposes have their source and their goal in the eternal world, it is only by knowing the eternal world that we can know things temporal as they are. The real is the ideal; but a deeper reality than our ideals. As the American Professor Hocking has lately written: "We have learnt that we must go to school to Nature to obey her, without letting the will or fancy mislead us; we must learn the same lesson in religion. All our creativeness must be within the framework of that which independently *is*." The mature mind would rather be defeated by reality than triumph over the products of its own imagination.

The State Invisible is the kingdom of absolute values, the kingdom of eternal life. It is because we have been misled into attaching absolute value to things that have it not, to man-made institutions, to transient enthusiasms, to all the idols of the cave and the market-place, that our faith in immortality has come to burn so dim. We have, as Mr Clubton Brock says, parodied our certainties in a wrong medium, till they have lost their certainty for us. To some extent, I think, we must admit that this scepticism about a future life has been wholesome. Men have denied themselves the consolations of belief because they are not sure that the values which it embodies are absolute. They feel the unworthiness of the doctrine of immortality as it has been presented to them. They have no desire for rewards for themselves and punishments for others; they do not feel that either are deserved. But it is the prevailing secularism which has caused the belief in eternal life to be swept away along with the travesties of it which made up the picture-book eschatology of the Churches. If we looked within, we should find both heaven and hell there. The highest human life tells us most about heaven, the lowest human life tells us most about hell.

The eternal values are commonly classified as Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, and we cannot improve on that classification. Goodness, Truth, and Beauty are the threefold cord which is not quickly broken. What are the marks or tests which give some of our experiences a much higher value than others, so that we feel that there is something divine about them? In the first place, they bring with them their own satisfaction. They are not means to something else. Secondly, they have an universal quality. They take us out of ourselves, out of the small circle of our private personal interests. They make us breathe a larger air, untainted by selfishness. Thirdly, they delight and uplift us in such a way that when the moments of vision are past we feel that we are still the better for having had them. These are the marks of the things of the Spirit. They are, firstly, precious for their own sake; secondly, they have God and not our little selves for their centre; and thirdly, they bring us a peace and happiness which does not wholly perish when they seem to leave us. And what are the experiences which have this character? First of all, moral goodness. When we are brought close to moral goodness, especially in the form of disinterestedness, sympathy, love, we feel that we have reached the heart of life, and come into the presence of God Himself. This is why it is said that God is Love, and that Love never faileth. Pure affection is stronger than death. Secondly, Truth has this character. By Truth I mean right thinking, the correspondence of our minds with the nature of things. Here, too, is something which stands firm in its own right, so that a brave statesman could say, "It is better that I should suffer for speaking the truth than that the Truth should suffer for want of my speaking." This, too, is why the work of the scholar, the scientific investigator, and the philosopher, is a branch of the larger priesthood, a direct worship of God.

And I cannot doubt that Beauty is also an absolute value, a divine attribute. It has the three marks of spiritual reality which I have mentioned. It claims to exist in its own right, and not as a means to anything else. It takes us out of ourselves, as pure affection and pure search after truth take us out of ourselves; and it is a permanent enrichment of our life. We may say with Augustine: "All that is beautiful comes from the highest Beauty, which is God."

Here, then, we have a definite content for the State Invisible: we are not reduced to talking vaguely about "Spirit," the word which so annoyed a practical reformer like Luther. Spirit should be the fullest of all concepts; it is sometimes in danger of being the emptiest. But if in place of this too general term we take these three absolute values, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty, and make it our ideal that these shall prevail "on earth as in heaven," we have a definite standard and a goal in sight. We also know our enemies—pride, sensuality, and selfishness, the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is pride which most prevents us from keeping our minds open and teachable for the reception of new truths. It is sensuality which most often poisons our appreciation of the beautiful, so as even to make it, in Tennyson's words, "procurers to the lords of hell." And it is selfishness which thwarts and spoils disinterested affection. All three shut up the soul in itself, and cut it off from its true and happy life in the eternal world.

The relations between matter and spirit, between the outer and the inner, between the visible and the invisible, between earth and heaven, are a problem never to be completely solved. But it may be helpful to remind ourselves that the contrast between outer and inner are misleading. The inner world is the whole field of consciousness, from which the physical world is a selection. Practical needs and the pursuit of specialised knowledge both tend to break up the *continuum*; and language, which was made to express our needs in intercourse with each other, helps to emphasise an artificial view of reality. The highest and most universal truths cannot be fitted into a scheme of reality such as we construct for our external life in time. We sometimes try in vain to find a place for God inside the artificial construction which we mistake for "things as they are"; and when this attempt fails, we are tempted to thrust Him out altogether. A truer philosophy will abate the claims of natural science to divide the contents of our consciousness into dreams and realities, the former being all that an abstract view of the world has left out; it will do this without in any way impairing the value of science as a revealer of many of the laws under which we live.

It is because man is a microcosm that he can only find his full life in membership. Potentially we have all reality within us, and potentially what we call the external world is a part of our higher selves. But, as Krause has said in a profoundly true passage, "The fellowship of higher beings with lower beings is immediate and direct, whereas the fellowship of co-ordinate beings on the same plane, in and through their common higher spheres, is mediate and indirect. Community is everywhere present whenever the inner manifestations of the life of the beings meet, mutually influence, and limit each other; and when at the same time they strive to maintain and heighten their independence. There is a degree of community even when there is no recognised unity of life, as when several beings are useful to one another in a community; but such communities are kept up merely by a common external interest, and have value only when the members are held together by justice." According to this philosopher, who is here rightly interpreting the Platonic doctrine, there can be no durable and valuable coherence in the State Visible, except so far as its members are also members of the State Invisible. True union between human beings can be achieved only in the spiritual sphere; in theological language, it is only as sons of God that we are in any real and effective sense brethren of each other. Any other kind of union, based on mutual convenience, is precarious and morally valueless. History confirms this view. Associations for unworthy ends find it very difficult to hold together long enough to accomplish the ends for which they were formed, whereas a community the members of which have in common a deep religious conviction resists all attempts to disintegrate it. This fact is connected with the necessity which compels all lower forms of association to curtail the freedom of its members, to impair their individuality, and turn them into mere tools. But the unity of the Spirit is not only consistent with, but vitally connected with, the fullest development and enhancement of individuality. A union of this kind lacks the cast-iron discipline of a military confederacy; but it has creative and assimilative powers which more than make up for this deficiency. Every person who is, by virtue of his rich and consecrated inner life, a citizen of the heavenly City, not only lives on that higher plane in which alone our personality is fully developed, but acts as a unifying, integrating force in society. Love, as Krause goes on to say, is the living form of the organic unification of all life in God. Love is the eternal will of God to be vitally present in all beings, and to take back the life of all His members into Himself as into their whole life. This love pours itself into all beings as the divine impulse to rejoice in the perfection and beauty of every being, and blissfully to feel this unity of life.

This is unquestionably the principle of the Christian religion, as we have it from the lips of its Founder and of those who have understood Him. We are to regard ourselves as strangers and pilgrims on earth, immortal spirits on our probation, but charged with the duty of making earth, which is the shadow of heaven, as much like its archetype as we can. And the way to do this is to develop our spiritual faculties to the uttermost, knowing that it is only in the spiritual life that we really come into contact with our fellow-men as they are. Social problems cannot be solved while we regard men merely as subjects of claims and counter-claims against each other, nor can any legerdemain of legislative machinery cure the deep-seated vices of human nature which are the cause of our troubles. The mere politician never awakens the sense of sin in those whom he addresses; on the contrary, he encourages them to think that their unhappiness is due to the injustice of other men. Thus he directly fosters hatred, bitterness, and alienation; instead of unifying the State, he disrupts it. We can all see how our civilisation is falling to pieces under this treatment. The government is despised and disliked by all; the State is torn asunder by warring factions, some of which are openly plundering their fellow-citizens and holding the nation to ransom. The State has completely lost its moral authority and its power of evoking reverence and loyalty. The idea of the Nation is not dead; men are still willing to die for their country, but the name of the State only calls up the picture of a collector and payer of blackmail. Nor can I see any remedy except in the adoption of the Christian standard of values and the Christian philosophy of life.

The question may be raised whether the citizens of the State Invisible should organise themselves as a Church, or in any other way. Some kind of mutual support is clearly necessary. What the New Testament calls the World, human society as it organises itself apart from God, is largely a system of co-operative guilt with limited liability. Each member of it can shift moral responsibility on to someone else; and when any of its tools is conscience-stricken, it says, as the Chief Priests said to Judas, "What is that to us? See thou to that." To meet this formidable organisation, there must be another society founded on the opposite principles, pledged to assist its members in the promotion of righteousness, peace, and good will. Such a society constitutes the invisible Church of which so much has been said at various times of history; and it needs the active co-operation of all high-minded men and women, who are shocked at the idea of using for their own purposes the faults and weaknesses of others—that sinister art without which, we are often told, it is impossible to get anything done in this world. But how far is it desirable to organise the moral forces of society into a visible corporation? Or, to put the question otherwise, Is the separation of Church and State a permanent thing, or a temporary accident? On the one hand we must emphasise that spiritual victories can be won only in their own field. The influence of the Church, as a spiritual agency, must be exercised upon the will and conscience of men; and a Church that leaves this, its legitimate sphere, and goes into politics, or attempts to use coercion, always comes out badly smirched, and generally outdoes secular governments in craft and cruelty. On the other hand, if the secular State has no spiritual or ideal basis, it is deprived of the strongest and noblest attractions that might hallow the obedience and kindle the devotion of its subjects. Nor does the dualism of Church and State seem altogether natural. The old idea, that the Church is the nation under its spiritual aspect, is surely the right one. It is impracticable at present, partly because the spiritual Roman Empire, with its claims to supernational or extranational obedience, still survives—a relic of the dead world-empire still vigorous in the midst of modern nationalism; and partly because the Church has split up into smaller corporations, none of which is capable of acting as the complete embodiment of the religion of the nation, while many prefer to stand outside all religious organisations. But if the State could once more be placed under protection of religion—not in the sense that it should be controlled by priests, but that it should be recognised by all, as it was in Greek antiquity, as a moral institution, existing to promote the highest possible life among its citizens,—we might hope to see a great improvement in the lamentably low standard of international morality, and a diminution in the sordid corruption, class-bribery, and intrigue which made up the life of democratic politics. If politicians came to regard themselves as the priests or officers of a holy corporation, pledged to stand or fall by the noblest ideals, the whole spirit of political life would be altered, and instead of lagging far behind even the most mediocre standard of private morality, the government might set an example of high-minded justice, generosity, and chivalry. There does not seem to be any reason, in the nature of things, why governments should be unjust in foreign policy, nor why they should, as a matter of course, appeal to the worst passions of the electors, their cupidity, pugnacity, and mean prejudices. The evil is partly due to a mutual shifting of responsibility. The government says, "We are only the servants of the people"; the people say, "We must leave it to the government to say what is right." Men of high character either keep out of politics or are driven out of them, and this is most true in the most democratic, which are also the most secularised, States. The dualism of Church and State may some day come to an end; and the truths which underlie both Hebrew theocracy and Greek political philosophy may be brought together in some form of polity which can also find room for the ideals of a spiritual world-commonwealth, and of a purified and exalted patriotism.

W. R. INGE.

THE CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE IDEALISM.

F. R. HOARE.

> "He who would do good to another must do it in minute particulars.
> General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer."
>
> BLAKE.

I HAVE in my mind a picture of a "world-lover."[1] He stands upon the edge of a prairie, or the seashore; in a mood of exaltation he feels an impulse to spread his arms as if to embrace the vast spaces in front of him. In their subtly diversified emptiness he perceives the crowding images that people his world, and he yearns towards them and loves them. He loves the whirling atoms and the streaming nebulæ; he loves the strange undergrowth of the oceanic depths; he loves the star-fish on the sand and the beetle on the leaf; he loves the upturned soil where the plough has passed; he loves the labourers, the teeming millions of Asia, the little brown babies in the jungle village, the muffled herdsman on the snow-line, the patient fisher with his cormorant, the patient hoe-er in the rice-field. Again, it is his native land he loves, and all lands, their heroes, sacrifice, and great careers. He loves the burning spirit of adventure; he loves the horse for its fleetness, the humming car, the clouds scudding overhead, the cry of the poet throbbing in his brain. He loves music, and lamps, and dusk, and his mother, and the world. . . . But his feet are cold, and he turns to his hotel, where there is a horse-hair sofa which he hates, and an eyeing waiter whom he hates, and greasy soup that he hates, and many other things that he forgot when he loved "the world."

What, then, was he loving? What is it, indeed, that we all love in these moments of exaltation? Can it be ourselves?

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[1] See the article entitled "World-Love," by Sir Francis Younghusband, HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1920, p. 301.

Can it be that these moments of fancied love are really moments of pure self-satisfaction, and that the objects of our "world-love" are but a few items from the unthinkable diversity of the universe selected, half-unconsciously, by our reverie because they can be woven into a pattern that affords us unalloyed gratification? It is obvious enough that a world-lover who was a city clerk or a worker with his hands would form a very different world-picture, and, what is more, would react very differently to the picture seen by the world-lover on the seashore. For all its apparent comprehensiveness this picture could scarcely fail to stir quite opposite emotions in, say, a student wrestling with the equations of stellar dynamics, or a deep-sea diver, or a fruit-farmer, or a ploughman with mud-caked boots and aching calves, or a census-official, or a hungry Chinaman with cramped limbs and cold wet back in an open boat, or the men who had to fail if others were to succeed, or the grooms at the stud-farm, the skilled mechanic who had to blow up the tyres, the piano-tuner, the girl who had to trim the lamps in the morning. It is not that these others necessarily have less emotional capacity or less capacity for unselfish affection; in so far as selfishness counts, it is not clear that the balance is in favour of the man who loves patience—in the teeming millions, and adventurous swiftness—for himself. Perhaps the different effects are due chiefly to the fact that, where all world-pictures are self-centred, no picture can lie evenly about another's centre.

It seems a shameful thing to have to admit that this monstrous figure of the world-lover came into my mind after reading Sir Francis Younghusband's moving and beautiful essay upon "World-Love." And let me disclaim at once all intention of mocking at that essay or at any of the aspirations expressed in it. If I mock at all, it is at the creature of my own perverse fancy. I feel sure that in the vision of that essay there is something that I miss, so that, missing it, I am incapable of doing justice to the essay. But the fact remains that this figure did thrust itself upon me after reading it, and, furthermore, that I do believe that for most of us the world-concept actually is of such a kind as, by its very largeness and lack of definition, to induce a highly subjective selection of objects when we reflect upon it and exceedingly egotistical emotional reactions. Some minds—the mind of the man in the street, for example, who has not trodden the Great Table-land of Asia or the Pathway to Reality,—will unresistingly accept a localised picture as the world-picture; another will attempt comprehensiveness by an effort of vagueness or abstraction that selects some moral or intellectual principles as world-unifiers; either sort will be making the world in its own image and loving it for the image it sees. As Sir Francis himself says: "We love the world because it manifests those very things which we love best."

But since I seem to be missing so completely the intention of his paper, I will make no attempt to consider it in detail in the all too disjointed reflections that follow. Yet, as I shall be concerned in part with the character of the world-lover and, particularly, of the world-lover in action, I will, before I leave the paper, quote in full the description of him that it contains. It may serve at the same time to afford some clue to my own perversity and to keep it within bounds. It runs as follows: "Those who are imbued with a fervent love of the world, like those who are devoted to their country, will be most delicately sensitive to the evil of evil and the good of good. And they will ache to remove the evil and achieve the good. They will be filled with a quickened compassion for those many who have to suffer through no fault of their own, as well as for those who have never had a proper chance. But they will also have a fined-up sense of what is best, and a hot impatience of whatever is short of the best in those who *could* achieve it. They will be possessed by a consuming passion for the best, and never will be completely satisfied till they have attained it and made it everywhere prevail. And the best, even when attained, they will straightway drive to better. Satiety will never overcome them. The joy of divine adventure will be with them to the end."

Certainly this beautiful description has no obvious relation to my portrait of the world-lover contemplating a portion of the ocean. Accepting it as descriptive of the type of man and activity produced by world-love at its best translated into action, what are we to think of this man, and what of his activity? Is he not even in this description a man with a passion for abstractions, a worker for abstractions? When he has to find for his daily conduct some motive more tangible and more specialised than world-love, some criterion detailed enough for decisions upon daily problems, will he not be the kind of man who fastens upon abstract principles, anchors his mind to them, and makes them the guide of life? For surely any man whose religion is world-love, and who is consumed with a passion for the world as he has conceived and unified it, must be driven to take as rules for action the principles in which he finds its unity, as the world-lover of my portrait took as the objects of his contemplation such items of the universe as gratified his self-complacency. And if so, though ever so much better than my day-dreamer, is not this man of action of somewhat questionable shape? There are ugly names that might be applied to him—names like "idealist," "fanatic," and "enthusiast." He will be hard to distinguish from the impracticable dreamer, the crank, the heartless devotee, the impossibly scrupulous citizen, those saints so intolerable as family men. For indeed all these folk are chiefly characterised, personal prejudices apart, by a single-minded passion for an ideal, whether it be contained in some worship or creed, or in some vision of personal destiny, apotheosis or martyrdom or both, or in some single rule of conduct, a conscientious objection or objective. It is from this devotion that they draw their undoubting faith, their high pride in the truth, and their scrupulousness; but hence also their dogmatism, their self-righteousness, and their priggishness. Hence, again, their fixity of purpose, their tenacity, and their courage; but hence also their "hot impatience," their obstinacy, their blindness, their callousness, and their cruelty. Hence a Francis vowed to poverty, or a Liebknecht to the people, but hence also the Inquisition and the Terror and the monstrous figures of a Torquemada and a Tinville; hence the "C.O." of popular imagination and not impossibly of real life, saving his soul while his sister is raped or the *Lusitania* sunk; hence strike-committees and Admiralties cutting off supplies from men, women, and children alike as an episode in the class-struggle or the war against Prussianism.

It may seem a travesty of world-love to associate the world-lover in action with some of these, but what, in the last analysis, is there to differentiate them? Loveless though some of these seem to be, there is none of them who would admit that he was not a world-lover. There is none who would not claim that in the last resort his motives derived from love of all the world, and each of them could with some show of truth deduce his principles from that all-embracing emotion. For each could claim that all his actions, whatever their immediate incidence, were subordinated to and justified by the ultimate benefit they were designed to secure to every creature.

Then what has gone wrong? Am I simply harping on the inevitable "weak side" of idealism, and is it not merely perverse to emphasise the darker aspects of so rare a gift, the very dynamic of moral and social progress, when there are enough already to assail it and all too few to defend; when moral and intellectual compromises are so prevalent and so ready, and half-measures and easy-going codes form most of the texture of our state and society? And certainly the man whose life is guided by principle, for all his occasional weaknesses, is a far nobler and more inspiring figure than any of those who mock at him from the unassailable ground of moral indifference.

Now, there seem to be two ways in which the following of universal ideals is able to betray us: one is through the harm that may be done to individuals by dealing with mankind on general principles, and the other is through the diversity of motive and spirit compatible with formal adherence to a rule. I will illustrate the latter danger first.

Some pacificists, and some educational idealists, have found their formula in the prohibition of the violent use of physical force; this formula may by some be considered misguided, but all will allow that it represents goodwill. Yet, let us obey it as scrupulously as we like, it will not prevent us from, and may even provoke us into, exercising control or giving vent to impatience by undue pressure of will or by furious reproof. We do not break our rule; but what essential difference is there between an overbearing manner and physical roughness, or between a sharp word and a slap to a naughty child? And yet so many of us who teach or control children are apt to think that we can save our consistency, if that be our formula, by these paltry distinctions.

If this rule seem too narrow, and too little representative of world-love, take such a lofty and difficult one as the requiting of evil by good. It is perfectly possible, as most of us know from our own experience, to obey this from motives that make the obedience perfectly detestable, as when we take the advice of the Book of Proverbs and go out of our way to do a kindness to one who has injured us, in order to make him feel uncomfortable by heaping "coals of fire" upon his head. Or take the great passage from the Sermon on the Mount that tells us not to discriminate, in our behaviour towards them, between our friends and our enemies, between the good and the wicked, any more than our Father in Heaven discriminates between the just and the unjust in the weather he sends. Surely we may hold that rule to be one that cannot betray us, a rule that we can follow blindly; yet if our feelings are not the same towards these two sets of persons, our attempts, our most successful attempts at treating them alike—in distributing benefits or disappointments, for example—may become a really horrible process, hard and calculating, sometimes even sullen and bitter, as we scrupulously, doggedly mete out perfectly even-handed consideration.

All this is obvious enough, and it is obvious enough also, it will be said, what has gone wrong. In these cases we are obeying the principle without being possessed of the spirit that inspired it. The obvious solution is to capture that spirit, and that means, in the last resort, to become a true world-lover. But few of us will feel that such a demand can be fulfilled to order, and in any case we shall want to know what to do with our principles meanwhile. To be able to be so horrible without ceasing to be high-principled is surely worse for us, and ultimately for others, than if our horribleness violated shamelessly every law of God and man.

And then the other weakness of idealism has to be reckoned with. To the damage we may do in spite of our principles must be added the damage we may do because of them, the suffering we may cause or permit in the course of realising our ideals. This consideration is unendingly insisted on, and I need not stay to elaborate it; I have already referred to examples both great and small. Here again we are pointed to an obvious solution: the principle must not become a fetish, and when occasion arises we must break it and be, superficially, inconsistent; instinct, honour, self-respect, common-sense, good-nature—any one of these is a better guide at such moments. But I cannot feel that principles or the practice of obeying them are so lightly to be abandoned, or subscribe to the paradox that rules were made to be broken. If a rule is a good one its value would seem mainly to lie in guiding our actions, not when its reasonableness is obvious, but when our judgment would otherwise be at a loss.

We are left with the fact that our idealism benefits some and injures others, and we are driven to inquire who it is that we really expected to benefit by it. It might be ourselves, for the effect of idealism in giving zest to life and simplifying its problems is plain enough. But in spite of all the dialectic of orthodox theologians and hedonist, egoist, and determinist moralists, I cannot see how anyone can consciously base a real religion or ethic upon benefit to himself. There remain apparently only two possible sets of gainers by our obedience to principle: one is the world in general, and the other is my next-door neighbour.

Now, in so far as we are concerned with the world in general, the universe, humanity, the race, or, as some would prefer to limit it, the workers, the proletariat, the allied peoples, or other large body of persons conceived in the mass—in so far as we are concerned with them it is easy to persuade ourselves that obedience to sound principle is the right thing, scrupulous obedience as such, no matter how we manage it; that is what will benefit humanity and so forth in the end. In fact, it is just by persuading themselves of this that men commonly justify their fanaticism, as persecutors or martyrs, as propagandists or autocrats, and so on; compromise, they would say, may win a point or ease a situation for the moment, but the cause, the right, "the best," or whatever it may be, can only ultimately triumph through unswerving loyalty to principle. Well, it may be so; and, if so, the ultimate benefit to a million men in the mass may outweigh the sufferings of those to whom our idealism has made us cruel or indifferent. For myself, I can scarcely see meaning in this counting of heads. But when we consider simply our next-door neighbour, when we make up the account of pain and benefit for some one person towards whom we have acted scrupulously on principle, we have no such abstruse calculations to make. Often we *know* that we have hurt him, perhaps in spite of, perhaps because of, our principle, and cannot persuade ourselves that we have given him compensating benefit. And, when we know that, most of us, if not on a platform or our high horse, are uncomfortable. Our idealism or our world-love is worth nothing to just the one person, may be, with whom we are concerned at the moment; is not that enough to show that something is wrong?

Each of us will have his own answer, and I do not wish to dogmatise. But, for myself, I find that I generally come down on the side of making my relations with my next-door neighbour the final test of the value of loyalty to principle; and I do so believing, seldom though I live up to my belief, that the act of direct help to my neighbour, typified by some such simple gesture as putting out my hand to lift him up when he has fallen down, is the one thing ultimately worth doing, and should in the last resort override all those considerations of tactical advantage and "the long run" that beset us whenever we attempt to apply principles.

The so-called "journey-section" of the Gospel according to St Luke contains sayings and incidents that seem at first sight an exaltation of fanaticism; but it contains also a story of another traveller, an alien from Samaria, that illustrates very well the point I am trying to make. It seems not far-fetched to see in the priest and the temple-servant the idealists whose devotion to ceremonial purity made them cross to the other side of the road to avoid contact with an apparently dead body, though there was just the possibility that they might have been able to do some good, and, no doubt, the desire to do so. The story, in fact, stresses the importance of helpfulness as compared with scrupulousness in daily life.

If all this is sound, it would seem that what is wrong with "principles" is that they do not individualise enough, and that even the spirit that inspires them does not individualise enough. And perhaps that is what is wrong with world-love. It may be that we cannot fruitfully love all the world, that the love that vitalises and is infallible is a selfless emotion directed towards a particular person, and that it is only when a principle does somehow express our actual love for other individual persons that loyalty to it cannot be involved insolubly in the conflicts of which I have been speaking. Certainly I feel that in loving all the world we may be far from loving any one creature in the only way that helps him. There is more hope, for most of us, of benefiting humanity by our love for one other, than of benefiting one other by our love for humanity. There are some we can think of who have done the latter or seem to have done so—characters as different in temperament and range as the Buddha, Socrates, and Plimsoll; but I believe that if we interpret them so we miss the effective sources of their power. It is easy to dogmatise, and indeed it is difficult not to be dogmatic in such a matter, for we are dealing with very intangible things; but I do feel that in so far as their world-love was real it was probably because it arose out of love for individuals and care for individuals. We ordinary people may perhaps find an intelligible analogy in the effect of marriage upon workers for others. Marriage, that on one view seems so often the ending of the idealist's career, is really, often enough, the renewing of strength. To most, both men and women, who have served many with heart, and hands, and brain, there comes a time when, unmarried, their love becomes strained and abnormal, and when, married, they can love and serve all with a greater and a purer love for undertaking those intimate adjustments and tendernesses required of him or her who loves one other with the whole mind and with the whole body.

I will not press an illustration that can be so variously interpreted. My concern is with these two contentions: first, that individualised loving-kindness is not so much the exercise and strengthening of world-love as its very root, the activity and experience out of which alone true world-love can grow; secondly, that it is, and in no transcendental sense, the secret of the hold over others of the great world-lovers. In the case of these we are apt to estimate the means as we estimate the results, by the degree of publicity they achieve. Let me take an, at present, less exalted example. I know a "fanatic," and surely a world-lover, the dearest to me of all, who was once so placed that for lack of opportunities his loving-kindness could only take the form of the simplest pleasantness, the barest courtesies; and one day someone said to me that she hated to think that his loyalty to principles, the principles that should have done the world such good, had brought him into a position in which his motives would be mistrusted and in which he could do no good to anybody. I tried to persuade her that what we knew of his conduct in prison was enough to tell us that his personal relations with both his comrades and his persecutors were as fine and considerate as ever, and that while that was so we knew that his loyalty to principle was no mere wrong-headedness or stroke of tactics, and that if anyone did any good anywhere he was doing it where he was. "Yes," said she, "but no one will ever know." It is true that few may ever know of his daily actions at that time, yet surely it is upon such unknown deeds that all power of influencing others for good is ultimately based. Would the Prince Gautama be adored as divine by millions in Asia to-day, would Francis of Assisi have founded so great an order, if each had not first laid his spell upon his immediate circle by countless acts of everyday kindness of which no one will ever know?

A difficulty some may feel about this line of thought is that it is too negative to be helpful, going too far in the reaction against conscious idealism. They may urge that there is something rather planless and groping, almost blind, about the operations of this sort of loving-kindness, and that it can afford no foothold for belief, even for faith, in anything but just "going on." It would be easy enough to retort that blindness of a worse kind is often characteristic of the world-lover, holding his head so high that it is always "in the air," and with so clear a vision of the goodness of the universe that he has little healing for the badness in his neighbour. It is more profitable to remember that this working in the dark, this mole-like burrowing, is often the only resource of men. For beliefs may be shattered, ideals and purposes change, and even the conscious love of others be quenched, and yet this working in the dark be able to carry intact the hidden faith and hope and love by which man lives. I do not know when kindness to the universe has ever saved a man from suicide, but many a body has pulled through a time of desperation by just doing jobs for his neighbours.

I am not going to put this forward as the chief recommendation of neighbour-love as against world-love; we cannot derive much moral stimulus from making provision for our worst moments. Yet a very considerable practical difference between the two ideals does seem to lie here. I suggested earlier that world-love could not be achieved to order; it is at least as certain that we cannot love our neighbour to order. So far, generalised love and individualised love fail equally as a basis for conduct if for that basis we desire a continuously and consciously felt emotion. But if we are content to allow, with Matthew Arnold, that life and conduct may be, and indeed have to be, in a large measure based upon just "going on" in courses consciously willed in our best moments, then it is clearly of the first importance that our fundamental idealism should be readily translatable into acts for which there are opportunities under any circumstances and in every mood, and acts that cannot of themselves be harmful to anyone. Love of individuals, translatable into kindnesses to individuals done without ulterior considerations, seems to me to meet these requirements more nearly than anything else. I cannot see that world-love has any such practical counterpart, and I do see many instances of attempts to translate it into conduct by means of general principles and universal methods of benefiting the world that can be positively harmful in their operations both to the world-lover and to those with whom he comes in contact.

Furthermore, when I suggested that individualised loving-kindness is perhaps the source of all wider love (and, I would add, of all wider conceptions of love), I touched, I believe, what is really the root of the whole matter. I know what large questions this raises, of psychology individual and social, of social evolution, and, if we like, of theology. It is perhaps a foolish thing to say at this stage of a paper that already contains a superabundance of challengeable assertions. Two considerations may perhaps serve to mitigate its crudeness, considerations bearing on the practical rather than on the philosophical side of the question.

But before passing to them I should like to avert a possible misunderstanding. When I refer to motives of kindness and the like I am not speaking of the resolve to "do good" to other people. That intention is often ridiculed, and deservedly ridiculed when it means, as almost always in common speech, the determination to impose on others our own standards of thought and conduct, and the gratuitous intrusion into other people's affairs. But the first objection only arises if "ulterior motives" and general principles lie behind our actions; the second is directed against the conversion of acts of help into acts of self-assertion, as when we begin to "manage" when we are only asked to serve. No one who has had any practical experience of helping others should be unconscious of this distinction or wish to quibble over it.

In the first place, then, we must all have learnt that our acts of kindness have tremendous power not only to carry into operation our neighbour-love but to awaken it within us. We could all give instances of this, ranging from the commonplace prescription for depression or self-centredness, that the patient should "think of someone else" or "do things for other people," to the deliberate ordering of his whole life or career by a man or woman who, at a time of utter agnosticism and despair, chooses some occupation in which the service of others is more direct and visible than is usually the case in our intricately organised society, in the hope or the instinctive knowledge that in such an occupation he will in time acquire as a fact of experience conscious love for others, and a sense of spiritual things, both of which have gone down in the wreck of some system of beliefs. I spoke of the extent to which life seems to be based on continuing in courses at some time consciously willed; it seems even to be true that often the "going on" has to precede our consciousness of what is behind this act of will; often we must will while yet blind in order to receive our sight, and perform the deeds of love before love itself can well up in our hearts. Like water underground, the power to love, with all that it may achieve, may lie concealed within us until an outlet is pierced.

And to pierce this outlet there are no means so ready as lending a hand to neighbours, who are always with us. The love that emerges may at first seem narrow, and limited in its direction, but not for long. Out of it will grow a wider love —of the world, of nature, or of God—giving hope and meaning to our neighbour-love, and easing the harshness that may tinge even the service of others if too long it lacks interpretation. For many, indeed, some such wider emotion, aroused by a less personal contact, by a preacher's appeal, by flowers, by "a chorus-ending from Euripides," has itself been, in appearance, the seed of their love and the herald of their awakening; but I doubt the reality of such beginnings. For unless the wider emotion is caught up into the current of an emotion with a personal objective, and given a direction such as only the practice of loving-kindness can give, it is all too apt, like the emotions of our world-lover, to begin and end as a mood of complacency centring in ourselves. To arouse unselfish love in us, a personal object is needed. The "world" is not such an object. God is, and that distinction is indeed as vital in religion as in theology; but, as a theologian put it long ago: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen."

Of love for God I must speak again. Here I must turn to my second consideration relative to the primary character of love for individuals. It is, briefly, that for most of us it is only our interest in and our care for individual persons that gives any real vitality to our efforts for persons in groups or in the mass. When we think of the innumerable organisations for the reform, protection, or comfort of large classes of scheduled persons, and of the enthusiasm with which they are run, this may seem an overstatement. But whoever has been mixed up with such organisations knows how inhuman their enthusiasms can be, how remote from the love of man or of God, being indeed sometimes rather the perverted form taken by the need to love that has found no personal outlet. He knows, too, with what a startling and novel sense of reality love for an individual can break into such enthusiasms, narrowing their scope for the moment, but making them concrete and personal beyond all experience, so that the rules and methods of the organisation, hitherto so universal and decisive, become for him trivial formalities or obstacles to be brushed from his path. And then two processes will take place side by side: on the one hand the care for the particular case will make far more understanding and acute his sympathy for all like cases, known and unknown, immeasurably re-enforcing, or rather re-creating, his original enthusiasm; on the other hand it will prove a remarkable solvent of groups and classifications, since the awakened love does not depend on the fact that the loved one falls into any particular class, and will quickly find how lovable and needy are other men and women who may even have been explicitly excluded from that class. Certainly such individualisation is a powerful solvent of those simplifications of mankind that universal ideals are apt to make, those comprehensive groupings into our particular versions of "the just and the unjust," so easily deducible from our conceptions of world-good and world-love, but in practice the perpetuators of every personal antagonism. Few have loved another better because he was classified as lovable, but many have found themselves loving another very readily as soon as they have forgotten that he was classified as hateable. It is a commonplace that most soldiers learnt this when the fortune of war, denied to civilians, thrust them into human relationship with some individual enemy. And, in the absence of some such accidental contact, hatred for men in the mass does more to divide men than love for men in the mass does to bring them together. We can hate in the mass more effectively and more readily than we can love in the mass. Even when we do combine expressly for fellowship and mutual love, the combination seems often to fail just because of its success in focussing love upon a group-object, thereby making it independent of personal sympathies. When hatred is thus focussed the Devil has done his work, for hatred thrives on generalities; when love is thus focussed the Devil has done his work again, for love dies of them.

No view could, superficially, appear more pessimistic from the standpoint of social policy, of international *Sittlichkeit* and of the brotherhood of man, and this essay would have to be doubled in length if even a beginning were made in working out and justifying its implications. I will only say that I do not shrink from them. Some may point out that it implies the impossibility, in the present phase of human evolution, of developing the highest forms of community-sentiment in any but quite small groups, as Rousseau limited the true manifestation of the "general will" to city-states no larger than Athens and Geneva. I should be inclined to acquiesce in the inference, holding that the typical states of the modern world are indeed far too large, and that the technique of political integration has as far outstripped the average human capacity for social good-will as the technique of applied science has outstripped the self-control and good feeling necessary for its humane use. Sir Francis Younghusband urges the value of the love of one's country as a type of and preparation for world-love, and with that we may agree; but this love is a tender growth and fitful, and we know that when it is assumed, organised, and exploited, and made to carry more than it can bear, it is swallowed up in that hatred of other countries and of dissenters in its own that is, in such circumstances, inevitably evoked to reinforce it, so that "patriotism" has seldom, if ever, in all history manifested itself on a very large scale except in organised conflict or persecution, or readiness for them. In the same way I could acquiesce, though for different reasons, in the views of the most cynical of *real* politicians as to the prospects of the League of Nations as at present constituted. I recognise the existence of a certain amount of vague international sentiment among world-lovers, a certain (and infinitely more valuable) amount of acts of kindness to aliens, "enemy" or otherwise, and a certain amount of indifference to political divisions among villages on frontiers not patrolled by armed forces, and all this is stuff for a League to work on; but it surely shows a lack of all sense of proportion to suppose that sufficient pressure can be generated from this to drive the vast machine set up at Paris or save it from being exploited as the tool of a clique of Governments.

Indeed, we seem to have acquired fundamentally wrong ideas as to the true bases of social and political solidarity. Otherwise we should not imagine that Governments can be a substitute for peoples, nor form a League of their delegates; we should not thus work from the inhuman and utterly loveless end of societies and, in so doing, sterilise such social and international sentiments as they contain. It has been argued before, and I think with truth, that reliance on the mechanism of the great state as the social nexus has atrophied those elements of fellowship in its constituent units that should be the most active elements in its life, and might be, I would add, as they have been in the past, effective links between its life and that of other societies. To me as a student of history the emergence and consolidation, political and economic, of great states in the last six centuries in Europe, for all the advances it facilitated in culture and even in the conception of freedom, appears as a swift and tremendous aberration in human history, to which previous eras afford only partial parallels and to which the European catastrophe we have witnessed was the only possible end. And I infer that, whether it is world-love that is our ideal, or peace between neighbours, the higher organisation of the state-system is an unsound basis for European reconstruction.

I must turn to my last inquiry, as to why it is that this love for men in the mass or for the world in general is so comparatively ineffective even where it exists. For if we are not to take a magical view of love, we ought to be able to give some account of the causes with which we associate its effects. I am not referring to metaphysical questions as to the basis in reality of our ideals and emotions. I do not know that from that standpoint there would be any reason for differentiating between different modes of love. I am thinking of the fact that, in practice, the power of love, its power of conquering all things, seems to be related very closely to its ability to evoke a response in the loved one. There can be few that have not learnt in their own lives that to be loved truly and in all circumstances is the most redemptive and the most life-giving experience that we can undergo; and, when we have loved others in the same way, it is in what we awaken in them that we often discover and measure what we have done—indeed, too often, an answering response becomes the consciously sought and quickly sterilising motive of our action. Now, we know that in some measure it is possible to love a whole people, and we can conceive that in such a group a living response should in some measure be awakened. Belief in the possibility of this has entered into a good deal of pacificist thinking; the idea is illustrated from another point of view in a striking story called "The Flying Teuton," published in the *Cornhill Magazine* two or more years ago. But real as I believe such possibilities to be, and strongly as they appeal to the imagination, they are, after all, rare, depending on some great crisis when a people is for a moment psychically one. As for world-love, it is hard to conceive of its object concretely at all, and harder still to conceive of its object as benefiting by it or responding. Almost inevitably world-love, when it has not its root in love of individuals, becomes self-love from sheer lack of a personal object and an objective response—and the picture of the world-lover on the seashore recurs again. And as a matter of fact, wherever man, emerging from the fragmentary and discontinuous world of his primitive consciousness, has found himself in a universe, and feels (in Sir Francis Younghusband's words) "the confidence which the world inspires by its orderliness and regularity; the devotion which it arouses by its display of the good it has at heart; the interest it creates when it shows man that he shares in its direction," and feels also that the world cares for him, he does indeed find that the love in him grows and reaches out and becomes universal in scope; but he finds that what he loves is not the world but God, bringing to that concept, maybe, his early notions of potencies behind events, of the spirit world, and of the tribal hero, enlarging it by a new sense of something completer, higher, and more lovable, but keeping it personal, making it, indeed, more personal than ever, just because of his greater need to love. For, whatever his theologians may tell him, in his heart he knows that God is better for being loved; he cannot know it of the world. And so with God's love for us—we are told often enough that man makes God in his own image; it might be truer to say that God has in truth grown with man's needs. However that may be, in so far as either is true we have some measure of the worth of love for individuals in man's greatest religious discovery—that God loves him individually. God loves mankind, no doubt, and to bring that home man invents schemes of redemption; but "God loves me"—what smallest child cannot find something thrilling and renewing in that? Indeed, I think that perhaps the most intense spiritual experience possible for a child is to feel vividly for the first time that God, who loves everyone and knows everything, also knows all about *him* and loves him personally. Certainly it was so for myself, and now, after those phases of belief and disbelief through which every restless spirit must pass, it remains one of the freshest and sweetest memories of childhood.

For that is what man really wants—to love and be loved by someone else. To build a life on that seems slow; to build a world on that seems not to move at all. When the great world-movements flame up and the great world-prophets speak, we want to bring miracles to pass and build the Kingdom of Heaven in a day. To care first for our neighbour seems to be to work ant-like and blindly. But, if there *is* something ant-like about the life of the human millions, how else should their loving seem? And the very prophets themselves, Zarathustra, Lao-tze, Gautama, Jesus, and the rest, the higher their vision and the wider their purpose, urge neighbour-love the more. They may speak of love for God and His love for men, but it is certain that if they speak of these things as in some sense separable from neighbour-love their enduring message will be only for a few mystics and a few wholly self-centred, and their world-movement or "revival" will swiftly burn itself out. They may kindle the fuel, but they cannot create it, and the wood for the burning is the habit of giving a hand to a neighbour day by day. That is one reason why the flames take hold so firmly and linger so long among "the common people."

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CROYDON.

MRS HUMPHRY WARD AND THE THEOLOGICAL NOVEL.

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To write a theological novel is to hurl the most defiant challenge in the face of those who glory in "Art for Art's sake." Why this special field of man's experience should be judged incapable of artistic treatment, the critics do not very precisely explain. But as often as a new work of fiction appears, with characters arguing against one another on "dogma," the pundits of the æsthetic world are irritated afresh, and they complain that their old rubric has once more suffered outrage. Mrs Humphry Ward sinned more frequently and more deeply in this respect than most other novelists of her time. But she remained unrepentant, and in the preface to the sixth edition of *David Grieve* retorted upon those who reproached her, with a vigour and a completeness which leave little more to be said. Against those who hate all fiction that subserves propaganda she had no difficulty in quoting impressive precedent. She could point to "novels with a purpose" that could be far less easily spared from our literature than those other novels of which the most obvious, if not the most flattering, description is that they seem to have no purpose whatever. Yet in the end there is no book of which this last account is strictly accurate, for the only choice we have is between those which serve purposes that are important and those which serve purposes that are trivial. Mrs Ward in most of her work—and that by far the most successful part—wrote for those whose minds are awake, or at least capable of being awakened, to the great issues of contemporary thought. It is worth while to sketch all human types, and even the generally neglected type of educated, progressive, but somewhat bewildered thinker on the high themes of religion seems to deserve some place in what Balzac called *La Comédie Humaine*. Treat him, if you choose, only as an "interesting figure." But the man has at least a personality of his own, with which it is well for us to become acquainted. And the signs of our own age appear to indicate that the time for figures merely interesting has almost gone by. Mrs Ward insisted on sketching the sort that is not only interesting but momentous. How could she draw this sort if she left out the deepest concern of all?

I.

There are few of this writer's books from which the religious interest is wholly absent, and there are at least five in which it may be said to predominate. *Robert Elsmere* is the best known, but in any such general survey we must not omit *The History of David Grieve*, *Helbeck of Bannisdale*, *Eleanor*, and *The Case of Richard Meynell*. The first point which calls for notice is one that all of these novels exhibit alike, and that constitutes a notable merit in the authoress when compared with many others who have imported speculations about faith into a work of fiction. We all know with tolerable exactness what Mrs Ward herself believed, or at least some things that she emphatically disbelieved. But her first concern was neither to proclaim what she thought true nor to repudiate what she thought false. The Evangelical school, the Broad school, the Romanising school—all pass before us in order, and if the writer's sole or even her chief object had been to take sides among them she would have deserved all the artistic censure that some quarterlies have bestowed upon her work. Her first desire was to enter with what St Paul called "charity" into the attitude of all candid souls who have set out, in however blundering a fashion, upon the great quest, to give all the credit that seemed to be their due, and to wean the angry disputants of each school not from the zeal that springs from conviction but from the bitterness that has its roots in misunderstanding. It would be too much to expect of anyone that this purpose should be achieved with perfect impartiality, and one can recall places where far less than equal justice has been done. For instance, George Eliot was at least as remote intellectually from Methodism as Mrs Ward can be, but the fervid Wesleyan must feel that sympathy is further from her perfect work in the hand which drew Mrs Fleming in *Robert Elsmere*, or the smithy prayer-meeting in *David Grieve*, than in the hand which gave us Dinah Morris in *Adam Bede*. The prejudices of temperament are hard to overcome, but we should be thankful to those who manage to overcome them as consistently as Mrs Ward has done, and thus set a pattern to that great number who do not even attempt to overcome them at all. On the whole she deserves the high eulogium passed upon her own Henry Grey, for she was sympathetic to "every genuine utterance of the spiritual life of man."

Again, while many others have introduced religious and anti-religious debate into a novel, she is one of a very few who have given us studies of *cultured* unbelief as it exists at the present time. We know how Dickens and Thackeray, for example, used to poke fun at the narrow evangelicals. Sam Weller in *Pickwick*, making his unseemly jests about Regeneration; Miss Murdstone in *David Copperfield*, rolling her dark eyes with delight over the congregation around her as often as the prayer-book mentioned "miserable sinners"; Miss Miggs in *Barnaby Rudge*, who hoped that she knew her own unworthiness and hated and despised herself as every good Christian should; Lady Emily in *Vanity Fair*, tying up her parcels of tracts, with mild exhortation for real ladies and warmer stuff about "The Frying Pan and the Fire" for the servants' hall—such matter as this has become quite familiar, and can be produced, now that the pattern has been set, in almost any quantity by very indifferent artists. It is often very successful wit, but its fault lies in the absence of humour, that lack of a background in charity which our own sobered age increasingly demands. Charlotte Brontë used to keep up the fun at the expense of the High Church. Mr Wells never lets us rest from laughing at the formulæ of "vindictive theologians." And Mr Winston Churchill—the American of that name—provides us in such books as *The Inside of the Cup* with most effective satire upon those who are zealots for dogma, but not zealots for the housing of the poor or the living wage. Mrs Ward's interest in religion was different. She was concerned with the state of mind of persons of culture, and although "culture" is an object of scorn just now to those who think it just the English word for Kultur, and keep themselves in readiness to explode the moment it is named, yet this is a misunderstanding which must soon pass away.

Mrs Ward spent her life in the atmosphere of the intellectuals; the university was her spiritual home; it is of the leaders of thought that she loved to write. She had the great advantage of personal acquaintance with literary and scientific men of wide celebrity, and it is their varying moods and attitudes towards religion which she has drawn with the most unerring hand. Taine, Edmond Scherer, Mark Pattison, Jowett, Walter Pater, and many others are made to pass before us in *A Writer's Recollections* by a critic who knew them well, and she has made us very much her debtors by helping us to know them too. Everyone must have been struck by her frequent allusions to two men, Ernest Renan and Matthew Arnold. The brilliant gifts of the former were enough to impress any keen receptive mind during the seventies, and we may well pardon the partiality of an admiring niece if Arnold's *bons mots* are treated by her as if they now formed part of the linguistic inheritance for all educated Englishmen. One may, perhaps, object that such phrases as "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace," "Hellenist and Hebraist," "Stream of tendency not ourselves that makes for righteousness" are not quite such universal counters of human thought as Mrs Ward seemed to assume, and not a few may be puzzled to find them used as if they came from *Hamlet* or *Faust.* So too we may smile at a writer who is still harking back for illustration to something that was done or said or felt by Renan, for the men of our own time have had many other teachers, and recognise many other landmarks as at least equally significant with the *Vie de Jésus.* But very few of those who grumble so were under the immediate influence of these magicians. Arnold and Renan were perhaps the two most original minds with which Mrs Ward in her youth was brought into close contact, and it is to her credit that she so appreciated each of them as to be unable afterwards to escape from the power of his personality.

The historic impulse which produced the first, and still the most famous, of her theological novels is quite apparent. In the five years from 1869 to 1873 Matthew Arnold made his well-known contribution to the great debate. The four books, *Culture and Anarchy*, *St Paul and Protestantism*, *Literature and Dogma*, *God and the Bible*, form together a manifesto of humanitarian Christianity. No one who reads *Robert Elsmere* can mistake the source from which some of its most arresting features were drawn. The strange re-interpreting of St Paul on the Resurrection, the spiritualising of the words "risen with Christ," the breaking away from the "envelope of miracle," the dissolving of supernatural occurrences into mere clothing for moral ideas—for all these, if a chief inspiration was found in the *Lay Sermons* of Thomas Hill Green, it is no less the thought and often the very words of Arnold which persistently recur.

But at this stage Mrs Ward was also in somewhat sharp revolt against some of her distinguished uncle's positions. The hero of her book could find no satisfaction in the Broad Church. She quotes Renan's judgment that if the prophecies of Daniel have to be placed by criticism in the period of the Maccabees, there is no option for critics but a resolute schism. And she adds, curiously enough, that the Protestant "is in truth more bound to the book of Daniel than M. Renan." In those days Mrs Ward could see no place for religious compromise, depicted Elsmere as confronted with a situation which left no room for choice to an honest man, set before us in the proposals of the cynical squire on the one hand and the idealistic Oxford tutor on the other the great contrast between temporising disguise and resolute veracity. "It can't be said," declares Henry Grey, "that the Broad Church movement has helped us much. How greatly it promised! How little it has performed!"[1]

In the sequel to *Robert Elsmere*, published more than twenty years afterwards under the name *The Case of Richard Meynell*, this attitude of bold secession is very suggestively modified. Meynell is a Modernist, but by no means willing to be in consequence a schismatic. He believes that the time is ripe for a new Reformation, and, though he thinks that this should be a Reformation from within, he is determined that it shall adopt no half-measures of timidity or concealment. Like Erasmus, he would move slowly, but he would not be so slow as to make no perceptible movement at all. If his movement fails he is prepared to be its victim, taking no refuge in the comfortable thought that Providence has bestowed upon him "no gift for martyrdom." But he is determined that, so far as lies in the power of himself and his friends, it is the orthodox resistance that shall be made to fail, and that the old historic Church of England, once more reformed, shall rise as she did three centuries ago to meet the new dawn.

Thus Meynell's case is that the so-called "orthodox" have no more right to expel Modernists than Modernists to expel the orthodox. If we defend the retention of the Roman cathedrals, though the English people had cast off Roman supremacy, why cannot we assert a similar ownership in the same fabrics if the supremacy of the Thirty-nine Articles has now to be repudiated. In the end this must no doubt be a trial of strength between parties, and the voice of the nation as a whole must decide. Hence arises Meynell's curious emphasising of the significant increase in the *number* of Modernists as compared with the days of Elsmere. Speaking to the daughter of that vigorous secessionist, he says: "All *within* the gates seemed lost. Your father went out into the wilderness, and there, amid everything that was poor and mean and new, he laid down his life. But we!—we are no longer alone, or helpless. The tide has come up to the stranded ship—the launching of it depends now only on the faithfulness of those within it."[1]

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[1] *Robert Elsmere*, chap. xxvii.

Almost exactly equidistant in time of composition between *Robert Elsmere* and *Richard Meynell* came that fascinating pair of romances in which Mrs Ward gave us her study of the Church of Rome. *Helbeck of Bannisdale* appeared in 1898, *Eleanor* in 1900. If we trace our authoress's interest in the broader Anglicans to the stimulus imparted by her uncle, it may equally well have been filial piety which made her touch so delicate when she drew those in willing and glad subjection under the Roman obedience. Charles Hargrove, whose frequent changes of creed the editor of this Journal has lately been setting before us,[2] is among the very few parallels one may quote to the chameleon-like religious career of the younger Thomas Arnold. That a son of the famous headmaster of Rugby should have begun as a disciple of his father, seceded in early manhood to the Church of Rome, swung over after a few years to Rationalism, and having remained there for a period should have made a fresh submission—not again to be recanted—to the Holy See, was by itself a sufficiently curious phenomenon to set any thoughtful mind upon the task of its unravelling.

In *Helbeck of Bannisdale* Mrs Ward has given us a psychological picture of an old Catholic household, whose representative is a man of the finest feeling, torn between the promptings of human nature and what he takes to be the inexorable obligations of his religion, preserving in a hostile neighbourhood the loyalty of his mistaken creed, and struggling in vain to reconcile his duties towards the true faith with an attachment he has formed, in spite of himself, to a girl who is, alas! among the "sinners of the Gentiles." *Eleanor* has its scene laid in Italy, the Italy that had just passed through the period of hot contention between the papal power and the national movement, and makes us realise with great vividness the two sides—the party of Pius IX. and the party of Victor Emmanuel; but to many of us the most important interest of the book centres round the case of Father Benecke, who has published a book about the Church and her history which is condemned by Propaganda. Shall he recant and escape deprivation? Or stand firm, and be a martyr? Father Benecke's dilemma, like that of Elsmere and Helbeck, brings home to us the everlasting issue between the spirit of the past and the spirit of the future.

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[1] *The Case of Richard Meynell*, p. 81.

[2] *From Authority to Freedom, the Spiritual Pilgrimage of Charles Hargrove.* By L. P. Jacks, 1920.

II.

Mr G. W. E. Russell declared that, so far as he knew, the Rev. Robert Elsmere was the only human being whose religious faith had been shattered by the discovery that "miracles do not happen." "That long-legged weakling," wrote Mr Russell, "with his auburn hair and 'boyish innocence of mood' and sweet ignorance of the wicked world went down, it will be remembered, like a ninepin before the assaults of a sceptical squire who had studied in Germany."[1]

Probably this is, on the whole, the most inept comment that was made by any critic upon the hero of Mrs Ward's great novel. Whether religious faith is, or is not, bound up with acceptance of the miraculous, is a matter upon which there is fair ground for difference of opinion, and the present writer at least is in thorough agreement with what he takes to be Mr Russell's view upon it. It may be conceded, too, that Elsmere after his ordination was curiously unacquainted, for a man of his training and powers, with the trend of modern unbelief. But it is absurd to suggest that he is an unintelligible or even a very unusual type, and that he is not—as the dramatic critics say—"psychologically convincing." He presents no greater problem than, for example, the Rev. James Anthony Froude at the time when he wrote *The Nemesis of Faith*. There is not the least doubt that many men, brought up to Holy Orders in the Oxford of forty years ago, were similarly immune from the infection of the Zeitgeist. No one who is in the least familiar with the moods of the theological student of our own time has the least difficulty in recognising Elsmere's distress, and most of us could quote parallels from men whom we have personally known.

The reason is obvious. To many—perhaps to the greater number of Christians—the whole fabric of faith stands as a solid system of which no part can be invalidated without invalidating the rest. That which, so far as Mr Russell was aware, had never occurred in the experience of any human being except "a character in a popular work of fiction" has, as others are well aware, occurred historically again and again, when religious faith has been shattered by discoveries about the antiquity of the earth, the dimensions of stellar space, the evolution of species, and the higher criticism of scripture. In all these cases the rule *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* was applied, to the immense dislocation of fixed beliefs, and it was the principle of a supernatural—or a miraculous—revelation which was on each occasion held to have been overthrown. The inference may have been exaggerated, or it may have been wholly wrong; but there is no doubt of its occurrence as a fact of religious psychology. It is no failure of insight into the moods of the human mind which we can justly charge against Mrs Ward, for the verisimilitude of her characters—Roman, High Anglican, Broad Anglican, and Agnostic—is well-nigh perfect.

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[1] *Cf.* Mr Russell's *Matthew Arnold*, pp. 236, 237.

It may be argued with far greater force against her, as Gladstone and many others argued, that the prestige of learning and intellect are by no means so exclusively on the side of her own school as she has tried to suggest. And it may be maintained that she has undertaken far more than she can effect in trying to find the essence of Christianity in Thomas Hill Green. But these discussions would carry us much too far. What I wish to consider is her proposed practical solution of the issue about Modernism as she has set it forth in *The Case of Richard Meynell.* Here she touched the newest and most urgent problem of our own time, and revealed, I think, the most vulnerable side in her whole programme for the future of the Church.

Some historian will yet be much interested in that singular alliance between Freethought and Erastianism of which Mrs Ward in her latest phase was so striking a representative. It is significant that in matters of Church Reform she again and again appealed to "England" as the ultimate authority, and one cannot help feeling that she had often in mind Reformers not so much like John Knox as like Henry VIII. The national Church, she kept reminding us, is a national possession, with its cathedrals, its ecclesiastical fabrics of every kind, its endowments—its "plant," as she occasionally, breaking into the vernacular of commerce, rather startles us by summing the matter up. Her idea seemed to be that just as state machinery, provided from the public purse, must not be monopolised by the interests of a single class, so the spiritual organisation is in essence a public affair, and must be wide enough to allow a home to men of every Christian faith. Why it should thus be limited to those whose attitude is *Christian*, or whether she would set any limits at all, Mrs Ward did not make quite clear. She did not meet such embarrassing proposals as that of Mr Ronald Knox in *Reunion All Round*, or such dilemmas as are set in *A Spiritual Æneid*. "For the life of me," says Mr Knox, "I could never see why we had to regret being out of communion with a good man like Dr Horton, more than being out of communion with a good man like Professor Gilbert Murray, who repudiates Theism."

Perhaps the most extraordinary position taken up by Richard Meynell is that the High Churchman ought to be as willing to tolerate the Broad as the Broad is to tolerate the High. For what this really means is that, while the Broad keeps his own view, the High ought either to become Broad or at least to act as if he had become so. The demand for tolerance is by no means identical as applied to each of these two parties. Rather, one is forced to say, must the orthodox be driven to exclusiveness by the very same logic which drives the liberal to charity. Those to whom dogma is comparatively indifferent may, and indeed must, adopt a generous attitude towards those whose honest beliefs they cannot themselves share. But men to whom dogma is essential cannot without absurdity be other than unbending towards men who preach that creeds are a matter of ceaseless change. The Modernist can remain in the Church undisturbed by the fact that his brother in the next parish imposes penances, pronounces absolution, and reserves the sacrament; for, although he does not himself approve such doings, he does not think of them as endangering souls in another world, or of the communion of saints as fundamentally vitiated by these divergences of practice. But the sacerdotalist cannot in the same way look on without fierce protest while his neighbour in Holy Orders is teaching that belief in the miraculous is superstition, that there was no Virgin Birth, and that the Tomb at Jerusalem did not on the third day yield up the body of the Lord; for he does not simply dissent from all this as a lamentable error of judgment: he regards it as a blasphemy, and a mood of complaisant indulgence for peace's sake towards those who commit it is, for him, denying his Lord before men.

I speak of this with all the more vigour because I do not share in any degree most of the objections which the orthodox level against Modernism. Perhaps, however, I understand them all the better just because of some very real objections with which I wholly sympathise against the presence of certain so-called Modernists, and because the principle involved appears to be the same. From time to time we have to hear or read sermons in which, for example, the notion of "subjective immortality" is insinuated, elegant Emersonian scorn is poured upon those—generally psychic researchers—who dare to take the survival of man as a genuine and perhaps even a verifiable fact, and the idea of evil as a mere negation of good or a necessary form of finitude is played with under some such nonsensical phrase as "supra-moral sphere." Are we to pretend that the Christian Church should make room for incoherences like these? And, if not, is our revolt different in kind from that which inspires the Anglo-Catholic to cut himself loose from association with Modernists in general? Are not the yearly secessions to Rome, however deeply we may deplore the fact that men feel driven to make them, thus the tokens of both clear-sighted and resolute candour? Aptly indeed from his own point of view may the High Churchman find a parallel to this theological issue in that old affiliation case tried before Solomon, and see men like Meynell typified by the latitudinarian mother who cried out, "Let it be neither mine nor thine, but let us divide it." And, though we may think that his point of view is wrong, we cannot fairly reproach him for acting upon the situation as he sees it, or set him in discreditable contrast with those who act differently because they see differently. The present writer, Modernist as he is in his own sympathies to an extent by which many evangelicals would be appalled, cannot acquiesce in this programme of easy-going complaisance for those to whom it would mean a denial of truth. Not thus shall the new Reformation be achieved. The coming change must involve no disguises, for the thing at stake is too momentous. Perhaps the Church should be divided in two, but where the differences are radical the division must be radical. Those within her pale who believe, however erroneously, that saving truth lies in rigid dogma, should not be browbeaten in the name of toleration into taking liberties with that which—as they hold—is not theirs to compromise. The stigma of narrowness is not to be expunged by the mop of prevarication.

One might point out, as further illustrating this tendency in Mrs Ward, how the spirit of revolt which has been so conspicuous in her theological novels is moderated into an enthusiasm for what Lord Eldon called the "wisdom of our ancestors" when she deals with problems of government. No one will be surprised, or at any loss to guess the reason, when he finds in *A Writer's Recollections* such grateful adoration of Mr Kipling and such nasty resentment towards Mr Wells. Some of us feel that old church tradition deserves at least as respectful a treatment as old political usages, that ecclesiastical authority is not more open to reproach than the prestige of an hereditary ruling class, and that there are dogmas about imperialism not less obsolete in the living thought of our new world than any dogmas of old theology. But Mrs Ward's mind was curiously blended—half conservative and half liberal,—and to those who, like England herself, "love not coalitions," this sort of compromise is far from satisfactory. It is not, indeed, uncommon in cultivated circles. Like many others, this novelist was a very orthodox aristocrat, though a quite unorthodox theologian. Robust rationalism in dealing with religious tenets can easily make its peace with a tenacious traditionalism in one's theory of the State, so that the abuse of radical politicians in *Marcella* and of the suffragettes in *Delia Blanchflower* gives willing place to a quite different tone when the radicals are causing upheaval of the Church in *Richard Meynell*, or an Italian countess is plunging into political discussion against Pio Nono in *Eleanor*. The Germans, as Dr Sarolea has aptly remarked, used to combine great freedom of thought about the divinity of Christ with a docile subservience to the divine right of their Kaiser. Imperialistic politics almost everywhere can be cherished by some side by side with the most vigorous spirit of theological anarchy. And although I mean nothing so offensive or so absurd as a likening of Mrs Ward to German exponents both of religious agnosticism and of earthly Realpolitik, I cannot refrain from noticing that the liberal trend of her thought was restrained by some astonishing limits. Inconsistency, however, is a poor charge in these days when our world has been shaken to its base, and we have much ground for thankfulness to this writer of fiction for at least some healthy ethical conventionalism. As we think, for instance, of the abyss of immoral nonsense into which the sex novel so often degenerates, even those pious folk who have been most shocked by *Robert Elsmere* must not forget what they owe to the authoress of *Daphne* and *The Marriage of William Ashe*.

There are many others too who in these times of religious disturbance are "wandering between two worlds—one dead, the other powerless to be born." Few have been able to present this state of mind with even a tithe of the vividness and strength with which this novelist has set it before us. By a curious coincidence the name of "Ward" has been borne by three persons in recent years, quite unrelated to one another, but each of whom has contributed in some notable way to the discussion of religious problems. In a previous issue of this Journal I drew attention to some resemblances between the late lamented biographer of Cardinal Newman and the author of that most suggestive series of Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* There is an analogy too between our gifted authoress of fiction and the author of *Problems and Persons.* For Wilfrid Ward's haunting interest in the phases of modern unbelief was not unlike Mrs Humphry Ward's interest in the genius of the Church of Rome. The former felt an intellectual kinship with the men whom his soul abhorred; the latter feels an emotional yearning after the symbols which Reason forbids her to trust. The disciple of Newman could not quite put from him that keen dialectic temper which inspired the *Grammar of Assent.* The niece of Matthew Arnold cannot escape from that wistful sympathy, joined to a stern disbelief in the Catholic Church, which produced those lines about the Carthusian monks on the Grande Chartreuse:

> "Not as their friend or child I speak!
> But as on some far northern strand,
> Thinking of his own Gods a Greek
> In pity and mournful awe might stand
> Before some fallen Runic stone—
> For both were faiths, and both are gone."

Mrs Ward's faith was not gone, and she remained the friend of all the faithful among mankind. But she was in error, I think, in supposing that the path of progress now lies in any other direction than that in which it has always lain, that fundamental discords can with advantage be superficially disguised, or that truth will be furthered by minimising rather than by intensifying the "clash of Yes and No."

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ETHICAL RELIGION.[1]

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE.

As first President of the Union of Ethical Societies, I conceive it to be my duty to survey the work of these Societies and try to interpret their function and assess their value. They have now become pretty well established in this country, and their influence has probably extended considerably beyond the limits of their membership. They were initiated here in 1886, chiefly through the energy and enthusiasm of my friend Professor J. H. Muirhead, who became the Hon. Secretary of the parent Society. Edward Caird was its first President, and Dr Bosanquet was for many years chairman of its executive committee. The first of its public lectures was given by Professor (now Sir Henry) Jones. These names give a sufficient indication of the general point of view from which it was started. Most of its promoters belonged to the Hegelian school of philosophy, or at least to that English variety of it of which T. H. Green had been the most prominent representative. They sought to communicate something of that deep interest in moral problems by which Green had been inspired, and to discuss methods of social reform. A branch was formed soon afterwards at Cambridge, with Henry Sidgwick as President and Seeley as the first public lecturer—thus showing that the movement was not confined to any particular school of thought. In these early days the work of an Ethical Society could hardly be said to be of a definitely religious character. In America, however, where the movement was first initiated under the leadership of Dr Felix Adler, it was much more decidedly religious; and in our own country also it has gradually acquired this tone, mainly through the influence of Dr Stanton Coit. Even from the first, indeed, our meetings tended to be held on Sundays;

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[1] Presidential Address to the Union of Ethical Societies in London.

and they served then, as they do still, as a refuge for those who are not attracted by any of the older religious bodies, but who yet like to associate themselves with one another in the effort to maintain an earnest outlook on the aims of human life. Hence, if not definitely religious in their character, they might at least be described as providing. in the phrase of E. Dühring, a substitute for religion—*Ersatz der Religion.* In some places at least they have been warmly welcomed by educated Jews, whose religion has always given a special prominence to righteousness. It was reflection on the Jewish religion, more than on any other, that led Matthew Arnold to define religion in general as "morality touched by emotion," and that is on the whole what the religion of the Ethical Societies has tended to be; though it has certainly been touched by a good deal of reflection, as well as by emotion. The question by which they are now confronted, and by which they are often assailed, is whether this is a sufficient account of the significance of religion, or whether such an attitude can be taken as an adequate substitute for religious belief.

That most religions have contained elements other than those that are explicitly moral, is sufficiently apparent. Some have had hardly any connection with morality, and some may even be said to be opposed to it. But it may at least be contended that with the deepening of men's spiritual experience religion tends to become more and more moral in its character. This is notably the case with the Jewish religion, both in its earlier and more purely national form and in its transformation into a world religion through Christianity and Mohammedanism. Both in its earlier and in its later forms it has often shown a disposition to relapse into ceremonial observances and esoteric doctrines; but its greater prophets have been constantly protesting against such lapses. We may remind ourselves of the emphatic declaration in the book of Isaiah:[1] "Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?" From the point of view of Christianity, the apostle James is even more explicit:[2] "Pure religion, and undefiled, before God and the Father, is this, To visit the fatherless and the widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world." With regard to the teaching of Jesus himself, it is certainly rash to dogmatise; but it seems probable that he was in the main a moral teacher and social reformer, with a strong leaning towards what in our time would be called socialism, and that he attached but little importance to any particular theological doctrines.[1] The parable of the Good Samaritan is probably the best indication of what he regarded as the essential feature of true religion. The most spiritually minded of his followers, such as St Francis, have laid a similar emphasis on ideas that are almost purely moral; and, with the gradual evanescence of dogma in recent times, it has more and more been recognised that the chief value of Christianity lies in its moral inspiration. I am very glad to observe that Dean Inge—who is not commonly supposed to be unduly optimistic in his outlook—has, in his recent *Outspoken Essays*, expressed his conviction that "the new type of Christianity will be more Christian than the old, because it will be more moral." I believe it would be even more Christian if it were moral altogether.

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[1] lviii. 6–7.

[2] i. 27.

Even if we penetrate behind the lofty shield of the Himalayan mountains, where almost all the great religions of the world appear to have had their cradle, we find that the sages of the East seem to have been to the full as eager about the saintly life as about the subtleties of metaphysics. "Not birth," it is said, "nor initiation, nor learning, nor descent, are the causes of Brahmanhood. Good conduct alone is verily the cause thereof." Buddhism is an almost purely ethical religion. "Buddha," says Swami Vivekananda,[2] "is the only prophet who said 'I do not care to know your various theories about God. What is the good of all the subtle doctrines about the soul? Do good and be good. And this will take you to whatever truth there is.'" Buddhism is thus, as Professor and Mrs Rhys Davids have brought out, not very far removed from the religion of Humanity and from what in recent times has been called Agnosticism.

In the last few years, however, there has been some evidence of a tendency to lay more emphasis on dogma and proportionately less on moral ideas. This is partly due to the fact that philosophy has become bolder and more constructive and less subservient to the materialistic tendencies of the special sciences. In literature Mr Chesterton is perhaps the most prominent representative of this change of attitude; and among more definitely philosophical writers Dr M'Taggart[1] is conspicuous for the stress that he lays on the importance of certain dogmas for religion and for his denial of any specially close connection between religion and morality. The dogma on which Dr M'Taggart lays most emphasis is that of individual immortality; and this has been emphasised by many other writers, partly on the basis of occult experiences. Mr Lowes Dickinson has strikingly brought out the value of the belief in personal immortality;[2] and it is undoubtedly a belief to which the emotional experiences of the war have given a fresh force. The belief in a personal God—as distinguished from a superpersonal Absolute or Brahman—has not been so much dwelt upon in recent years; but writers so eminent as Dr Ward, Mr Balfour, and Dean Rashdall serve to show that the conception retains some vitality. These writers, however, while giving much weight to certain metaphysical conceptions, do not in general deny that morality forms a large part of the content of religion. Their arguments for God and Immortality are often based upon what they believe to be moral demands. But a certain depreciation of the moral element is rather characteristic of several influential writers in recent times.

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[1] The most convincing treatment of this subject to my mind is that contained in Mr I. Singer's book on *The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul.* The more imaginative treatment of Mr George Moore in *The Brook Kerith* is on somewhat similar lines; and of course it is a view that was very strongly supported by Tolstoy.

[2] *Karma Yoga*, p. 170.

Even Dr Bosanquet, who was one of the leading representatives of the ethical movement in its earlier years, has recently described morality as being "the *bête noire* of religion."[3] He quotes in illustration of what he means the saying of Mause Headrigg in *Old Mortality*: "Mony a hungry starving creature, when he sits down on a Sunday forenoon to get something that might warm him to the great work, has a dry clatter o' morality driven about his lugs." He quotes also her characterisation of such morality as "fizzenless" or sapless, and adds: "It is not ill-meant towards men and women whom I highly esteem, and of whose movement I was a member for a considerable time, if I venture to see inevitably and by no personal fault some such character in the 'ethical culture' propaganda, as also in the Positivist doctrine." "There seems to be a common reason," he concludes, "why none of these sects can get to the heart of a nation." The common reason he finds, as I understand him, in the tendency of such sects to promote a certain pharisaic self-satisfaction in their adherents, instead of the "salvation" or deliverance from self which the more definitely religious doctrines proclaim. If there is any validity in this criticism, it is a particularly serious accusation for us, since many competent observers have declared that such pharisaism is the besetting sin of our country.

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[1] His lecture *Dare to be Wise* may be referred to, as well as *Some Dogmas of Religion.*

[2] *Religion and Immortality.*

[3] *Some Suggestions in Ethics,* p. 97.

There are, of course, other influential writers who have attacked "mere morality" in a much more ruthless fashion. Nietzsche definitely described himself as an "immoralist," and he has not been without his followers in our own country. The fact that he wrote in German, and the fact that among his many paradoxes there are one or two that appear to glorify war, have led many people in this country to treat him as little better than a moral pariah. Certainly some of his utterances are apt to strike one at first as immorality touched by hysteria. But that he cannot be lightly set aside by the members of Ethical Societies is made apparent by the recent publication of a very thorough and sympathetic exposition of his teaching by Mr W. M. Salter,[1] one of the earliest and most distinguished of the ethical lecturers in America. I think Mr Salter overrates somewhat the importance of Nietzsche's message; but most of the attacks that have been made upon him are pretty clearly based on misconceptions. He was a "good European," and by no means a supporter of the Prussian State, or indeed of any State. He referred to the State in general as "the coldest of all cold monsters." His main attacks are directed against Christianity rather than against morality; but they are directed against Christianity as an ethical religion, and their general point is somewhat akin to that which is suggested by Dr Bosanquet. He blames Christianity for being "too human": he thinks that it does not sufficiently liberate us from ourselves. Hence he seeks refuge in the thought of something that is above humanity—in the conception of the Superman.

What are we to say in answer to the strictures that are thus apparently made from various quarters, not specially connected with any of the older dogmatisms, upon the conception of a purely ethical religion? There are, I think, several things that may be said, partly in defence and partly in recognition of certain dangers against which we ought to be on our guard.

1. The first thing to be noted is that morality is an ambiguous term. Its primary meaning has reference to the

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[1] *Nietzsche the Thinker.* This is, I believe, the most complete account of Nietzsche's work in English. The shorter book on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, by Dr A. Wolf, however, is equally sympathetic and well informed.

mores or customs of a particular community, as distinguished from the legal enactments by which its life is governed. It is evident that such customs, though they generally rest on something that was once important, and often on something that continues to be important, cannot be regarded as having any absolute or eternal value. But the sanctions of religion gather round them; and certainly the tables that are thus set up have to be broken from time to time, sometimes even with violence. The pharisaic morality or religion of the Jews seems to have become antiquated in this way. The tables in which it was embodied were almost sufficiently broken by the later Jewish prophets with a vigour hardly inferior to that of Nietzsche himself. On the other hand, the virtues that were described by Aristotle and illustrated by Plutarch cannot easily be superseded, though even they may be liable to a gradual transvaluation. Generally it will be found that when men describe either themselves or others as immoralists they are referring only to particular customs or taboos to which they or others objects, not to those essential attitudes of mind that ethical writers seek to cultivate, such as "kindness in another's trouble, courage in our own." I do not mean to imply that they are always right in objecting to the customs or taboos that they criticise; some of them may be more deeply rooted in human nature (which is a very complex nature) than is at once apparent; but at least the question what particular things should be done or avoided is a question of detail, not of fundamental principle. Special institutions, such as the family or the State, call for particular forms of loyalty, sacrifice, or chivalry; and the exact nature of these varies with time, place, and condition. This is still more true of particular modes of etiquette, fashion, and ceremonial. If the observance of these is what we mean by manners or morals, the fact that anyone is an immoralist—*i.e.* opposed to some of the conventions of his time and country—need not greatly disturb us. Especially in a very conservative country like our own, such immoralism may be a great service to morality. "Propriety," according to La Rochefoucauld, "is the least of all laws, and the most obeyed." It is easier to be "correct" than to be good.

But even goodness may be understood in different senses. One of Nietzsche's sayings[1] is that "The noble one wishes to create something new and a new virtue. The good one wills that old things should be preserved." This is a somewhat peculiar use of the term "good"—rather akin to the sense in

[1] *Thus spake Zarathustra*, i.

which a child is said to be good when it sits still and makes no noise. Nietzsche himself corrects this usage when he speaks of "creative goodness."[1] On the whole, Nietzsche's meaning seems to me to be pretty nearly the same as that which Lowell expressed in the saying that "Time makes ancient good uncouth." There is, of course, some ground for occasionally understanding "good" in the lower sense. It is often so used in English, and perhaps more often in German. *Gut* and *böse* often refer to what we should call good-nature and ill-nature, rather than to good and bad will.

2. From what has now been urged it follows that morality, in the sense in which it is to be identified with religion, is not dry or cold. It is "touched by emotion." It would seem to have been chiefly the absence of this that was felt by Mause Headrigg and her associates. It is certainly possible to treat morality as if it were merely a set of rules of etiquette or a legal code. Perhaps the ancient scriptures of the Chinese and the laws of the Jews, associated with the names of Confucius and Moses, may fairly be characterised as belonging to this type; but even in these the conceptions of family or racial piety give the regulations and injunctions a certain warmth and depth that are generally lacking in matters of law or etiquette—just as, among ourselves, the conception of a "perfect gentleman" tends to mean a good deal more than external observances. In the case of the Jews at least, the essential significance of their moral code was eventually summed up in the conception of love towards God and man, and in the efforts to behave towards others as we should wish them to behave towards us. It would be a strange kind of religion to which such a morality as this could present itself as a *bête noire*. It is undoubtedly possible, however, to have some degree of religious warmth without the sense of social obligation, to have a sort of love of God without love of our neighbour. It has been noted that even the friend of man is not always a friend of men. It is such a religion that is apt to be cultivated in the cloister; and it is specially against this type that ethical religion, in all its forms, is a protest. Swift's gibe is well known, that "some people have just enough religion to make them hate one another, not enough to make them love one another." Even ethical religion, if we are not careful, may engender sectarian animosity; just as the love of our country may turn into the hatred of other countries, or even of some of our own fellow-citizens.

3. Again, I think it is important that ethical religion

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[1] *Thus spake Zarathustra*, ii.

should not be interpreted in a too purely subjective and self-centred way. It is somewhat liable to this danger, owing to the fact that it has no external deities to appeal to; nor does it lead us to worship our ancestors or even, like the religion of Humanity, connect itself definitely with the historical achievements of mankind. It is apt to be deficient in altars and oracles, sacraments and impressive rites. In this respect it is somewhat akin to Quakerism and to the more severely Protestant sects; and these are the types of religion that are specially exposed to the dangers of individualism and spiritual pride. The adherents of such religions are too prone to congratulate themselves that they are not as other men. Mr Bradley has reminded us that our own country, "the chosen home of moral philosophy," is apt to be thought of on the Continent as being specially characterised by hypocrisy and cant; and indeed even our own writers sometimes refer to us as "the island Pharisees." Such references may not be entirely fair; but it is well at least that we should be on our guard against the tendency to value our own attitude of mind instead of beneficent activities in the world around us. The Stoics, who may almost be said to have had a purely ethical religion, appear to have been somewhat liable to this defect; and I fancy it is also a besetting sin of Buddhism. In times and places nearer our own, the influence of Kant is in some respects comparable to that of the Stoical teachers. His insistence on the view that there is nothing intrinsically good but the good will may be so interpreted as to lead us to undervalue the objective achievements at which a good will aims; and the more recent contention of Green, that the only good is goodness, may be exposed, though in a less degree, to the same danger. "If our virtues did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike as if we had them not." I suppose the Good Samaritan in the parable was not pluming himself much on the excellence of his volition, but was thinking rather of the needs of the man who had fallen among thieves. It is one of the merits of Utilitarianism that it directs our attention to such ends. However true it may be that merit is not to be measured by results, yet there is at least no kind of merit that does not aim at results. In fairness to Nietzsche, I think it ought to be recognised that his attacks on pity are mainly directed against the sentimental attitude that values "the tears of sensibility" rather than the effort to remove their cause. Carlyle, who is not usually regarded as an immoralist, resembled Nietzsche in this respect, as in several others. When Blake tells us that "pity would be no more if we did not make somebody poor," most of us would agree that we could well spare a considerable amount of pity for the sake of eliminating poverty—at least indigence, the squalid kind of poverty that calls for pity. We can dispense even with the Good Samaritan in favour of a social organisation that makes it increasingly difficult for anyone to fall among thieves. The love that forms the basis of morality is what Kant called "practical love"—the love that seeks actively to promote the good of its object—not "pathological love," which begins and ends in feeling. Professor MacCunn, in his excellent Liverpool Addresses on Ethics of Social Work, refers to "a certain great surgeon, one of the most tender-hearted of men, who once said that with him pity as an emotion had to cease in order that pity as a motive might do its work. Similarly, we have the saying of La Rochefoucauld about himself: "I am not very sensible of pity; and I should wish not to be so at all. Nevertheless, I would do everything in my power to comfort a person in distress." Sensibility and active beneficence are by no means coincident; and he who enjoins us to "be hard" does not necessarily intend us to be cruel. All the same, I think it is a kind of injunction that should be somewhat sparingly used. Without some tender feeling, the more active kind of benevolence would be apt to lose its motive power. If too much feeling paralyses, too little would surely deaden. The distinction between practice and emotion is probably not as complete as Kant imagined. But I think it is a sound doctrine that what is morally important is to act; and that action is directed to ends beyond itself.

4. This leads me to notice a further point, viz. that a purely moral religion must probably be regarded as a somewhat incomplete one. If religion, in its most developed form, is, as I believe, concerned with ultimate values, it is concerned, directly or indirectly, with everything that contributes to human well-being. It is concerned directly with truth and beauty, and somewhat more indirectly with the promotion of individual health and happiness and of a stable and righteous social order. Morality can hardly be held to cover all this, except in the sense that it is morally right to pursue these objects. Religion may be said to be concerned with ultimate ends, whereas morality is concerned with the direction of the will to the attainment of such ends. The Stoics, Kant and Green, as I have just indicated, tended to ignore this distinction by representing moral goodness as being in itself the only ultimate end. Kant partly corrected this in his treatment of æsthetics and religion; and Green seemed to be on

the point of advancing to the view that knowledge and beauty may also be accepted as ultimate ends; but neither of them succeeded in showing how the acceptance of these ultimate ends is to be reconciled with the doctrine that the only good is goodness. On the other hand, Mr Bradley has definitely stated that to make morality absolute is to break with every considerable religion, which, in view of Buddhism, is perhaps an exaggeration on the opposite side. But certainly when Carlyle tells us that all religions are here to remind us of "the quite infinite difference between a good man and a bad," the statement must be taken with considerable qualifications. Some religions at least have reminded us rather that even the best men have limitations that prevent them from growing into the skies, and that even the worst are not hopelessly incurable.

Perhaps all religions are in some respects incomplete, and it is not easy to state satisfactorily what is required for a complete one. So far as I can judge, the best general definition of religion is that it means devotion to what has the highest value. It is generally said that the highest value has the three aspects of truth, beauty, and goodness; but merely to enumerate these is hardly satisfactory. When it is said that truth, beauty, and goodness are intrinsically valuable, what is really meant is that perfection is intrinsically valuable, and that perfection has these three aspects. It must be admitted that it is difficult to form any quite clear conception of what we are to understand by perfection: but it would seem that we have to think of it as coherent and intelligible, and so as possessing truth; as an orderly system of many in one, and so as beautiful; as living and self-creative, and so as having goodness. This conception of the perfect whole is what the Cartesian philosophers called the idea of God; and I believe it is also what Plato meant by the "form of Good"; and it certainly seems to me to be the only ultimate object of worship. For us, however, the aspect of goodness may be said to be the most central and fundamental; because for us the idea is an aspiration rather than a possession. It is the guiding principle in our efforts to improve the general conditions of human life; and this effort is the essence of morality. In the carrying on of this effort we are realising such perfection as it is possible for us to achieve: and in this sense, as a French poet has put it, each one of us can, in a small way, be creating God—*Chaque homme fait Dieu un peu avec sa vie.* But we aspire to a greater perfection than any that we can ever hope to attain. Our human attitude is one of reasonable hope rather than of fulfilment. Some have even said that, if they held truth in their hands, they would let it go again for the pleasure of pursuing it. I cannot agree with this. If I had truth in my grasp, I believe I would hold it pretty tight. But I admit that our human attitude is that of pursuing truth, beauty, and goodness, and catching occasional glimpses of them, as Moses was said to have caught a passing glimpse of the back of Deity. Hence the active element—the element of striving forwards—predominates in our attitude.

Thus, while I think it right to make some qualifications on the claims of ethical religion to be regarded as in itself complete, I still think that the ethical element in religion is the most fundamental; and perhaps it is also the element in which we may most confidently look for general agreement in the near future. Even in this respect I am anxious not to exaggerate. It would be a mistake to suppose that, beyond somewhat narrow limits, people readily arrive at a complete agreement on questions of right and wrong. Heroic self-sacrifice is perhaps universally admired, and meanness and cruelty disliked; and almost everyone approves of justice, though there are wide differences of opinion as to what in any particular case is to be regarded as just. But recent history has probably led most people to realise that there are important questions of principle on which even thoughtful men are by no means unanimous. There are some who appear to believe quite genuinely that the life and prosperity of one's country are of such supreme importance as to justify almost any action that seems to be necessary for its defence or even for its enhancement. There are others who quite as genuinely believe that it is hardly right to incur any serious sacrifice for these objects. I suppose most of us would agree that the correct view lies well within the limits that are indicated by these extremes; but between them there is still considerable scope for divergence of opinion. And similar differences would be found in questions relating to commercial morality, the rights of property, the treatment of animals, and many other problems in practical ethics. It is doubtful whether the substitution of moral ideas for theological dogmas is a simplification. For this reason the important question of moral education for the young is not quite as simple as has sometimes been supposed; though I believe that, when the nature of education is rightly understood, as a development from within rather than an imposition from without, it can be satisfactorily dealt with. In any case, it can hardly be doubted that the questions that arise with reference to right and wrong in most men's lives are of more fundamental importance than those that arise with reference to either truth or beauty. A mistake about beauty is seldom important except in the case of those whose special business it is to produce beautiful objects; and a mistake about truth is seldom important except in science or philosophy or in cases in which it leads to wrong action. The discovery of truth and the creation of beauty bring glory, in the main, to particular individuals; but, in general, it is righteousness that exalts a nation. The saying of Matthew Arnold, that conduct is three-fourths of life, is no doubt a somewhat misleading way of calling attention to this relative predominance of moral issues. It follows, I think, from this predominance that a purely ethical religion is less incomplete than one that is purely metaphysical, as some Oriental ones have tended to become, or of the purely æsthetical type to which perhaps that of the ancient Greeks may be said to have approximated. An ethical religion at least lays the emphasis on what is most important for men in general. It is at least concerned, in the memorable phrase of Aristotle, with what can be done and achieved by man; not with the thoughts of unattainable perfection and inconceivable bliss, which has tended to make some religions blighting influences on human life instead of gospels of hope and encouragement. One of the Jewish characters depicted by Mr Zangwill in *The Children of the Ghetto* is represented as exclaiming, "Oh, why is religion such a curse?" The general answer would seem to be that it is a curse when it is based upon fear instead of hope, on law instead of love, on dogma instead of free inquiry, on priestcraft instead of the light of reason. One of the current theories with regard to the origin of the more primitive forms of religion is that they sprang from a set of taboos based upon the fear of the old man of the tribe. One is often tempted to think that some of the later forms are based upon the fear of the old woman typified by Mrs Grundy. It is only by slow degrees, as Goethe urged in *Wilhelm Meister*, that fear gives place to reverence; and even from this it needs some further progress to bring us to "admiration, hope, and love." Even if you take so relatively hopeful a religion as Christianity, with its "glad tidings of great joy," it is a melancholy spectacle to note how largely its followers have been preoccupied by fear. Hell seems to have counted for much more than heaven, except in a few somewhat mystical minds. It is particularly sad to see how even so brave a spirit as that of Samuel Johnson was overclouded by religious fears. The case of Cowper is no doubt more exceptional.

It is very noticeable, however, that the attitude of people almost everywhere has been undergoing a rapid change in this respect. There have been, I think, few times in the history of the world in which there has been a more widespread longing for some genuine form of religious faith, or a more deep-seated discontent with the sham religions that have been so commonly provided. This desire for something better was growing up even before the time of the European War, but it has been greatly intensified by that terrible catastrophe, which has, I fancy, stirred the general mind of our peoples more profoundly than anything that has happened since the earthquake at Lisbon. The shock of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, though also to be reckoned among those great rebuffs "that turn earth's smoothness rough," was more purely political and social in its significance. Unfortunately all such awakenings are apt to be of short duration.

This revival of religious interest has shown itself chiefly, as I have already noted, in attempts to establish the persistence of individual life after the death of the body. The present is not a suitable occasion for any discussion of the value of such attempts. It cannot be denied at least that the desire which underlies them—the desire that those whom we have loved and lost should have, in Tennyson's phrase, "the glory of going on," and that we should recover some personal contact with them—is a very natural one for our human hearts. Sometimes the hope for such persistence has been connected with Oriental theories of animism and reincarnation, and may thus be said to involve a return to very ancient forms of belief. But it is well to remember at least that these old beliefs were seldom regarded as gospels of hope. Most of the ancient believers in future lives seem to have regarded the prospect with some alarm, and hoped chiefly for some ultimate relief from the process—some form of Nirvana. It is characteristic of our more hopeful outlook upon the world that almost all our modern believers in the prolongation of life conceive of the continuance of conscious existence and individual personality as a good to be desired. Nearly all the major prophets of our time have forward-looking thoughts. One might almost say that they nearly all cherish Messianic hopes. Nietzsche taught us not to think about the fatherland, but to look rather with eager longing towards the land of our children. Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution and the striking conception of creative imagination that has recently been set before us by Mr E. D. Fawcett turn our minds in the same direction. The Invisible King of Mr H. G. Wells is not God the Father, but rather God the Holy Spirit—the undying fire within our hearts urging us on to our higher destiny. He is, as Heine described himself, a Knight of the Holy Ghost. In the remarkable Gifford Lectures—on Space, Time, and Deity—by Professor Alexander (one of the earliest and best of the lecturers to our Ethical Societies), Deity is represented rather as that to which we aspire than as that from which we come. I have purposely referred to writers of very different types and representing very different modes of thought.

Whatever we may think of such hopes and speculations, it must, I suppose, always be true that our main interests have to be centred upon the mode of existence that is carried on by us here and now on this comparatively insignificant planet. It is to this, on the whole, that the Ethical Societies very properly direct their attention; and I think we may feel confident that, if they continue to devote themselves to this seriously, courageously, sympathetically, and hopefully, they will really be working in harmony with all the most vital developments of philosophical and religious thought; and they will not in that case be merely the creators of a new sect to be added to the already too numerous bodies that exist among us, but will rather be essentially co-operating with others in bringing to fruition the germs of a genuine religion of humanity.

It is of course perfectly natural and legitimate that those who agree with one another in certain opinions and attitudes of mind should associate themselves together, and to some extent segregate themselves from others. Probably for a long time to come there will continue to be rival forms of religious union. Indeed, the attempt to establish a universal world-religion, like the attempt to establish a world-empire, might only lead to more intense forms of conflict. What we may reasonably hope is that there will be a gradual approximation, and that at least it may rapidly come to be seen that the various religions—to adapt a saying of Carlyle—except in opinions do not disagree. It can hardly be doubted that the most important of all practical problems at the present time is that of finding some *modus vivendi* among the rival nations of the world. There were high hopes about this at the time when the armistice was arranged; but it can hardly be said that the outlook is quite as hopeful now. There are obvious troubles in Russia, in Ireland, in India, and in many other countries; and anyone who reads such a book as that by Mr Cheng on *Modern China*, or that by Mr H. J. Mackinder on *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, may realise some of the less immediately obtrusive dangers that lie in front of us. I believe it may be taken as certain that no mechanical arrangement will ever introduce peace and goodwill among men. At most one may say that the actual formation of a workable League of Nations might be taken as some evidence that people were ripe for the establishment of peace and goodwill. The ripening must come from within. It is for this reason that I look with special hope to the "Concordia" movement that was initiated by the late Principal Naruse of Tokio a little before the outbreak of the war, and that I am glad to learn is now likely to be revived. The special object of that movement is to bring about friendly relations between East and West, and especially to promote the mutual understanding of their moral and religious conceptions and their social ideals. We have heard too much of the saying that "East is East and West is West"—commonly quoted in a sense almost contrary to that which Mr Kipling intended. There are many "good Europeans" who have felt the call of the East, just as there are many Orientals who are ready to appropriate what is good—and even what is bad—in our Western civilisation. There are many who stand, like the souls that were depicted by Virgil, at the edge of their respective worlds, stretching out their hands with a yearning love for the remoter shore—*Tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore.* I expect—I may even add, I hope—that there will always remain some differences between these two worlds; just as there will always be many smaller ones within each of them. Differences of sun and wind and soil and sea will always be accompanied by some differences in mind and soul; and humanity is all the richer for such variations. But we have surely seen enough of each other to realise that it is quite possible to have a fundamental unity of spirit underlying these differences. I do not believe, however, that there can be such a genuine unity on any basis that does not lie deep down in the essential nature of man, and that may not be properly described as religious; and I am convinced that any religion that is to accomplish this object—the greatest surely of all earthly objects—must be predominantly an ethical religion.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF RELIGION AND RESEARCH.

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It is a familiar fact that a man's reflections and inquiries outside the sphere of religion can exercise a powerful influence upon his religious convictions and his conceptions of religion; and also that his religion or theology can control his ordinary scientific and other "non-religious" thinking to such an extent that they are not rarely considered to be prejudicial to the spirit of free and fearless research. Evidently, therefore, our religious and our non-religious thoughts are not naturally contained in separate water-tight compartments; and it would seem that whatever "realities" belong to the sphere of religion, and are experienced or recognised by the men whom we call "religious," must be associated with whatever "realities" are recognised outside that sphere in such a way that our ideas about both can interact in the way they do. Indeed, the history of thought has been characterised by increasing differentiation—the separation of religious from non-religious aspects, the appearance of new departments, bodies, or, we may say, "species" (*e.g.* astronomy, chemistry, astrophysics, etc.), and the process is significant for our conceptions of objective progress. One of the most fascinating and fundamental of inquiries is that into our own mental development, whereby we come to realise even the necessity of distinguishing between the "religious" and the "non-religious" or between what is and what is not "scientific," a development which accounts for our present conflicting attitudes. In fact, it may be submitted that in the pursuit of truth a closer examination of the dynamic and differentiating aspects of the processes of thought in the history of individuals and peoples is the necessary prelude to any critical reconsideration of the implicit and explicit theologies and philosophies which now sever us and impede social and other advances.

Although thought has become increasingly specialistic, there are many indications of the feeling that analysis may outstrip synthesis, and that the interrelations of existing divisions or subdivisions cannot be neglected with impunity.[1] Two studies, geology and geography, for example, may be pursued independently; but from time to time one is found to depend upon the other, and throughout the vicissitudes of departments of thought there are alternating phases of isolation and interrelation, processes which are especially instructive when we turn to problems of religion. For, without further ado, I wish to suggest that the future of our progress outside the sphere of religion depends vitally upon religion, indeed upon a further development of religion itself, and that the latter will rest upon an advance in those realms which our science and criticism jealously shield from religious, confessional, and subjective entanglements. In other words, the separate aspects which we dichotomise into "religious" and "non-religious" are so united that progressive development cannot be partial or one-sided.

It will doubtless be agreed that the further social, political, and other development of individuals and peoples turns, to a certain extent at least, upon their self-control, moderation, and so forth; that is, upon their ethical and moral character. What I submit is that we are at the stage where, if we are to maintain our position and make a further advance—and the two aims are one,—only a religious development will stimulate and unify our research, and only an advance in our research will bring religion into harmony with the best thought of its day. The advance, in a word, will turn upon a further development in man's relationship with the God of whom it has been said that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being." For, if this is true of God—and it is the living experience of many,—"God" must stand for some tremendous reality, on another plane, but inconceivably more vital, than all our other and non-religious conceptions of reality. Consequently there is a fatal rift in our outlook upon life until we have made up our minds and formed some Theory of Reality. Either we differ hopelessly upon a question than which there can be none more vital for every aspect of human welfare; or we do lip-service to an agreement, but our research does not at present enable us to interpret our experience and give it a real meaning. Our religion and our research thus appear to be inevitably interconnected.

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[1] See, *e.g.*, Professor Coulter on "The Evolution of Botanical Research," in *Nature*, 29th January 1920, p. 581. (The analogy between evolution in the world of life and that in the world of thought is to be borne in mind.)

My starting-point is the field of Biblical Criticism, the uncompromising study of Sacred Writings in the light of all that research has to offer. As a result of past advance of thought the Church is no longer the sole interpreter of the Bible, nor does the Bible interpret itself alike to all men. The three types—Conservative, Moderate, and Radical—differ from one another, and among themselves; and such are the cross-divisions and combinations that scholars can no longer be easily labelled. Not to speak of the ethical, moral, and religious problems, the claims of textual, metrical, literary, and historical criticism frequently conflict; while archæology, anthropology, psychology, and history often pull in opposite directions. Consequently, not only do readers differ seriously because of their different temperaments, preconceptions, convictions, and the like, but the "secular" studies have not reached the stage where they can be so co-ordinated as to preclude the extreme divergences which now hinder the progress of biblical criticism. This criticism can justify itself by the fact that its methods are those employed in other fields; but its progress is bound up with those fields, and, accordingly, biblical study itself needs a methodology, not merely of the departments of research, but more especially of the distinctively "religious" and "non-religious" inquiries.

The Bible, then, will not interpret itself to ordinary readers, nor be interpreted by the Church, in any adequately harmonious manner until our research has reached a higher and more co-ordinated stage than that at present, where scholars and readers alike are at hopeless variance. The goal, however, is no monotonous, static identity of view, but a congruence of method and a new underlying unity, so that the various problems and the departments of thought may be less out of harmony, and the road be open for the newer problems—each age has its own—now being impeded and obscured through the absence of methodological unity and the conflict between religious and other knowledge.

The really fundamental problem of the Old Testament is not the literary analysis—there is sufficient agreement upon essentials—but the reconstruction of the political and religious development of Israel, to replace the traditional narrative which modern criticism cannot, in any circumstance, accept in all its details.[1] There are the gravest internal and external difficulties, and there is not that development between the Mosaic and the post-exilic ages which we are entitled to anticipate on the ground of the teaching of the religious reformers and other evidence. The attempts to reconstruct in the light of our modern knowledge and of our conceptions of development are, in general, opposed to the religious philosophy of the old writers, with their periods of apostasy and penitence, of decline and reform; and the fundamental biblical conception of a primitive revelation is replaced by the no less impressive conception of a progressive revelation. It is this problem of religious development, whether in the history of a people, viz. Israel, or in the history of the race, which now comes to stand in need of reconsideration.

In reconstructing the outlines of the history of Israel insufficient attention has been paid to the vicissitudes in and around Palestine. The problem was studied too narrowly within the covers of the Old Testament.[2] Now, however, we are gaining a broader view of the history of a small people in a land surrounded by ancient civilisations, and our ideas can be further enlarged by a better knowledge of the history of the rise and vicissitudes of other religions. Here we find alternating periods of decay and revival, the latter not infrequently associated with great political and other movements; and at the same time there is a genetic development, such that the revival is a return of the old, but of the old in a new form. Very subtle and rather novel problems arise when one seeks to determine more narrowly the distinctive features: the disappearance, reshaping, or re-interpretation of the old, the appearance of new positive elements, and the inauguration of new stages, cycles, or, as one is tempted to call them, "species." The history of religions elucidates the principles of the development of religious and other thought; and, in forcing a reconsideration of Old Testament religion, it also brings us to the problem of the reconstruction of modern thought. The history of transitional periods in other lands and ages now becomes of supreme interest, and the history of Israel, in particular, gains another significance.

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[1] Scholars are of course divided as to precisely what may or may not be accepted. I, myself, am frequently radical and sceptical as regards the value of the historical narratives for the period with which they deal, but freely recognise their value (including the book of Chronicles) for the light they throw upon the periods when they were written, collected, and edited. This light illuminates not the earlier periods, therefore, but later ones.

[2] This was largely inevitable. It was necessary to concentrate upon the biblical evidence, and external evidence has not always been reliable or accessible. A very important step is, however, taken by the Rev. Professor Burney whose commentary on *Judges* (1918) includes the first really critical and comprehensive account of "external information bearing on the period of Judges" (pp. lv.–cxviii.).

The problems of the Old Testament turn upon a few centuries in the middle of the first millennium B.C., when the downfall of the Hebrew monarchies was followed by a certain disintegration, leading to a new reconstruction which was essentially religious. Instead of a simple evolution—from nomad religion to priestly legalism—we have to understand (1) the earlier vicissitudes in the entrance of semi-nomads into a land of long-established culture; and (2) the later decline from the height of the monarchies, the appearance of relatively simple conditions, and the work of reconstruction which produced post-exilic Judaism. Assyria fell, artificial archaisation in Babylonia and Egypt led to decay; but the reconstruction of Israel, with its results so profoundly beneficent for humanity, is a phenomenon which cannot be too carefully investigated, so suggestive is it for our own tasks of to-day. The study of that reconstruction and our new reconstruction of Israelite development belong to biblical criticism; but, involving as they do a reconsideration of the facts and theories of the development of life and thought, the biblical problems become essentially problems of this age. This age will both interpret and be interpreted by them.

I cannot delay upon further details; I will only remark, at this point, that if we feel we have outgrown earlier stages of religious or other thought, nothing is better attested than the repeated renewal or reassertion of elements in forms that are in harmony with newer conditions. In this fusion of resemblances to and differences from the old we have analogies in the history of successive stages in organic evolution; and while it may be said that we of to-day are witnessing, if not helping to introduce, a new stage in human evolution, we have this responsibility, that our knowledge of development in the past can enable us more consciously to contribute to the next stage. But our research has yet to investigate critically and without prejudice the nature of the resemblances and the differences. "Mediævalism," "obscurantism," "reactionism" are terms which no thinker can employ.

Tendencies in life and thought are leading to what, on the analogy of literary, textual, and historical criticism, may be called "religious" criticism. The problems of the relation between Christianity and other or earlier religions need more objective treatment than they usually receive. The application of psychology to religion is also raising new questions.

Problems of the relation between religion and magic, of religious decline and pathology, of holy men, intermediaries, and the like, have far-reaching implications. The theory of the priority of magic over religion has an often unsuspected significance for our ideas of God. The theory that religion "began" with totemism or with ancestor-worship—to mention no other views—bears upon that of the source of our own religious experience to-day and of our convictions of God's place in the world. The comparative and psychological study of varieties of Christian experience, of non-Christian religious experience, and of non-religious but related experience (*e.g.* cosmic emotion, etc.) raises profound problems which are bridging the gulf between "religious" and "non-religious" thought. Anthropology, psychology, and the study of religions are preparing the way for a veritable science of religion; they are leading gradually to conceptions of religion in accord with the best thought. If only scholars were agreed upon the essential nature of magic and the real difference between magic and religion we should have an immeasurably firmer grasp of true and progressive religion—and of its antithesis—than we possess at present.

While research is thus impinging upon the sphere of religion—and to an extent to which organised religion cannot be indifferent—another change becomes inevitable. The problems which belong to "religious criticism" sooner or later raise the question, How did people think of *their* gods? what did their gods *mean* for them?[1] And it is not difficult to see here how one's personal experience both affects and is affected by one's study and treatment of the problem. When we ask ourselves what reality—and I suppose one must begin by adding "if any"—is represented by the data of religion, our research is applying itself to men's conceptions of God and Reality. Moreover, not only is the consistent thinker consciously or unconsciously developing his own personal convictions—which will be the less "subjective" as religion is studied in a scientific spirit—but to the fearlessness and sincerity demanded by the temper of science there must be added, as the ideal, a "spiritual" training, equipment, and character. The fact, for fact it is, is assuredly significant for our conceptions of the subject of inquiry, for what must "God" mean if our inquiries into ancient or modern, primitive or developed religion seem to take us to our own inmost depths?

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[1] This method of inquiry, though commonly ignored, is, significantly enough for his theory of the communion-sacrifice, that of Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., p. 82 *seq.*).

Already the psychological study of religion emphasises the "naturalness" of religion and associates "religious" truth and reality with what is open to the psychological discussion of human nature. Moreover, sociological and other students incline to admit that religious experience has *some* reality or actuality to justify it; it is the theistic or other interpretation and expression which is adversely criticised. Yet it is very instructive to observe the efforts to express what, if it is not "religious experience," is at least related to it—"cosmic emotion," for example—in a way that shall avoid theology or philosophy; they indicate how inextricably our distinctively "religious" experience and mode of thought is interwoven with all the deeper experiences and thought outside the sphere of religion. But when it is said that religious experience is "really" connected with man's social nature, or that it is of some actuality no less intelligible, it is difficult to see how this is to be proved or disproved. Whatever be the reality experienced so variously by theists and others, we evidently need some clearer formulation of what this Reality means for our own life and thought. The question cannot be left where it is; we desire a more or less systematised Theory of Reality which shall interrelate the rival and opposing conceptions of ultimate reality and co-ordinate our own particular conceptions of this and any other realities we recognise.

I cannot formulate a Theory of Reality, but I suppose that one of the main differences between (*a*) the God of Theism, (*b*) the Humanity, or other "God" of ethical and positivist cults, and (*c*), let us say, a mascot (which can be psychologically very effective), lies in the realm of thought and action proper to each, the content of each, and the significance of each for the rest of our life and thought. Conceptions of reality are thus bound up with the efficacy of our reality under discussion. According to our thought of it so we use it. Now, to go back for a moment to biblical criticism we find that theories, principles and the like proved imperfect or erroneous as they became less effective in their relevant field; difficulties increased, inconvenient facts had to be ignored or forced; old principles conflicted with new ones. To this we may add a growing uneasiness and dissatisfaction which was more than merely "intellectual." But in biblical criticism, as elsewhere, when old theories have been replaced by new ones, the data have been more effectively handled, the relief has been more than "intellectual," and even when the new theory has been uncommonly drastic, it has really been less complex, more synthesising and unifying, and more in harmony with new tendencies, principles, or facts. The test, then, of our theories, principles, and conceptions is their efficacy in their proper field.

This process, one well worthy of more careful treatment, is that wherein theories and so forth are found inadequate, and are replaced by new ones which, in spite of the intervening struggle, have often, like new stages in the history of a religion, grown out of their predecessors. The process of reconstruction in the world of thought has its analogy in that of the world of life, where our theories, principles, and outlooks are less consciously held. And the analogy may be pursued, for if our theories and views of life are imperfect and erroneous, like our theories in research, they will be ineffective, do what we may to ignore or suppress inconvenient facts. We may even *feel* a certain dissatisfaction which it is difficult to specify. Now, if we agree that there is a Moral Law in the Universe, our life and thought cannot proceed with impunity along lines contrary to it. With greater force will this principle apply to our conceptions of God. We may say, with the contemporaries of Zephaniah, that the Lord will do neither good nor evil, or we may think of God as Him in whom we live, and move, and have our being. But if men act upon wrong conceptions of what is most vitally real and true the consequences are bound to be untoward; although at present, however, we are not agreed as to how far religious reality is significant. The more significant it is, the more prejudicial will be our imperfect and erroneous conceptions.

In any case, it is unfortunately unnecessary to refer at length to the prevailing bewilderment, disillusion, unrest, suspicion, and despair, the indications of moral, ethical, and spiritual ill-health, and the many bizarre, fantastic, and often veritably pathological features of the age. Psychologists emphasise the results of the possession of a well-organised or of a discordant or dissociated personality, of good or of bad complexes. The prevalence of what is abnormal enables one to realise what is normal; and “ the psychology of insanity ” leads to a “ psychology of sanity ” (*Hibbert Journal*, April, p. 509). Moreover, the psychology of adolescence and conversion has much to suggest for an age distracted, anxious, and in search of rest, confronted with the disintegration of one system and the necessity of constructing another. How far may this ill-health not be due to erroneous ideas of life and reality, to imperfect or misleading conceptions of “ God ” and of the reality for which this Name stands? The answer will depend upon our conceptions of the meaning of God for man, and the relationship in which a man, consciously or unconsciously, stands to Him.

The question is much more than merely "religious"; it is not disposed of by leaving it to the theologians. The assertions and claims which recur throughout the religions are such that, if religion is not a stupendous lie—and this is inconceivable—man is in some way part of the Universe more profoundly than we can understand. Science can indeed associate the human organism with the rest of the Universe, but the extraordinary convictions and statements of man's place in the Universe are not only contained in man-made mythologies, theologies, or philosophies, they are also in large measure implicit in men's activities, which, as they become more earnest and fundamental, have a significance transcending our positive knowledge. Man himself is but a very recent appearance in the history of the earth, and as he becomes more conscious of himself and the whole of which he is part, the differentiating process whereby he severs God and Nature, or distinguishes the religious and non-religious aspects, tends to obscure the earlier unity of experience.

Yet the way in which the individual is influenced by what we call a "religious" experience, the effect of a consciousness of "God" upon his life and thought, and the nature of the development of his world of ideas combine to show that the "realities" of religion cannot be held utterly apart from those of ordinary experience, and that "God" represents a reality significant even for the individual who knows Him not. The experiences which have forced men to convictions of an existence "outside" and "beyond" this life point to a consciousness of something that "transcends" (in the strict use of the term) what we call "this" world of Space and Time. In a word, then, there are convictions and experiences that are unintelligible and meaningless unless they point to certain ultimate facts of which our interpretations are natural approximations—facts, too, such that the genetic development of individuals and of the race leads to truer and more effective interpretations. There is a religious dialectic and a certain naturalness and orderliness in the vicissitudes of religion which force the assumption of some Reality even though it be known only through our imperfect apprehension and statement of it.

We often entertain conflicting beliefs, for example, of a bodily and non-bodily resurrection, which if pursued consistently would speedily land us in hopeless confusion. So, as regards our experience, interpretation, and systematisation of whatever is real and true, if we are consciously and unconsciously proceeding in diverging directions our whole self must suffer in some measure. If, as religious experience suggests, we are normally part of a larger life, we thwart our deeper selves if we persist in thought and action that denies and excludes this.[1] If we think that reality is only physical, the more consistent and systematic our ideas in all their ramifications the more imperfect will be our personality —that is, *if* our fundamental conviction is "really" wrong. Hence, for the credit of research, it is incumbent upon men to make up their mind upon the significance—"if any"—of the religious consciousness and religious experience for scientific and other "non-religious" thought; and it is no less incumbent upon them, for the credit of religion, to utilise "non-religious" inquiries and "religious criticism" to the end that religion may once more live by being brought into harmonious relationship with the progress of thought.

The value of the comparative study of theological and non-theological conceptions of God and Reality lies in its contribution to new developments. It enlarges our ideas of God and Reality, and in showing how, on the religious standpoint, God has revealed Himself to individuals and peoples at different levels, enables us to form some more objective estimate of these "levels" in terms of concepts, categories, knowledge, and systematisation of thought. Further, this study throws light upon the dynamic processes of the mind: the mind's consciousness of something outside ordinary experience and the effort to consolidate the ground gained in its new advance. Here we find ourselves passing between God and Man, between Human Personality and Divine, between man's convictions of ultimate reality and the consciousness of his own reality. Thinking of God's nature and activities man has grasped new possibilities, and reflecting upon God's rule in the Universe he has developed his own mental processes and illumined his own nature.

There are two extremes. On the one hand, there are speculations which may seem futile—the old discussions of the movements of angels, the space they occupy, the way in which the universe is contained in God's mind, the mode of thought of disembodied beings or of an omnipresent Being, and so on. On the other hand is the cruder rationalism and positivism which would thwart the individual's development by rigorously rejecting all that falls outside so-called rational thought. Meanwhile, however, the extension of ideas of relativity, the impetus given by mathematical speculation, and the widespread interest in psychology have broken down barriers. We are confronted with an irrationalism, an anti-intellectualism, and the prominence of sections of population averse from specialistic thought. False idealism and unworthy belief prevail, and there are no coherent, systematising conceptions of God, Man, and the Universe to unify men and lay the basis of a new reconstruction. None the less, recent decades have seen great strides in our knowledge of the physical Universe and in our knowledge of man, his nature, his conceptions of himself, and of his ultimate realities. The age, it may be hoped, is preparing its own cure.

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[1] I say, we "thwart," just as men are said to thwart and impede God's work. But if we agree that ultimate facts of our existence (*e.g.* God, a life beyond the present) ultimately force themselves upon our consciousness, we seem to imply that by our nature we are (? subconsciously) one with Reality. We imply, that is, certain facts of human nature and existence which, together with much else in comparative theology, can be handled logically, and are assuredly vital for our theories of all kinds of knowledge.

The educated classes—whether biblical critics, scientists, and the rest—have their share of the responsibility for the disintegration of life and thought, and if they refuse to take part in constructive work, destructive work will be pursued by others. The striking absence of idealism among the middle classes, the despised *bourgeoisie* of the extremist, is the clearest indication that *their* education needs synthesising. Before we can educate the masses, the classes need re-educating; it is their apathy and inertia which make so many impatient minds see the sole hope of the future in the more impressionable masses. Just as we become forced to take long views in economic and political questions, so, where thought is concerned, a more dynamic outlook is needed of the development of individuals and peoples. We have to make up our mind touching the importance of Religion, and to find conceptions of Religion, God, and Reality that shall guide us to the next stage in our development. Religion alone, without an advance of thought, might tend to be magic and superstition; and theologies that form closed systems will leave no room for further advance. Life and thought need a new co-ordination and re-organisation; and it is necessary to do justice alike to rival and conflicting facts and to opposing and hostile factions.

A new way of correlating the distinctively "religious" and the distinctively "non-religious" aspects of life and thought is demanded, and the work of research will proceed *pari passu* with the duty of acting justly towards the divers religions within our sphere of government. The reconstruction of social and political life and of religious and other thought is one task throughout. The task is, in a word, to advance to the stage where differing competing and conflicting "facts"—and some of them uncommonly vociferous ones—may be treated in a way that does justice to the principles of the best thought. And if it be admitted that social and political developments are forcing a higher type of character, if we are not to fall behind; so, if we are to maintain our intellectual level, the reconsideration of our conceptions of effective Reality will also demand, and tend to produce, a higher character. The goal at which to aim is, in truth, another and higher stage in human evolution; and an advance to a higher conception of ultimate Reality can only be made in a newer consciousness of the relationship upon which it depends. And the religious "theory" is that man cannot do this unaided.

Again and again men have been able to reconcile their profoundest experiences and their conception of the Universe. To-day the task is greater—it is to transcend the accumulated experience and knowledge of past ages. We cannot ignore man's modernity nor the implication of his experiences. There has been a repeated experience of the oneness of the Universe; and when St Paul speaks of the whole creation as the object of redemption (Rom. viii. 22), modern knowledge tells us that man cannot be the sole object of cosmic evolution—this would be Nietzsche's "superman" over again! Man may be unavoidably anthropocentric; but he is infinitesimally small, and only if man is an integral part of Ultimate Reality can the anthropocentric intuitions be justified. And forthwith a religious "theory" of Grace is involved! There is something intellectually "shocking" and clearly "undemocratic" in the supposition that we can form a lasting outlook upon life which ignores the best scientific, mathematical, and other "non-religious" thought, or which can find no place for religious and related experiences, however diverse and difficult. We need a synthesis of the conflicting interests in the worlds of life and of thought; and this involves some new advance, and a co-operation on the part of all men of good will. No more "creative" task can be imagined.

CAMBRIDGE.

STANLEY A. COOK.

THE ROYAL ACADEMY PICTURE SHOW AND HIGHER CRITICISM OF ART.

PROFESSOR W. R. LETHABY.

It used to be explained that the "Higher Criticism" made no claim to exaltation of status, but that it occupied other ground than the ordinary variety in trying to see particular facts in their wider relations. Such criticism, however it might be called, is required for all our modern institutions and professionalisms. It may hardly be realised by students of current thought, policies, and tendencies, how the annual show of pictures at the Royal Academy is arranged and catalogued matter for an estimate of the quality of modern existence. Those pictures, with the foreground of moving groups of "sightseers," make a perfect cinematographic exhibition of well-to-do people and their desires. The paintings themselves by the economic "higgling of the market," assisted by the skilled intervention of jurors and dealers, and the outflow of press comment, represent exactly what English culture expects of "Art" in this year of grace—this special year following the war. There are here in fact many exhibitions—the waiting motors in the court, the great suite of galleries, the crowds flocking through the turnstiles to see the biggest picture-match of the year. The paintings themselves furnish an absolutely perfect exhibition of exhibitionalism. There is much here to suggest thought, for if deep does not call to deep, shallow reflecting shallow might evoke another kind of profundity. Just this is what English artists, trained, too, for the most part at the cost of the State, have to supply to satisfy the national longing for art. Observers and students require material, statistics, and tabulated facts to work on. Here are all these excellently arranged and indexed. What does it all mean from the national, human, and—if I may use the word in my way—from the religious points of view?

People have been put off by the propaganda that art is a high mystery not to be understood by the uninitiated. Why then do artists perform in public? There are, of course, more technical and traditional approaches to art valuation, but from the human point of view all that is required is a clear shining mind to hold the mirror up to fact. We need a study of the psychology of pictures which shall recognise that in them we have minds invitingly laid open before us. Painting is a language for mind and spirit communication; well, then what does it say? These pictures make up indeed a composite photograph of the British mind and heart in 1920—reverence, pity, love, fashion, commercialism, low comedy and harlequinade must be here in their due proportion, although I must confess I have thought that the latter categories are even over-represented. The great picture-shows are only one class of specimens of our ruling institutions at this time, and a study of each of them should be put on record. In to-day's paper I read, "Miss Lena Ashwell, speaking at Cambridge on Saturday, said that the artistic genius which ought to have been stirred by the war had no chance of finding expression because the entertainment of the people was in the hands of commercials. William Shakespeare would not have a dog's chance to-day."

We are often told that art is imagination, and it may be admitted that imagination is one important factor. What imaginations have we at the Royal Academy? There is, in fact, hardly a design for a monumental, symbolising, summarising picture in the whole show. It is not that we have ceased to think in that way and cannot produce these imaginations, but it is a quite astounding fact that such serious monumental designs of a national character have gravitated to *Punch*, where we accept them under the name of *cartoons*. The only serious designs that I have seen during and since the war which dared to touch the note of nobility have been in the comic press. Here the artist may still speak without the exhibition standard in his mind or the fear of dealers in his heart. Here we may still find the eye language of serious imaginations. In great epochs of civilisation many of these comic-paper cartoons would have been thought worthy to be put into public frescoes and mosaics for speech with the people: now that paintings may only be seen behind barriers by paying gate-money, there is "no demand for that sort of thing." It is difficult to maintain an ideal in a deal!

We are also told that art requires an object seen through a temperament, and that it is the temperament that matters.

Quite true in a way, so it is, and cannot be helped; in any case we are all "temperaments." We may take it for granted or go on to question the temperaments and spirits what they be of. Should a painting temperament be balanced and central or, if not always that, should it be eccentric in noble or ignoble ways?

Arguments have raged on the question how far "subject" is of importance in painting, and an uncomfortable feeling has been raised that to care for "subject" or to have an objection to vulgarity is vulgar. That is, it is suggested that it is dull and bourgeois to care for touching and teaching subject matters, but that the reverse and the perverse don't count as such. There is here a dim reflection of a half-truth by accident. A gin bottle might, once in a way, be painted more nobly than a lily; and always it is not so much what the subject is *called* that matters as the way it is "seen." It is a question of good-will, health, and sanity; indeed, more and more we shall have to fight to maintain sanity. I find a passage in a book by Michaelis, the late great scholar of Greek art, which I must quote as it shows how similar arguments on art for art's sake had been "made up" and pressed in Germany.

> "The work of art has a language of its own, which it is our task to understand and to explain. There is not only a written but a pictorial tradition, each of which follows its own laws. But it does not appear right to me—though these may be unwelcome reflections—to appreciate in a work of art only the form, in a picture the colour, and to declare the content more or less indifferent. Least of all can this be the case in regard to ancient art. The painter Nikias observed that the subject formed a part of painting. Ancient art knows as little as ancient life of an absolute mastery of form. The Athenians only considered the person perfect who combined beauty with an inner efficiency, and ancient art is not different. It may be conceded that Lysippos said the last word in perfecting Greek art, yet Phidias ranks above him, as his content is richer and higher, and his form equals his content. The form is only the robe which the content creates for itself. Content and form are inseparably one. It is only their relation to one another which determines the value of a work of art."

Much well-intentioned talk about art is confusing because art is so many-sided, and while the speaker is thinking of *a* the listener hears in relation to *b*. Art is not only high imagination and invention, it is also skilled workmanship and patient record. It is "design," but it is also imitation. All art is labour as well as thought. All *doing* indeed includes some *saying*, but some forms of art, like building, *do* more and *say* less; while other forms, as painting, while doing less should say far more. Their doing is for the saying's sake. Painting, indeed, is another form of language—thought addressed to the eye instead of to the ear. In all forms of art the spirit triumphs over mere brute toil. Art is best conceived as beneficent labour which blesses both him who gives and him who receives. Beauty is its evidence—Beauty is virtue in being.

The purpose of this little paper is to ask for interest in, and general understanding of, the functions of art by all who are interested in thought, and life, and civilisation. I wish to suggest that the art of picture-painting must be studied from the human and communal points of view and not be left to breed in and in to the point of insanity.

One of the reasons for latter-day extreme doctrines and practice in painting is to be found in an attempt to find a ground not occupied by the photographic camera. Having got machines to draw, and paint, and sing, and act drama, we do not know what to do with ourselves. Art philosophies are very largely conditioned by economics; "Cubism" and End-of-the-worldism are almost mechanically simple reactions from mechanism. If good art is a form of pleasant human speech, great art is teaching and worship. All art is the wisdom of men's hands. We cannot for long love triangles, zig-zags, and jazzeries. Beauty is that which when seen we should love. I saw the other day that the elder Mr Yeats had said that beauty is that which suggests affection—I quote from memory, but it seemed a critical saying which may hardly be bettered.

Of the current exhibition at the Royal Academy of Arts I will only venture to say that the four record pictures of the Peace Conferences seem to me to be far and away the most real and worth while. They at least have a reason for being, and they are wonderfully skilful. Then in order of reality come the portraits, and these too fill a want that seems to be felt. But—if I may say just what I think in a world where that is hardly permitted—the portraits as a whole, however clever they may be, seem to lack humanity. Many of them are like impersonations of success, competence, pride, force, riches, commercialism—masks rather than faces. Only one of those I saw seemed to be just a human creature: here there was tenderness, reflection, shyness—the mystery of a man; my heart leaped within me to see a soul. And this reminds me that English people as such have hardly been painted since Holbein; they have been painted as titles, or as property, or fox-hunting, or clothes and fashion. Reynolds was an exquisite painter of perukes, powder, and perfume; in his time, however, the position of a painter as another kind of valet was well understood. After the portraits come some decorative pieces, about half a dozen of which might be gay and delightful in a great financial dining-room or a restaurant. The next series in order of sincerity appeared to be the studies of "interiors"; we are all interested in pleasant rooms and fine old furniture and tea-things. It is not exactly great-minded; but it is charming, so let us be thankful. As for the landscapes, there are several small portraits of places which are excellent and evidently done for love and interest. Of more grand-manner landscape I do not remember any which had the moving quality except perhaps one of Venice by a survivor from the last generation who holds something of Turner and Samuel Palmer by apostolic succession rather than by wilful revivalism. There seems indeed to be a noticeable failure in "the will to" paint poetic landscape. It may be that men are unconsciously getting frightened by a feeling that untrampled country only remains in the narrow cracks between the railways and factories. To paint a landscape now requires so much "leaving out" that hearts may well fail. As Morris said of one of Fred Walker's "Idylls," "But 'tisn't like that." Up to now, indeed, our composed landscapes have been canvas screens put up between us and our desecration of England.

Of course there are dozens of nice little pictures of slight incidents and pretty corners, very well done. As a whole, indeed, the artists are competent and sometimes amazingly skilful. It has been said recently that painters have lost the traditions of their art, but I have not found it explained whether this refers to the types of pictures produced or to sound methods in workmanship. In the knowledge of pigments and how to mix and lay them so that pictures will last, there has probably been a most serious loss of workmanlike tradition. ("You might make an artist, but a workman—never!" said Stevenson.) On the other hand, it must, in fairness, be said that the traditions which well-equipped modern painters still have are only acquired by earnest work for a dozen years. The loss of purpose and the general anarchy are largely the result of exhibitionism itself: not even of "academicism" in general but of Royal Academicism. Still our painters and craftsmen of every kind would do true and impressive work if they could get out of the limelight of the press and find other ways of employment than that of amusing the financial world. The great fact of the whole business is that we are witnessing the maturing of the Capitalistic school of painting. If the Royal Academy, as a powerful and wealthy corporation enjoying the hospitality of the nation in regard to its premises, had had guild rules, it might have been different, but possibly only in a small degree. The Royal Academy *régime*, as it is, has led to the sad identification of "art" with painting, especially the oil variety, and further, with the sort of oil painting which is likely to sell at an annual bazaar and bring in gate-money. It is an old, and in some ways a generous body, but there is too much confusion between a semi-public institution and a private-interest-making corporation—it is too ambiguously ambidextrous. While I am finishing this, I read: "*Purchase of Paintings.*—The President and Council of the Royal Academy have purchased the following works under the terms of the Chantrey Bequest: *Feeding the Fowls*, oil painting by —— ——, R.A.; *Epsom Downs*, oil painting by —— ——, A.R.A." As far as may be judged from the titles, these do not appear to be pictures of an epic character and of national importance. The selection, however, is manifestly impartial as between the two classes of members of the institution.

Painting is properly a craft and should be organised as a trade-guild having relations with house-painting, the parent art. Then the drainage of all "art" to London should be intercepted and diverted to many centres of civilisation. Above all, public bodies should spend less in educating artists and more in obtaining sound work of all kinds in their several towns. It seems a silly sacrifice, this education for what is not required, or required only as oil paintings in gilt frames to hang on the walls of the smoking- and billiard-rooms of the "moneyed classes." They who pay for paintings certainly call the pictorial tunes. "How can it be otherwise?" may be asked: but why should art students be brought up at the public expense for such a fate? Another way must be found at one end or the other. I said to a serious old student the other day that if the faculty for art was a "gift," then its mission must be to *give* and not to show off. "Yes," he replied; "but no one wants our giving."

Artists wish to give; they want to be allowed to work. A few "fine arts," so called, are the last refuges left in a world which has destroyed reasonable employments. Artists have the proud distinction of making things, and doing something with their hands. Many, indeed most, of the rebellions in art and the resorts to shock tactics are the result of disillusion. The exhibitional way is too severe a task; a few only can fight their way through with expert swordsmanship to journalistic recognition and high prices. The heart of art must wither under such conditions. Art should be peaceable, modest, helpful, health-giving. "All great art is praise"; yes! and—forgive the word for the meaning—the greatest pictures are preached. Was any sermon, indeed, of the whole nineteenth century so prophetic as Madox Brown's *Work*, with the philosophers and politicians of 1860 riding by on the other side for an outing? As it is, what has been accomplished save the stuffing of sale-rooms? Hardly anything has been done for a serious purpose since the Death of Nelson was painted at the Houses of Parliament. A private person may hardly be sure of getting a competent portrait painted without going to one of half a dozen fashionables and paying an unknown sum. We must begin again at the other end and commission young painters to do their best for ten or twenty pounds. That is on a small scale, and as drawings tinted or otherwise, rather than as show pieces in oil paint. The fact is, exhibitionist portraits do not make house portraits, nor gallery pictures room pictures, nor popular successes food for human joy. In truth there is an artificial standard all along "the line." Too many pictures are merely professional products. Picture-making may be strictly analogous to the better-understood "book-making" exercise. The right way to get art is to pick a man and trust him to do something for you personally, if necessary mentioning a sum of money—"what can you do for me in painting up this room for fifty pounds?" That is the way our national arts might be improved. Visit local Art Schools and draw out the spirit of locality. Every town should have its pleasantnesses (if any) and its antiquities (if not torn down) recorded, and its public buildings adorned in some civilising way. The men are able and waiting, it is the tradition of employment which has broken down. We must bring back simplicity and confidence. The setting up of an aristocracy, an æsthetic house of lords, has not answered in the democracy of art. Was it this Blake had in mind when he said something to the effect that all are equal in the heaven of art? It is a great national question—the cause of art is the cause of civilisation; but this exhibitionism is one of many symptoms of "the sickness of acquisitive society."

W. R. LETHABY.

HARTLEY WINTNEY, HANTS.

A BUDDHIST VIEW OF SPIRITS AND SPIRITISTIC PHENOMENA.

W. A. DE SILVA.

THE thirst for knowledge of what appears to be shut out from one's eyes is ever present in man. Curiosity, love of novel sensation, desire for information which may be of use in promoting one's ambitions, the interpretation of the secret yearnings of the heart, the desire for the acquisition of power and knowledge that are not in the possession of others, have all contributed in various degrees to stimulate this quest after the unknown. In recent times a new factor, a desire to make use of this knowledge for better and higher service in strengthening the mutual bonds that link together the whole human race, has come into play. Love and sympathy have first to be evoked in oneself; but they cannot develop and become effective in the place where they originate. They must at once be freely bestowed and transferred beyond self. The average man bestows these gifts on those who are near and dear to him—wife, family, parents, relations, friends—in a widening circle. And as the circle of love and sympathy widens, so do his own happiness and peace grow fuller and deeper, and he longs to extend it beyond the bounds of earthly and visible existence.

The East long ago investigated and studied what are called spiritistic phenomena, and the results of their studies are found implicit in the vast mass of Oriental religious literature. They have obtained the acceptance of the bulk of all Eastern peoples. The Eastern point of view on matters of this kind should interest many investigators in Europe and America. It will suggest lines of thought which may explain much that is strange and puzzling at the present stage of knowledge in the West, and help investigators in their own quest after the unknown. The records of experience in regard to life here and hereafter, and beings seen and unseen, have been handed down by tradition and have been incorporated in the religious literature of the East, not as matters requiring investigation and proof, but as accepted facts that had been investigated and realised long ago by our ancient teachers and their remote ancestors. We now no more think of enquiring and experimenting for ourselves as to the existence of other beings, or the conditions and characteristics of such beings, than a person here thinks of investigating for himself the conclusions of science in connection with every-day physical phenomena.

The Old World views in regard to spiritistic phenomena can be summarised in a few general statements. Life consists of beings in innumerable stages of existence without beginning and without end. We realise life in the average human unit in the expression, more or less, of six senses—those of Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch, and Thought. These senses are expressed by the different organs of the sensory body, and Thought is a sense and has its organ like any other. Each of these may be developed in various stages of intensity. The expression of one or more senses may be entirely absent or very slight, and sometimes almost imperceptible, while the expression of others may be more pronounced than the average in its intensity. The differences and variations in different individuals are innumerable and hardly measurable. It follows, in accepting this view, that it is possible that there can be beings other than human in whom are found variations and differences in these same senses and sense-organs. There are beings whose physical state is denser or rarer, as the case may be, than the physical state of man or animal. Those with rarefied bodies are invisible to an average impression of sight. These beings with rarefied physical bodies are classified for the purpose of description in accordance with their stages of sense-development. For want of a better term the unseen are classed as "spirits." The word itself is not taken to define any unchangeable or permanent individual class; it is a relative term employed merely to express beings who are not usually perceived by the senses of average man.

Some of these unseen beings are classified as gross elementals, *i.e.* spirits whose opportunities and senses are cramped, whose mental development and development of character are erratic, and therefore whose ideas of right and wrong are hardly measured by considerations of harmony. Their attributes of craving, passion, and self-delusion are at their full height, and their activities and life are governed by these conditions. There are others who are more advanced in the development of their character, but still addicted to erratic action due to a predominance of one or more of the attributes of being, till we come to others of higher and higher scales of harmonious development.

Suffering, sorrow, and pain are the results of craving, passion, and delusion. In a being whose cravings, passions, and delusions are intensified the suffering is great in proportion. When these are diminished or under greater control, the suffering and pain are lessened and happiness is increased. The spirits ascend in the scale of happiness in proportion to the diminution and inhibition of the attributes of being. The higher the scale there is less sorrow and more happiness, till in certain higher spheres of development the experiences of the sense of pleasure, love, and sympathy are at their greatest intensity.

Birth, death, and being[1] cease only when craving, passion, and delusion are entirely eliminated in the long upward march of beings. All beings that we speak of are subject to birth, death, and re-being, which occur in consonance with nature. Nature is conceived as existing in the three conditions—namely, the continuous element of change marked by its two great crises of birth and death.

Everything is in a state of continuous change. In consequence of these changes there is absence of harmony, and the resulting disharmony may be scarcely perceptible or may be extremely violent. All things are correlated to each other, a change in one acting on every other.

The phenomenon of birth in a physical sense is varied according to the state of the senses and organs of senses of each particular class. We know of the conditions of birth in a physical sense in animals and human beings. We know of the division and multiplication of organic living cells. Births in the sphere of the unseen differ in accordance with the state of sense and sense-organs existing in that sphere. They necessarily do not bear any physiological resemblance to what we notice in the animal world.

Death is the dissolution of the senses and sense-organs through various means, through effluxion of time, through age, and through cessation of functions. The span of natural life in one stage differs from the span of natural life in another stage; we know only of the average span physiologically in average man and animal. We are aware that certain conditions make a considerable alteration in the time of this dissolution. The less dense the physical form, the greater is the average time that it takes before dissolution sets in. In the unseen world the span may be comparatively great according to the state of the development of the senses and sense-organs. The sense-organs have no permanent character. They are only media where activity takes shape.

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[1] To the Eastern "being" implies craving, passion, and the activities which follow on them, and is therefore, and in this sense, an evil.

Activity is "being" and produces force, and this force, which has a distinctive character directly resulting from the diversity of activities, we call Karma. When sense-organs dissolve, force that has been shaped through them does not disappear. It remains distinct so long as it is not merged in harmony. There is no harmony so long as the activities of being are tinged with the variations due to craving, passion, and delusion. In describing the phenomena of electricity the terms "positive" and "negative" are used to denote variations whose real nature is hardly understood, except that they describe conditions which are dissimilar. We can in like manner describe the force of being, or Karma, as having an indefinite number of variations and not merely positive and negative. The electric force sent out by a wireless operator is caught by another operator through the medium of an apparatus sensitive to the particular wave of force. Similarly the Karma, when freed from a particular group of sense aggregations, gets itself expressed in a nascent field suitable for its manifestation, and this is the sense in which we understand survival and reincarnation, or re-being. This suitability may be slight or intensive. One Karma cannot combine with any other distinct from it, for each has its own individuality, as activities differ in different individuals. For that very reason a Karma cannot take its field in any other sense-group which is already under manifestation.

It is not quite easy to demonstrate re-being by any actual physical analogy. We have already mentioned the three attributes that constitute being, viz. craving, passion, and delusion. Happiness consists in the weakening and uprooting of these; the less one possesses or is possessed by them the greater is the state of happiness. In life and its activities there is a continual striving for happiness. Various methods are followed, some consciously and of set purpose, and others unconsciously and without feeling that one is trying for anything special. The codes of ethics, the sanctions of society, and the teachings of religion, all aim at gaining this object. Some of the means adopted are more effective than others: some lead straight to the goal; others take devious paths; but activity is continuous, and this activity shapes itself and carries with it its sum of results which continue on and on till its object is gained of uprooting its motive power, craving, passion, and delusion.

There is one aspect in this continuous activity for gaining happiness and diminishing craving, passion, and delusion which one has to bear in mind—that of the interdependence of all beings. It is the progress of the whole. To accomplish this process, each unit has to improve itself. The greater is the perfection of each unit, the greater is the progress of the whole. The unit at every turn finds it difficult to progress if it thinks of itself without realising its relation to others.

A continuity of acquired character is manifested in re-being. The sphere in which the re-being takes place is largely determined by the attitude of the conscious mind at the time of dissolution. At this time the mental process becomes active. With the release of energy required in the maintenance of the senses which more or less cling to the body, the thought-sense is freed and made active and potent. Before the mind's eye appear all the immediate past activities—the cravings, the passions, and self-delusions, the combat against these, the training undergone to resist and subdue these, the joys that accrued from such resistance, and the sorrows and pangs due to their manifestation. These crystallise, as it were, and take shape. When a being dissolves with thought-results shaped by craving, passion, and self-delusion, he passes into spheres of darkness and suffering, where such conditions find easy root. Where these defects are more or less under control he passes on to spheres of light, peace, and rest in consonance with the predominant thought-ideas. If a person's dissolution sets in with his faculties unimpaired and in happy surroundings, unworried by cares, cravings, and passions, his future being is cast in a happy sphere. In Eastern countries friends and relatives remaining near a person at his dissolution endeavour to do their best to relate to the dying person the good acts he accomplished in his life—they endeavour to remind him that nothing is permanent, that he is himself but a part of the ocean of beings, that he should have no cravings nor passions. He is thus helped to a harmonious shaping of his last thoughts.

The old writings and traditions of the East go into minute details of the various divisions of unseen beings. The spirits of the unseen world range from suffering spirits to shining spirits.

To the lowest form belong those in the dark spheres, where there is much suffering and sorrow, and they are beings whose cravings, passions, and self-delusions have been great.

Next in order come spirits who are near to the earth; who have obtained their re-being with a prominent expression of craving or passion, but whose suffering is less and whose freedom is greater than that of the former class.

These are also malevolent spirits whose powers and freedom are great, but who suffer from passion.

In the fourth class there are the shining spirits—those who enjoy pleasure and happiness in varying degrees.

To the fifth class belong the tranquil spirits, whose happiness is great and whose faculties for the enjoyment of the senses of the mind are high.

To the sixth class belong the fine and subtle spirits who have no individual form, but are thought-groups in the enjoyment of transcendent tranquillity, and happiness.

In the spirit-spheres there are activities and there are all the changes of moods and conditions due to the activities of the senses, expressed differently from the human environment, to suit the conditions prevailing among them according to the development of their various sense-organs. There is individuality; there is variation of development and attainment. There are those who lead and those who follow. There are society, association, and attachments.

There are conditions under which man can have access to the spirit-world. The manner in which a human being can communicate with the spirit-world is one that has received much attention in Eastern writings. The physical senses of a normal man differ from the physical senses of a spirit in different degrees. In certain individuals some of the senses are abnormal. By practice and training it is possible to make the senses either finer and more sensitive or denser and more resistive to impressions. In some human subjects we find in their sense-perceptions great variations from the normal. Where a man is able to approximate some of his sense-resources to those of the spirit-world he becomes a medium through which communications can be established. Thus we have three conditions under which a person can get in touch with the unseen world:—

1. Where there is manifested a natural abnormal development of some of the senses.

2. Where by practice and by concentration through the repetition of words or phrases, and by adopting other devices and controlled activities, certain senses are approximated to those of some of the beings in the spirit-world.

3. Where mental training is practised for the advancement of any faculties such as those related to certain religious practices.

The first of these includes mediums. In the majority of cases a medium will be found to be abnormal in one or more of his senses, and is often unbalanced. Some of the senses thus weakened and others that have been strengthened enable him to get into touch with spirits, some of whose senses or faculties approximate those of the medium. The use of the planchette, the crystal, or even the automatic hand, concentrates the abnormal faculty enabling the spirit to make the communication.

In the second class can be placed magicians, or those who are said to practise witchcraft by various formulæ and rites. They induce conditions in their own senses, or the senses of others subjected to them, approximating them to those of some of the spirits. In the first division a medium, through his natural abnormality of the senses, is enabled to communicate with spirits of weak powers. In the second case when a magician or necromancer practises his art for gain or for acquiring power for his own sordid purposes, he usually comes in contact with gross spirits, who possess also characteristics mostly of an unsympathetic nature, and who, if the opportunity occurs, may perpetrate acts that are far from agreeable.

The third case is that where the senses are well trained and where mercy, compassion, love, and altruism predominate, and where the subject attains a state of ecstasy. This state is obtained by great religious teachers and adepts, who work for the uplifting of humanity and who are able to help both man and the unseen spirits to a higher state of harmony and beneficent activity.

The spirits themselves, when their ties are close to earth and when their cravings prompt them, try to get in touch with the human world through similar means. The advanced spirits, whose passions and cravings are far removed from the earthly sphere and whose enjoyment and happiness are great, do not, as a rule, desire any communication with the earth mediums—only under two conditions would some of them express themselves to man. One is where they are eager to do some service to humanity and where they find some human being who is likely to be able to carry this out. The second is where through compassion and love, by some timely warning or otherwise, they attempt to avert or modify some avoidable evil or calamity. The powers of spirits have similar limitations to those of the human race. They do not possess miraculous powers. Their powers are governed according to the development of their senses. They cannot foretell any event except through deductive reasoning, but where their senses are greatly developed they may be able to make the deductions with better knowledge and insight than man, and they can sometimes describe things with greater detail where their sense-perceptions are acute. In other matters they may not be able to go so far as the average human being, when through any circumstances their sense-development and sense-conditions prevent them from perceiving what the average human sense perceives.

There are certain grades of spirits who desire when they are in a weak state the help of human beings and the help and sympathy of those whom they regarded as near and dear to them, and this help can be communicated just as among the living. Every kind thought and wish extended towards these spirits helps them in their development. Those who die a sudden death without having time for reflection and composing their minds, those who at their dissolution have some longing or passion, are weak spirits that specially benefit from the kind thoughts of the living. Buddhists have a definite method in their religious practices of daily sending out their thoughts of love, compassion, and kindness to all beings. They specially think of those who had been near and dear to them; the spirits of such, if born in any of the weak spheres, expect this help from their friends. The relatives and friends do special deeds of charity and acts of love, so that they may extend their kind thoughts—which have been thus exalted and ennobled—to their departed friends. When these thoughts reach the departed they feel exalted and become stronger and happier. This may be described as the Buddhist or naturalistic version of the Catholic or ecclesiastical doctrine of Purgatory and masses for the dead.

W. A. DE SILVA.

COLOMBO, CEYLON.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN CANADA AND REUNION.

THE RIGHT REV. EDWARD J. BIDWELL,

Bishop of the Diocese of Ontario.

IT is only right for me to begin this article by disclaiming any special commission or authority to speak on behalf of the Church in Canada, though I have good reason to believe that, speaking generally, what I have to say would be endorsed by the majority of the Canadian Episcopate. Two at least of the younger Bishops, both Canadian born—the one a graduate of Oxford, and trained at Cuddesden; the other trained at the Leeds Clergy School, and a former curate under the present Archbishop of York at Portsea,—certainly share my views, as we discussed the question at length during our passage to England. For myself, though an Englishman, I can claim the experience gained by seventeen years' work in the Church in Canada—six years as Headmaster of one of the oldest of her Church boarding schools, four as Dean and Rector of a fairly large cathedral parish, and seven as Bishop, —during which time I have been brought into contact with all sorts and conditions of men throughout the country. These are my credentials for what they are worth.

That I may be scrupulously careful not to claim more weight for my utterances than rightly belongs to them, let me add that my diocese, which is named after the Lake, is only one of six in the vast province of Ontario, and though big in area compared to an English diocese (it comprises six large counties), is the smallest but one in the Province.

My reason for soliciting the indulgence of the editor of this journal is the following. When we Canadian Bishops come over to such a gathering as the Lambeth Conference, our natural attitude is one of the deepest respect and reverence for the great ecclesiastical leaders whom we are privileged to meet. The names of many of them are household words to us; to their learning and spiritual power we owe an incalculable debt. We are fully conscious that the conditions and circumstances of our young country cannot as yet produce such men. We rightly come therefore to listen and to learn, rather than to inflict our views upon men so much wiser than ourselves.

But when so great and far-reaching a question as that of Christian Reunion comes up for discussion this attitude of deferential silence cannot be entirely maintained. For in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, all the facts of the case must be tabled. And while we fully recognise the infinitely superior academic attainments of our English brethren on this subject, and their necessarily intimate knowledge of its bearing upon conditions in the great Mother Church in England, yet we, and we only, can give accurate and first-hand information of conditions and work in the Church in Canada, relatively small perhaps, and comparatively unimportant at present, but probably destined, as that vast country develops its extraordinary resources, to become the greatest branch of the Church overseas. And whatever shortcomings may be justly laid to the account of the Canadian Episcopate, at least they are now without exception men who have had full opportunity of acquiring a thorough knowledge of local conditions before being elected to the Bench, as the practice in vogue in most cases in the other Dominions of bringing men straight out from the Old Country as Bishops has been dropped in Canada for upwards of twenty years. It is true that several of our Bishops were born and educated and have worked some time in England. When I was enthroned, the Bishop officiating for the Metropolitan was an Oxford man, as was the Bishop who preached, and as I am. But all three had worked for years in the Church in Canada before becoming Bishops. We can I think, therefore, claim to have a unique knowledge of problems and conditions in the Church in Canada which have a direct bearing upon this most important question of Christian Reunion.

Let me try to state some of these problems and describe these conditions, which are widely different from those confronting the Church in England. In the first place, we have none of the prestige of a National Church except in so far as the glory of our venerable Mother in England faintly reflects upon us. We are simply one Communion, and that not the largest, amongst others. Our endowments are trifling in amount. There is practically nothing of the social cleavage between Churchmen and Nonconformists which exists, or did for so long exist, in England. Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and others meet each other constantly in social intercourse, and our children marry their children. Consequently our Church has to justify its existence by its message and its efficiency.

Further, we are only upon the fringe even now of our responsibilities and possibilities. New regions in this vast country are constantly being opened up and developed, certainly involving, now the war is over, a great inrush of emigrants. To keep pace with these demands is a tremendous task, well-nigh impossible under present conditions. For it must be remembered that the older Eastern dioceses all have their mission districts, which, owing to sparseness of population, can never be self-supporting, and for the maintenance of which large sums have to be raised every year.

In the next place, spiritual influences in Canada have to fight the battle against materialism with almost none of the adventitious allies to be found in the Motherland. There is little as yet of that semi-spiritual, semi-intellectual atmosphere, the inheritance of the ages, which predisposes men to respect religion even if they do not accept its message whole-heartedly. There are no cathedrals and churches many centuries old to remind men of the dominating force of religion in the past. There is little of that indescribable background common in the older lands which makes so valuable setting for a spiritual appeal. In a country of vast distances (the diocese of one of my colleagues referred to above is 80,000 square miles), of amazing resources, the extent of which has hardly as yet begun to be realised, of potential wealth almost beyond imagination, it is a small wonder that men's eyes are on the future, regardless of the past. And the ever-present danger is that sheer stark materialism may triumph over all spiritual ideals.

None but those who have lived and tried to carry on spiritual work under these conditions can possibly realise what they mean, and how infinitely more difficult they render that work. Certainly to one brought up and trained in the Church at home, who is open in any degree to new impressions, as he must be to do successful work in a new country, these conditions are almost certain to effect a profound modification of outlook. His conception of values changes. He faces realities, sometimes ugly, but always vitally interesting, and has to reckon with them.

Speaking frankly, I am of opinion that the only chance that the spiritual forces in Canada have of triumphing over the foe of sheer materialism which threatens to destroy them is by uniting those forces in one common task. Look at the facts. For years our Church has found the task it has been called on to perform quite beyond its powers, in spite of generous aid from the Mother Church, and of the heroic efforts it has made to cope with the situation. The other Communions are in no better case. (I do not take the Roman Catholic Church into consideration, as unfortunately for the present at any rate they hold absolutely aloof.) Side by side with this inability to meet obligations there exists serious overlapping. In my own diocese, in several parishes with a population which could easily be cared for spiritually by one man, there are often three—Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian,—each with their handful of adherents. An English rector or vicar is, theoretically at any rate, rector or vicar of the whole parish. In our case it is not so. The priest must strictly confine his spiritual work to his own flock. The result is that we have often to combine two or three or even four churches many miles apart into one so-called parish, involving for the priest excessively long drives on Sundays and weekdays, with the resultant fatigue and loss of time, not to speak of the scanty Church privileges for the people such a system involves. Meantime the Methodist and the Presbyterian are probably covering the same ground. Whereas the three men, each stationed at one point, could produce ten times the effect, *ceteris paribus*, on the spiritual life of the community.

Now while this is happening in the more settled portions of Canada, the West is simply crying for men. We want men; so do the Presbyterians and the Methodists and other denominations. But there is not and cannot be, as things are now, any settled plan of action. As an illustration of what can be done by a single corporation acting on a definite policy, take the great "C.P.R.," as we Canadians like to call it. Wherever settlers were likely to come it threw out its tentacles to provide transportation facilities, it staked out farms, and went so far as partially to equip them for the intending settler. Districts were mapped out and arranged for, and even buildings erected in advance. But the Churches could not make preparations beforehand. They had to wait to see to what denomination the newcomers might belong, and then decide whether there were enough of their own to justify the necessary outlay on equipment. Too often the result has been competition, rivalry, and consequent failure on the part of all adequately to meet the situation. The Canadian Government also has done much in providing facilities for settlers, and in meeting their material needs. I believe it would not be averse from assisting to provide for their spiritual needs if only it could be approached with a united voice. But it certainly cannot and will not give help to any particular denomination. There is no doubt also that our "unhappy divisions" are a greater hindrance to the influence and progress of Christianity in a country like Canada than they are in England. For the social cleavage being non-existent, people see that we work together, live together, and unite in every possible way except for worship, so that religion appears to them as a far more outstanding divisive factor than it would to the majority of Church people in England, who have probably moved strictly in their own Church circles all their lives. For this reason alone many have, as they say, "no use for religion." Even the well-instructed, who understand thoroughly and appreciate the position of the Church, find it hard to acquiesce in this state of affairs.

All thinking people agree that the present disunited condition of Christendom is wrong, and contrary to the mind of Christ. My point is to urge that, while no doubt any steps that are to be taken towards reunion must ultimately depend on fundamental principles, our leaders should take into most careful consideration the tremendous problem with which we in Canada are confronted. We are engaged in endeavouring, in the face of great difficulties, to build up a nation on the only sure and lasting basis—that of righteousness. And the feeling is shared by most religious leaders of all the Communions in Canada that, while by a strong united effort we might grapple with the task with some hope of success, it appears to be almost beyond our powers in our present divided condition. So strongly is this felt that a united body is even now in process of formation, consisting of the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregationalist Churches. It is no doubt much easier for them to unite than for us to join in any such movement. But even in their case nothing short of the overwhelming needs of the situation would have been strong enough to overcome the weighty opposition the proposal aroused when first mooted. The great National Church of England, with all its prestige and resources, could no doubt accomplish much in England, even if it felt obliged to continue in splendid isolation from all the other religious forces in the country. In Canada there is no national Church, only separate religious Communions. And while we know well that we are still in the day of comparatively small things, yet we feel an exceeding responsibility when we remember that the spiritual future of what appears likely to become a very great nation largely depends upon the foundations we can lay now.

It is not my purpose here to set forth any definite proposals in the direction of reunion. I leave that to men possessing a measure of wisdom, insight, and learning to which I cannot lay claim. But I venture to assert that any proposals or suggestions coming from us would be received with most courteous consideration by the other Communions in Canada. By a resolution of the House of Bishops passed at the General Synod recently, individual Bishops were requested to hold "informal conversations" with representatives of the other Churches on the subject of reunion. No general report of these conversations has been issued; but, speaking for myself, I found an unanimous agreement that union was not only most desirable but really necessary if Christianity was to be the factor in our national life that it ought to be. University professors and pastors of churches were in complete accord on this point. When such a spirit exists, can it be impossible to find a solution?

In proof of the good feeling and courtesy towards our Church which exists in the other Communions in Canada, let me give two personal illustrations. When the Armistice was declared, we had of course arranged for a special service in the Cathedral, as had the various denominations in their own churches. But at a special meeting of the Ministerial Association of the city, it was unanimously resolved to approach me with a view to holding a combined service in the Cathedral, on the ground that it was the great historic church of the city (Kingston), and therefore the most fitting place in which to hold such a service. They most courteously offered to leave all the details of the service to me, and requested me to deliver the address. I explained that while I could not legally invite them to take part in an Anglican service, I saw no reason why a combined service should not be held in the Cathedral, provided that it was drawn up and arranged by a committee of representatives from all Communions including our own, and that there should be another address as well as my own from one of their own body. My directions were scrupulously carried out; ministers from all the principal churches took part in the service, which I do not suppose will ever be forgotten in Kingston, and nothing was done to offend the most rigid of our Church people.

Again, only a few days before I sailed for England, attended, as representing the Church of England, a very important conference in Toronto between the Churches in Canada and the Y.M.C.A., with regard to the religious work carried on by the latter. After considerable discussion a resolution was brought in by a very distinguished Presbyterian divine, which would undoubtedly have been accepted by the representatives of all the other Churches. I knew, however, that the Anglican Church could not accept it, and so, before it was put, rose and stated that I should be obliged to vote against it on that ground. The resolution was at once gracefully withdrawn, and I was asked to frame one which would be acceptable to the Anglican Church. This I did, and it was carried unanimously.

Perhaps even a more striking illustration of the spirit in which we are met is the fact that when the various religious Communions in Canada formed a Joint War Commission, Dr Roper, Bishop of Ottawa, was unanimously elected their chairman.

I am, of course, well aware that these matters lie in the confines of the "No Man's Land" of ecclesiastical controversy, and leave the barbed-wire barriers of denominational differences untouched. But at least it is something for both parties to have come out from behind those barriers and met in such friendly spirit. Does it not afford room for hope that the barriers themselves may be removed?

The present writer belongs to a school of thought which is even passionately attached to the Anglican Church, accepting implicitly her Divine Commission, her Apostolic Ministry, Creeds, and Sacraments. We could not tolerate any surrender of her priceless heritage which would endanger her Catholic position. But we do plead very earnestly that the door which is ever so slightly open should not be closed and barred without at least the most earnest consideration of the problems our Canadian Church has to face, and the tremendous results pending. We feel that it must be possible for the united wisdom of our revered leaders, under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit, to arrive at some practical solution of this most momentous question.

One final word. On the voyage over, at the usual saloon service in the morning, one Bishop took the service, a well-known Professor of Theology at Edinburgh University read the lessons, and another Bishop preached. At the steerage service in the afternoon a Bishop conducted the service, and the Professor preached. The sea remained (comparatively) r..in. During the passage the present writer had much converse on the question of reunion not only, as above stated, with his brother Bishops, but also with the Edinburgh Professor, and a layman—one of the most public-spirited men in Canada, a graduate of Balliol and by religious profession a Methodist, married to an Anglican wife, daughter of a public man whose name is well known on both sides of the Atlantic. We all agreed that there ought to be no insuperable obstacle in bringing our respective Communions together. I know that we shall never cease to pray that the attempt to secure a result so eminently desirable will not be abandoned in premature despair. *Sit Spiritus Sanctus dux et lux.*

EDWARD ONTARIO.

THE POVERTY OF THE CLERGY AND THE WIVES OF THE CLERGY.

Mrs H. L. PAGET.

The Bishop of Exeter is reported to have said that he does not attach great importance to finance; that it is relatively the unimportant part of the Church's work, and he goes on to say that "The Church wants devoted clergy, but you cannot go into the market and buy a devoted man for so much money. No, to attract devoted clergy it is not a question of finance; it is much more a question of spiritual appeal." This is propounding an ideal truth, but there are certain complications that affect the whole situation to which the Bishop does not apparently allude. The theoretical man called to minister as a priest in the Church who need not hesitate in regard to poverty and self-sacrifice presumes a celibate clergy. Rome realised this long ago and made her regulations accordingly; she was certainly worldly wise and may have proved herself spiritually wise as well. It is possible that the need of the world demands celibacy at the present time; we dream of a mobile force of ideally obedient clergy who are ready to go at a moment's notice to the ends of the earth. Indeed, committees have been formed to bring this obedience and call home to the hearts of others. If this be so, it ought to be receiving a large share of attention at the Lambeth Conference, and we can hardly believe that Englishmen would be found wanting in response.

If, on the other hand, our fellow-countrymen still desire "a married man," then of necessity those that are married, or that intend to take the holy estate of matrimony upon themselves, do well to pause before committing others to a life of very complicated poverty. Poverty in a monastic cell is a very simple affair, or even poverty in a cottage or a workman's flat; but only the wives of the clergy know what it means in a house that is far too large, a house that has never been modernised, entailing the maximum of expense and labour and the minimum of comfort.

Before leaving London I had begun an informal enquiry into the Church housing problem in the diocese from the woman's point of view; it is an enquiry that should be made throughout the Church. We who are commonly called clergy wives have shown ourselves ready for any sort of work and a good deal of self-sacrifice, but we have an uneasy sense that much that we do is wasted because of the antiquated administration of Church property and Church funds. Our circumstances have been muddled for us, and we bear the brunt. It might be difficult to place responsibility, but we have our quarrel with Church dignitaries and ecclesiastical commissioners and absurd architects who invented the prim, uncomfortable little houses with hairpin windows and ecclesiastical eyebrows. Certainly no real effort has been made to enquire into the impossibilities of the majority of parsonages, and the most that is offered has been in the form of doles which stand condemned by every serious charitable organisation.

Some personal experience is worth a good deal of theory. When I was very young, a neighbour came in to call at our vicarage—a very rich woman. "You and I know," she said with a charming smile, "that it is impossible to live in these houses under a thousand a year." My knowledge was more accurate than hers; all that the vicar then received was about £200. The house had five flights of stairs from basement to attic, it had no bathroom and no hot water above the ground floor, and there was a fine display of stucco outside to keep in paint and repair. Of course, money for improvements can be borrowed: Queen Anne is quite ready to consider bathrooms, but people think twice before they make a fresh charge on such a small income. An unmarried vicar has been able to make improvements since our time. A further experience of important work, which necessitated a curate kept at our own charge, made one regret the annual payment for the rebuilding of the house out of the net income of under £300. I have also had lately as a housewife to refuse to live on half the nominal income in an official house that comprised (as the guide-books have it) about forty-five room and offices. And still there are annual payments for past improvements, fires to be kept going lest the property should deteriorate, and the inevitable menace of dilapidations. Such a responsibility should not be personal; it is not fair, it is not common sense.

I know of another Bishop's wife living in a large house on a diminished income who finds the burden almost too heavy to bear. Any man of the world would mock at those who accept office under such circumstances; but even if, by a paradox, we are often accounted worldly for doing so, it may be real obedience to the spiritual appeal. If that be so, then the Church as a whole should set its houses in order, and overweights of material things should not be hung round the necks of those who sincerely wish to respond to the higher call. We could all struggle along in good humour if we could be sure that anyone was at work on these subjects. Meanwhile it is left to the individual to battle as best he can, and there seems to be no serious effort to deal with the whole question. Many doors have been opened of late years to women—one that is at present closed and which might yet be unlocked is that of the Ecclesiastical Commission.

But after all, my own experiences, even if my problems as a housewife are not yet solved, are easy as compared with many others. The servant difficulty, acute everywhere, is over so far as most clergy households are concerned. Few of us can compete with the wages now offered, and, though it is easy to insinuate that pious people desire to lower wages, we really have learnt something about the conditions of labour and realise that for the most part we must do without help.

Here is a country vicarage in the south. The clergyman's wife gets up between 5 and 6 a.m. to get on with the housework and out into the parish and more especially to her guide's work. Another, this time in the north, where the housewife, who never complains, speaks with wonder that by the grace of God she has been able to take on the whole of the domestic work so late in life without loss of strength. A very big and old-fashioned vicarage in an industrial centre is run by the women-folk of the family and one maid, for in this case the house-mother is not single-handed. But every bit of outside work depends in some way or another upon them as well. They are indeed overworked, and when it was suggested that they must have more help the answer came swiftly that a curate was wanted first. This offers without doubt a fine spiritual ideal in a somewhat materialistic part of the world. My mind turns back to London. The house I am thinking of stands in the noisiest thoroughfare where dock traffic and trams clatter and clang all day and all night. It is tall and spare, like an ill-fed, elderly woman, and has not even the reserve of an area, though it has the inevitable basement. To add insult to a woman's injury, it has that pious, semi-ecclesiastical expression which always means discomfort. I think of patient, willing feet toiling up and down the stairs during a time of illness. It was impossible for the single-handed wife to use the basement, so a cooking-stove was fixed upstairs; but even though she was thus saved one flight of stone stairs, the inevitable ghost of dilapidations haunts her when she tries to forget the basement she does not use.

Take a case of prolonged illness necessitating a cottage in the country. Expenses increase until it is impossible for the family to extricate themselves. Death comes, and dilapidations—to be borne by the incoming priest, thus tightening the vicious circle. And the big houses, like changelings, must always be fed before the pitiful human beings can get their share. Think, too, of the widow, unpensioned as a rule and with no savings; for when could she have saved out of the small income? I know one who worked in and out of the house, in and out of the parish, and who now bears real poverty alone. Then there is not only poverty but loneliness, and these react upon each other. Women are essentially social; we must have companionship. A country village can be very lonely, for it is obvious that everyone needs some outside interest and escape from work. The wife of the clergyman is bound to know more of the sad side of life than any other woman. She is not allowed to remain in ignorance of any failure, whether it be of the flock, of her husband, or of herself. Such a claim is made upon her sympathy that the depression which few people guess at is often a form of emotional exhaustion. Of course we know that we grow dull and narrow, novelists and dramatists may make their thin fun of us; but we do shoulder, as far as possible, the burden of others, having neither preparation nor blessing for any vocation but that of marriage. Anyhow there is little money for holidays, or books, or recreation. Invitations do come along, but we have not the clothes or the small talk. I know a woman who said, "My husband bicycles over because he doesn't want special clothes, but I can't go." We get prickly about kindness, which is stupid of us, and we are quick to detect the diminutive: "The vicar is *such* a good little man, and his wife a most hard-working little woman." But we smile when we think that with all the kindness, and even with a certain amount of occasional patronage, we retain something over and above independence, seeing that our work is voluntary, though it is seldom recognised as such. I know two cases where the wives of clergymen have been told that they must be well-to-do because of their rich relations. The line of argument is not easy to follow, but it is evident that the conclusion was to relieve the speaker of any responsibility for church maintenance in her own district.

Yet, after all, people still seem to want married clergy. I suppose we keep things homely and save our men-folk from getting out of touch with an actual, troublesome world. There are those who, desirous that the diaconissate should not be a celibate order, urge that it would be a great advantage to have the wife of the missionary or the parish priest ordained as a deaconess. That would be to professionalise what the clergy wife, with all her faults, is keeping less professional. Let us offer all the ecclesiastically built houses for such very professional couples, and ask that we may, for the most part, be left as part of the common life with just sufficient means to live without debt and anxiety. I do not think I would like to be born in the other sort of household if I were a baby. But that brings me to the vicarage children, and when we think of them, our eyes brim over with love and pride. Only they are one more problem in regard to the spiritual appeal. All the same, the nation might well thank us for the great men and women born of us. Legend tells that someone looked through the *Dictionary of National Biography*, marking the sons and daughters of the clergy. I do not know with what result, but I am not afraid of any such undertaking; had I but time, I would do it myself. Our children are splendid; we cannot give them all that we would wish, nor even all that we had ourselves as children, but they share our economies and bear patiently the church talk we cannot altogether avoid. Yet zealous neighbours are shocked if the vicarage children are not foremost in every good work that is going. "So curious," said a lady, "I asked the vicar's daughter to help when we had the garden meeting for the waifs and strays, and she did not come. I thought it would have been so nice for her." I never met that daughter, but I hope she was as I fancied her—a rebel, bent on establishing her own personality; she should have done good work by this time if it were so. The priesthood in the Church of England is not Levitical.

Give us then a chance to be homely. We want to be hospitable without having to reckon the cost in money or labour; it is humiliating to know the right way to do the right thing on the right occasion, and then to be obliged to let the chance go by. We want the little house and modern conveniences, and we shall never want a crowd of servants. I know a servantless vicarage where any threat to "start servants again" ensures a particularly fine polish on the boots which the children clean. Give us the chance to be just sufficiently free in time and money that we may get outside our work now and again and be neither conspicuously dull nor dowdy.

But this complicates the simple "spiritual appeal" of the Bishop who does not attach much importance to finance. We cannot have it both ways, and the whole Church should tell us which way is best. Given that we clergy wives remain, then let a commission get to work on our houses. Some parishes which are not suitable for married people should be set apart for unmarried men, where they might work from a clergy house; others could be counted as family livings with a new interpretation of the words. Some parsonages and many palaces could be sold or altered. The need for diocesan retreat houses might solve the problem of palaces. In regard to alterations, kitchens could be brought upstairs and basements turned into clubrooms; others could have the top storey cut off and turned into a separate flat for one of the staff, either man or woman. Hot water should be available on every floor, and bathrooms and hand basins installed; if we are to do all our own work under difficult conditions, we must have labour-saving devices. As the clergy are without capital, and as the livings are too small to bear the repayment of loans, we stand in need of help. The whole bad system of dilapidations should be reformed, and many of the official residences, notably bishops' palaces, ought to be partially furnished. It is a reckless waste of a man's income to have to carpet and furnish enormous rooms; the master of a college is not required to do this.

If we, as housewives, have to attach a disproportionate importance to finance, it is because our strength is being wasted by the encumbrances of past ages. For the most part our heavy work brings its great reward of joy, but the pressure of circumstances is beginning to tell; and I, for one, would advise the man to hesitate who, desiring ordination, desires also to be married. People still talk platitudes of "the richest Church in the world." If it be true, which I doubt, it is a further indictment of the management of funds and of those who, demanding a married clergy, make it impossible for their wives and children, and so increasingly difficult for men to respond to the spiritual appeal.

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THE RESIDENCE, CHESTER.

THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST.

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SINCE the days of Copernicus the universe has widened and deepened beyond the power of the mind or the imagination to grasp. The mass of knowledge which has grown through all these years now surpasses the ability of any intellect to compass or co-ordinate. Man himself seems but an atom swept along by a complex of forces and laws infinite in number and in power. Face to face with this new and immense world, man seems to shrivel before the sway of these forces and the operation of these laws. Overwhelmed by the sense of their power, man is humbled into helplessness and looks with awe and with dread upon a history in which his part seems to be reduced simply to that of a spectator. Yet, in spite of all these intellectual affirmations and convictions, there is an instinctive resistance to this subjection, and man claims for himself what he too often is unable to justify—an individual position in the midst of this world. He feels, though he may fail to prove it, that he is a person. What that assertion involves is seldom fully realised, for personality is one of the most difficult problems which man has to solve. Too often the whole subject of personality is avoided, and one of the questions which has absorbed some of the most intense thinking of the centuries is deliberately shelved.

In a way, and in a very striking way, the story of the world is the story of individuals. Social conditions may shape, and racial inheritance may qualify, the expression of life; but Plato and Alexander have influenced the world far more than they did the history of Greece. And Homer's song has set men singing who never heard his speech. In its most significant form the history of the world or of civilisation lies in the history of some dominating and overpowering personalities.

Taking history as it is, and facing the facts as they stand out before us, we come to the underlying problem: What is personality? The more we study it, the more we are puzzled by it. Not only is the ultimate question itself a mystery, but its effects are equally mysterious. Why does one mind or heart move other minds or hearts which come long after the first has ceased to think or beat?

Nowhere is this seen in such an impressive way as in Jesus Christ. In His own age and among His own people and associates He was a mystery. He overwhelmed men with surprise. He still overwhelms and subdues them by the unknown possibilities which come to light in Him. He has been a surprise because it has always seemed not only improbable but incredible that such as He could in any way be significant or conclusive in a world like this. And the mystery gains in depth when we see that history, both in the individual and as a social story, shows that He has been and is of the most signal, radical, and profound importance.

We each feel the mystery which surrounds all beginnings, and in no field of research, no matter where cultivated, is there so much energy and earnestness displayed as in the attempt to lay bare the roots of life. The moral and the spiritual qualities of personality are of the very essence of it. These, too, are the fundamental characteristics of the person of Christ, the unique and impressive elements of His very being. More than that, however much we think we are able to estimate the force and value of the intellectual powers, when we come to the spiritual our realisation halts far behind the facts. For of all the forces of the soul the most mysterious is Holiness. We think we know what it is and what it does, but we cannot really tell how it comes or through what channels it flows. Moreover, its value as an element or force in human life is not appreciated. This whole problem of life and personality, especially the problem of the personality of Christ and all that it involves, at this the most tragic period of human history for centuries, is assumed to be relative, and the meaning of His living energy a vague and unnecessary question. It is not relative: it is primary and fundamental. If there is one thing which the story of the past makes impressive and convincing, it is that the Mystery of Christ is the key to human history. For Jesus Christ has been the centre of heroic efforts and of passionate hopes. He has been their ideal, and ideals are the power which rules the soul. Yet ideals are always less than the ideal. That is, the interpretation which is offered rests upon a more or less perfect appreciation, and is shaped by the individual needs and the individual capacities. So we find in the actual history. No particular individual and no particular age has done more than grasp, in part, all He is. The necessities or needs of the times and the individual soul have led men to see that which met their life and with which they often were satisfied and rested. And the matter which counts is that the particular social or individual soul has found inspiration and energy in Him when they found it nowhere else. He has been the centre and the heart of vital changes which mark the progress of the world, not towards material or even intellectual achievements, though here, too, He is to be found; but towards those finer instincts, that purer and nobler spiritual eagerness which sees the promise of goodness and of holiness in each and every human soul. No age has ever fully expressed Him, and no age has ever exhausted Him, any more than it has been possible for the individual to do so.

At the beginning the spiritual anxiety was so great and the barrenness of soul so poignant that it is hard to fix the eye upon the central point. All the moral forces which make life worth living and fill the soul with energetic aspirations were reduced to exhaustion. Running all through the New Testament and the contemporary literature of the Empire, the underlying appeal, the working of an inward necessity, is for life itself. Not, of course, for mere physical life, but that alone which makes the physical life worth having. Whether the words are His or not, they express what was in the soul of the world and what it found in Him: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." No one who reads the story of His first preachers has any doubt that the immense fervour, the hearty delight, the splendid joy which blazes from every window of their souls, was the shining forth of the soul's gladness in this new life, which was an actual reality, though so mysterious that they could not measure it. That personality, what it was and what it did for them, was quite enough, for life was more than speculation.

The first five centuries were largely devoted to the investigation of that problem. It was, however, approached from the metaphysical side: What was He? What was His inmost essence, and how was it related to God and Man? These questions, no doubt, appealed to the prevailing philosophical temper of the Greek mind, and are, no doubt, of primary importance if they can be solved. What the Greek did has remained; but the question whether this was the ultimate problem His person suggested and brought to light, is not easy to determine. What personality actually is, is an impressive problem, no doubt; but what it does, and how it does it, appeals more to the instinct for reality which is planted deeper in the souls of men. Metaphysics are not the only questions presented by this fact, but a deeper and more mysterious one—that of spiritual dynamics. And here we see the problem stated, not in the terms of the schools, but of life.

It has been this aspect of it which has produced the immense variety of opinion in all the centuries. Each has tried to state that ideal which He presents to it in the imperfect terms of its own experiences and its own needs. But always when it has issued from the touch of His life, the flow of His spirit into others, there has been something which makes one feel His presence, even though it has been so imperfectly apprehended and expressed. Only in the hard tones of the dogmatist and the iron hand of the ecclesiastic has it been difficult to recognise His spirit. For in the days of their triumph there has been a failure of spiritual life which has brought sterility to the soul and emptiness to the heart.

In the first flush of the new inspiration men flung away the life they had, for the very fullness of being made them prodigal and indifferent to the ordinary values as men then understood them. So in the days of struggle and of trial the martyr stood for the highest to which the Christian soul could aspire. And the martyr has never lost his inherent worth, though oftentimes the spirit which moved him was so strained and ecstatic that it removed him from the immediate presence of the One whom he thought to serve. When one looks into the face of the young Felicitas and hears her calm and gentle words, one feels sure that she was right and that He was with her for whom she died. In all the changes of history there were still some who felt instinctively that the noblest and best in them called for Him.

It may be that in His wisdom the monk was the chosen vessel to keep alive the memory and the power of One whom the world could not live without. Yet when we look at the outward form in which he strove to express the ideal, it is impossible not to feel that other elements were mingled in this dream besides those which came from Him. The rejection of the world, the denial of the common affections and happiness of the family, the friendships which fill life with peace and thanksgiving—all this is so unlike Him who in the hour of human gladness looked with tender eyes on those young people who were beginning their new history in

Cana of Galilee. We see that He spent all His days among the poor and the unhappy, finding in human relations the highest expression of His Sonship to His Father; we see His last words were for the mother who bore Him. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience seem hardly an echo of His voice; and if they are not anti-Christian in their origin, at least they are, to coin a phrase, sub-Christian. In the changing times to come they revealed not only their strength but also their terrible weakness. It was in the humility, the gentleness, and the unselfishness of the best of the monks that men heard the voice of Him for whom they felt such a strange awe, and through it new cravings awoke in hungry hearts.

After the awful centuries of the Merovingians and the changeful and troubled years of the Carolingian period, when pity and mercy, love and compassion seemed swept out of life for ever, a strange yearning arose in hearts unable to feel any of these things which seem to mean so little in the rough struggle of a brutal world. What had they to do with that far-away Mysterious One of whom they had heard? Then some pilgrims came back from the East, where a pathetic longing to feel the reality of that long-ago life had led them. There on that sacred soil they had seen where He had lived, where He had died, and the whole story grew vivid and living. He was the One Sufferer whom a suffering world could fully love. The "Ecce Homo," the patient Christ, the dying Saviour, filled their inner life. And men who could not pity, and women who could not love, felt fountains of sweet waters rising in their burnt-out souls. They flung themselves at the foot of that cross, and never has mankind forgotten the vision of that Sufferer which rose before a world that was weary of its own brutality.

And yet, in spite of the new pity and the new sympathy, they shut themselves apart and sought, prostrate before that sacred Figure, a personal grace and an inward peace which the stormy world forbade. The fame of St Bernard has lived long, and the age he led brought a new and a finer spirit. The passion of it all shows how new visions were haunting the souls of men. And yet those very visions passed beyond the cloister wall, and men were stirred by the thought of a Redeemer of mankind. It was not enough that a soul here and there, brooding in passionate pity for this wretched race, should find its path, through the stony road, to God. A longing grew that others too, outside the silence of the cloister, driven by the pressure of life and stained with the toil of common tasks, should see that which would lift them up.

Just one generation after the great Abbot of Clairvaux had lain down to rest a man was born in a small Italian town who has shone through all the ages in the beauty of his spirit. There was about St Francis, Dante said, "a certain spiritual splendour," and men have never ceased to wonder at his joy. He saw in every flower and bird, in the shining of the sun and the beauty of the moon, the glory of the day and the solemn grace of the midnight sky, one never-ending song of praise to God who made them all. In each human soul he saw a child of God and wanted to gather these dispersed sheep into the security of that unchanging love. The religious spirit has never found a purer expression. The mystery of Christ seemed more fully revealed to him than ever man had seen it. He died broken-hearted at forty-four, knowing that his dream was fading away and men were going back to the gross light of common day. The world was too blind and too brutal to see or feel the beauty and the power of this great dreamer. But his dream could not be realised through the half-monastic way chosen, or under the conditions more or less self-imposed. The mighty energy and the breadth of action of that Mysterious Person went far, far beyond what even St Francis had dreamed. The whole of human society must feel the force of His influence. The great body of organised mankind must in the most direct way be brought under His sway.

It is hard to see all the elements which were mingled in the great revolution which marks the sixteenth century as one of the critical periods of human history. But here as before, as in the first century and in the twelfth and the thirteenth, the storm centre was the person of Christ. Men's deepest instincts, their spiritual and Christian sympathies, sought first to determine what their relations to Him were, what He was to them in these growing and changing times.

It is this fact, this new interest and interpretation, which makes the name, the character, and the history of Martin Luther of supreme significance. It was because to him and for him Jesus Christ was the necessary element in his living and the heart of all his actions that he became the leader of the great movement which was pointing towards an unknown future. All the infinite variety of hopes and dreams drew men towards Him as the ideal whose realisation would bring life into a new and nobler world of energy and love. All the demands which different ages and different needs had made upon Him had been met by fuller and fuller unfolding of the spiritual resources of His personality, and with the coming history the question presented itself: How is He related to it? What has He to offer to the bewildered, confused, and yet hopeful world which too often felt itself far off from Him? Luther presented the ever-living ideal, which had changed the world of the past, to the men of his own day as the hope, the heart, and the life of the future. But with a new interpretation. The Christ whom Luther loved and adored was the same as of old. The change was not in character or purpose, but in fullness of sympathy, in breadth of interest, in depth of action. He was no longer, or only, the Saviour of the individual, but the Saviour of the world. He was the One who gave to all the world not only a new value and a new sacredness, but was in close relation with all that was most vivid and real. He was no longer the Awful Judge or the Sad-eyed Sufferer alone, looking down from the high elevation of His perfection, but an inner and intimate force in the soul of each man; a living power daily and always working in and with the spirit of those who needed for their highest and most perfect realisation of themselves some power which was above and beyond them. This organic relation with the souls of those who trusted Him lifted men far above the traditions of the past; freed them from the burden of history, whether in thought or institutions; changed the sanctities of the soul from the outer expressions and the bondage of old inheritances, and made them free. A boundless spiritual future filled men's souls with wonder and with awe. The old Paradise where man had walked with God became to them a supreme and present reality. Nothing is stranger than the inexhaustible spiritual energy of those men who saw the new vision and walked in the life of the Lord that lived with them. There is something titanic in the vitality, the labours, of those leaders of the sixteenth century. The whole world seemed to shake and rock as the new forces broke forth. The simple virtues and the common affections, the actual life with its tears and its laughter, which had been crowded away in shame and silence, spoke now with a new voice. He was with them, sanctifying and elevating the whole of man's most sincere experiences into that very life which God wished him to lead. The dreary subtleties of the schools, the rigid austerities of a life which had in it no joy but the joy of pain, were swept away, and a life of sunny gladness in the presence of the Christ gave all things a new meaning and a new value. Breadth, reality, freedom, power: these were the spiritual gifts of the new expansion of the old ideal.

Man was intended to have the whole of Christ. The mystery of that life was to be the mystery of his own.

Men have understood Him in their own way and with their own limitations, but He has always been unfolding more of Himself as they have been able to see more, and His fullest meaning for man and in man will never be completely known until that most complete and perfect union has been realised, when men have grown into the fullness and stature of Christ. Each age has failed to fulfil its dream, and yet each age has opened the way for some higher vision, even if realisation has halted.

The last days of the classic world seemed to leave mankind in ignorance, blindness, misery, and hopelessness. Out of the long agony of the early Middle Ages came a new world in which man at least had a new value, and this value came from a realisation, however imperfect, that the highest ideal the world could think was a man. The divineness of His manhood oftentimes made them blind to the humanity and the reality of it; but it worked as all truth works, silently and secretly, sending up new dreams out of the depths, new longings, and new desires out of the hidden places of the human heart. And each and all were looking to Him, and groping for a relation of some kind with Him which would release their higher instincts and hold in check all that was mean, and cruel, and base. Their best instincts they took to Him, and He fed them with His interest and sympathy. Nothing that was fine and true ever feared to face Him, and draw upon His inspiration and help. No noble movement, no great aspiration ever failed in that appeal. In spite of all mistakes, distortions, and even perversions, His name has always led men higher, and the ages which have walked freest and most fearlessly have been those in which men have rejoicingly felt they were following Him. However far they go with Him, men feel that there is always farther beyond, where He will lead those who are able to follow Him and are willing to walk, even alone, if He be with them. There is no age in the past, since He came, that can be understood in its inner meaning and far conclusions without Him.

We are facing a world to-day outwardly unlike the world of the sixteenth century, yet in its spiritual conditions not so unlike. Spiritual bankruptcy threatens us. The proud industrial world, which was to bring success, happiness, and victory, has fallen into ruins, as Feudalism fell. The old relations and interpretations of life are, too many of them, a complete failure, and do not meet the new conditions. The "hands," which were to toil and labour for the building up of a great social system upon the foundations of the inexorable and immutable laws of economics, have also feet and eyes, heads and hearts—are, after all the technical phrases of the market, simply men. The failure to see this is obvious. The results may be disastrous. The world has devoted its energies to power and wealth. It found the secret of life in material success and achievement, and not in spiritual growth. It is poorer to-day in the things which make nations great than it has been for generations. At the foundation of all its tragic experiences which have brought such untold suffering lies the fundamental denial of the worth of personality, the rejection of spiritual values, the repudiation of the infinite significance of the human soul.

A re-interpretation of life is necessary before the world can return to the path of its highest history. This re-interpretation involves a new relation with Jesus Christ, more intimate and organic than that which now exists or ever has existed. For the old interpretations are imperfect and incomplete, inasmuch as they are not adequate to the larger needs and the more varied necessities of the spiritual life. Man himself has become more significant in his spiritual nature than he has ever before been. He makes claims for himself which seem bewildering, confusing, and brutally offensive, in the form in which these claims have too often been stated. The very meaning of personality itself, as a sacred, wonderful, and mysterious thing, appeals but little to the mind which finds itself involved in purely material and economic estimates of life. It is only when man's personality is connected organically with a personality whose meaning and power rise above the formal and conventional, that it becomes impressive. The deep unrest, the outraged instincts, the hungry desire for some kind of recognition of this inner worth of life, are working blindly and madly in many souls. It is not what men say or even what they think, but what they feel, what they are groping for, which makes the mystery of Christ more awful and impressive than ever before. A new unfolding of His spiritual capacities, His infinite resources of character and power, will do in the present what they did in the past. They will open a new history for the world and mark out a new path for human energy and human life.

Institutions and organisations have no dynamic quality. The fixed and formal order of life has no creative or transforming power. All these, whether in social, political, or religious life, are merely conservative—that is, they are functions through which the energy or force which is the creative element in life works. All institutions, whether secular or religious, are characterised by this static and rigid character, and again and again have stood in the way of life and movement.

Below the mechanism of life lies life itself. Below institutions are the soul and inspirations which move them. Beyond the limits of the individual life lies the source of that which flows into his personality and gives it power. The very root of all Christ's relations with life lies in the fact that there is some organic connection between them. This is the very heart of the Christian consciousness. It is the basis of all Christian experience. It makes the difference between a philosophy and a religion. It is vital, and it is dynamic. It is the beginning of everything to the soul, and in its action and development it moves into unknown spiritual histories.

We need to know what the relation of Jesus Christ is to this new phase of man's strange history. The necessity of this is seen when one recognises that the attitude which sets Him apart from the daily concerns, the common interests, the everyday occupations, the trials, tribulations, ambitions and hopes of men, inevitably involves an actual rejection and denial of any relation whatever with Him. For, once admitted that this world has no relation with Him, except as a preparation for the future, there follow an instinctive scorn and contemptuous repudiation.

The way in which that life of His flows into this world of ours is the secret of His personality. He who interprets the inmost meaning of our present world, and also the meaning of Christ for this world and in this world, will have opened the way for a history so vast that all the past seems but a timid prelude for the mighty years that are to come.

A new power will flow into the lives which have found the way to let Him in. Nobler living will come from a completer entrance into that history which finds its highest meaning in what He is. While we wait for this new expression of His Mystery, we can pray that the power of it may live in us, even if we cannot speak and know not how to put it into words. It may be no word is needed save the word which comes through lives which live always and more in the Mystery of Christ.

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THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL.

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THE main difficulty which confronts us in the study of Pascal is that the book which was to be the crowning effort of his life has come to us in fragments, and it is not easy to find the particular blend of imagination and precision which is necessary for the reconstruction of Pascal's thought. But the more closely we bend ourselves to a study of the *Pensées* the more clearly there emerges a philosophy of the spirit which is at once incisive and suggestive—alien to confusion and to conventionality, and uplifting in its constructive force. "The philosopher," says Pascal, "must see the thing all at once in one glance," and that, I venture to think, he has been able to do with some success. And thus because of their universal appeal parts of the *Pensées* have become deeply imbedded in the religious consciousness of the world.

In one direction at least the thought of Pascal marks the beginning of our modern era. He breaks away from the analytic method imposed by scholasticism on theological argument, and he learns new ways of approaching the subject of the Christian mysteries. Since man, he says, is a complex, reason alone is insufficient to enable him to grasp a system of reality which itself includes man's own perception of God. This was a new step in thought, and its results are to be seen in the growth of religious philosophy from the time of Pascal to the present day. Pascal's idea of the function of philosophy reappears in the system of Hegel with all the force of a new element; and it is seen more clearly still in the groundwork of Bergson's philosophy. In each writer the most important advance seems to be the realisation of man's position as a part of the system which he attempts to grasp. In all this the initiative belongs to Pascal.

In the course of the development of Pascal's thought we find he applies the same theory to the spiritual world. Man is himself part of the spiritual order which he attempts to apprehend. Thus Pascal conceives of religion as affecting the whole nature of man, as making an appeal to which the whole nature responds. Upon this groundwork Pascal builds his theory of the method by which man, in the fullness of his nature, seeks contact with God. No one method of approach, he thinks, can be sufficient. For the schoolmen's logical demonstration of the existence of God, Pascal substitutes the method he calls "persuasion." On this new method not only must the intelligence be eager for conviction, but the will must learn to bend, and the heart to feel love to the point of sacrifice.

In discussing this method Pascal is careful to give full weight to the beauty and dignity of each part of human nature:—reason, will, emotion. While he criticises the exclusively intellectual method of approach to God, he shows how ennobling is the possession of intelligence. He does not diminish the part played by reason, but shows that other means of approach are necessary. An illustration of this point is the well-known passage about the "thinking reed." Descartes had defined man as "une chose qui pense." Pascal was the first to use a less abstract expression, and allied man in all his glory of reason to the physical world by calling him "a thinking reed." "Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed. The whole universe need not arm itself to crush him. A breath of air, a drop of water, suffice to kill him. But even should the universe crush him, man would be nobler than that which overcomes him, because he *knows* that he is dying, and he *knows* the advantage the universe has over him. The universe knows nothing of it. Our whole dignity, then, consists in thought. It is that to which we cling, and not to a space or duration that we are unable to fill. Let us then work to think well: that is the basis of morals."[1]

"By means of space the universe comprehends and absorbs me like a point; by means of thought *I* comprehend *it*."[2]

While, however, in Pascal's mind the glory of man lies in his thought, in his conscious relation to all things—for in his mind even the acceptance of death is the final effort to apprehend that relation,—man in regard to the infinite finds the glory and dignity of human reason turning to dust and weakness in the sight of God. By reason man's moral dominion over the external world can be given form and expression, but by reason alone man cannot gain the knowledge of the existence and nature of God. Mere argument on the subject is apt to issue in scepticism rather than in faith. Pascal has learnt this from his study of Montaigne and the Libertins, of Descartes and the Rationalists. And he places in the same condemnation all writers who have given themselves exclusively to scientific and logical argument. "Reason (without imagination) may protest, but cannot get things valued by her measure alone." Purely mental processes, Pascal knows, will never release the human spirit from the deadening clash of material interests. It will not by itself give spiritual freedom and energy, nor bring man to Christ. Some other human powers and faculties must be brought into play when man attempts to gain a relation with the Divine. Instinct, imagination, and experience are all called in by Pascal, and finally he uses an argument familiar to St Augustine, where the highest use of reason is defined as the preparation for faith. Thus reason, says Pascal, may submit itself to what it has itself judged to be right. In the letter of St Augustine to Cosentius (cxx. 3) occurs the thought afterwards developed by Pascal:

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[1] Page 117, ed. Havet. [2] Page 118, ed. Havet.

> "It is a rational principle that faith should take precedence of reason. For if this precept is not reasonable, it is unreasonable, which God forbid! If then it is reasonable that in order to arrive at heights, which we cannot yet reach, faith should precede reason, it is clear that reason, in so far as it convinces us of that, itself precedes faith."

Pascal comments on this thought and develops it as follows:

> "Reason would never submit itself unless it judged that there were occasions when submission was a matter of duty. It is then right to submit itself."[1]

And again:

> "The final effort of reason is to recognise that it is surpassed by an infinity of other things. It is but weak if it cannot go so far as to recognise this. And if natural things surpass it, what about supernatural things?"[2]

And again:

> "Nothing is so essentially natural as this abandonment of reason."[3]

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[1] Page 302, ed. Havet.

[2] Page 301, ed. Havet.

[3] Page 303, ed. Havet.

Reason, then, he concludes, is man's claim to greatness, but by itself cannot bring man to God. Pascal now considers in their turn the will and the heart of man.

In considering the will he gives value to this element in the personality of man and to its function in the act of faith:

> "The will is one of the principal organs of belief—not that it forms the belief, but because things are true or false according to the aspect which one sees in them."[1]

And in another passage:

> "Let man hate himself, love himself, he has in himself the power to know the truth and to be happy; but he possesses no truth that is constant or satisfying. I should then wish to urge man to desire to find it, to be ready and disengaged from passions, to follow it where he will find it; knowing how much his knowledge is obscured by passion, I should wish him to hate the concupiscence which of itself determines his action, so that this should not blind him when making his choice, nor stop him when he will have chosen."[2]

But just as the full value of reason is only seen in the reduction of reason to faith, so Pascal conceives of the will at its highest point as being satisfied in submission:

> "The personal will can never be satisfied, even though it gains authority over everything it desires, but *satisfaction comes with the moment of renunciation.* Without the will one cannot be dissatisfied: but through it one cannot find satisfaction."[3]

The bearing of Pascal's theory of the will on the thought of a later age is important. Its basis is opposed to that of Kant so far as Kant completed his own work. It is interesting to consider it in connection with William James's "*The will to believe,*" which gives the will its place in religious psychology, but does not contemplate the sacrifice of the will.

Pascal next deals with the purely emotional response in human nature, with its dangers limitations, and with its actual place in development. He first shows how necessary is the function of feeling in the religious life.

> "Do not be surprised," he says, "at seeing simple folk believe without argument. God bestows on these the love of Himself and the hatred of themselves. He

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[1] Page 144, ed. Havet.
[2] Page 118, ed. Havet.
[3] Page 453, ed. Havet.

> inclines their hearts to faith. You will never believe with a useful and faithful belief unless God moves the heart, and you will believe as soon as He moves it."[1]

And again, in a well-known passage, he affirms that man knows God primarily through the heart:

> "The heart has its reasons, unknown to reason: this can be seen in a thousand ways. I mean that the heart naturally feels love to the Universal Being, and also naturally feels love to itself, according to its purpose: and, by its own choice, hardens itself against one or the other. When you have neglected one and accepted the other, is your love a matter of reason? It is the heart and not the reason that knows God. This is faith: God perceptible to the heart, not to the mind."[2]

The idea of an emotional impulse, dissociated from the will and the reason, became increasingly important at the end of the eighteenth century, and affected Rousseau's religious idea, where feeling predominates, and in fact dictates the *credo* of the worshipper. We cannot derive this incomplete view from Pascal. He saw the danger of isolating feeling and treating it as the sole means of approach to God. Nowhere in Pascal's writings is there any hint of sentimentality, or of the cultivation of the emotional religious sense at the expense of man's other faculties. Thus he consistently urged on all grounds that the appeal to the nature of man should be a three-sided one and should call out reason and will and love. He believed that all man's faculties—physical, mental, and spiritual—should be exercised to the utmost, but that man's isolated effort would be unable to bring him into touch with the Divine. He felt that it would be through effort and also after the acknowledgment of failure that the goal would be finally attained. It is only when the limit of failure is reached, the end of effort, when man realises that he is unable to apprehend God with any one faculty, or even with all developed and combined, that God stoops to gather to Himself the human spirit, and the "sense of God" flows over and into the whole nature of man by channels unaccounted for in any mental analysis. Thus man is finally able to offer himself to God as a "reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice." But we shall see, when we come to consider Pascal's idea of the relation of theory and practice in the Christian life, that the submission of human faculties does not bring about their destruction, but rather the resurrection of what is best in them. This extremely consistent theory of Pascal's is borne out in his life, where it is evident that he sharpened the weapon of his mind, controlled his will and gave it direction, and lifted emotion to a continuously higher plane in the effort to prepare himself for the personal relation with God. His best and most inspired work, too, was done after his vision [1] and the great renunciation that was its consequence. Man, as with Dante, must become king and priest over his own nature before he can ascend into Paradise.

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[1] Page 304, ed. Havet.

[2] Page 419, ed. Havet.

The venture of such faith as this is independent, as Pascal recognises, of proofs of the validity of Christian doctrine: though he considers that he should not neglect the study of evidences. In regard to statements of the Christian faith Pascal says that mathematical argument is "inutile en sa profondeur." [2] While geometric truths can have their demonstration, there can be no demonstration of spiritual truths, which are a matter of conviction coming after long-sustained efforts of reason and will, and succeeded by yet more efforts. "Certitude, certitude, joie, paix." But all forms of the approach to truth, whether by argument or by the uncharted methods of faith, are to Pascal presumptions of the reality of truth itself. There is one Truth to which all roads tend. Thus what Pascal attempts to show in his unfinished apology for the Christian faith is the agreement in aim of many methods of apprehending God.

It is significant that recent apologies for Christianity have frequently consisted of attempts by one person or by different people to treat different aspects of a subject in turn, with a view to expressing a common agreement in aim rather than in method. All hold that there can be no complete demonstration of the truth, but a general presumption of its reality. Such books as *Lux Mundi* and *Foundations* have been the efforts of two successive generations of thinkers to state their manner of approach. But how different this plan is from the method of the period before Pascal, is best gathered from a study of St Thomas Aquinas and his followers down to the seventeenth century.

The *substance* of Pascal's religious philosophy is intimately connected with his method of approach. We have seen that he considered man to be part of the whole system of reality, and therefore that man needed to use his whole powers in order to apprehend in any degree the nature of that reality. Pascal also believed, in common with all the great thinkers of his age, that the whole of reality was summed up in the nature of God, and that therefore men should look to God both as the source of all and also as the metaphysical unity within which they perceive differences and distinctions. In this he expressed his own age and generation. For the same assumption can be found in Descartes, Malebranche, Bossuet, Fénelon—and later, in divergent forms, in Spinoza and Leibniz, whose thought in all cases had its origin in the belief expressed by Descartes and others. A few concentrated and typical expressions of these writers will illustrate the point. Descartes in his Third Meditation postulated the existence of God, of whom a finite being could only form a partial conception.

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[1] In 1654.

[2] Page 539, ed. Havet.

"Whatever the mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real and true, and as implying any perfection, is contained entire in this idea." Malebranche "saw all things in God." Bossuet saw all the course of history as the expression of one mind, that of God. Fénelon chose the mystic way of approach to a unity of all things. Spinoza saw everything *sub specie æternitatis*; and Leibniz renews the thought by saying (in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 27): "God is for us the only immediate external object, and we see things through Him."

The problem of philosophy in Pascal's time was to discover the relations between different parts of a recognised whole, and to state the relation of the parts to the ultimate harmony and unity. We may call the thought both Platonic and Christian. It works from two assumptions—the reality of the whole and the reality of individual experience.

Pascal shared fully in the philosophic outlook of his time. He dealt, however, with a large number of problems, and his claim on us as a thinker and a guide is that he probed to its depth the problem he was examining, and where he gained a conviction of harmony it was at the expense of unsparing effort, and thus it was never a shallow accommodation of experience to theory, or *vice versa*. He made the beliefs of the time his own by wrestling with all the difficulties they presented. He analysed, too, very clearly the elements of the harmony he discovered.

It was something more than the unity of the passing experience; the Stoics had gained that, but Pascal went further. It was more than the abstract mathematical conception of an infinite which includes all finites; the Schoolmen had seen as much as that. But Pascal, by combining the two trains of thought, came very near to a conception that transcended both; for he thought of the unity of God as both personal and inclusive, as present and alive, and as lasting endlessly. It was, in fact, the conception of St John's Gospel which he reached through Christian thought and experience: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

We might illustrate the process by taking one of Pascal's mathematical conceptions and showing how he was led on step by step to think out—first in connection with mathematical ideas, and afterwards in connection with psychological ones—the relation of man to the universe and to God.

He begins by observing that space is both infinitely divisible and infinitely extendible; thus he concludes that the universe represents two types of infinity. It is worth while to notice that by thinking of space as *extendible* rather than *extended* he anticipates Bergson.[1] Also by thinking of space as infinitely divisible he anticipates the work of some modern mathematicians, who argue for the reality of space and the matter that fills space.

Pascal next seeks for illustrations of his thought. In the effort to connect imaginatively the infinitely great and the infinitely little, he arrives at a magnificent comparison which, though probably originally derived from Empedocles' *Hymn to Nature*, he has made his own and developed in many ways:

> "All this visible world is only an imperceptible heaving of the vast breast of Nature. No idea reaches (this immensity). We may stretch our conception of it beyond all imaginable spaces: we still only produce atoms at the expense of the reality of things. (*Reality*) *is an infinite sphere of which the centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere.*"[2]

In another passage Pascal illustrates his idea of the infinitely little:

> "I wish (man) to see within it (the extreme littleness of nature) a new abyss. I wish to picture for him not only the visible universe but the immensity one can conceive of in nature, within the limits of a minute (but not indivisible) atom."

Here Pascal imagines, as some modern physicists have done, the movement of the universe reproduced in the constitution of an atom. Thus in the delicately subdivided portions of this natural world Pascal teaches man to strike new depths of infinity. He now turns his thought to man, set in a universe characterised by these two types of the infinite, and he realises that man can perceive neither in any fullness, for man's perceptions are limited to the mean:

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[1] Kant's theory of space and time rested on a different basis, that of the priority of the infinite.

[2] Page 100, ed. Havet.

> "Our senses perceive nothing extreme. Too much noise deafens us, too much light dazzles us, too great distance or nearness prevents us from having sight: too much length or brevity in a discourse makes it obscure: too much truth astonishes us—I know some people who cannot understand that if you take four from nothing nothing remains. First principles are much too clear for us to understand them: too much pleasure inconveniences us: too many harmonies in music are unpleasing: too much kindness is irritating—we wish to repay the debt over and over again. . . . We do not feel extreme heat nor extreme cold. Any qualities in excess are hurtful to us, and do not stimulate feeling; we suffer rather than feel them. Too much youth or old age are hindrances to the spirit; and so with too much or too little learning. And so extreme things might as well not exist for us, and we are not in regard to them: they escape us or we them": [1]

In this condition of moderation, enforced by the life of the senses, man, feeling that the two infinites are fleeting past him at every moment, seeks at all cost a stability, and a certainty, which his reason desires, though he knows he is mistaken if he imagines he has gained a position of certainty:

> "Nothing can fix the finite between the infinites that enclose it and flee from it." [2]
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> "For ever uncertain and wavering, we sail over a vast space, impelled from one end to the other. Whatever the goal to which we think we can attain and cling, it wavers and falls away from us: if we follow it, it escapes from our grasp, slips, and flees with an eternal flight. Nothing waits for us. It is the state which is natural to us and yet that which is the most contrary to our inclination. We burn with desire to find a firm foothold and a final and constant foundation, and to build on it a tower which may rise to infinity." [3]

Man therefore is incapable of grasping the two infinites which are only harmonised in God:

> "One depends on the other and one leads to the other. These extremities touch, and are connected by reason of

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[1] Page 106, ed. Havet.

[2] Page 109, ed. Havet.

[3] Page 108, ed. Havet.

> having been removed from one another; and they meet in God and in God alone."[1]

Pascal now faces the whole of the problem. What is the relation between God, in whom both infinites are satisfied; the universe, which bears the marks of His being, and thus of the two infinites; and man, sharing also in these marks, and yet unable to comprehend them?

> "When one has learned, one understands that, nature having engraved her image and that of her Maker on everything, nearly all things have the marks of her double infinity."[2]

Man, he says, aspires to know the parts of creation, and finds he can understand at least that these parts have a relation to one another:

> "If a man first studied himself he would see how incapable he is of going beyond. How could a part know the whole? But man will perhaps aspire to know at least the parts to which he is related. But the parts of the world have all such a relation and connection with one another that I think it is impossible to know one without the other and without the whole."[3]

The difficulty of knowing the whole lies in the complexity of the nature of man, though it is that very complexity which knits him to the varied whole:

> "And what completes our powerlessness to know things is that they are simple in themselves, and we are composed of two natures in opposition and of different kinds, soul and body; for it is impossible that the part in us that reasons should be anything but spiritual even if people were to assume that we are only corporeal—that would cut us off the more from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is not possible to us to know how it should know itself. And thus, if we are only material, we can know nothing at all; and if we are composed of spirit and matter, we cannot perfectly know the simple things, spiritual and corporeal."[4]

But, on the other hand, within that very complex human nature which is conscious of itself and its powers and limitations there lies the key to the greatness of man, which is independent of the small part he plays in the physical universe, and depends on the fact of man's personality, with which he is able to apprehend not only nature but God:

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[1] Page 106, ed. Havet.

[2] Page 104, ed. Havet.

[3] Page 110, ed. Havet.

[4] Page 111, ed. Havet.

> "The greatness of man is great, in so far as he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself as miserable. To know oneself as miserable is then to be miserable, but to know that one is miserable is to be great.
>
> "All these miseries only prove the greatness. They are the miseries of a great Lord, of a dethroned King."[1]

Man's consciousness, then, according to Pascal, is that which ennobles him, and gives him eyes to see what he is:

> "Man is nothing and yet everything. He is as a colossus to the minor divisions of the universe, and as an atom to the major divisions."
>
> ". . . For who would not notice that our body, which was just now imperceptible in the lap of all, is at present a colossus, a world, and everything in regard to the nothing which one cannot reach?"[2]

Thus man becomes in his mind the mean beween God and nothing, because man is a complex of soul and body in which one element, the soul, is divine and infinite, the other, the body, is of the earth and finite:

> "For, after all, what is man in nature? Nothing in regard to the infinite, everything in regard to nothing, a mean between nothing and everything. Infinitely removed from understanding the extremes, the end of things and their principle are irremediably hidden from him in impenetrable secrecy; equally incapable of seeing the nothing whence he has come and the infinite in which he is absorbed. What then will he do but perceive the appearance of the mean of things, in an eternal despair of knowing their principle or their end? Everything has come from nothingness and reaches out to infinity."[3]
>
> "Let us then know our worth: we are something and are not everything. What being we have conceals from us the knowledge of first principles, which arise from nothingness; and the little being we have hides from us the sight of the infinite."[4]

Knowledge and inquiry have led Pascal to the utmost humility in considering man and his relation to God. Looked at in relation to the infinite, all finite things become of equal value—that is, of no value at all.

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[1] Page 115, ed. Havet.

[2] Page 101, ed. Havet.

[3] Page 102, ed. Havet.

[4] Page 106, ed. Havet.

When Pascal had reached this point light began to break. Man's very consciousness and aspiration, even though they may seem to fail, must be a consequence of the existence of that spiritual whole of things to which he belongs. Unless, thinks Pascal, we are all bound together in a mystical communion and fellowship with God, we should not even have the desire to know Him. That desire in itself proves that we are part of a whole, the nature and end of which is Divine. "Tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne me possédais, ne t'inquiète donc pas," says the confessor in *Le mystère de Jésus* to the spirit of man. And here Pascal is at one with St Augustine, who said, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is unquiet until it rest in Thee."

Thus our very efforts, he considers, are a proof of the unity that includes us all: a unity he first assumed, and has now reached by argument and experience.

He next considers the question of the relation of God to the individual soul. Where can God meet man? How can the spark be transmitted through which man will become conscious of his union with God? God and man in the same sphere are unthinkable if man as a finite being limits the infinity of God. This was assumed by seventeenth-century thinkers. But if, with Pascal, we consider God and man, not as extensions but as persons, we find that there can be a bond between them, and that bond of union is love. Such love gives the idea of interpenetration without absorption, and thus helps the Christian to the full doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. Of such grace, such love, every Christian, thinks Pascal, may be a channel.

The ground, as far as we can see it, of our drawing to God is, then, partly due to the natural structure of our thought and partly to man's own immediate necessities. The complexity of human nature implies contradictions which can only be satisfied in God. Man, says Pascal, seeks an explanation of these in philosophy, and finds the dogmatists and the Pyrrhonians at war. The sole useful result is the stimulus to think further. But when he turns to religion he finds that one hypothesis satisfies the contradictions—that is, the union of the Divine and human as expressed in the Incarnation of our Lord. This belief depends to a large extent on the action of grace, met by the human effort of faith. If grace and faith are wanting, let man act, says Pascal, as though they were within his reach. When luxury and worldliness disappear, faith will enter in.

In this connection it is interesting to examine Pascal's belief in regard to the actual nature of this contact of man with God. He believed that mystical union was reached through suffering, and not by veiling or destroying pain and the consciousness of pain. Thus, as he strikingly puts it, the contact with Christ is by His wounds:

> "After His resurrection, as it seems to me, Christ only allowed himself to be touched in His wounds. *Noli me tangere.* Thus we should only join ourselves to Him in His Passion."

Pascal, then, considers suffering as an actual means of contact with Christ.[1] In a sense, too, suffering emerges from that contact and is a consequence of it. For the vision of holiness produces in man the sense of his own sin and shortcoming, and thus of suffering for sin. This suffering is felt both for ourselves and, by the sympathy of strong substitution, for others. It is here that we reach Pascal's theory of the relation between action and vision.

Pascal's theory is sharply separated from that of Calvin. Both writers were concerned with the starting-point of experience in the Christian life. Calvin thought that moral action originated in the conviction of sin; Pascal that the Christian becomes convinced of sin only through the vision of holiness. Pascal, like Calvin, was strongly preoccupied with the moral fact, and with the necessity of distinguishing good from evil, and he was led to regard life as a tragic conflict, but he felt that the conflict was a necessary consequence of the possession of an ideal. His mysticism, like that of other mystics of the seventeenth century, was, then, an effort to deal by will and emotion with problems of good and evil. It was this admixture of moral and intellectual discipline with his mysticism that led Pascal to conclusions of extraordinary interest.

Thus he recognised pure mysticism as belonging to the early and primitive stage of religious experience. It is the starting-point of that experience and not its goal, and everything depends on the use that is made of it. So far as it tends to blur the distinction between man and the universe and between man and God, the mystic's vision has only incompletely helped him. Pascal arrives at a truer consciousness. Beginning with a clear perception of the oneness of the individual spirit with God, and yet recognising the limits of personality, he goes on to apprehend a religion of the spirit, a conception of the fellowship of souls in an *Ecclesia* which is the image and interpretation of Christ to the world. Only by passing through two stages of experience, the individual and the social, can man claim to share in the vision of an Absolute God, transcending all apparent oppositions between subject and object, between the individual and society, between man and the universe, "between affirmation and negation," as Dionysius puts it. Such an ultimate vision is more than the "personal experience of eternity" claimed by all mystics. It implies this, but it also implies that the pilgrimage of life has been both a hard and a joyful one, and that other spirits have thrilled with emotion at the upward movement of the soul to fulfil its spiritual destiny. The true vision is not a solitary survey of the incommunicable. This view was held by Dante in the *Divina Commedia*, and illustrated in many beautiful ways. There the soul passes through a helpless isolation in the *Inferno*, through the "fellowship in hope" of the *Purgatorio*, and lastly to the fruition of personality in the power of sharing with other spirits the sense of the abiding consciousness of God. Between the "mystic blur" of the first blinding vision, and the "unconfused union" of the end, there lies the Pilgrim's Progress of this life.

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[1] *Prière pour la Maladie*, written in 1648.

The Pilgrim's path follows in the case of Pascal another and a very remarkable course. He is not only the Pilgrim to the Holy City, but he follows Christ in the way of the Cross. Like all the Port Royalists, he felt that in every action of his life the Christian celebrated the great mysterious rite, and shared in the life of the Church, the body of Christ. The Port Royalists transferred the significance of the life and death of Christ both to the spiritual experience of each individual and to that of the Church as a whole. Mystics and symbolists, they bore the spiritual stigmata of the Passion both in their persons and as members of the Church.

True mysticism such as Pascal's, the mysticism of the spiritual philosopher, prepares the soul for life, for the activity of reason and will. False mysticism, in its artificial separation of the spirit of man from the rest of the created world, is an anticipation of physical death, and produces paralysis of the best human powers.

Pascal, with the greatest mystics, beheld the transfiguration of human nature in the vision of Christ, and on his way down from the Mount into the restless world learned to judge of it sanely, and to know its present part in the future perfection of all things.

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THE MINISTER WHO BAPTISED SHAKESPEARE.

By the Rev. E. I. FRIPP,
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JOHN BRETCHGIRDLE, or more commonly in Cheshire, Bracegirdle, was a native of Baguley near Manchester, and it is interesting to trace his steps from the Cheshire village to Stratford-upon-Avon, where, as vicar, on the 26th April 1564, he baptised William Shakespeare.

An old timber mansion, Baguley Hall, still stands as a landmark of Bretchgirdle's youth, but nothing is known of his parentage. He went to Oxford in or about the year 1540, to that nest of Protestant heresy, Christ Church College.[1] He and a fellow-student, who was probably also a fellow-countryman, John Sankey, "supplicated" for their B.A. in March 1544; were "admitted" upon the same day, the 7th April; and, after being twice "dispensed" in the Michaelmas term, "determined" together in 1545. These facts are recorded in successive entries in the University Register.[2] Sankey apparently left Oxford for the Church in 1545, to become in time Protestant parson of Shalston in Buckinghamshire;[3] but Bretchgirdle remained at Christchurch until 1547, taking his M.A. degree on the 11th July 1546, and then, in or about 1548, returned to his native country as perpetual curate at Witton *cum* Twembrooke near Northwich.[4] At Witton was a Free School attended by boys from Northwich. Bretchgirdle was master of this school as well as perpetual curate of the parish. So we learn from Latin poems addressed to him by a grateful pupil, John Brownsward. In one of these poems the author speaks of having benefited for a twelvemonth from his master's "piety, perpetually resounding in his ear," and "the chaste simplicity of his learned breast," and his "diligent study, putting to flight the shadows of loathsome error."[1] Others trade over seas, flying from poverty but also from the security of home; others engage in war and ambitious projects, in crime and popular applause: but his is the fame the Muses give, which neither greed nor oblivion can take away. He follows the right hand steadfastly, and murmurs not when "Justice overlooks him, wandering in the liquid skies."[2] "Happy the man who is strong to resist the blandishments of Venus! And happy the boy who submits to such a master's rod, and bears his yoke, and passes (his) early years under his tuition!"[3] In another poem Brownsward urges the Northwich youth to "honour and love their master, who deserves so well of them, making it his constant care to 'crucify fierce manners' and file them smooth"[4]—an indication that Bretchgirdle, like a good Calvinist, could use the rod when he thought an extra dose of original sin demanded it.

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[1] Wolsey's "Cardinal College," which from the outset was frequented by men of Reformationist principles. See the story of Dalaber in Foxe: *Acts and Monuments*.

[2] Boase, 208.

[3] See Bretchgirdle's will, 20th June 1565.

[4] Ormerod: *Cheshire*, iii. 156.

In 1549 or 1550 Bretchgirdle leased, for the term of his own life, from Sir Thomas Venables of Kynderton, a house and croft and half an acre of land adjoining the Witton "chapel-yard," and spent upon repairs and a new chamber, which may have been a study, a sum of £20 and more—the equivalent of £200 to-day. In such expenditure, probably, he was not sufficiently watchful of his rights, "Justice," as Brownsward says, "wandering off into the liquid skies." Here, unmarried, but looked after by one or more sisters, among his boys and books, with a horse to ride when he visited distant parishioners, he lived for about ten years—years of King Edward and Queen Mary—until, shortly before Mary's death, he was appointed vicar to the neighbouring parish, one of the largest in England, of Great Budworth. His presentation is dated the 14th November 1558; Queen Mary died on the 17th of that month; and on the 4th December, when Queen Elizabeth had ascended the throne, he was instituted in his new charge. The living was the gift of his College of Christ Church at Oxford.[1]

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[1] Bis sex flammifera concitus orbita
Phoebus proripuit signa per aurea
Cursus, ac toties emicuit vaga
Accensa facie soror:
Nostram dum pietas perpetuo tua
Aurem personuit, castaque pectoris
Docti simplicitas, et studium tetri
Erroris tenebras fugans.

[2] Astraea vitiis cedere nesciae
Coelum dum liquidum rapit.

[3] Felix ille tuae qui ferulae manus
Submittit teneras et tolerat piae
Vitam militiae qui virides tuo
Annos transigit in sinu.

[4] Qui feros cura meditatur omni
Atque aeri mores cruciare lima:
Ore Norwicum placidò erudito
Ore reformans.

But he soon resigned it. Stirring events called him into the Midlands. Who was the means of his coming to Stratford, we can only conjecture. He had a kinsman there in Master John Grantham, of whom very little is known. He had also a warm friend in Alderman William Smith, farmer of the College tithes, and paymaster at this time, under the Corporation, of the vicar's and curate's salaries. Alderman Smith was brother-in-law of John Watson, the Chancellor of St Paul's and, early in Elizabeth's reign, Master of Holy Cross at Winchester. Bretchgirdle may have known John Watson at Oxford, as a Fellow of All Souls' and a Master of Arts of less than two years his senior. Be that as it may, Stratford parish was in difficulties and in need of a wise Protestant leader. The Romanist vicar, Roger Dyos, had been practically dismissed by Alderman Smith and the Corporation. He was Queen Mary's nominee, and had not been a *persona grata*. Half-a-year's salary was owing to him at his entrance into the vicarage, and a further year's salary was unpaid at Michaelmas 1559. Two justices in the neighbourhood, Sir Robert Throgmorton of Coughton and Sir Edward Greville of Milcote remonstrated in vain on his behalf.[2] The parishioners, in these days of change and freedom, held the purse-strings, and Dyos had to go. His curate was already dead, his burial being recorded in the Register of 1559: "January 31 William Brogden, *priest*." This was the last *priest* entered in the registers. Henceforth for a long period the common name for vicar and curate was *minister*.[3]

In the autumn of 1559 or the spring of 1560, we may believe, John Bretchgirdle arrived in Stratford. At any rate, his successor at Budworth was appointed on the 19th May1560. His presentation to the vicarage of Stratford followed in due course, on the 28th January 1561. On the 27th February he was officially admitted to his charge in virtue of a commission to Master Richard Cheyne, rector of Hampton Lucy. Behind these proceedings were more than Alderman Smith and the Corporation. They had the approval, beyond question, of Thomas Lucy and the expectant House of Dudley, and of course, the new Protestant Bishop of Worcester, Edwin Sandys.

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[1] J. Harvey Bloom, Notes to the *Stratford-upon-Avon Herald*.

[2] See their letter of the 14th October 1559. William Clopton must have been a powerful supporter of Dyos. He died 4th January 1560.

[3] Once in 1564 there is *sacerdos*.

From the spring of 1560, then, at the latest, until his untimely death in the summer of 1565, John Bretchgirdle was head of the parish of Stratford, helping to shape the life of the town in the difficult, divided, contentious days of transition from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism. The Prayer Book was introduced, stained glass was removed from the church and chapel, frescoes were whitewashed, and carvings hacked. Feeling ran high. Cases of assault and drawing of blood were dealt with at the Court-leets of October 1560 and May 1561. Men of good family or position in the town fought in the streets and taverns—Thomas Trussell, Thomas and Edward Walford, John Lane, John Grantham (the vicar's kinsman), Alderman Rafe Cawdrey, Thomas Dickson of the "Swan Inn." Households were divided, and brothers were at variance.

In these days John Shakespeare served as a Constable and helped to keep the peace. He came in for "opprobrious words and reviling" uttered against the officers. In October 1561 he was promoted to be a Chamberlain, and entered on a period of signal service to the borough. From October 1562 to October 1565 he was the acting Chamberlain, busy in carrying out an extensive scheme of repairs and improvements in the Corporation property. He overhauled the vicar's house, making it thoroughly habitable—rebuilding the central chimney, tiling the roof, restoring the timber, claying and sanding the kitchen floor, spending upon the house at one time no less than £6, 15s. 5d.—well over £60 in our money. Then he protestantised the Gild Chapel, "defacing images," "taking down the rood-loft," "making seats" and a communion-table. Next, he put the school, and master's house, and the almshouse in order, re-roofing them all. He made also a pinfold on the Chapel premises, and obtained the Chapel orchard with its dovecote for the use of the members of the Council. The Corporation had reason to be grateful to him, and on 5th July 1565 they made him an alderman.

In these and other works vicar and chamberlain must often have met. They were probably of one mind, stout Protestants and men of public spirit, setting the good of the town before their own advantage. Several times John Shakespeare lent money to the Chamber, receiving no interest and waiting a considerable period for repayment—*i.e.* 25s. 8d., £3, 2s. 7½d., and 7s. 3d.: in all £4, 15s. 6½d., or upwards of £50 in our money, a no despicable sum to a man of business who could only borrow with difficulty at 10 per cent.

Twice John Shakespeare brought a child to John Bretchgirdle to be baptised, and once to be buried. A christening was an important family function, attended by godparents and friends as well as the father and the nurse. The mother, on the other hand, was rarely present, the interval between birth and baptism being very short. On Wednesday, 2nd December 1562, a little procession followed baby Margaret Shakespeare from Henley Street through the town to the parish church. The ceremony differed in several respects from that of four years previously, when the first-born of John Shakespeare and Mary Arden was christened *Joan* by the Romanist vicar, Roger Dyos—probably after and in the presence of her aunt, Mary Arden's sister, Joan Lambert of Barton-on-the-Heath. Then, part of the service was in the porch, some of it was in Latin, and the infant was both dipped and anointed with chrism. Now all was in English and at the font, and the anointing was omitted; and Master Bretchgirdle concluded with an exhortation to the godfathers and godmothers, in which he urged them, among other things, to call upon the child, so soon as she shall be able, "to hear sermons."[1] Margaret was probably named after her aunt, Margaret Arden, who married Alexander Webbe of Bearley.[2] But the following spring this child died, and on the 30th April 1563 another and a sad procession wended its way to her grave. Again later, almost a year afterwards, on the 26th April 1564, John Shakespeare followed his third child and first son to church, and named him after some friend—probably his neighbour in Henley Street and colleague as a principal burgess on the Council, William Smith the haberdasher—*William*. William Smith, like John Shakespeare, was making his way in business and public confidence, was conspicuous for his independence of character, and a father of sons, contemporaries of William Shakespeare, who became leading and well-to-do townsmen. Moreover, whereas John Shakespeare named his first son William, William Smith named his first son *John*.[3]

Another link between the chamberlain and the vicar was the Plague. It had been brought from Havre to London, and thence into the Midlands by the troops of the Earl of Warwick. When it ceased in London in January 1564, it raged in the provinces. It was at Leicester towards the end of June, and about the same time at Coventry, where it was serious. On the 11th July it broke out virulently in Stratford. "*Hic incepit pestis*" are the words written by John Bretchgirdle in the Burial Register of this date. From January to 11th July there had been 21 interments. From the 11th to the 31st July there were 17. In August there were 35; in September, 84; in October, 58; in November, 26; and in December, 18. Whole households perished, mostly of the poorer folk, but well-to-do homes suffered. Alderman Smith lost his sister-in-law, Mistress Watson, at the College. The Town-Clerk buried two children, and Master Rafe Hilton, the curate, three. The vicar, who had his private troubles (he lost his sister Cicily in March, and heard that his landlord, who was "not favourable to True Religion," had seized his house at Witton at Whitsuntide), found his hands full.

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[1] *The Prayer Book of Queen Elizabeth*, 1559: The Ministration of Baptism.

[2] Now living in John Shakespeare's old home at Snitterfield.

[3] William Smith was this year the junior of the two Chamberlains for whom John Shakespeare was acting.

John Shakespeare's accounts show payments for extra ministerial services:—

> "Item paid to Master Vicar £1, 7s. 0d.
> Item paid for a priest's board and his drinkings at the 'Swan' 11s. 6d.
> Item paid to the preacher £2, 10s. 0d.
> Item paid to the same preacher £1, 0s. 0d.
> Item paid to Master Vicar" 6s. 8d.

To avoid infection the Borough Council held their meetings in the orchard, which John Shakespeare had secured for their use. "At the Hall holden in our Garden," runs the minute of the 30th August 1564, "money was paid towards the relief of the poor"—*i.e.* the sufferers from the pestilence. Members were assessed according to their means: Master Bott of New Place, at 4s.; the Bailiff, George Whateley, at 3s. 4d.; the Chief Alderman, Roger Sadler, at 2s. 8d.; Alderman Smith, Adrian Queeny, John Wheeler, and Robert Perrott, at 2s. 6d.; Alderman Rafe Cawdrey and five others, at 2s.; John Shakespeare and five more, at 1s.; John Tayler and three others, at 8d.; Alderman Brat at 6d.; and William Smith, the corviser, at 4d. The Town Clerk, Richard Symonds, who this day attended the funeral of his son and daughter, is not rated. There were further levies on the 6th and 27th September, when payments varied from 18d. to 4d. On each occasion John Shakespeare contributed 6d. At a fourth levy on the

20th October he gave 8d. For safety the local Court of Record suspended its sittings during September. What happened in the school it is not easy to trace. Probably it was closed for some months on account of the sickness and for repairs. And there was a change of headmaster. Some years before, Bretchgirdle had received from his old pupil, John Brownsward, a Latin poem in which the latter complained of his scanty leisure and circumscribed lot, and vain struggles with poverty and competitors. This was written, apparently, at Christmas, 1560, on the eve of Brownsward's promotion from the mastership of Wilmslow to that of Macclesfield.[1] Probably to be near Bretchgirdle, he came to Warwick, where he was schoolmaster at the Old Burgess Hall (now Leicester Hospital) for the half-year 29th September 1564 to 25th March 1565.[2] Bretchgirdle now sought and obtained for him the mastership of Stratford. There was an increase of salary by the change from £13, 6s. 8d. to £20. Accordingly, on Sunday, 1st April 1565, Brownsward signed an agreement with the bailiff and burgesses to "serve in their Free School, as a good and diligent schoolmaster ought to do, for the term of two years from the date above said . . . in consideration of the sum of £20 yearly and his dwelling-house"; and it was further covenanted "that if he shall fortune at the end of the said two years or at any time after to mislike with anything and mind to give over, and to teach no more within the said Borough, then he shall give warning and shall serve for the space of one quarter of a year freely without taking any wages or else pay to the Chamberlains £5 for that they have been at charges in placing of him, his wife and his goods." To John Shakespeare, then, fell the task of bringing Master and Mistress Brownsward, and their goods, to Stratford from Warwick, as well as making their house water-tight.

The vicar's house and the schoolmaster's house were close together within the chapel precincts. The two friends must have looked forward to happy co-operation. But within three months John Bretchgirdle was dead. He made his will on the 20th June 1565, and next day he was buried. "June 21, Johannes Bretchgirdle, Vicarius," is the entry in the register. The will is interesting: "I, John Bretchgirdle, clerk, Vicar of Stratford-upon-Avon," says the testator, "which am at this present visited with the hand of God, howbeit of good and perfect memory, thanks be unto God, being desirous to be in readiness against the uncertain hour of death, make my last will and testament in manner and form following. First, I commend my soul unto the hands of God, to be received of His fatherly goodness unto the fruition of His heavenly kingdom through the merits of our Saviour Jesus Christ; and I bequeath my body to Christian burial[1] in the parish church or churchyard where I shall decease. And I bequeath to the church where my body shall be buried 6s. 8d.[2] for breaking of the ground for my burial, and to the Poor Man's chest of the same parish, 6s. 8d." He remembers the poor of Baguley, where he was born, of Witton, and of Great Budworth, and bequeaths 40s. "to be a stock for the Almsfolk of Stratford to be employed by the Chamberlains for the use of the said Almsfolk," with 10s. to be distributed among the poor of Stratford. To his sister Maude goes his best gown and round cloak, his best bedding and two best silver spoons; to his sister Elizabeth, wife of John Finlowe, his gown of Bristowe frieze, his cloak with sleeves, and his second bedding. A cousin, Richard Goodwin, receives his wearing apparel and carpentering tools. £3, 6s. 8d. is allotted to the children of poor kinsfolk. Bequests of books show his interest in education and his Protestant principles: *Unio Dissidentium*[3] to his old fellow-student, John Sankey, parson of Shalston; *Musculus upon Matthew* and *Homiliae Nauseae* to "Master Brownsward, Schoolmaster of Stratford"; Eliot's Library of Cooper's Castigation, "to the common use of the scholars of the Free School of Stratford"; unto his friend Robert Bendbow, Vicar of Horley, "the four singing books" he bought of him, "and the other four for service in the church," and to Thomas Bendbow his son, parson of Wappenham, *Margarita Theologica*, in Latin and English; to his godson Edward Winnington, his *Trilingua Lexicon Graecum* and to his brother, Hugh Winnington, his *Josephum De Antiquitatibus Judaeorum et Bello*; to his godson George Marson, his Virgil with comment and Horace with comment; to his godson Robert Venables, his *Encheiridion* in English and Latin; and to Christopher Sankey—a son, perhaps, of John Sankey—*Tully's Offices* of the largest volume, and Eliot's

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[1] "John Brownsward, now schoolmaster of Wilmslow, *grammaticus*, is elected to be the Headmaster, 30 January 156$\frac{0}{1}$" (Macclesfield.)

[2] As we learn from an entry in the Burgess Account made by John Fisher on the 15th December 1565 (transcribed by Mr T. Kemp of Warwick), and from Brownsward's agreement with the Stratford Chamber. At Warwick, Brownsward followed John Skerrow, and was succeeded by the Puritan, Ralph Griffin.

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[1] Cf. *Hamlet*.

[2] The regular payment for an interment within the church.

[3] The heretical work which got the Oxford scholars into such trouble in 1529. See Foxe.

Dictionary for Young Beginners. Gifts to the sons and step-daughters of Alderman Smith point to close friendship between the vicar and the College household, and suggest that he was tutor to the boys. They are:—"To William *Apophthegmata* in Latin and *Aesopae Fables*; to his brother Richard *David's Psalms* and the *Acts of the Apostles*, both in English metre, and one of my *Copias Verborum*; to Robert Smith my *Tully's Offices* in English and the *Acts of the Apostles* in English metre; to Thomas Smith another of my books, the *Acts of the Apostles* in English metre; to John Smith *Salustii* text and *Justin*; to William Smith, the youngest son, and to Alice Savage and her sister Elizabeth, to every of them 12d." A tenant and a debtor are not forgotten, and a foundling child is not overlooked: "Item. I give to the poor foundling that William Stubbs doth keep, 5s."

What he has spent on building at the Vicar's House is to remain for the commodity of his successors. As his executor he appoints, "for that great trust he has in him," his cousin, John Grantham of Stratford-upon-Avon, to whom he leaves his coffer with the plate lock, his writing-desk, coffers without locks in the loft, and 20s. owing from Roger Atkins. For witnesses he has "caused to be called" Alderman Smith, mercer, Alderman Adrian Queeny, mercer, John Sadler, miller, Robert Salisbury, brewer, and others.

The inventory made on the 30th June, by Queeny, Sadler, and Roger Bragg, with others, adds little to our knowledge of the vicar's bachelor establishment. He had a handsome clock (which he bequeathed to John Sankey), books valued at £10, and two cows. He was not Puritan enough to object to the square cap, three of these being found among his effects and valued, with "two night-caps of cloth," at 4s.[1]

John Brownsward served his two years, and possibly a third, in Stratford, and then returned to Macclesfield, where he was headmaster until 1588. He died on 15th April 1589, greatly respected, as his monument testifies in Macclesfield church. This, a brass plate, was put up by a pupil, Thomas Newton of Bentley, who, in 1590, published his Latin verse under the title *Joannis Brunswerdi Macclesfeldensis Gymnasiarchae Progymnasmata quaedam Poetica.* A copy, a thin quarto of 56 pp., is in the British Museum (1213 l. 39).

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[1] Both the Will and Inventory have been unearthed and transcribed by Mr Richard Savage of Stratford-upon-Avon, who lent me his copies for this article. Unfortunately the books, valued at £10, were not catalogued.—E. I. F.

EDGAR I. FRIPP.

MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

THE quest of origins seems to have a special attraction for the modern mind. Both in science and history the tendency is very marked, and the department of science which most lends itself to research of this kind, biology, has enormously profited in all its branches by the energy with which it has been pursued. At the same time it must be acknowledged that there is much truth in the words of a modern writer: "The embryology of the body is to those who have had no biological training far from being a gratifying subject of contemplation. The stages through which the body passes before reaching its familiar form, have a superficial aspect of repulsive and ugly caricature with which only a knowledge of the compressed pageant of nature they represent can reconcile the mind."[1] What is this "compressed pageant"? Nothing less than the whole history of organic life from its first appearance in a speck of protoplasmic jelly to its highest point of development in man. The living cell from which the human embryo takes its start is indistinguishable from such a speck. We might expect (did we not know the wonderful process it is destined to undergo) any sort of development, or none at all; yet within that apparently formless, microscopic compass lie potentialities which will ultimately result in the production of the complex and wonderfully co-ordinated human body, with its array of specialised organs. Such a history may well illustrate the impossibility of passing a judgment on any form of life from contemplating its origin alone.

We have to a considerable extent become accustomed to the knowledge of the lowly biological origin of man. It has very usefully contributed to the lowering of that conceit which was the natural result of our anthropocentric outlook on living nature and on the universe at large. But a younger science than biology, one in the full flush and energy due to the remarkable results obtained by new methods and a wider and deeper knowledge, is now also claiming to show that not only the human body, but the human mind, exhibits signs of a lowlier origin than our pride approves. Man's "Godlike reason" appears, according to modern psychology, to have gone through a distinctly animal stage, and to bear about it still the unmistakable signs of its parentage.

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[1] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 88.

This conclusion is largely due to the discovery of the wide and persistent prevalence of instinct in human mentality, to the fact that much of the conduct which we fondly suppose founded upon our logical reason is in reality due to impulses derived from primeval and elementary instincts to which we unconsciously give a rational basis undeserved by them. So important and fundamental a factor is instinct in the human as well as in the animal psyche, that one of our chief English psychologists is led to state "that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained."[1]

We seem here to have Bergson's *élan vital* presented to us in a somewhat different guise, and with an application even more definite than is to be found in his well-known and exceedingly interesting work, *L'Evolution Créatrice*. It will be remembered that he there points out that human evolution has been one-sided because in it intuition has been sacrificed to the development of the logical reason. If the latter is of the preponderating importance which man has assigned to it, the sacrifice was doubtless justified; but even then the resulting feebleness to which intuition has been reduced is a grave and distinct loss, and the fact that modern psychology is discovering how large a part of human conduct and opinions is really derived from instinct, and not from reason, may be a step towards perceiving how evolution—now that it is self-conscious and can be made purposive—may be so guided as to lend itself to the development in due proportion as well of intuition as of the logical reason.

The consideration of such a point is by no means of the purely academic interest that might at first sight be supposed. It has the most directly practical bearing, for much that is quite inexplicable in human behaviour, both individual and collective, receives a wonderful amount of illumination from this result of modern psychological research. To understand *why* men and women are impelled to such and such conduct, and to such and such explanations of it, is the preliminary and indispensable step to discover whether the conduct is wise and the explanations not only justifiable but true, and such knowledge is of equal practical importance in education, legislation, and statesmanship. The lack of this last which we, as a nation, are never weary of deploring may indeed be directly due, at any rate in part, to the lack of any sure guidance as to the comprehension of either conduct or its motives. We are beginning to see that psychology alone gives promise of affording such guidance, and the object of the present essay is to point out both the fact that it does so, and the consequent necessity of availing ourselves of its help.

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[1] M'Dougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 44, 1914 edition.

The reason why ignorance of the instinctive bases for human conduct has so long prevailed lies in the high mental development of man: "Large mental capacity in the individual . . . has the effect of providing a wide freedom of response to instinctive impulses, so that while the individual is no less impelled by instinct than a more primitive type, the manifestation of these impulses in his conduct is very varied, and his conduct loses the appearance of a narrow concentration on an instinctive object. It needs only to pursue this reasoning to a further stage to reach the conclusion that mental capacity, while in no way limiting[1] the impulsive power of instinct, may, by providing an infinite number of channels into which the impulse is free to flow, actually prevent the impulse from attaining the goal of its normal object. In the ascetic the sex-instinct is defeated, in the martyr that of self-preservation, not because these instincts have been abolished, but because the activity of the mind has found new channels for them to flow in."[2]

The "activity of the mind" does more than find new channels for the impulse to flow in; it also satisfies the demands of the logical reason by "rationalising" the impulse itself, that is, by inventing a rational basis for that of which the true foundation is instinct. "That a man generally knows why he thinks in a certain way, and why he does certain things, is a widespread and cherished belief of the human race. It is, unfortunately, for the most part an erroneous one. *We have an overwhelming need to believe that we are acting rationally,* and are loth to admit that we think and do things without being ourselves aware of the motives producing these thoughts and actions."[1] To the consideration of this "overwhelming need" we shall presently return, but it is necessary first to gain a clear idea of the way in which the rationalising process takes place. It is for the most part quite unsuspected by the subject himself, and takes its rise in "a system of connected ideas with a strong emotional tone, and a tendency to produce actions of a definite character. Such a system of emotionally toned ideas is termed in technical (psychological) language a *complex*. . . . Complexes may be of all sorts and kinds, the component ideas may be of every variety, the accompanying emotional tones pleasant or painful, very intense or comparatively weak."[2] When they are intense—as in the case of falling in love—they have a very powerful effect upon the whole consciousness, and they may probably be fully recognised by the subject; but in very many, perhaps the majority, of cases they are not so recognised, though they continue to exert a strong influence upon the mental trend and consequent conduct. Dr Bernard Hart gives as an illustration the behaviour of a party politician: "When he is called upon to consider a new measure, his verdict is largely determined by certain constant systems of ideas and trends of thought, constituting what is generally known as 'party bias,' [in psychological terminology] a *political complex*. The complex causes him to take up an attitude towards the proposed measure which is quite independent of any absolute merits that the latter may possess . . . [yet] he fondly imagines that his opinion is formed solely by the logical pros and cons of the measure before him. We see, in fact, not only that his thinking is determined by a complex of whose action he is unconscious, but that he believes his thoughts to be the result of other causes, which are in reality insufficient and illusory. This latter process of self-deception, in which the individual conceals the real foundation of his thought by a series of adventitious props, is termed rationalisation."[3]

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[1] It ought not to *limit* but to *guide* it.

[2] Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 120, 121.

The remarkable and deeply interesting fact about this peculiar but quite normal mental process is that it is in many cases entirely unconscious. We very commonly observe it in other people; we see clearly that so-and-so has a party or a class or a scientific or a religious "bias"; we are usually indignant if any such bias is attributed to ourselves.

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[1] Dr Bernard Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 66. Italics mine.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 64, 65.

Yet in "common justice" we should be ready to suspect in ourselves a trait which we see to be exhibited by such a vast number of our fellows.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact, so strongly corroborated by rationalisation, that a craving for rationality is a normal phenomenon of human mentality. But if this is so, as observation and introspection certainly bear out, and if instinct, instinctive impulses, and habits which are the result of following instinct play so important and fundamental a part in mental processes, the question arises whether this craving for rationality has not itself an instinctive basis, whether it is not at the human stage of evolution a direct consequence of the onward pressure of the *élan vital.* Bergson certainly countenances this view. He points out that it is very doubtful whether science, with its present mode of explanation, will ever attain a complete analysis of instinct, because instinct and intelligence are two divergent developments of the same principle, respectively directed upon the inward and outward aspects of life. "Consequently, that which is essential in the former (instinct) could not express itself in intellectual terms and analyse itself."[1] Nevertheless, the two are closely connected: "There is no intelligence in which traces of instinct are not discoverable, emphatically no instinct unsurrounded by a fringe of intelligence. It is this fringe which has been the cause of so many mistakes. Because instinct is always more or less intelligent it has been concluded that instinct and intelligence are things of the same order, that the difference between them is one of complexity or perspective only, and especially that one is definable in terms of the other. The fact is that they are found in company because they complete one another, and they complete because they differ from one another, that which is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence."[2] In a later passage of the same work Bergson points out that intelligence *per se* can never do more towards explaining the secret of life than give a translation of it in terms of inertia, studying from without that which can only be understood from within. It is intuition which conducts us within, and intuition Bergson defines as instinct become "disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object, and of expanding it indefinitely"; and he regards the possibility of such an intuitional development, intuition become intelligent as well as self-conscious, as proved by the coexistence in man of the æsthetic faculty and ordinary perception.

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[1] *L'Evolution Créatrice,* p. 182.

[2] *Op. cit.,* pp. 147–8.

He suggests that research having an orientation similar to that of art, but taking as object life in general, might attain of this a knowledge of the same kind as that reached by physical science in its own domain. Such a body of knowledge would be philosophy, not science, and, as he justly says, could never hope to attain an exactitude comparable to that of science on its own ground. "Intelligence is the luminous kernel round which instinct, even when so expanded and purified as to become intuition, forms but a vague nebulosity."[1] Nevertheless, intuition may enable us to grasp what the data of intelligence fail to give us, and thus indicate the road to their completion.

According to this view, intuition and the logical reason or intellect are branches from the same root, and that root is instinct; but they are divergent in their activities. Intuition knows, but knows not how it knows; it attains its object, but has no need to represent to itself the path by which that object is reached. By the intellect, on the other hand, each step is consciously recognised; it desires above all things *to understand* what it is doing, it is in doubt of any result otherwise achieved. It is by the intellect that man regards himself as chiefly impelled, and to which he desires to refer his unique position in the world of life. Without doubt his contention is largely true. Intuition alone ends in a blind alley; uncombined with intellect, it seems to have a strict limit set to its progress. Evolution under its sole guidance can produce the communal life of the bee, the ant, and, among mammals, that of the herd and the pack, but once produced it is stationary: it has achieved the perfection of which it is capable, it can advance no further. To a being possessed of intellect, on the other hand, it is impossible to say, "Thus far and no farther," because every onward step instantly opens the way to a further step. No man could venture to assert that the progress of the human race is blocked. It is quite another danger which threatens it, viz. that of turning aside from the path of the highest development of which it is capable and pursuing another, or others, every step of which the self-conscious, intelligent reason might justify to itself, and yet which would tend to the appearance of a race of super-animals, not of super-men. "The big blonde beast" of Nietzsche would then represent the goal to which human evolution was inclining, and there are not many persons who would be willing to grant that it represented the highest path, nor that leading to the greatest and widest power.

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[1] *L'Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 191–3.

There is another goal which science envisages, and it has been graphically and attractively presented to readers of *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* as "the perfect unit which Nature has so long foreshadowed, in which there shall be a complete communion of its members, unobstructed by egoism or hatred, by harshness or arrogance or the wolfish lust for blood. That perfect unit (the whole human race) will be a new creature, recognisable as a single entity; to its million-minded power and knowledge no barrier will be insurmountable, no gulf impassable, no task too great."[1] This goal, according to the writer from whom the above passage is quoted, is obscured from sight and eliminated from endeavour by the invincible strength of the gregarious instinct in the individual man, and the immense size and strength of the major unit of the species (the nation) . . . leading to segregation into classes which form, as it were, minor herds in which homogeneity is maintained by the external pressure of competition, of political and religious differences, and so forth. In fact, there is, as experience but too evidently corroborates, a lack of unity in the nation which woefully obstructs that complete and serviceable specialisation which would enable the individual at one and the same time to attain his own particular and highest development and to use the capacities thus placed in his possession to the best advantage of the "major unit" to which he belongs, and through it to mankind at large.

The lack of unification is a point on which, in the psychology of the human individual, modern science lays great stress. All students of psychology and all readers of psychological works are familiar with the term *dissociation*, indicating the pathological condition in which the mind no longer acts as a single entity, but groups its activities round two or more distinct centres which acquire an apparently independent consciousness, each pursuing its own course regardless and ignorant of that of the other. A classical instance of this condition is given in Dr Morton Prince's *Dissociation of a Personality*, a highly interesting and curious account of the various mental metamorphoses passed through by a patient of his own who developed three to all purposes quite distinct personalities, and was cured by the fusion brought about by the apparently voluntary self-obliteration of one of them. Dissociation carried to such a length as this is startling and unusual, but it is to be observed that it could not happen at all unless in the normally healthy mind there existed the possibility of conflict between its constituent aspirations, motives, and ideals. And, as a matter of fact, we are all aware that such an unseen conflict very frequently occurs in ourselves, and, judging from their words and conduct, in others also. Very few of us, however, are at all conscious of the fundamental nature of this conflict and of its widespread and very often disastrous effects on health, happiness, and usefulness. It has been reserved for a development of modern psychotherapeutics, psycho-analysis, to run the mischief to earth, with results which are far from flattering to our self-conceit, but which cannot be left on one side in an inquiry having for its object some clear vision of man as psychology leads us to regard him.

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[1] *L'Evolution Créatrice.*

Psycho-analysis is the latest and apparently the most successful method of getting into touch with that region of human mentality known as the *subconscious,* or sometimes as the unconscious, mind.[1] It has long been known that the imperfection of the memory we consciously retain of our past is only apparent. Stored within the psyche, but usually inaccessible and to be reached only by some stimulus of abnormal strength, is the whole record, without exception, of every experience the individual has ever passed through, every influence felt, and every impression received. This fact asserts itself in delirium, under hypnosis, through some powerful mental shock, in insanity, and *in dreams.* It is of dreams that psycho-analysis has largely made use, and there seems something curiously revolutionary in the fact that, after being relegated to a position in which only superstition saw anything noteworthy in them, they should now be raised to a position of such great psychological importance. The interpretation of dreams holds in the minds of modern psychological experts a status hardly inferior to that enjoyed by it in the times of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. It is not, however, with the future but with the past that the twentieth-century dream-interpreter concerns himself. He has ascertained that—as was implied in the earlier portion of this essay—the subconscious mind is not only an indelible record of individual experience, but also retains the impress of primeval impulses and tendencies which, so far from being outgrown as we fondly deem in civilised man, are still subconsciously active and apt to break out in disconcerting strength at unexpected moments. It is common to say, after witnessing an outbreak of passion or sensuality in a person whom we deemed actuated by a high moral standard, "How could he have committed such and such an act or followed such and such a course of conduct ?" It was not the least like him. It was not the least like what he appeared to others and probably to himself, but it denoted part at any rate of what he really was, a hidden but true aspect of his actual self; and when no such evident manifestation occurs, these secret tendencies may yet find a kind of symbolic outlet in abnormal mental and bodily symptoms and in dreams. The method of interpretation employed with regard to the latter is highly technical and somewhat complicated in detail; it can only be usefully employed by trained students of psychology and experts in psychotherapeutics. The point of relevancy to our present considerations lies wholly in the results attained, which have been too consistent and too definite to be set aside, and which show clearly the survival in civilised man of the present day of instincts and impulses of his savage and animal ancestry.

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[1] Myers, who first advanced the hypothesis of its existence, called it the subliminal mind.

Some of the conclusions based on these results, however, are more than questionable. By the discoverer of psycho-analysis, Dr Freud of Vienna, and the school of psychotherapy which he founded, the sexual element in human nature is far too exclusively dwelt upon. It is held to be present in almost every phase of human mentality, normal and abnormal, to affect every relationship in life, even that of parent and child and brother and sister—in fact, to be pre-eminent and active from the cradle to the grave. Such extreme conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, and they have probably arisen because all the first subjects of psycho-analysis were in a morbid condition either of body or mind or both. It is not wise to generalise from such premises alone; nor even when normally healthy subjects are also taken into account is there certainty with the Freudian school that knowledge of mental states, ascertained to be true in those whose conditions were pathological, has not unduly influenced the conclusions reached with regard to the healthy. It is the case that many psychologists of eminence have been unable to accept extreme Freudian conclusions.

While giving due weight to this fact, however, it seems nevertheless to be true that sex has an earlier, a wider, and a more lasting influence upon the human psyche than we have been willing openly to acknowledge to ourselves, *and this is where the mischief lies.* We have endeavoured to ignore instead of facing a conflict which exists between that higher nature which is the specifically human, and the lower animal nature which we have inherited through untold ages, and which is not evil in itself but evil in man when it is allowed to have the predominance. After all, this inner conflict is nothing new. It was experienced and graphically described by St Paul two thousand years ago, and by many before and after him who have recognised that the battle-ground of the "spirit" and the "flesh" is the human psyche. What modern psychology impresses upon us with fresh force is the danger of ignoring or trying to ignore this conflict. If we recognise it for what it is, we are forearmed, we know what we have to expect. If we try to hide it from ourselves, to pretend it does not exist, and call it by euphonious names, we drive it underground and confuse the whole issue; we lay ourselves open to defeat by an insidious foe who gains strength from our insincerity, but half conscious probably, with ourselves.

To be forearmed does not necessarily mean to be assured of victory. Indeed, the scientific forecast of human development appears to end in an *impasse*: "The regulation of the sex-instinct, despite the possibility of sublimation—that is, the fact that its energy, if not expended wholly in its own channels of expression, may function as a reinforcer of purely intellectual activities,—is regarded by a foremost psychologist as a perennial problem of which the difficulty increases with every forward step of civilisation and every increase of the control of far-sighted intelligence, over the more immediate promptings of human (animal) nature. There is a perpetual effort on the part of the intellect to frustrate the end for which the powerful sex-instinct exists, thus evidencing a fundamental disharmony of human nature which not only endangers the happiness of individuals of all times and places, but also threatens every advancing civilisation with stagnation and decay. . . . To weaken either factor of this discord would be fatal to humanity; the weakening of the instinct would mean the extinction of the race; the weakening of the intellect would mean the loss of human attributes and of all that renders human life of more value than the animals."[1]

What is clearly wanted is a supreme unifying principle able to dominate and transform this "fundamental disharmony." Psychology points to none such; but then no branch of science affords any final solution to any perplexity which its researches raise. Psychology is not peculiar here; we must look elsewhere for a resolution of the problem set by the conflict between the sex-instinct and the growing intellect of man.

The unifying principle of which we are in need is not to be found in either party to the struggle, but in that of which, because it transcends the phenomenal, science takes no cognisance, the spiritual element in human nature, that in which the relationship of man to the Eternal Reality of the universe, named by us the Divine, consists. This unifying principle is not definable in words—that must be acknowledged at once; it cannot be adequately described in any human language; it can to some extent be expressed in a human life, as the life of Christ (and in a minor degree the lives of other great religious geniuses) testifies, and it can be experienced by normal individuals and by communities also. It does not act in opposition to nature; it acts *through* nature, which it can harmonise because it is the basis and sustainer of nature as well as its culmination. This is the Christian solution to the sphinxian riddle formulated by modern psychology. "Who shall deliver us from the body of this death?" we cry with St Paul, meaning, as he did, from this bondage either to our animal or our intellectual nature; and his answer is ours: "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord." The Christ-life perpetuated in us is the victory which sets at rest the agonising conflict we experience, not by annihilating either combatant, but by giving to each due place and recognition, and by bringing both under control of that which alone has claim to be the reigning factor in man, the Divine life in him.

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[1] M'Dougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 404–5.

In the light of this Christian solution to man's agelong inner conflict (and, in the writer's belief, modern psychology points in the same direction), the human psyche is neither a unit nor a duality, but an imperfectly developed *unity*, a many in one, progressing with pain and difficulty towards that complete unification of all its various capacities, desires, and prerogatives in which alone a rightful proportion and entire satisfaction are to be found.

Modern psychology is a comparatively new science; it cannot yet be supposed to have said the last word, even from its own standpoint, with regard to the function of the sex-instinct in human evolution, the inner significance of which is a matter which the intellect *per se* will never be able to grasp, because the intellect, as Bergson insisted, forms its judgments solely from without. Intuition, checked by the intellect, may some day carry us further, but the only adequate interpretation of this, as of so many other natural facts, will be attained by the spiritual illumination and unification which are the common goal of both intuition and intelligence where human beings are concerned.

There appears to be need for a caution against regarding the subconscious mind too exclusively as the record of animal tendencies and impulses. In individuals the subconscious memory retains all the experiences and impressions of which the psyche has been the subject. Should not the racial record of which the individual psyche is, as it were, a compendium, be regarded from the point of view of spiritual impressions also? Man has *actually progressed*; his present stage of evolution is in advance of that to which the survival of the animal impulses in him points as having been his once, and to which their unchecked indulgence would cause a retrogression. There have, therefore, already been victories of the "higher" over the "lower" nature; and the records of these and their results must be equally present in the subconscious mind with the animal records to which such prominence has been given. We should take courage from this consideration, which is in no sense weakened by the fact that the good impulses which we receive from that ever-active subconscious region of our mentality have a natural source. Their tendency is upwards and forwards, not downwards and backwards as in the case of the unregulated animal impulses; and we may justly conclude that, if we have a hidden foe to reckon with, we have also an unsuspected friend whom it depends upon ourselves to reinforce.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD

LONDON.

RETREATS AND RECONSTRUCTION.

THE REV. CHARLES PLATER, S.J., M.A.,
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ENDLESS and bewildering has been the talk about social reconstruction. Theories abound. Society has been reconstructed on paper—according to every conceivable pattern. It is becoming a sort of a game—and a game which is trying to the temper of people who are waiting to see something *done*.

Yet, while many have been talking, some have been laying the foundations of a new order, and laying them, not in the air but in the hearts of men and women. It is a relief to turn to the record of their obscure but successful labour.

Twelve years ago I wrote for the HIBBERT JOURNAL an account of the work of popular Retreats as I had seen them working in Belgium, and urged their introduction into this country. Immediately I began to receive sympathetic letters of encouragement and enquiry from clergymen and laymen of every denomination all over the world. Anglican Bishops and Nonconformist leaders assured me that they would take practical steps to set the work on foot. A prominent Australian citizen had the article reprinted and sent to every minister of religion, editor, and public man in the Commonwealth. Working-men, in particular, wrote with enthusiasm to say that here at last was a practical way of solving the social question. And in the Catholic Church these retreats have, as we shall see, actually been established on a large scale.

It seems an opportune moment, then, for taking stock of the movement as it has developed in England since 1908. And if I confine myself to the retreats organised by the Society to which I belong, it is not because I underrate the excellent work done by others, but because I wish to describe only what I have myself seen.

But first let us enquire why it is that this work of retreats has such an important bearing on the problems of reconstruction which agitate the world.

In a word, it is because the retreat provides a sound *moral basis* for individual and social life. It not only presents a theory, a philosophy of life, but it impresses itself upon character, clarifies the moral vision, strengthens the will, exorcises the selfishness which is at the bottom of the mischief. The dynamic principles of spiritual life are not merely talked about: they are assimilated. The process is one of self-discipline, of spiritual adjustment. And this is ultimately the only way to secure social stability. Ideas are dynamic: get hold of them, assimilate them, and they become part of life influencing action.

Society to-day threatens to fall to pieces. We cannot heal the breaches by Acts of Parliament or resolutions passed by societies. Our laws are discredited because our politics are suspect. They are evaded or flouted because men see no reason for observing them. Industry, commerce, finance, have become a struggle of hostile and largely demoralised forces.

The evil is deep seated, and the remedy must go deep to meet it. We must bring home to individual men and women the sovereignty of the moral law and, as has been said so often of late, we must create "a new spirit."

But here is a psychological difficulty. People to-day are tired and restless. Their lives are full of anxiety. They are bewildered by the multitudinous and contradictory voices of very minor prophets. They are, as many of them would put it, "fed up." Is it possible to get them to give a hearing to any message, however salutary? The noise of life is all against it.

Get them away! Break the current of their working lives and superficial pleasures. Carry them off bodily for two or three days at least to a restful and attractive country house. Feed them well, and allow plenty of sleep. Tell them to drop worries, anxieties, regrets, plans—everything except the thought of God and their souls. Set before them the Christian philosophy of life, and let them look at it steadily. Then send them out with a new resolve and a high hope, peace in their hearts and the path of duty clear.

That is what a retreat is, and it is eminently practical and effective.[1]

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[1] The actual organisation of these retreats, the methods of attracting people to them, the arrangement of the day, and similar matters need not be described again here. Some account of them may be found in my *Retreats for the People* (Sands & Co.).

The first permanent retreat house for men was established at Marple near Manchester in 1908. Occasional retreats had been organised in religious houses, but this was the first attempt to set aside a house for retreats and for nothing else. The opening retreat in May was attended by 14 men, including a carpenter, a bricklayer, a painter, some mill-hands, a solicitor's clerk, a postmaster, and an alderman. By the end of 1909 nearly 700 men had made retreats in the house, and it became necessary to take a larger building. A move was accordingly made to Oakwood Hall, Romiley, a few miles away. Here the retreats have gone on ever since. The war years, of course, brought down the numbers, but the average is steadily rising again. Last year the retreats were followed by 564 men.

In 1912 a house was established at Osterley, near London. A series of three-day retreats at the week-ends made a very powerful impression on the business and professional men, the labourers, mechanics, and clerks, who attended them. The various social classes fused in a most encouraging fashion when all these men found themselves facing the great realities. But for various reasons this London house has not attracted the great crowds which have thronged to the other centres.

In June 1913 a third house was started on the Tyne, near Gateshead. In the first year we had 240 men, in the second nearly 400. The outbreak of war stopped the work completely, for the house was at once lent as a Red Cross Hospital, where, in the years that followed, nine thousand wounded soldiers were tended. But the retreats were started again there last year at Easter, and before Christmas some 600 Tynesiders had picked up the retreat habit again.

It was actually during the war that one of the most important of the retreat houses was set going. Glasgow has an enormous Catholic population, and it had long been felt desirable to have retreats in the neighbourhood. A house was taken at Airdrie and opened in June 1915; before the end of the year it had provided retreats for 400 men. A more suitable house was taken at Bothwell in 1916. Hither the men have flocked at the rate of 1000 a year. Lack of bedrooms alone prevented the numbers from being very much larger.

Thus we have four houses, all of them (with the exception of the London house) attracting a large and increasing number of men. But let me finish this dry and statistical record of the retreats for men by describing two war-time experiments, both rather significant in their way.

In July 1914, by the kindness of the Archbishop of Birmingham, two retreats for laymen were given at Oscott College, the diocesan seminary. They were attended by 84 men, but it was quite evident that a very much larger number of men in the Birmingham district would gladly make a retreat if they had a chance. Accordingly a number of "overflow" retreats were extemporised in a borrowed and none-too-large house at Edgbaston. How the men all fitted in is still a mystery to me. At one of these retreats we had 40: they slept on shakedowns in the attics, took their meals in a passage, overflowed from the chapel down the stairs. Not an ideal arrangement, but a proof of their earnestness. They were largely miners from Cannock and Chasetown, but included business and professional men from the city. These annual Oscott retreats and subsequent overflows went on during the war. By 1917 about 1100 men and boys had taken part. The work is now merged in a great permanent house of retreats at Edgbaston, a spacious mansion in Somerset Road with a half a dozen acres of beautiful grounds. This retreat house is managed by nuns, and is unique in this respect that it provides retreats for groups of men and women alternately.

The second war-time experiment was the provision of retreats for soldiers. These were given first at the London retreat house, and subsequently at Oxford. A full account of them has been written elsewhere:[1] here it must suffice to say that the men were taken mostly in small groups of ten or a dozen, and that some fifty groups were provided for. Of these retreats Fr. Martindale has written:—

> "If one result of the retreats should be more certain than another, it ought to be the ultimate conversion of the man who gives them. They are a revelation of the very best qualities in human nature, and of the most varied, yet most direct, action of God upon the soul. God and the soul! Men come to retreat with their ideas, naturally enough, thrown out of perspective; some of them quite eclipsed, some just flickering through the mists of opinion and the illusions of experience, and with their will tired somewhat, suffering it to drift, to be pushed about by the intolerable business of life; feeling themselves middle-aged before their time, in spirit, that is, with no real independence of thought and choice, and

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[1] *Retreats for Soldiers*, by Charles Plater and C. C. Martindale. Published by Harding & More, 119 High Holborn, 2s. 6d. net.

no ambition left. For such, a retreat drives their ideas into right order, and is a strong tonic for their will, so that they revive and seek to obtain the hundred per cent. from themselves, and to become real 'self' throughout, and no mere wisp of personality within the unreal cocoon, like Kipling's 'Tomlinson.'"—*Retreats for Soldiers*, pp. 29, 30.

And now for some account of the retreats for women since 1908. That women as well as men need retreats is obvious, and the need is all the more urgent in these days when women are playing such an important part in social and civic life. As a matter of fact it was for women that these retreats were first organised in England on any large scale. Cardinal Vaughan, then Bishop of Salford, introduced the Cenacle nuns into Manchester as early as 1888, and established them in London in 1899; they started a third house, in Liverpool, in 1909; a fourth, at Grayshott, in 1913. At these houses a very large number of women and children make retreats annually; at Liverpool, for instance, the record for 1918 was as follows:

> 604 girls, 694 business girls, 70 mothers, 49 ladies, 50 secondary school girls, 530 boys. Total, 1997.

A number of convents organise occasional retreats for women. Thus in London alone retreats for working girls are provided at a dozen centres for the August Bank Holiday week-end, Friday evening till Tuesday morning; the girls all declare that they know of no holiday so restful and helpful as a retreat.

Altogether, in the houses which we have mentioned, probably about 10,000 Catholics make annual retreats, and the number is rapidly increasing. This is worth bearing in mind, for it shows at least that there is no insuperable difficulty in getting people to bury themselves for two or three days when once they realise the advantage of it.

But we need not pay too much attention to numbers. The tendency of a retreat is to form an *élite* in every class, to leaven the mass of the unthinking and selfish world.

More and more does one become convinced that this is the only way to mould public opinion. Get a group of thoroughly convinced men, with their ideals clear and their wills set, and they will inspire the rest. So many priests have told me that it has made all the difference in their parishes having even half a dozen men who have been in retreat. A retreat makes talkers into workers, and fussy, self-important workers into quiet, unselfish workers.

It must not be thought that the aim and purpose of retreats is to promote social reform or improve material conditions. Such is not the case. If it were the case, these retreats would probably be much less effective in promoting social reform than they actually are. You do not hear much about housing or infant welfare in a retreat; but a retreat is more likely to stir up a sense of responsibility in face of these problems than would be stirred up by a conference which dealt with them exclusively.

A retreat puts man right with God, and consequently with himself and with his fellow-men. All good things follow from this: the inner man is set in order, the great purpose of life unfolded, duty is faced joyously, slackness and selfishness are conquered by love.

In a word, it is because the retreat is supernatural that it is so effective. Man is lifted on to a higher plane.

The following words were spoken, not by a recluse, but by a prominent American manufacturer who had just made his first retreat:—

> "I am getting old now, and I have taken part in many movements in my time, but never in one so inspiring and invigorating as this. Other movements were outward to the world; this is inward to the heart and spirit. I feel for the first time, as it were, unfolded and revealed to myself, with the inner man set in order and eyes that look out and see straight. It is, indeed, a wonderful awakening. Life has new perspectives and new values, and the spirit breathes free and is refreshed. Talk of science and progress; here we have the science and progress of life itself, where the logic of right living is made as clear and as forceful as the logic of right thinking. My friends, this is the one great movement of our day."[1]

"Invigorating"; yes, that is just the word. One is struck by the number of times the idea recurs in letters from those who have made retreats. Father Martindale[2] quotes some examples:—

> From an Australian soldier: "I've been talking about the retreat to X, and we both found the same

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[1] Quoted in *Retreats for the People*, p. 179.

[2] *Retreats for Soldiers*, pp. 30, 31.

thing. We feel we've got more *physical vitality* since we came."

"I put more buck into everything."

"I did feel what you called middle-aged; the war had tired me inside: now I'm full out for things."

The results of these retreats are surprisingly durable. Men will write years afterwards to say how a certain retreat shifted their whole outlook on life and gave them guiding lines. There may have been relapses and falls, discouragement and clouds, but the men knew how to deal with them. They had the principles of the spiritual life inside them: the retreat had not been a mere burst of emotion.

These principles issue into very practical *work* for the betterment of the world. It has been through these retreats that the Catholic Social Guild has won so many of its study-club members—young working-men from the industrial centres who, without any thought of self-advancement, give up their evenings after a hard day's work, to mastering social science and economic history and the moral principles of social reform. They look upon such study as direct service of God and their neighbour; they tackle it with courage in spite of immense difficulties, and they strive to apply in workshop and factory the principles which they have assimilated. They think for themselves and are proof against the clap-trap which sweeps away the indolent-minded. Such men are a steadying influence in the community.

As for the relations between employers and employed, it is evident that nothing can adjust them so satisfactorily as a retreat made in common. That relation has to be humanised; but how can it be humanised unless it is made supernatural? Efforts are being made to "bring masters and men together"; but there is not much prospect of bringing them together on the purely economic ground. So long as both are simply out for all they can get, the disastrous tug-of-war will continue, and apparent concessions, extorted by fear or force, will be recouped at someone else's expense.

Again, it is suggested that employers and employed should live their lives and take their amusements together; idyllic pictures are painted for us of institutes in industrial districts where the various classes should meet round the billiard-table or at the improving lecture and drown their economic differences in the festive tea-pot. That is all charming, but how many of either side would feel really comfortable? How long would it last? It would be what Aristotle calls "a watery friendship," and the harmony (if not the tea-pot) would speedily be broken, *unless* the minds of both sides had previously been attuned to the situation.

On the other hand, nothing could be more natural, unconscious, spontaneous, than the instant *friendship* among men of different classes who meet in a retreat. It is only comparable to the breaking-down of social barriers which took place, in moments of stress, during the war, and, like this, has the whole weight of custom and class-tradition against it. When a group of men are staring at eternity, grappling with a consciousness of sin, feeling at the same moment their utter nothingness and their unspeakable worth as sons of God,—well, they are not likely to be severed from one another by differences between their respective balances at the bank.

The short after-dinner recreations during a retreat are a revelation of how simple and real men can be with each other. There is no forced hilarity, but a joyous lightheartedness. The atmosphere is that of the *Fioretti* rather than of a Public Meeting for Improving the Relations between Employers and Employed.

Here is a picture of a retreat supplied by a well-known doctor:

> "Have you ever heard of Christian Democracy? I believe there are books written about it. But if you wish to see it alive, in operation, you must join one of these parties. For here was the brotherhood of man. We gathered together; we talked seriously on serious things. But we also told funny stories and laughed hugely at them. We had fine arguments, about nothing, leading to nowhere, as every good argument should. And when we tired of talking all at once, we split up into little parties, and the professional man and the working-man, the manufacturer and the mechanic, the gentleman at large and the docker, walked side by side and opened their hearts to each other."[1]

Or again, take the social evils one by one—drink, dishonesty, impurity, conjugal infidelity, betting and gambling, selfishness, pride, and the rest,—how are you going to deal with them? If you regard them *primarily* as social evils, you may multiply prisons and asylums and punitive laws and information, but you will not check the flood. For it issued from the individual heart, and only by quickening the individual conscience and stiffening the individual character will you rescue society. A man grappling with a drunkard's habits will need a stronger motive for self-control than is furnished by statistics about the national drink bill. One who is devoured by sexual passion needs more help than is provided by a paper read at a medical congress. Even the merely listless and indolent may not find a sufficient spur to action in the Utopia-vision of the social reformer; and the prospect of national bankruptcy or general anarchy will not always be enough to keep a workman from slacking, an employer from exploiting.

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[1] *Retreats for the People,* p. 190.

But an earnest retreat does, as a matter of fact, reach down to these centres of disintegration in the moral life. I speak of what I have seen, not a few times but in many hundreds of cases. Long-standing habits of drink or impurity are subdued—sometimes by a sudden strong, heroic blow, sometimes after a long and courageous struggle. The irresolute are shown how to make up their own minds. The apathetic find a dominant interest, an ideal which pulls together all their dormant energies. The self-centred are shown a means of escape. Taken merely on its human side the process of a retreat is soundly scientific; the Ignatian method of "Spiritual Exercises" is a very carefully considered soul discipline.

And surely there is need of discipline, of guidance, of scientific treatment in the enormously complex and unspeakably important life of the soul. For lack of it, what religion there is in this country tends to go off into arid speculation on the one hand or vague emotionalism on the other. God is the God of order and life in the supernatural as well as in the natural order. To neglect His laws in either sphere is to invite disaster. How often disasters are due to lack of *knowledge*, we cannot guess; but we all meet them with distressing frequency. What needless perplexities, what unnecessary discouragements, what futile friction, what cruel burdens imposed on men by their own ignorance or that of their would-be guides! No practical business man would suffer his temporal affairs to get into a ruinous muddle for lack of method; why, then, not import some method into the spiritual lives of the bewildered who need guidance? We have seen lately an enormous demand for such mind-training as will make men efficient in business or public life. It would be interesting to compare in detail the methods in popular use with the methods of St Ignatius' *Exercises*, to which, it may be, some of them owe not a little.

"But why not go straight to God, following His spirit?" Yes, but what is thought to be His spirit may be the delusions of self-love. The director clears away impediments and then—stands aside. Nothing is more clear than that, as a retreat proceeds, God is taking the men into His own hands and leading them by His own ways.

Here is the goal of the retreat—loving self-surrender to the God who made and redeemed us. There is the key to the complexities of life, to the mystery of suffering, to the social problem. That gives meaning and worth to the monotonies of life and opens out unsuspected vistas to the discouraged and the suffering.

Such, then, is the contribution made by these retreats towards social reconstruction. They set in right order the life of man—first the inner life, then the outer. They deal with the human heart which has been the source of all the mischief, and they deal with it delicately, firmly, skilfully. They do not cram opinions down unwilling throats, like Thrasymachus in the *Republic*: they lead men gently from the shadows of the cave into the light of the sun.

CHARLES PLATER.

OXFORD.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 534.)

The striking paper on this subject by Dr Henry Preserved Smith demands the serious attention of the Churches. It affords a strong confirmation of the facts so forcibly brought out in the book *The Army and Religion* reviewed in the January number of this Journal. Here we have from religious workers both in the English and American armies the testimony that "the Churches have never gained the interest and enthusiasm of eight out of ten of the generation just coming to maturity." "The majority of men have no clear idea of what the Christian religion is." True, these enquiries as to religion were made with regard to men engaged in the war; but this is not material. Dr Smith says, "The fact alleged is no less ominous because it is chronic instead of acute. Indeed, it is more so. If it were due to the war, we might hope that it would disappear with the coming of peace. As a chronic state of affairs it must alarm all to whom religion is the chief concern in human life."

These enquiries fit in with the fact, which statistics establish, that only some ten to fifteen per cent. of the population are found within our churches and chapels. Dr Smith rightly draws a distinction between religion and organised religion, and he defines organised religion as "the religion that has taken form in the several Churches." This really touches the root of the matter, and indicates the region in which all the trouble arises—the forms, dogmas, creeds in which the Churches express and propagate religion. It is here that the leaders of religion are so smitten with blindness and fail to discern the signs of the times.

In *The Army and Religion* it is stated, "There is a surprising unity of testimony that the men as a whole believe that the Churches are out of touch with reality and out of touch with ordinary humanity. They think them irrelevant to the real business of their lives, antiquated in their ideas and methods, and wanting in vitality and conviction. There is little or no life in the Church at all, it is an antiquated and decaying institution, standing by dogmas expressed in archaic language and utterly out of touch with modern thought and living experience."

And this is not the view of any one section of the men, for we are told "there is a surprising unity of testimony that the mass as a whole" believe this. It is stated that "many are asking for a new theology." Yes, and nothing is given them but the old. "The Atonement, the Divinity of Christ, justification by faith, they consider are no concern of theirs."

All this relates to "organised" religion. What is the testimony with regard to "unorganised" religion—character and conduct, the religion of the masses outside the Churches? One of the witnesses says, "I have been puzzled often to find men of no profession of religion exhibit such an unselfish, brave, kind, and just spirit to an extent not seen in professing Christians. Taking the whole moral achievement of our armies in four years of war, we must surely feel that along a great and difficult range of virtues they have raised the standards of the whole nation. They have exalted devotion to duty, sacrifice, and brotherhood. The wonderful spirit displayed in the war is Christian and God-inspired."

Dr Smith says, "The young man of to-day has little interest or enthusiasm for organised religion, and we now begin to see why this is so. Organised religion suffers from accretion of dogma. The formulas which have resulted from past controversies cling to it and hamper its activities."

In truth the new wine is with us, but the leaders will persist in using the old bottles. Happily the old bottles are bursting, but it is a long process, and meanwhile much of the new wine is spilled and wasted. Who will supply the new bottles, and where are they to come from? Ah! he will be a wise man who can solve that problem. If the leaders of the Churches, instead of employing their powers to buttress up the old, would use them to construct new forms that would meet the religious wants of the age, what fruitful work it would be!

P. E. Vizard.

London.

"EVANGELISM OLD AND NEW."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 581.)

The article by the Rev. A. T. Cadoux on "Evangelism Old and New" presents with force and clarity a point of view which prevailed, say, fifty years ago, and that which finds favour in thoughtful minds to-day; but the writer surely posits an antithesis where none exists—or, at least, by silence, suggests a state of things in the after-life which must necessarily be really foreign to his thought. The driving power of the older preaching no doubt came, in a measure, from the preacher's belief in unending torments; but the modern evangelist, while eliminating the doctrine of *eternal* punishment, is not thereby constrained to forego the sanction of pains and penalties for ill-spent days. The hell of orthodoxy conflicts with modern notions of righteousness and compassion, and has therefore become much less terrifying, much less deterrent, than the newer conception of a future where the judge exacts payment to the uttermost farthing, where sowing and reaping are inalienably correlated, where the anguish may be acute, but where the wrongdoer admits his liabilities and would not, if he could, escape the just reward of his deeds, knowing that only through such purgatorial pain can entrance to the upward path be gained.

The fear of hell need not be regarded as an obsolete incentive to nobler living, for the hells pictured by those "travellers" who *have* returned are indeed awe-inspiring and ruthless in the inexorable logic of their discipline. The "place prepared" has been prepared by the man himself; in every pang he may recognise an inevitable sequence to thoughts, words, and deeds remembered as part of his earthly equipment. The punishment is not enforced from without, but is the natural fruitage of a life lived in rebellion against the Divine laws; and the only chance of restoration lies in a voluntary, a joyful, acceptance of the pain—in a realisation that each throb of agony is the outcome of some special sin and, owing to this acceptance, is doing its remedial work. The duration of the suffering may be long or short according to the attitude of the sufferer; it may conceivably be eternal if his will continue in opposition to God's; but there is no such thing as divine condemnation to endless misery; if such a condition exists, it is self-inflicted.

The preacher of to-day will, as Dr Cadoux truly says, "think rather of the hatefulness of sin than of its punishment," will dwell on its inherent antagonism to the Divine scheme and on the necessity for a Divine sacrifice and sharing in the consequences of transgression; but he need not throw aside a potent aid for arousing sinful consciences. As the hatefulness of sin is not apprehended by the soul steeped in sin, a lower appeal must be made—the appeal to fear,—and the élan of the old Evangelism may be preserved, alongside broader thought which refuses to worship a Deity who could sentence finite beings to infinite tortures. The "necessary stimulant" remains if only the clergy will acquaint themselves with what is familiar to those who read the literature of psychic research.

The writer of the article also remarks that "the picture of heaven is not nearly so moving as that of hell": we agree, if heaven be pictured as a place where "congregations ne'er break up and Sabbaths have no end"; but the newer knowledge portrays it as a place of infinite attraction, full of interest and vast possibilities, where every talent can be developed, every intellectual desire be gratified, all loving, serviceable activities have free scope. Were such a heaven presented from our pulpits, the hearers would be allured by its beauty, its sweet reasonableness; while the companion picture of a state of remedial purgation, where the punishment accurately fits the crime, would commend itself to common sense and love of fair dealing, and the preacher will not lack material for soul-appalling descriptions of the horrors which must be endured by those who choose the ways of death.

One would like to know if Dr Cadoux really means his article to carry the implication that a disbelief in eternal punishment involves a disbelief in any after-world penalties; because if he does not so mean, if the cleansing fires of retributive justice *will* furnish effective texts for the evangelist though the word "everlasting" be deleted, then his argument would seem, in some respects, to fail in relevancy.

BETH FINLAY.

ST LEONARDS-ON-SEA.

"EUCLID, NEWTON, AND EINSTEIN."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 425.)

I READ with much interest the article on "Euclid, Newton, and Einstein," and should like to ask the author whether certain experiments have been tried which I have not seen referred to in any of the articles upon the subject. The starting-point, as the article explains, is the discovery that the speed of light measured across the presumed "ether stream," compared with that in the line of it, shows no indication of the presumed "ether stream." Then various explanations of this fact become possible, such as the contraction of all distance measurements in the one direction as compared with the other.

I would ask, Has the matter been investigated by measuring the speed of light in the two opposite directions over the same course, in the direct line of the supposed ether stream? This would eliminate such possible explanations as the above, for clearly the distance over the same space is the same in both directions, and any difference in result would be directly due to the motion through the ether. There are, I know, many difficulties in doing this measurement, as compared with the measurement on the double journey, going and returning, but still *it is possible* (space forbids discussion of methods here). If this method show the existence of the ether stream, then it is established, and one of the explanations of its non-appearance on the transverse course becomes necessary; but if this method also show no evidence of it, then we are left with only the three other possibilities—namely (1) there is no ether, (2) the ether near the earth is carried along with the earth, (3) the velocity of light is dependent partly upon the motion of its source.

There is another test that can be applied, and that is the measurement of light from a star that is sometimes approaching the earth and sometimes receding from it. This may have been tried; but, as I have not seen it mentioned in any paper on the subject, I ask for information. If the light from such a star is found to be the same, independent of the motion of the star, while yet the speed of light near the earth's surface is the same in every direction relative to the earth, showing no ether stream, then it is certain that the ether exists, and is being carried along with the earth; for the light, having traversed the space between, has taken on a component due to the motion of the earth, when coming into the region of the earth.

If, on the other hand, the speed of light from such a star is dependent on the motion of the star, then either there is no ether, in the sense that has hitherto been supposed, or else wave propagation through it depends upon the movement of the source, which latter seems improbable, as pointed out in the article, and would throw us back to the other alternative, involving the projectile theory of light—which also seems improbable, because as the article also remarks, the evidence for the wave theory is so strong. But it is not absolutely impossible that both the wave theory and the projectile theory of light may be true. The projectiles might oscillate as they travel, and so produce a wave motion which might satisfy all the phenomena of light. It will be asked, What could make the particles continue oscillating? The reply is: That same force, whatever it be, that ties them together, when they are in the molecule.

If the stream of projected particles be tied together by an elastic force, they will continue to oscillate as they follow one after the other with the same period that they had at the start. This idea would lead on to many more, which it would be out of place to discuss until one has the result of the two experiments concerning which I ask for information.

G. A. Sexton.

DR BROAD'S REPLY.

In reply to Mr Sexton's questions the following remarks may be made:

(i) (*a*) If the velocity of light is to be measured by observations of the times when a beam leaves A and when it reaches B, a different point, we must know beforehand that the clocks at A and B are going at the same rate and that they agree in their zeros. Even if they agreed when together at A, it would be most unsafe to assume that they would continue to do so when one is moved to B. Agreement would therefore have to be tested when the clocks were *in situ* for the experiment; this could only be done by light signals; and such signals only constitute a criterion of sameness of rate and of zero when we make definite assumptions about the velocity of light. Thus an experiment of the kind suggested would involve a circular argument if used to settle the question of the connexion between the observed velocity of light and the motion of the observer and his instruments in the ether.

(*b*) Even if this difficulty could be avoided, I think it is certain that no *direct* measurement of the velocity of light would be capable of detecting such relatively small differences as would be involved in the composition of the velocity of the earth in its orbit with that of light in the ether. The latter velocity is so enormously greater than the former that the composition of the two could only affect the resultant velocity by an amount below the limits of experimental errors.

(ii) The same theoretical difficulty certainly, and the same practical difficulty probably, apply to all such attempts at settling the question, and therefore to the proposed experiment with the light from a star when approaching and when receding. Dr F. W. Aston of the Cavendish Laboratory, who has kindly answered some questions that I have put to him in connexion with Mr Sexton's letter, says that the practical difficulty due to the comparatively small velocity of the earth might be overcome by using instead Positive Rays, which consist of particles moving with a velocity of about 10′ cm. per sec. But he also says, and I agree, that the argument would still be circular, because of the difficulty about the test for sameness of rate and of zero in clocks at different places.

(iii) There is no theoretical objection to a combination of the undulatory and the emission theories, such as Mr Sexton suggests, if this be found necessary to explain the facts. In Lane's book, *Das Relativitätsprinzip* (Vieweg), it is said that W. Ritz attempted to meet the Michelsen-Morley difficulty by an emission theory. Full references are given in § 2, note 13, p. 266, of Lane's book. I have not read Ritz's work, neither has Dr Aston; but if Mr Sexton cares to pursue the subject, he will find Ritz's first contribution (according to Lane) in *Ann. de chim. et de phys.*, xiii. 145, 1908. He also appears to have written in *Arch. de Genève*, xvi. 209, 1908; *Scientia*, 5, 1909; and his *Gesammelte Werke*, pp. 427 and 447. The other relevant literature will be found in Lane at the page indicated above.

C. D. Broad.

"SURVIVAL AND MONADOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1920, p. 495.)

I wish to offer an observation or two with regard to the view expressed by Bishop Mercer, in his statements that "the supposed gap between matter and mind is fast closing" and that "the true line of advance, on the score of probability, would be to discover the 'psychical' nature of what we now call 'physical.'"

When we speak of matter we describe things only so far as they are material. So when we say that matter can think, we speak as though materiality were the same as thought. When we speak of conscious being, we are describing things only so far as they are conscious. So when we say that a conscious being can be in space, we are speaking as though consciousness were the same as materiality. Such statements seem to confuse the two qualities. The only truth in the alleged opposition of spirit and matter is that the attributes of spirituality and materiality are distinct from each other, just as redness and greenness, closely connected as they are, cannot be said to be identical. The truth is merely that of qualitative distinction. But the system which is made up of the human mind and the human body is one of which both sets of characteristics can be predicated. This complex entity has the two aspects of consciousness and extension. Only, these aspects should not be confused with each other. It is not correct to say that the person, meaning by this the conscious being which forms one side of the twofold system, is extended. It would be as absurd to say that the body is conscious. The former would be to speak of consciousness as though it were extension; the latter would be to speak of extension as though it were consciousness. There is no reason, however, why the same entity should not be both conscious and material. There is no gap between matter and mind in the sense that both material and mental characteristics cannot be ascribed to the same complex entity. What is physical may also be psychical. And what is psychical may also be physical. Only the physical as such must not be confused with the psychical as such, nor *vice versa*.

It seems to me that the difficulties belonging to the question of the relation between mind and body spring largely from confusing qualitative distinctness with non-connectedness.

W. Powell.

Hitchin.

IS CHRIST ALIVE TO-DAY?

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1920, p. 361.)

A courteous critic has read this article and asks, "But (as an argument) is it convincing?" and tacitly offers his own conclusion that it is not. Far more emphatically would I answer, "No, and never will be." I am aware that such writing as mine, in as far as it deals with argument, resembles the sermon of the preacher in Browning's immortal *Chapel on the Common*, where the unwonted listener heard many strange assertions, "Each proof abundantly convincing, To those who were convinced before,"—but not in any other case. So it is to this day; the sphere of perception is not intellectual only, and cannot be dealt with on that level only. To hold that Garment's Hem means the light but sure touch of a new range of conviction, to which words are almost inapplicable. It is like a breath of fragrance you labour in vain to describe; like the brilliant sparkle on a heavy wave, the instant it assumes a certain angle with regard to the sun; like the stirring of the seed under the clod, which changes potential into actual life; like an instinct that will not be denied, telling us what is supremely good in Art. It is like a score of other such impressions that convey a confidence of truth to the soul, and then poor clumsy words come halting and trailing after, doing their best to substantiate that which is already known. Their use lies in showing that, given the sum-total of the conditions, the conclusion does not contradict reason. The fragrance is not an illusion, seeing that thousands of others, widely scattered over time and space, have perceived it also, the sparkle is not arbitrary, but obeys certain foretold statements of cause and effect; the miracle of germination will always take place if the same circumstances are repeated; and the appreciation of Art, though almost impossible to define, has a solid basis in truth. Here are four hasty black-board drawings, each one indicating an objective reality behind the subjective appeal, and yet I doubt if they are the least use unless that of which they are the inadequate symbol is already known.

Turning to the stores of enlightenment hidden in the ancient East, I speak with diffidence because I have read but little. Every one of us would, I believe, be willing to submit the worth of a religion to the test of ethics. The eyes of the worshipper of Krishna may "light up with holy love"; but does he go away a better man? When the worshipper of Christ has reached this stage, he certainly does so. Even Gautama Buddha, the beautiful heart, the Prince Pitiful of the world, seems to have but a poor effect on his followers of to-day. He took on his heart the suffering of our race; Christ went deeper and dealt with its sin, therefore dynamic power attends belief in Him, which fails in the case of Buddha. The divine power is (as far as my experience goes) individual only, and has a tendency to fade and die down when applied to a community, a nation, or the social order of the world. We like to talk about "a Christian State," "a world-wide-society founded by Christ," or even "the vision of a universe lit up by the glory of the Spirit of God." There may be help in these thoughts as aspirations and hopes, but we have sadly to confess that they in no wise represent the facts of to-day. They are held in reserve for a future, distant but bright and beckoning, when "the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ." But the power in the individual is boundless, and they can be found by the thousand.

Let me here turn for a moment to a slighter matter, and deal with what a second critic calls "incorrect scientific statements" put forward in my illustration about the moon and the tides. Let me say in one word that the scantiness of the outline is intentional. It is not due to ignorance. It so chances that I know that the moon pulls the earth out of the ideal orbit, that the sun causes a fraction of the tides, and that water rises high in a capillary tube; also I know the double connotation of the word "law." Yet for all these admissions I reassert that earthward gravitation is a "law of Nature," and that, until the invisible moon were put forward as an hypothesis, the raised belt of water certainly would appear to defy that law; moreover, when that hypothesis was adduced, it would be fully within the scope of a mathematical genius, like Lord Kelvin, to disentangle the influence on the water of the obvious sun from the far larger amount that would go to the credit of the unknown moon. I have no wish to wrangle over details, but I desire to make it clear that it was not my intention to give with one hand a somewhat intricate lecture on gravitation, while drawing attention to a great spiritual lesson with the other. Experience has taught me that a black-board drawing is the better for having but few lines, so long as these lines convey the main truth, and that touching and retouching detract from its merit as an explanatory illustration.

Let me revert in closing to the main theme. I do not wish to appear to inflict any article of the Creed on another mind by the force of authority, for we are single and individual wills and we each must bear our own burden of decision. But I would once more suggest that those who are bewildered should consult the "two or three Witnesses" presented to them. Faith, in these difficult times, may waver and vibrate on its pedestal; but it need not be overthrown, and we may learn to say with the child Zinsendorf, "Wenn es auch einen anderen Gott giebt, so bleibe ich bei dem Herrn Jesu."

CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

IN *The American Journal of Theology* (April, pp. 180–190), Mr J. B. Pratt asks, "Can Theology be made an Empirical Science?" The answer is in the negative, and the reason given amounts to the claim that the knowledge of God does not present the fact of God to us as a scientific fact, but simply as the result of inference and interpretation. It is argued, against Professor D. C. Macintosh's recent book on *Theology as an Empirical Science*, that the historical revelation in Jesus, for example, rests on historical data, not on data such as an empirical science demands; that the evidence of Christian experience[1] presents us with data of psychology; and that the mystic's claim to a direct intuition of God as Reality involves an object or Presence to be apprehended, which, as "the mystics testify, has no definite qualities by which it can be made communicable or identifiable." The theory of knowledge which underlies a paper like this requires closer analysis, however. And the possibility of verifying the experience of God may be developed along larger lines, as indeed is done by Mr C. C. J. Webb in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures, entitled, *Divine Personality and Human Life* (Allen & Unwin). By "a personal God" Mr Webb means "a God with whom a personal relation is possible for his worshippers." He has reached this point in the first series, and now starts from the position that the supreme level of religious experience implies a spiritual life which takes the form of personal intercourse. Can this be verified? Mr Webb sets himself to answer the question by applying the principle to the economic, the scientific, the æsthetic, the moral, the political, and the religious life, in a series of chapters which vary in convincing power, but which are invariably suggestive and ingenious, particularly that upon the moral life. After dealing with Kant's exposition of reverence and conscience, for example, he concludes by asking, "Is not our only way of escape from the embarrassment created by the presence in us of this implanted sentiment of reverence for what, though bound up with our personality, is yet, as the object of our reverence, distinguished from it, the frank recognition of a Personal God . . . who is not only immanent but transcendent, with whom a relation only to be described as personal is possible, and is, in the experience of Religion, actually enjoyed?" The lectures in which he defends his position against naturalism and absolute idealism are most acute, and he makes out a good case for the right, as he says, "to accept far more simply and less grudgingly than did Kant the testimony of religious experience." Few Gifford Lectures have given the theologian a more positive contribution for the philosophical justification of his faith in God.

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[1] Mr D. M. Baillie (*Expositor*, January, pp. 64–77) criticises, from a more positive standpoint, the radical empiricism of James and Höffding, as witness to the real theology of Christian experience.

The second volume of the *History of Religions* (T. & T. Clark), which Dr G. F. Moore has just published in the International Theological Library, deals with Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. There are obvious advantages in handling these three together. But the difficulty of the task remains, and it is to Dr Moore's credit that he has managed to preserve not only objectivity but proportion in his well-considered survey. "J'ai eu soin d'avertir plusieurs fois," says Voltaire, "qu'on ne doit pas juger les grands hommes que par leurs chefs-d'œuvre." So with the great religions. Dr Moore begins by explaining that he judges each religion by its most intelligent and devout representatives, even although they are always in a minority. His treatment proves that he has acted up to his principles. We have here a succinct historical sketch of each religion, which is compact and comprehensive without being dull. To take only one point, from the section on Hebrew religion. He notes how the stories of the Creation imply a "vegetarian golden age," and that simultaneously the early prophets in the eighth century refused to shut their eyes to a combination of flourishing religion and social oppression. They "were moved to indignation by the wrongs of the oppressed and the decadence of morals, and believed that God must be as indignant as they were at such doings." Now, in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 237–256), M. Antonin Causse also shows how the prophets protested against the higher civilisation of the monarchy in Israel as an impious declension from the theocratic communism and simple life of the patriarchs. Israel's soul turned back to the golden past, when there were neither kings nor temples. "Dans les jours de puissance politique et de splendeur profane, elle gardait la nostalgie des temps primitifs." Not only eccentric sects like the Rechabites, but prophets like Amos and Hosea, and redactors of the old documents, boldly reverted to the utopia of a society where life was simple and brotherly. The huge empires of the East rested on the toil and slavery of the unnumbered poor, but in Israel alone the voice of protest was heard, the plea of justice for the oppressed, and the recognition of rights possessed by the humble. The autumn number of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (1919) is almost exclusively devoted to one prophet, Isaiah, and mainly in connection with the literary structure of the book. Dr Kemper Fullerton reconstructs i. 10–20 and ii. 6–21; like Professor G. B. Gray, he develops Marti's view of the latter passage, on the ground that "it permits one of the noblest poems of the master stylist of the Old Testament to stand out in something like its pristine splendour and impressiveness, Isaiah's Dies Irae." In some general notes, Dr J. P. Peters (pp. 88 f.) argues for xi. 1–8 as Isaianic; Mr Moses Buttenwieser (pp. 94–112) upholds the view that the author of Isa. xl.–lv. resided not in Babylonia but in Palestine; and Dr H. G. Mitchell (pp. 113–128) analyses the "Servant of Yahweh" sections, as M. J. Touzard does, from a slightly different critical standpoint, in the *Revue Biblique* (January, pp. 43–74).

In the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* (1919, pp. 113–138), Gustav Hölscher agrees with Sellin that the canonical book of Daniel consists of an apocalypse or biography of Daniel (originally Aramaic), preserved in chaps. i.–vii., to which the last half (chaps. viii.–xii.) was added during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. But he goes into more detail. The Aramaic group of stories, ii. 4*b*–vi., are from one pen; the author of viii.–xii. translated i. 1–ii. 4*a* into Hebrew; and—most revolutionary of all—chap. vii. is really pre-Maccabean, the allusions to Antiochus (verses 7*b*, 8, 11*a*, 20–22, 24–25) being secondary. Hölscher admits, of course, that viii.–xii. reflect the Maccabean struggle against Antiochus Epiphanes, but his article is a plea for i.–vi. (and indeed vii.) as the work of an earlier story-teller. In the *Expositor* (March), Dr C. J. Ball draws attention to the light cast on Dan. i.–vi., and especially on the story of iv., by the old Babylonian poem, or monologue, of a king who was struck down by a malady from which he could not recover "until at last Merodach relented." Some of the details in Dan. iv. certainly suggest a reminiscence of the much older Babylonian legend.

The Maccabean period is estimated in Mr Norman Bentwich's *Hellenism* (Philadelphia), which is avowedly written from a less sympathetic point of view than M. Friedländer's book. Mr Bentwich views the literature and philosophy of Hellenistic Judaism "from a standpoint of rabbinical tradition," treating the Hellenism which the rigid Jews repudiated as an amalgam of superficial paganism and second-rate philosophy. In the closing chapters of a readable though one-sided account, he comes down as far as the second and third centuries of our era; but the opening part, which is most vital, discusses the interaction of Judaism and Hellenism in the Maccabean era and the succeeding age. Mr Bentwich recognises "one splendid figure" in the medley of writers and thinkers, namely Philo. He "does not harmonise the spirits of Hebraism and Hellenism—that was impossible in his day—but he does fuse the spiritual teachings of the two, and that not in an artificial and conscious way, but sincerely and spontaneously. He created something new in literature and thought." Simultaneously with Mr Bentwich's book, a critical study of the Jewish philosopher has been published in English, the first since Dr James Drummond's standard treatise. Dr H. A. A. Kennedy's *Philo's Contribution to Religion* (Hodder & Stoughton) is an excellently equipped piece of work. In seven chapters he unfolds the essential ideas of Philonism, with ample quotations from Philo's writings. Philo's personality is less interesting than his philosophy. But in order to understand the presuppositions of early Christianity, it is imperative to know the position of this Alexandrian Jew, and Dr Kennedy's fine pages are an introduction to the subject. As he points out, Philo's "enthusiasm for the efforts of Greek speculation concealed from him the fact that he was constantly attempting to fuse together incompatible magnitudes." But his attempt is significant, especially in view of what his younger contemporary Paul did in theology.

Mr Herbert Danby, who has translated *Tractate Sanhedrin* for the useful series of early documents published by the S.P.C.K., deals in a special article (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1919, pp. 51–75) with the bearing of this second-century rabbinic tract upon the account of the trial of Jesus. Does the Jewish manual of instructions about legal procedure contain any data which illustrate contemporary trials before Jewish authorities in the days of Jesus? Mr Danby prefers the Lucan version to the Marcan, and, after examining the Jewish tract, concludes that the compilation "is of little or no value as a picture of native law as practised during the period in question." Indeed, he will not go further, even on the basis of the Lucan story, than the admission "that the Jewish authorities in Jerusalem were empowered to carry out no more than a preliminary investigation of the evidence against their prisoner, and a study of the Gospel narratives makes it doubtful whether they can justly be said to have overstepped this permission." The *Megillath Taanith* is announced in the same series of translations. Meantime, Dr Solomon Zeitlin continues his study of "Megillat Taanit as a Source for Jewish Chronology and History in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, pp. 237–290), and his annotations will be a boon to the translator and editor. In the *American Journal of Theology* (April 1920) Father M. Power proposes a theory which would have saved many a scholar from anxious research, if it had been known earlier—and if it could be accepted! It is that the well-known difficulties of the calendar about 14th and 15th Nisan are due to historical "camouflage," *i.e.* that the *Badhu* calculation is a deliberate trick of Jewish calendar-makers, to make a Friday-passover impossible. Dr A. T. Robertson's book on *The Pharisees and Jesus* (Duckworth) is a candid attempt to estimate the recent theories that the writers of the Christian Gospels, if not Jesus himself, were unfair to the Pharisees. Mr Herford, says Dr Robertson, "proceeds to boost the Pharisees by depreciating Jesus while disclaiming it." The aim of this little book is to examine the data of the Gospels and tradition as objectively as possible, and its conclusion is that the attitude of Jesus to the party was justified.

With regard to the criticism of the Synoptic Gospels, Professor B. W. Bacon (*Expositor*, March, pp. 200–218) discusses the "rhetorical symmetry and the pragmatic purpose" in Matthew's alteration (chaps. viii.–ix.) of the Marcan materials, holding that Matthew's order is artificial, not chronological. He makes out a good case for his view. Mr H. M‘Lachlan's *St Luke: The Man and His Work* (Manchester University Press) is a larger book than his previous study of the same topic. He is out to break a lance for the Western text of the Lucan narratives, but his pages contain more than textual criticism. He uses the third Gospel and Acts to show Luke in various aspects, *e.g.* as editor, as letter-writer, as diarist, as theologian, and even as humorist. A discursive, stimulating book, with several arguments that are liable to be challenged, but with invariable acuteness. The closing chapter is an ardent plea for the Lucan authorship of the "Periope Adulteræ." Mr A. M. Perry's essay on *The Sources of Luke's Passion-Narrative* (Chicago) is a thesis written to prove, from an elaborate analysis of the Synoptic record, that the non-Markan materials in Luke are largely drawn from a special narrative, probably in written shape, which overlapped the Markan story. This narrative, owing to its association with Jerusalem, is called J. According to Mr Perry, it was a unity, free from doublets, "written in Greek, but possibly a translation of an earlier Aramaic composition or collection of traditions," covering the life of Jesus from his arrival in the city to the resurrection-appearances, *i.e.* the bulk of xix. 28–xxiv. 53. A less speculative and more synoptic book on the Gospels is the posthumous work of Dr H. B. Swete, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (Macmillan), consisting of lectures to theological students. The parables are expounded with simplicity and a scholarly care, first the Galilean, then the Judæan, while the book ends with a section upon the general teaching of the parables, in which some of the points are extremely well put. Dr Swete explains Matthew's predilection for the term "Kingdom" by the fact that the evangelist "seems to have felt that he was entrusted with the task of correcting the impression that the Messianic Kingdom was political or racial."

The problem of an Ephesian imprisonment as a time for the composition of the later Pauline epistles is still being discussed. Mr Clayton R. Bowen concludes his discussion (*American Journal of Theology*, pp. 112–135, 277–287) by arguing that, while "Ephesians" is sub-Pauline, Colossians and Philemon and Philippians were written by Paul, when he was under arrest for a while in Ephesus; he incidentally suggests that the first two chapters of Colossians have been revised and interpolated. In the *Revue Biblique* (1919, pp. 404–418) H. Coppieters arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion, after reviewing the evidence from ancient tradition and from the epistles themselves. In *The Irish Theological Quarterly* (January, pp. 43–52) Mr Hugh Pope pleads for the literary unity of 2 Corinthians in its canonical shape, but only by reiterating the hypothesis of Chrysostom that the offender trounced in 2 Cor. ii. and vii. is the incestuous man condemned in 1 Cor. v. All these and other problems of the epistles are set in a clear light by Dr A. H. M'Neile's *St Paul: his Life, Letters, and Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge University Press), which is a compact handbook, stronger in the historical and literary sections than in the theological, but presenting on the whole an adequate survey of the subject. Dr M'Neile seems to regard the Pastoral Epistles[1] as probably sub-Pauline. He also regards the We-sections in Acts as the work of St Luke. But in *The Harvard Theological Review* (April, pp. 136–158) Mr J. A. Blaisdell enters a plea for Epaphroditus (*i.e.* Epaphras) as the diarist, on the ground that the diarist must have been the Philippian representative upon the deputation which conveyed the collection. He takes Phil. iv. 18 to mean that Paul received the gift of money through Epaphroditus, who was already at Rome, and that the latter did not come expressly from Philippi but had been arrested and conveyed to Rome along with the apostle. The larger problem of Paul's doctrine[2] is handled with singular ability by Dr H. A. A. Kennedy in his book on *The Theology of the Epistles* (Duckworth). It is not every day that the student is furnished with so competent a manual. Dr Kennedy has to cover more than Paul's doctrine, but the Pauline theology comes first, and to it he has devoted more than half of his space. One of the merits of his discussion is its balanced judgment. He has weighed, for example, the evidence adduced by Bousset, which is more than can be said for M. C. Piepenbring's discussion of "La Christologie Biblique et ses Origines," now concluded in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*. M. Piepenbring constructs, like Bousset, a

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[1] Mr R. St John Parry's recent edition (*The Pastoral Epistles*: Cambridge University Press) of the Greek text maintains their Pauline authorship, but without any fresh considerations.

[2] Dr B. S. Easton's article in *The Constructive Quarterly* (Dec. 1919, pp. 682–700) on "St Paul's Doctrines of the Atonement" argues that Paul only used the sacrificial theory tentatively, as one of several expressions for his faith.

Paulinism for which he rightly pleads there is no basis in the teaching of Jesus, and then casts abroad to the mysteries for the starting-point of the apostle's theology of faith. Dr Kennedy's synthesis is much more convincing. Another recommendation of his book is its admirable arrangement. Mr Kipling's Golightly "was proud of his faculty of organisation—what we call *bundebust*." It is a faculty for which Dr Kennedy's readers are repeatedly grateful; they soon become conscious that he knows where he is going and that he has that rare quality in theology, an orderly mind. One regrets that the Johannine epistles did not fall within the scope of his handbook. However, Dr Gore's *Epistles of St John* (London: John Murray) may be said to fill the gap. Dr Gore takes the older view that the epistles, like the gospel, were written by the apostle John. But it is his exposition which is really the contribution of the book. He brings out, with his accustomed insight, "the momentous simplicities" of the epistles, especially of the first, about God and sin and morality.

Cardinal Louis Billot's *La Parousie* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne) is a counterblast to the critical estimate of New Testament eschatology by "le modernisme." It is ingenious rather than convincing. When Jesus said that "this generation" would not pass away until all his predictions had been fulfilled, the Cardinal admits that "this generation" meant the contemporaries of Jesus; then, face to face with the prediction not only of invasion and siege but of cosmic convulsions and the advent of the Son of man, he explains that the former were fulfilled at the siege of Jerusalem, and that there was even a partial, preliminary fulfilment of the latter, figuratively as it were! "These simple remarks will be sufficient to clear up all the difficulty," says the good Cardinal. But exegesis of this kind, even when armed with quotations from Chrysostom, Augustine, and Jerome, is like "manning a rush against the breast" of the modernists. He quotes with horror and indignation a "phrase stupéfiante" from Duchesne's *Church History*, which admits that Paul laid down rules about celibacy and marriage "in view of the imminence of the last day"; and this naïve expression of anger is a clue to the naïve tenor of his own arguments. It is not a book to come out into the open; for readers sheltered inside a theological seminary it might pass.

New Testament eschatology fares better in three recent books on the Apocalypse of John, all written from a scholarly, moderate position. Professor S. J. Case calls his monograph on *The Revelation of John* (Chicago) "a historical interpretation"; it endeavours to set the apocalypse in the Domitianic period, as a tract against Cæsar-worship, written by "a Christian of Asia, bearing the familiar name of John." Professor Case's exposition is readable and reliable. His contentions are generally those of ordinary criticism, but they are freshly put, and put in a way that ought to win a hearing from those who may not be acquainted with the solution of the problem reached in our own day. Dr I. T. Beckwith's *Apocalypse of John* (New York: The Macmillan Company) has much the same line and plan, although he thinks that there is "a reasonable degree of probability in the tradition that the book comes from the apostle," and, instead of arguing like Professor Case that the seer mistook Domitian's place in xvii. 10-11, judges that the number seven simply symbolises the Roman power as a whole. The commentary shows wide reading and hard work; Dr Beckwith has written a most thorough-going monograph. Professor Peake's Hartley Lecture on *The Revelation of John* (London: The Holborn

Press) is less technical and ambitious, but equally well equipped. It is a popular presentation of the results of modern criticism, by a writer who has looked at things with his own eyes and who has the gift of interesting the Christian public in these things. Dr Peake has no certain mind upon the authorship, except that he feels it improbable that the book was written by the apostle John. The strength of his volume lies in the persuasive, continuous exposition of what the book meant for early Christianity towards the end of the first century. He has some educative chapters on the permanent message of the book and on its interpretation, which ought to exercise a healthy influence. Dr Peake is refreshingly frank. He admits the repellent features of the Apocalypse, even in noting its sterling qualities. Altogether, he has done a welcome and difficult bit of work. As for the emergence of the crucial issue about Cæsar-worship, which occasioned the persecution under Domitian, Mr Donald M'Fadyen (*American Journal of Theology*, January, pp. 46–66) traces this carefully to Domitian's personal characteristics and to the need of some such deification as a prop for his imperial pretensions. He calls attention rightly to the importance of the crisis as the first deliberate effort "to suppress the Christian religion as such throughout the empire." Hence the seriousness of the situation which evoked the passionate call of the Apocalypse. And in connection with persecutions of the early Church, we may notice a point raised with regard to a later trouble in the second century. In the translation of *Marcus Aurelius* which has just been issued in the Loeb Library, M. C. R. Haines attempts to clear the emperor from the odium of antipathy to Christians. He translates xi. 3, "The readiness (to die) must spring from a man's inner judgment, and not be the result of mere opposition." That is, he renders παράταξις by "opposition," not by "obstinacy," and further conjectures that the following phrase, "as is the case with the Christians," is a gloss (p. 382). This appears to be the view of a recent French critic, M. G. P. Lemercier. The idea of a gloss is, however, not obvious, and when Mr Haines proceeds to argue that Aurelius was so good and just a man that he is unlikely to have punished or persecuted Christians, the argument wears thin. The Roman authorities were not intolerant persecutors, but a good emperor had to enforce the law, and the better he was, officially as well as personally, the less likely he was to tolerate such defiance of imperial regulations as Christians seemed to offer.

The theology of Hermas is examined with admirable penetration by Mr Oscar D. Watkins in the first volume (pp. 47–71) of his *History of Penance* (Longmans). This monograph is most welcome to the student of ecclesiastical history, and naturally the approach made by Hermas to a systematic and rigorous penitential discipline is one of the first data to demand attention. As Mr Watkins points out, "the rule of the *Shepherd* of Hermas that Penance was only admissible once after Baptism became the rule of the Church for many centuries; but it will hardly be wrong to refer its inception to the limiting necessities of the anxious days which preceded a great persecution." The Christology of the book does not come under the scope of Mr Watkins' argument, but, after all, the penitential ideas of the *Shepherd* are among the most characteristic of the book; certainly they were the most influential. In the *Journal of Theological Studies* (April, pp. 193–209) Mr C. H. Turner puts in a timely plea for more attention to the Latin text of Hermas, with a reminder of the significance of the book. It is admitted that Hermas made no great contribution to the rising problem of Christology. But he has been "unfairly neglected. Granted that neither his mind nor his style entitles him to a place in the first rank, yet his moral earnestness, his simple enthusiasms, his championship of a straightforward cheerfulness, ἱλαρότης, as a great Christian virtue, should assure him a rightful place in the august company of the Christian worthies of the generations that followed the Apostles."

P. Batiffol's "Synthèse antidonatiste de saint Augustin" (*Revue Biblique*, 1919, pp. 305–349) is an analysis of the ins and outs of the Donatist controversy as an occasion for Augustine's theory of the Church. This theory took shape, according to Batiffol, as "une conciliation de la foi en la sainteté du corps mystique et du fait de la société mêlée qu'est la *Catholica* visible." He argues that the synthesis is as old as the New Testament and essential to Catholicism. Dr Sparrow Simpson's volume, *The Letters of St Augustine* (S.P.C.K.), forms a convenient introduction to the study of this and of other aspects of Augustine's theology. He wrote letters on the subject for over thirty years. These and the rest of his correspondence are analysed, *i.e.* some salient selections from them, and carefully arranged chronologically in groups. The plan is to weave extracts into an outline of the writer's position on any subject, and Dr Simpson has succeeded in producing a highly useful handbook.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

Divine Personality and Human Life. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the years 1918 and 1919. Second Course. By Clement C. J. Webb.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xvi+291.

This volume completes a work containing many interesting and important reflections. The earlier volume had for its topic Personality in God, the nature of Personality in man being reserved for treatment in this second volume. This order of treatment was justified on two grounds, historical and philosophical. The historical reason was that the conception of personality had developed under the influence of the theological discussions carried on in the Christian Church regarding the persons of the Trinity and the relations of the divine and human natures in Christ; and "the philosophical reason was the fact that Personality is itself an ideal which may best be studied at the outset apart from conditions which in our experience of finite persons limit its full realisation." These are good reasons, so far as they go; but something may be said on the other side. The question about divine personality would never have been asked unless there had already been some conception of personality as it is found in man to make the question intelligible. The two conceptions affect one another in our thought, and it can hardly be maintained that that of divine personality is primary. Nor, with Professor Webb's complete work before us, is it clear that the discussions concerning personality in God throw very much light upon the definition of human personality. The Boethian definition *naturæ rationabilis individua substantia* is still adhered to. Yet the discussion of personality in God was much occupied with, and in the end was an elaboration of, the distinction in the Athanasian Creed between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. Even after the author's learned discussions, questions remained concerning the meaning of these terms as used of God and the Trinity; and some of the difficulties involved were pointed out in the review of the earlier volume in this Journal for July 1919. But the same distinction does not greatly help us in regard to the nature of personality in man. The human person is *individua substantia*; but whether *substantia*, as used here, corresponds to οὐσία or to ὑπόστασις is a question not put. In this respect the study of the ideal of personality is not allowed to explain our finite personality. Yet the inquiry into human personality could have been carried out on these lines, though it might have led only to confusion. God, according to Mr Webb, is the Absolute, the "ultimate system of Reality." Here is his οὐσία. He is also the persons of the Trinity—three ὑποστάσεις. If this mode of conception can throw light on the relation of God to finite persons, then again we shall begin with the conception of God as οὐσία. God or the Absolute is the "ultimate system" and "an all-inclusive unity," and human persons will be included in, or be "appearances" of, God. Are they then ὑποστάσεις in the same sense as that term is used of the "persons" of the Trinity? If not, we cut away the ground for that "personal intercourse" between God and man which is fundamental for Mr Webb's philosophy. If they are, then God is manifested in two personal systems—that of the Trinity and that of finite human persons. How are these two systems related? They are equally included in God, for God is the Absolute and "all-inclusive." They are both personal, and personal in the same meaning of the term—though that personality may be only incompletely realised in the human system. The divine persons are not subject to error or sin, but it is difficult to clear them of finitude without "confusing the persons." However this may be, we do not seem to approach a precise definition of human personality by this route.

But I must not go on talking about what Mr Webb has not said. My point is simply that we have to make a new beginning in investigating personality in man, and that the theological definitions of the earlier inquiry do not help us much. What the author gives us is not so much an inquiry into the nature of human personality as (as indeed his title indicates) a discussion of the relation of divine personality—or belief in it—to different aspects of human life. For this purpose the economic life, the scientific life, the æsthetic life, the moral life, the political life, and the religious life are passed in review successively. Thereafter follow lectures on the value of the individual person as interpreted first by naturalism and then by absolute idealism; and the book closes with a lecture on the destiny of the individual person.

The different aspects of life are accepted, in the main, in the form in which they appear in civilised mankind. In its normal functioning life in all these aspects (unless the religious) commonly goes on without conscious reference to divine personality. It is clear also that some of the aspects, such as the economic, have much less relevance to any such question than others, such as the religious life or the moral. It is clear also that, at least at some stages or in some forms, certain aspects of life, such as the æsthetic and the scientific, are found in antagonism to the recognition of divine personality. But, after all allowance has been made for these things, the general thesis of the discussion may be said to be that human life in all its activities attains the highest dignity of which it is capable only when it is recognised that the human spirit can be and is in personal intercourse with the divine. There are many interesting things in this discussion, especially in the treatment of the scientific life and the æsthetic life. These can be mentioned only. The account of the religious life contains a defence of the author's view of the nature of religious experience against the criticisms of Dr Rashdall. This also must be passed by for the present, in order that a little space may be left for what is said about the moral and political life.

The general problem here is the reconciliation of the factors of consent and of authority in human life. "In our consciousness of obligation," says the author (p. 132), "we are aware of an imponent of the obligation whom we must reverence as other than ourselves and as not merely superior to us but supreme over us, even though, in virtue of the unconditional acceptance of the obligation by our reason, that which he imposes may be intelligibly spoken of as self-imposed. We must acknowledge in obligation, as it has been put, an aspect not only of *autonomy*, but also of *heteronomy*, which turns out on inspection to be really a theonomy." Perhaps the terms in which this view is stated seem to imply that the recognition of an obligation as valid is the same thing as the acceptance of it for the guidance of one's own will; and, if this implication is intentional, it seems to me a confusion of thought. Yet, apart from this, the view is in harmony with the author's doctrine of the equal immanence and transcendence of God; and it is also accompanied by a clear recognition that the obligation of morality has "an intrinsic authority, needing not to be guaranteed by any other revelation from God than that which itself is" (p. 129). If then we recognise—however the recognition may have been arrived at—that the consciousness of obligation implies "the consciousness of a divine lawgiver," we have reached a position in which free assent is given to authority. To establish this same combination of consent with authority is also the problem of politics. But political theories have commonly selected one factor only to the exclusion of the other: consent being the fundamental idea of democracy and stated in the old theory of the social contract, while the idea of authority was expressed in the still more antiquated theory of the divine right of kings.

Mr Webb holds that each of these doctrines involves a truth, though a one-sided truth: "the doctrine of social contract, the truth that without consent there is no legitimate authority; and the doctrine of divine right, the truth that the conception of authority with its correlative obligation cannot be deduced from that of consent, but derives from an ultimate experience of the human spirit incapable of explanation in terms of anything other than itself." And so he infers that "the legitimate authority in the community will have in the strictest sense of the word a 'divine right' to the obedience of its members; but that authority alone can be described as legitimate which is established by consent, just as in the individual's moral life the only way by which I can know the command of God to be his is by the recognition that this and nothing else can I will, in Kant's phrase, 'as law universal,' that is to say disinterestedly, and as what it is not merely pleasant but *right* that I should do" (p. 137).

In spite of the ingenuity as well as the earnestness with which this view is worked out, it does not appear to me to be convincing. The analogy of morals and politics seems to me misplaced. Politics is not analogous to morals; it is a very complicated and distracted case of morals. The religious man will certainly recognise that the moral law is God's law; and in all his political activity he will seek to fulfil God's law; but he will not always find it in the law of the State. Again, the consent upon which democracy or a "free" government is based is not the same thing as, or even analogous to, the recognition of the moral law by the moral reason. It is useless to appeal to Rousseau's *volonté générale* until a precise meaning can be given to this conception. The consent to government or the laws is the consent of a majority, which need not be rational and is seldom reasoned. The moral law has no dependence upon consent of this sort. If authority is an "ultimate experience" of the human spirit, it yet remains hard to determine the human depositories in whom this authority is vested; and tradition would seem to have as good—or bad—a claim to decide where it lies as consent. There are many difficulties in recognising any particular State as "the surrogate of a divine Lawgiver and Ruler" (p. 161).

Mr Webb closes his Gifford Lectures with a dignified if sombre discourse on "the destiny of the individual person." His recognition of personality as belonging to the essence of the divine life would seem to give him a stronger reason than other Absolute Idealists have for the belief that death may not triumph over the personality of man. But he feels the difficulties, he is perplexed by having to conceive the unimaginable, and alienated by the trivialities imagined. In the end for him, as for many others, the belief in immortality depends upon the religious value of our unique individuality.

W. R. Sorley.

Cambridge.

Implication and Linear Inference. By Bernard Bosanquet. Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. viii+180.

Mr Bosanquet's purpose in this brief and lucidly written book is to defend the principle on which his logic is founded against recent attacks, not on his own logical theory, but on the theory and practice of formal logic. While he stands in a manner above the conflict, he has an intense and intimate interest in the fortune of the battle. The critics of Mr Bosanquet and of the philosopher with whom he is closely associated, Mr Bradley, attack the metaphysics on which the logic is based rather than the logical theory itself, and one of the points of greatest interest in this book is the way in which the metaphysical theory is elucidated by the logical principle. In fact the contention which is pressed on us throughout is that escape from the nullification to which formal logic, relying on the syllogism, reduces knowledge is possible only for those who recognise the metaphysical principle expressed in the doctrine of the Absolute. Knowledge cannot start from sense-data, for these offer no means of transition to knowledge; neither can it start from general principles, for these enclose us in a vicious circle from which there is no escape. We must start from the complex situation itself, guided by the principle of coherence in a system.

The opponents or reformers of the formal logic who are criticised are Dr Schiller, Dr Mercier, and Mr Russell, and the criticism of them is not a challenge to their indictment of the syllogistic principle, but is intended to show that their own theories do not in principle abandon the ground taken up by the logic which they attack.

Every inference, Mr Bosanquet tells us, involves a judgment based on the whole of reality, though it may refer only to a partial system, and this need not be actual. This partial system he names a complex. I cannot help thinking the choice of this term unfortunate, because the complex has acquired such a prominent place in the Freudian theory. The Freudians have annexed the term to indicate a self-contained and closed-in system within a greater whole, although they denote a practical and not a theoretical system, psychological not logical in its nature.

Briefly stated in non-technical terms, Mr Bosanquet's contention is that inference is not a habit or custom acquired by observation of sequence and uniformity, which enables us to anticipate experience with increasing confidence based on an increasing degree of probability. This is the type of inference which he calls linear. True inference is implication. Implication always means reference to a system. It involves a judgment based on the whole of reality, even though it refers to a partial system more or less completely closed-in and self-contained. The full force, and the whole force, of an inference lies in this reference to the whole of reality. Thus, to take one of his illustrations, in the assertion, "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space," the essential basis of inference is present, although the judgment may be immediate and independent of any intervening operation between starting-point and conclusion, because the assertion is implied in the nature of space, the system to which it refers, and this system must be different from what it is taken to be if the assertion is untrue.

I am sorry to find that Mr Bosanquet repeats in this book a criticism of Bergson which he made some years ago in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and which I gather from a footnote is also repeated in the recent new edition of his *Logic*, which I have not at hand to refer to. I am sorry, because I think on this particular point Bergson's doctrine is much nearer to Mr Bosanquet's than the words quoted from *Evolution Créatrice* could lead one to suppose. It is quite true that Bergson describes as the characteristic of intellect that "it deals naturally and solely with repetitions. Its function is to bind the same to the same." But this characteristic, in Bergson's view, is derived from the function of intellect and not its original nature. It is intellect which creates the fixity and stability and immobility which is presented to it as matter. The reason why the intellect is "in the main an observer of tautologies" is precisely because it is its essential work to generate that view of the flowing movement which makes it a field of action, and which gives to the human form of activity its specific mode. Is it not clear, I ask, that Bergson's logical theory, like Mr Bosanquet's, is to be appreciated only if we understand and accept, provisionally at least, the metaphysical doctrine on which it rests?

In regard to Mr Bosanquet's book generally, it is enough to say that all students of advanced logic must read it, and also that anyone who may be quite unfamiliar with the technical problems of logic may read it with ease, and will find more enjoyment than the title might encourage him to expect.

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Theology as an Empirical Science. By D. C. Macintosh, Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale University.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1919.—Pp. xvi + 270.

THIRTY years ago there was published a volume of lectures by an American professor, whose early death deprived the theological world of a singularly attractive writer on the themes contained in this volume. It would be too much to say that the mantle of Professor Stearns has fallen upon Professor Macintosh. The qualities of the two writers are very different, and while they necessarily have much in common in the selection of material and in methods of treatment, the individuality of the authors stands out very clearly, and the results vary in some important particulars.

The titles of the two books are different: the earlier work being *The Evidence of Christian Experience*, and the later *Theology as an Empirical Science.* But the titles suggest wider divergences than are to be found in the contents of the volumes. The apologetic interest suggested by the first title does not destroy the scientific character of the work, any more than the wider term "Theology" prevents Professor Macintosh from concentrating attention mainly on Christian experience and Christian doctrine. More formally, however, and more frequently scientific terms and methods are referred to by Professor Macintosh in order to show the possibility of regarding theology as an empirical science. Unweariedly and with considerable skill the outlines of a theology in all respects analogous to such experimental sciences as chemistry or biology are presented. If the physical sciences have their presuppositions and data and laws and theories, so too must theology, and these things will be similarly handled.

The presuppositions of empirical theology are held to be, over and above certain conclusions of the historical and natural sciences, freedom, immortality, sin, and, especially, the existence of God as "the ultimate object of religious dependence or the source of religious deliverance," whose attributes and relations are to be discovered by a scientific treatment of religious experience.

The data of empirical theology are the facts of the religious consciousness, or rather some of those facts, for Professor Macintosh is careful to remind us that "not all that has been experienced in historic religion is truly divine or really holy." Before we can get our data, therefore, a double sifting of the contents of consciousness is necessary. We must first separate the religious consciousness from the total consciousness of the moment, and then select from that narrower sphere of the religious consciousness such elements only as appear to have real and abiding religious value. "Religious perception is a special case of perception in a complex." Two questions are likely, therefore, to suggest themselves at the outset. (1) If we agree that our knowledge of the external world depends upon a selective power of the mind, upon the mind's ability to break up into parts what is first presented as an undifferentiated continuum, are we right in applying the same method in dealing with religious facts or realities? Is the world of religious reality to be explored in the same manner as the physical universe? Can we by any process of abstraction and analysis find God? Is the object of the religious consciousness simply one object among others, detachable from some larger whole, and capable of being known by the withdrawal of attention from all that we decide is not God? It may be that the value of the analytic method in the physical sciences depends upon the nature of the material with which they are concerned, or upon the kind of knowledge with which the scientist as such is content. (2) And further when we have decided that only certain facts of consciousness are religious data, we are confronted by the serious task of determining which of these data are valuable and which are valueless. Who, then, is to decide? All religions are asked to furnish evidence. "But it ought to be readily evident that the adoption of an objectively scientific method in theology will mean that religions other than the Christian are virtually invited to supply such data as their experiences afford, as material for theological science." It is conceivable, the author thinks, that the important data are all transcended or reduplicated in Christianity, but the evidence of each religion should be impartially considered. The most impartial judge, however, must know the principles in accordance with which judgment must be given. So Professor Macintosh supplies him with the pragmatic test, made critical or scientific. "Critical pragmatism passes over into science when a clear distinction is made between that working which constitutes full verification, and other working which falls somewhere short of it. When this distinction is applied in religious pragmatism, then we shall have alongside of the *novum organum* of inductive logic in general a *novum organum theologicum*, a new instrument for the criticism of religious thought and the discovery of religious truth, which will transform theology from mere religious common sense into an inductive empirical science."

The data of empirical theology obtained in this way are not mere images of the mind, but at least as real as other facts of experience. In religious perception, as in the perception of material objects, the mind is in contact with reality. It is one of the merits of the book that it distinguishes clearly between psychology and theology, or, if the word is preferred, between psychologism and theology. It is possible to find in the mental states the indication of the spiritual realities behind them. There is not simply an appreciative but a realistic apperception. Knowledge of reality is given in experience; and it is not always necessary to stop and ask, How can this be?—just as the chemist does not feel himself called upon to demonstrate that the elements with which he deals are something more than images. "There may, of course, be greater need for religious epistemology than for epistemology in general, because of the greater prevalence of religious scepticism than of scepticism as to the knowledge of things in general. But just as there may be much knowledge, and even scientific knowledge, of particular things without much knowledge about knowledge, so there may be much knowledge of God without much knowledge about this knowledge of God."

The data of empirical theology are facts of revelation, and they are found very specially in the historical religions accompanied by the inspiration of the teachers or prophets to whom they were communicated. Within the limits of experimental religion Professor Macintosh finds the most normative revelation of the divine in "the personal life and character of Jesus, 'the Christ,' the atoning 'work of Christ,' the resultant Christian experience of salvation, and the developing 'Kingdom of God.'"

But the empirical theologian, like the physical scientist, formulates laws as well as examines data, and of these the author gives a considerable number. First of all there is the dependableness of God. When there is the right religious adjustment the action of God can be relied upon. That is the foundation of all scientific religious experience, just as the constancy of nature is the ground of confidence in the investigations of natural science. Another example is: "On condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired truly moral states of the will (such as repentance, moral aspiration, and the moral elements in self-control, courage, victory over temptation, faithful service and patient endurance), God the Holy Spirit produces the specific moral results desired."

On the basis of these data and laws the empirical theologian may proceed to theoretical constructions, and to the assignment of attributes to the God surely but dimly apprehended at the beginning. By the experience of the divine, when there has been the proper religious adjustment, a man is led to the knowledge of the goodness and greatness of God. Further, he comes to see that God must be existent in time or He could not have become the object of experimental religion. He must be realised as self-dependent, or He could not have satisfied the religious need for the Absolute. And similarly with other attributes usually associated with Deity.

The value of a work such as this depends not only upon the depth and extent of the author's religious experience, but also upon the use made of the writings of others. Dr Macintosh has said many things that are good and done much to justify the application of his method to theology. But there is need of a wider survey of the relevant facts, and a juster appreciation of what has already been provided in the biographies of the saints and the classical writings of the various religions. Traditional theology is based upon experience to a larger extent than is allowed for here. The New Testament may still be the best handbook of empirical theology, though the least formal and discursive. H. H. Scullard.

London.

From Authority to Freedom. By L. P. Jacks, LL.D., D.D.
London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.

This deeply interesting record of a remarkable man illustrates very forcibly the sad prediction of Christ that his coming would bring "not peace but a sword" upon earth, dividing families and breaking up domestic ties. The story of Charles Hargrove's life opens in the home of a stern Evangelical divine of the old school, imbued with a fanatical horror of Popery. In families of this type there was a strange tendency to make one of the children a scapegoat, and not infrequently the best of them was singled out for this treatment. So it was with Hargrove, whose parents early came to the conclusion that his soul was in imminent danger, and that it was their duty to scold and whip him into a better mind. Their worst fears were more than realised when at the age of twenty-two he joined the Roman Church, and four years later became a Dominican monk, a lapse from grace which embittered the old age and perhaps even shortened the lives of both his parents. The grief and indignation of the father's letters are most pathetic, because real affection is apparent under all the invective, and because we feel that Charles Frearson Hargrove unwittingly drove his son in the direction which he least desired him to take. The secession seems to have been made rather impulsively, and as a consequence of accepting that curious syllogism which was responsible for so many conversions to Rome in the days of the Tractarians. "God must have given to man a divine and supernatural revelation. There must be a living authority to interpret this revelation. No other Church except Rome even claims to be this authority." In Hargrove's case it was the major premiss which at last gave way, after he had been for ten years a Dominican. The record of his life in this Order is one of the most interesting parts of the book. There is something terrible in the effectiveness of the methods by which the door of escape is bolted and barred upon a convert who has been once captured.

Not only is he cut off from all outside influences, but to harbour doubt even for a minute is to commit a deadly sin. The wonder is that a man ever frees himself from an obedience which enthralls the soul more completely than the body. In Hargrove's case emancipation came after he was sent to Trinidad, where he began again to mix in society and to read secular literature. Doubts as to a supernatural revelation were reinforced by a revolt of the will against its servitude, and by a horror of the doctrine of eternal damnation, which was of course held by his parents as strongly as by the Church of his choice. The end came abruptly, but doubts may have been stifled for some time before they got the upper hand. He quietly left the Order, and returned to England, where, after drifting for a short time, he threw in his lot with the Unitarians, and had a career of varied usefulness and considerable distinction as a Unitarian minister at Leeds. His duties were too exacting to permit him to produce any important literary work, and there are signs that he would not have found it easy to concentrate himself for long on any one task; but his personal influence was wide and deep, and he was an excellent citizen. He had friends in other religious bodies, but he was inclined to exaggerate the disapproval with which the orthodox regard the society to which he belonged, a disapproval which his own brother was at no pains to conceal. He married some time after leaving the Roman Church, thereby cutting off the chance of return to it, though he felt the pull from time to time, as almost all who have been Roman priests do. The last half of his life seems to have been happy as well as busy, and when he died at a good old age, he had won the respect and affection of a large circle.

The biographer has done his work with great tact and skill, and has given us one of the most valuable religious biographies that have appeared in recent years.
W. R. Inge.

St Paul's, London.

George Tyrrell's Letters. Selected and Edited by M. D. Petre.
London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920.

To supply a complete picture of the life and thought of Father Tyrrell these letters should be read with his books and biography, of which latter a short summary is provided at the beginning of the volume. By themselves they can yield no more than fragmentary glimpses, but are invaluable as a supplement and as throwing strong sidelights upon the darker places of his more formal writings. They reveal the inner workings of his mind and heart in a way impossible to the latter. For though his published works are plain-spoken, they could not but, in some degree, manifest the sense of restraint imposed by his relations to the Church at large and to the Society of Jesus in particular. These letters, without any circumlocution or *finesse*, display the conditions, internal and external, under which the larger works were written. Tyrrell did not commit himself to a detailed system. He would never have been the author of a new scholasticism. He was too well aware of the necessarily tentative and hypothetical character of all syntheses to fall into such an error. But his writings show clearly enough that a more or less complete *schema* was present to his mind, by which he sought to assure himself of his own position and reconcile the

Church's mission and message to the world with the progressive developments of science and philosophy. As regards the latter he was eclectic. The influence of St Thomas Aquinas never entirely deserted him, though largely modified by Kantian and Pragmatic views. Under the pressure of the inward impulse of his thought and the outer circumstances of his life, his theological opinions matured rapidly in his later years, till in *Christianity at the Cross Roads* he gave to the world a fuller expression of his general trend of thought than in any of his previous writings.

The "increasing purpose" that inspires his works is the conversion of the exaggerated intellectualism of dogma into moral and spiritual values. These latter elements have always been present in Christian dogma, but have been obscured by the Church's almost exclusive insistence on its theological aspect. The task he attempted—truly Herculean—was to effect a revaluation of dogma on these lines, so that these more permanent elements might attain their due predominance, while the theological sank into its humbler position of symbolic significance. This amounted to nothing less than the overthrow of the traditional ideas as to theology and authority, which are coeval with the history of organised Christianity, and which, though they reach their completest and most uncompromising development in Catholicism, are also common to the chief Protestant communions.

The authority that remained was moral. That of Pope and Hierarchy depended, as that of Christ and his Apostles, upon life and example, though he recognises the difficulty of this application of the idea (p. 105). It was a consistent application of his fundamental notion, which he derived from Kant, and on which he repeatedly insists, that the only valid proofs of the existence of God are moral (pp. 13, 26, 27, 108); that the conscience, not the individual or conventional, but the general spiritualised and divinised conscience of mankind, is the only real authority whether for belief or practice (pp. 35, 228 ff.). This conscience (he teaches in *Christianity at the Cross Roads*) was made flesh in Christ, who of all men came nearest to the fulfilment of the Ideal, and this is the true meaning of the Incarnation (p. 230.) The whole body of dogmas must be reinterpreted on similar lines. As for that notion of theological authority which puts its experts in the position of men of science and makes faith a kind of knowledge, and which culminated in the definition of Papal Infallibility, he will have none of it, though he has an unpleasant suspicion (doubtless justified by facts) that it is the inevitable development of a principle which can be traced to St Paul and even in St Matthew's Gospel (p. 104).

It is easy to see how the expression of such views, however guarded, inevitably brought him into collision with such a rigidly dogmatic system as that of Rome and of the Society of Jesus. That such antagonism existed and grew, with the growth of his thought, till it culminated in his excommunication, is a matter of history. In these letters he speaks plainly to correspondents of his hopes and fears, of his own faith in the ultimate triumph of his principles and of his efforts to maintain his position in the face of suspicion and opposition on the part of the authorities. It was a difficult position to maintain, and his sincerity leads him sometimes into interesting admissions of his doubts as to the complete validity of that valuation of dogma, which he may be said to have shared with all "advanced" theologians of every denomination. What made all the difference in Tyrrell's case was his Catholic priesthood and Jesuit membership, and also that his acceptance of the theory was more thorough, consistent, and uncompromising than theirs. This is the distinguishing mark between Broad Catholicism and Liberal Protestantism, which latter, both in history and in dogma, keeps some absolute preserve, whether greater or less. Thus Harnack pins his faith to a doubtful text in St. Matthew, as Loisy showed in his *Évangile et l'Église*, and Anglican Broad Churchmen believe in the Trinity in some refined sense of their own while rejecting Transubstantiation as a later and unhistorical development. Tyrrell, as a Catholic, did not distinguish between the theological values of the doctrines defined by the Church as *de fide*. All are to be reckoned as parts of one whole. "The whole" (he writes on p. 57) "has a spiritual value as a construction of time in relation to Eternity. It gives us the *world* of our religious life. But I do not feel bound to find an independent meaning in each element; or to determine prematurely what elements are of literal, and what of purely symbolic, value—which is the core of historic fact and which idealisation. My faith is in the truth, shadowed by the whole creed." To take one dogma by itself, isolate it and question its credibility or historicity is not only un-Catholic, but uncritical and unhistorical. All the dogmas are interrelated and stand or fall together in the Church's system, just as all parts of knowledge are related to the whole. And even the older doctrines, as that of the Trinity, have an origin and a history, comparable to those of the later developed, albeit not so clear owing to the paucity of early records. Hence Tyrrell saw quite clearly, and, in a letter to Lord Halifax (p. 132), put the matter with his usual sincerity, that, while so-called "Anglo-Catholicism" would be out of sympathy with the breadth of "Modernism," the Broad party in the Church of England would be equally so for another reason.

Yet, though in his published works he always treats the whole question on general lines and was opposed on principle to the attempt to apply the theory in detail, he gives some indications in this correspondence of the way in which he conceives his revaluation of dogma would affect particular doctrines. Thus, in a letter to A. F. (p. 63), he writes:—

> "Is it not evident that there is often a difference of Yea and Nay between Modernism and popular Catholicism? Can the Christian religion admit the deliberate toleration of error, fable, and superstition out of deference to the ignorance of the crowd? . . . Mysteries and symbols are justifiable just so far as truth does not admit of plain statement. But have we a right to cover up in myths and fables those simple truths of Christianity? . . . If we tell them that Christ's body rose into the clouds, they will only laugh their whole religion to scorn. If we tell them that his self-sacrifice raised him above his fellows, to the level of God, they will understand and believe and love and imitate. The spiritual truth of the Eucharistic presence is within a child's comprehension; the carnal miracle of Transubstantiation is now a scandal to the meanest intelligence."

It will be observed that here, while a clear idea is substituted for the story of the Ascension, this is not so in the case of Transubstantiation. Yet, after having so candidly stated his negative position, some positive declaration would have been welcome. And, indeed, could any case be imagined where a "plain statement" was more required, when it is considered that this dogma has been one of the greatest causes of misunderstanding between Catholics and Protestants of all grades. His prelude leads the reader to expect this, and leaves him disappointed. His few remarks on the same important subject, addressed to Baron von Hügel (p. 59), are open to the same criticism:—"So, too, in affirming the philosophical concept of Transubstantiation, or of the Hypostatic union, she but protects the simple truths of revelation on which her affirmation formally falls." It seems to the present reviewer that it is just these "simple truths" which are by no means clear, or, if clear, then very much misrepresented by the dogmas, in view of the critical work done on the old documents of recent years, and especially of Loisy's commentary on the Gospels, wherein he shows that, shorn of all verbal accretions, the institution of the Eucharist was no more than a farewell meal.

Tyrrell is much more explicit on the doctrine of the Virgin birth (p. 58), in the same letter, but hardly more satisfactory. His explanations of this and other questions, here and elsewhere, are very ingenious, but the chief defect is that he seems to read a moral purpose (pp. 57-64) into early Christian mythology, which does not appear to have been present to the minds of its originators. It is, *e.g.*, hard to believe that the authors of the Ascension story (p. 64) had definitely in view the exaltation of Christ's moral grandeur rather than, primarily, an exhibition of supersensible triumph and power, such as is displayed in certain miracles of the Gospel and which may have had some foundation in superphysical facts. It seems simpler and truer to assume that it is the mystico-magical element which here predominates in the story itself, and that this subsequently gains whatever moral aspect it possesses from the character of Jesus. This has surely been the order of development in all myth-making —first the story, then its moralisation; and if so, it is gratuitous to assume that the Christian myths originated differently. This would of course admit the theological element, of which myth is the *matrix*, into the very heart of what Tyrrell calls "revelation," which is contrary to one of his main principles, but it is simply a question of fact and criticism.

Yet he is wonderfully candid and sincere withal. He writes (p. 61): "To some extent symbolism is a sop to Cerberus. It will do for the present to keep the old and new believers in our Church. But eventually men will ask, Why express symbolically what can be said plainly, and *we shall have to criticise and define the just limits of symbolism.*[1] . . . Again, a good deal of our symbolic interpretation is apologetic afterthought and not quite honest. We should ask, Are we truly interpreting the meaning that the symbol strove imperfectly to express? . . . But then, if we can express it more clearly, why adhere to the symbol? . . . Altogether it seems to me a very complex problem."

"It cannot be denied that the desire of Modernists to hold to the Church at all costs (in which they are right) acts as a bias on their perfect candour and makes them too ingenious. . . . Courage is, I learn daily, the rarest of virtues; and have ceased to look for it—even in myself." In this connection it is interesting to quote from a letter (p. 158) included in that division of the volume which comes under the head of "Personal": "As to your analysis, I never claimed to be more than indifferent honest. As the nearest that man can come to wisdom is to realise his folly; so none is further removed from honesty than he who brags himself honest. I know I am but as a skein of silk that has been touzled by a kitten; still, in that I freely admit it, and also do heartily dislike the state of tangle, I am, at least in aspiration, honest *as any man of my experience* can be. For surely the shorter the thread, the less its capacity of implication; and it is easy for these Yorkshire ploughboys to be simple and straight, but very difficult for a *fin-de-siècle* Jesuit with all my circumstances and antecedents." Again he writes (pp. 108, 109): "Have you ever read John Morley's book on *Compromise?* It is a stronger plea for honesty than I yet feel equal to. But I think his hard sayings apply to those only whose convictions are fixed and subjectively certain, and so I may go on shuffling a little longer." "And yet I have the horrors on me, and feel tangled in the arms of some marine polypus or giant octopus. The Church sits on my soul like a nightmare, and the oppression is maddening; much more since these revelations of bad faith and cruel mendacity. . . . Hence I do long for *simpler* conditions, when I should not have to do good by stealth, and whisper the truth in holes and corners as though it were obscenity. The grotesque insincerity of my position as a Jesuit appals me at times. . . . And then something says: No, wait till you are driven. Initiate nothing. Yet if an opening offered I think my prudence would prove frail against the temptation."

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[1] Italics are mine.

The difficulty of such a position can be well imagined, and he felt it acutely. A man with exceptionally strong reasoning powers, with a correspondingly deep and wide religious sentiment, a nature utterly sincere and open and hating all shams, to find himself by fate and circumstances forced into a position in which his sense of loyalty to his Church and Order was in antagonism to the free expression of what he believed to be the truth—here were all the elements of a tragedy! It is easy for an outsider to say—Why, then, did he not secede? Tyrrell contemplated the possibility of such a step (p. 115), but only if he were "driven" (p. 109). Besides, he had the positive reason for remaining in the Roman Communion that he firmly believed in institutionalism. "The antinomy that I wrestle with," he writes (p. 113), "is that institutionalism, or externalism, is at once essential and fatal to religion." And he believed in each individual, so long as possible, remaining in the Communion from which his spiritual life had been drawn, as is shown by his letters of advice to would-be converts from other bodies (p. 254 ff.), and, in any case, he was utterly opposed to the formation of new sects (p. 111). Further, though he did not believe in the claims of the Catholic hierarchy to intellectual obedience, yet he could not but recognise the historical fact that the Roman Catholic Church was the Mother of all Churches in its jealously preserved continuity of doctrine, discipline, and ceremonial, and in its international extension (see pp. 31, 106, 112, 249). He did not desire to destroy but to fulfil, in the sense of reinterpreting its theology, or, rather, as he would have preferred to put it, bringing to light those hidden foundations which alone give that theology reality.

Although he disclaims optimism (p. 3), he must have been very much of an optimist to believe this possible, and he retained this optimism to the last, as is shown by numerous passages throughout these letters. His optimism was founded on the delusion, which recurs frequently in the course of the volume, that the pressure of the lay element in the Church would eventually bring about reforms which the hierarchy were struggling to withhold. One or two quotations will suffice as examples (p. 110): "One thing I am sure of—that, in spite of theory, the Church is ultimately taught and governed from below; that the formation of the lay mind is the thing to trust in and work for." And (p. 21) "The millions of the near future will not be the docile, priest-worshipping crowds of dear old Ireland, but will be up in all these questions, now whispered in the ear among ourselves; and so we must get ready."

The chief way in which the "lay mind" has affected the Church in the past, apart from the movement that issued in the Reformation, has been by providing those superstitions which the Church has consecrated. At present, except in a very few cases, not only the uneducated, but even those who pass for educated among practising Catholics, accept quite uncritically the Church's authority as the basis for their belief in her dogmas. They are "blind led by the blind," and "the people love to have it so." The Roman authorities are not entirely fools and would not attempt to oppose a really strong movement in the laity. Those who wrote and published *Pascendi* and *Lamentabili* judged their Catholic public, on the whole, well.

Another thing which helped to keep Father Tyrrell from succumbing sooner than he did to the mental and moral struggle, which his views and position made inevitable, was his saving sense of humour. The "personal" letters are full of this, though one feels that many of his allusions are lost or obscured by the absence of the letters of his correspondents. At the end of the last chapter but one of the volume there is reprinted a delightful little article of his from the *Weekly Register* of 27th May 1899, in which, under the head of "Books that have influenced me," he makes a happy combination, as elsewhere, of the lightest persiflage with a serious philosophic view of life.

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The Beginnings of Christianity. Part I: The Acts of the Apostles. Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D. Vol. I. Prolegomena.—London: Macmillan & Co. 1920.—Pp. x + 480.

IN the disputes concerning doctrine and practice which arose in the early Church, all parties appealed to Apostolic tradition and writings as the ruling authority in such matters. There is evidence of this in the literature of the second century, and the practice is still observed by the generality of Christian writers. Notwithstanding the numerous divisions in the Christian Church, and the fundamentally different views which are often held by opposing sections within it, Apostolic authority is invoked and accepted by nearly all as final. This is done because such tradition and writings are believed to repose on the teaching of the Apostles to whom the Founder of the Christian faith—so it is claimed—had delivered a certain deposit of doctrine and a body of ordinances. The claim is subjected to a scholarly investigation in the above volume which, by way of introduction to others that are to follow, is the first of a series. The conclusions arrived at on many points will no doubt cause a few to tremble "for the faith that is in them," but every lover of truth will welcome the work, as a courageous and honest effort to present a clear and consistent picture of the beginnings of the Christian religion.

The book under review is divided into three parts, the first of which is devoted to the Jewish World; the second, to the Gentile world; and the third, to the primitive Christian community. Most of the volume is the work of the editors, but Dr Montefiore, Messrs H. Duckworth and Clifford Moore, and Professor George Foot Moore have also contributed. Of five appendices, three are by the editors and two by Prof. G. F. Moore.

There has been no attempt to fit in the chronological data of the Synoptics, into the story of the Jewish state in Chapter I. The historicity of Jesus is assumed, and the reader will naturally infer that the editors have found no sufficient reason for rejecting the accepted theory that Jesus entered upon his public ministry and died during the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate. It may be their intention to discuss this part of the subject in a future volume, otherwise the omission of it from the present one must be regarded as a defect.

Dr Montefiore, in dealing with the spirit of Judaism, is somewhat apologetic in tone. He writes, however, with full knowledge of Rabbinical writings. He boldly states that Judaism taught no doctrine of original sin, that it cherished "a vigorous and healthy sense of human responsibility," and that this passage from the Mishnah—"The day of atonement atones for sins between man and his God; it does not atone for sins between man and his neighbour till he has become reconciled with his neighbour"—represents the considered doctrine of the Synagogue on the atonement. In its highest form, Rabbinical teaching regarded repentance as sufficient ground for forgiveness (p. 72).

The editors, in discussing thought and practice in Judaism, have given us the best treatment of the significance of the ministry of John the Baptist that has so far appeared in English. They exonerate the Pharisees from the charge brought against them in the Synoptic Gospels of making the law more difficult of observance by their use of tradition in interpreting its enactments, affirming that they aimed at making and succeeded in making the observance of it easier. The chapter on the Diaspora is a clear statement of the debt of the Christian Church to the work of the Jews who had settled abroad, especially at Alexandria.

Nothing better could be wished for on the Roman Provincial System than Mr Duckworth's admirable contribution, which is lucid in style and evinces complete mastery of the subject. The space of one short chapter for dealing with the schools of thought, cults, and the public activities of the Roman Empire compels Mr Clifford Moore to be brief in his treatment of his subject. He has given us, however, a valuable summary of the facts. If we are to indulge in a regret, it is that more has not been said about the life of the lower classes, to whom Christianity first appealed.

It is now generally admitted that Christianity was largely influenced by Greek philosophy, many of whose leading ideas were freely annexed in the development of its doctrines. "The ethics taught by the Stoic and the other schools," says Mr Moore, "with their emphasis on the individual life, formed a sound basis on which Christianity could build, and provided it with a body of doctrine which it could advantageously adopt . . . for it was the genius of Christianity to weld together into a new organic unity elements drawn primarily from Stoic ethics, from the later Platonic metaphysics, from Oriental mysticism, and from Roman administration, as well as from the faith and hope of Israel" (pp. 261–2). Christianity had something new to contribute to the ethics of the Greek schools, for, he adds, that "no philosophic system of ethics ever rose to the altruistic teachings of Jesus, or taught that love was to extend to one's enemies."

All this is true, though many will question whether it is the whole truth about the relation of Christianity to pagan ethics; for even the later Stoics failed to appreciate the new religion, notwithstanding the points of similarity between it and their system. Are we not to look for the causes of its unpopularity with the cultured classes of the Empire in a fundamental difference, which had its roots in a difference of attitude towards life?

Little has yet been published by English writers on the lines of Part III. of this book. What we have previously had are mostly translations of works published on the Continent. The editors discuss the teaching of Jesus, the life and thought of the primitive Christians, and Christology of the Synoptics and Acts. They deal with this part of the subject in a commendable critical spirit, for they obviously realise the importance of the subject in its bearing on popular Christianity, and conduct their investigations with caution. Professor Moore has made an independent study of the Messianic hope of the Jews, and handles his subject in his accustomed thorough-going fashion. If his conclusions overturn the generally accepted ideas, he, at least, speaks with the authority of a fearless scholar. It is a false notion, he writes, that the age of Jesus expected a warrior-Messiah. That expectation dated only from the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Prior to this event, the Jews had looked for a peaceful ruler, and even in that form the "hope" could not be traced beyond the Hasmonean period.

It is difficult to summarise this part of the volume without the risk of injustice to the authors, for in the light of the context only can the reasonableness of their inferences be seen. Some indication of what it contains must, however, be attempted. Early Christian writers, it is averred, displayed no capacity for appreciating fine distinctions of meaning. They combined the titles "Son of Man," "Son of David," "Son of God," "Prophet like unto me," and "Messiah," and applied them to Jesus, notwithstanding that they connoted different conceptions. The idea of immortality was not a part of the Jewish Messianic hope, and nowhere figured as one of the blessings of the coming era. A belief in the "resurrection" exerted very little influence on Jewish faith. The conception of the end of this world, of a resurrection of the dead and of eternal bliss had originated in Persia. The "Kingdom of God" connoted for the Jews the sovereignty of God in the present life chiefly; whereas for the primitive Christians it referred primarily to the rule of God in a future life, though the Jewish notion is not altogether absent from the teaching of Jesus. There existed a body of Aramaic Christian literature before the Greek Gospels were written. The first part of the Acts is based upon this source, and in all probability Mark and Q. In the oldest synoptic strata Jesus is shown as a preacher of repentance because the Kingdom was at hand. He scarcely ever referred to himself. It is doubtful whether "Son of Man" in Mark can mean the Apocalyptic heavenly being, at least in a number of passages it is the equivalent of the Aramaic barnasha (man). Jesus, apparently, rejected the title "Son of David," which enthusiastic followers gave him. He did not centre his teaching on the nature of God, for the doctrine of the fatherhood of God was a popularly accepted Jewish conception. His teaching was concerned with the way men should live and become worthy children of the Heavenly Father. He did not contemplate founding a Church, neither did he command his disciples to baptize. He was conscious of an indwelling divine spirit urging him to undertake his mission and persevere therein. It cannot be affirmed with any degree of certainty that Jesus identified himself with the "Suffering Servant." After his death he is called the "Son of God" by his followers, but on Jewish lips that meant no more than that every righteous man is a son of God. This relationship for a Jew was a moral and not a metaphysical one. His disciples identified him with the prophetic well-known picture of the righteous man suffering and misunderstood, soon after his crucifixion. He was, however, seen alive by the Apostles after his Passion, which brought them all back to Jerusalem to wait for the Parousia. They had a place of prayer of their own, but they remained faithful adherents of Judaism, and were recognised as such by the temple authorities. The communism practised among them was due to their expectation of a speedy Parousia. They lived on their capital and soon exhausted it. Poverty followed, which the less visionary Gentile churches helped to relieve. Circumstances made the election of the seven deacons necessary. This was a new step, and its results were tremendous; for Hellenistic influences and ideas poured in upon the primitive society. It was then that baptism was introduced, and the doctrine of regeneration was attached to it. Peter, evidently, was in sympathy with the new movement and its missionaries, but Paul became its chief champion. The other Apostles remained loyal to their Jewish conceptions. Both wings, however, emphasised the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the earliest Church is described as a society of those who through the Lord Jesus Christ had received the Holy Spirit. The belief that the Spirit was bestowed at baptism or by the laying on of hands is traced to this early stage of Church history.

It appears somewhat strange that the editors should have accepted the evidence for the inclusion of the reference to the Holy Spirit in the preaching of the Baptist as sufficient to outweigh the inherent improbability of it. Harnack, in his reconstructed Q, brackets the words Holy Spirit. The reference to the disciples of John in the Acts contradicts it, and Josephus knows nothing of it.

That Jesus was conscious of being controlled by the Spirit is evidently an inference drawn by reading between the lines, so to speak, for there is but one mention of the Spirit in Q, and the text there is uncertain. Luke has "finger," whereas Matthew reads "Spirit." The Lucan variant has the flavour of greater antiquity. Once only is the word "Spirit" placed in the mouth of Jesus in Mark (iii. 29). Indeed, in the Synoptic Gospels there is nothing more noticeable than the absence of references to the Spirit in the teaching of Jesus—unless it be the absence of reference to any baptism of the disciples by Jesus, and it is difficult to understand how our authors could have overlooked this important contribution to their argument that the rite was introduced after his death. Dr Lake, who elsewhere admits that the doctrine of transubstantiation is to be found in the Pauline Epistles, as an element that was borrowed from paganism, affirms in this book that regeneration in baptism, which he also finds in the New Testament, is likewise traceable to pagan sources. It would thus appear that the whole fabric of sacerdotalism is a foreign accretion. If the cry "Back to Jesus" were translated into action to-day, what a revolution would follow in our methods of presenting the Gospel message!

Needless to say, all the difficulties involved in the Synoptics and in the theology of the Acts are by no means solved in this work. The editors have, at least, shown us the road by which the truth may peradventure be reached, and for this the student of Christian origins may well be grateful. Amid so many merits, it is perhaps ungracious to draw attention to minor blemishes, but there is apparently a misprint on p. 189, where Aulus Gabinius is said to have been a pro-consul in Syria in 66 B.C. The period of office given by Mommsen is 57–54 B.C., so that the year 56 B.C. must be intended. So too in a footnote on p. 346, pp. 246 to 262 should be pp. 346 to 362.

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The Revelation of John. By Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D.—London: Joseph Johnson, 1919.—Pp. xiv+390.

DR PEAKE tells us in his preface that it had not been his intention to publish anything on the Revelation of John. He had included this in the optional subjects for the Manchester B.D., with the expectation that Dr J. H. Moulton would take it. This, however, turned out to be impossible, and he had to lecture on the book himself. When he was called last year to deliver the "Hartley" lecture this subject appealed to him as being suitable and timely. The result is the present volume, which is a real contribution to the interpretation of a fascinating but, so often, fantastically treated book.

Circumstances have conspired of late years to deliver the Revelation of John from the clutches of those who fain would find in it a sketch of history from the earliest times to the end of the age. Our knowledge of Apocalyptic has grown. The work of Dr Charles has been most important, although his eagerly awaited commentary in the International Critical Series has not yet been published. There is general agreement now, among scholars who count, that the writer of Revelation is dealing with events of his own day, and that his predictions are for the immediate future that faces him. The difficulties into which "continuous-historical" and "futurist" interpreters have fallen have led to an escape being sought from the fetters of history by means of the theory that the book deals with principles, and not with history at all. This view was developed by Dr Milligan, but he did not succeed in showing that it presents a complete scheme of the book. The war aroused new enthusiasm on the part of those who endeavour to trace current events in the series of seals, trumpets and bowls, and their attendant signs. Har-magedon had come at last, and the Kaiser was certainly the Beast or, at least, the false prophet. The war has passed, and already the need is apparent that the riddle must be read differently, or given up. Experience teaches us that the latter alternative will not be taken. Mohammed, the Popes of Rome, Luther, Napoleon, and others have served their turn, yet failure to fulfil prediction causes no dismay among those who profess to have a key that fits the lock. Discredited at one point they plunge into fresh fancies, making their interpretation of this scripture a riot of futile freaks. Dr Peake follows the "præterist" method of interpretation, but with the concession that the writer of the Revelation often held mistaken views as to the meaning of the history of his own times. He will have nothing to do with the attempts to fit the scheme of the book into the materials supplied either in Josephus or in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.* The result will be disappointing to those who believe that they can discern in the mysteries of the Revelation clear references to ancient history and to current events, who read into it the history of our own and future times drawn out in prophetic form. But for those who desire to gain some understanding of the meaning of this most prominent representative of the heroic stage of Jewish literature these pages will brim over with interest.

Controversy, sometimes of a lively character, has gathered around the Revelation of John from early days. The East would not accept it, but the West gave it enthusiastic support. That it "has retained its place in the Canon is due," Dr Charles declares, "not to its extravagant claims to inspiration or its apocalyptical disclosures, but to its splendid faith and unconquerable hope, that has never failed to awaken the corresponding graces in every age of the Church's history." Its contents have weighed more than its canonicity.

The matters concerning which controversy has been keenest are its date, its author, and its interpretation. Early testimony regarded it as belonging to the days of Domitian, but in more recent times there was a tendency to push back the date to before the destruction of Jerusalem. The references to the temple as still standing (chap. ii.) were deemed to require this. It was also felt necessary to provide some space between the Revelation and the Gospel if both were to be ascribed to John the Apostle. But the letters to the seven Churches reveal a state of things that could not have existed so early, and persecution on the scale that these letters describe did not occur until the reign of Domitian. Dr Peake, while he does not dogmatise, accepts the last decade of the first century as the most probable date of the completed book.

As to the authorship, Dionysius of Alexandria, in the second century, referred to the shadowy mention of the tombs of two Johns at Ephesus, and to the fact that there probably were many Johns in Asia. He also speaks of John Mark as a possible writer of the Revelation, although he does not give his sanction to this solution of the problem. He is definite, however, in his conviction that the John who wrote the Gospel and Epistles did not write the Revelation. The thought of to-day gravitates towards this position. The style of the Revelation is almost decisive in assigning its authorship to some other than the John of the Gospel. When an earlier date was given to the Revelation this difficulty might possibly have been met (although this is disputed), but since both books, in all probability, belong to the Domitian age this is no longer possible. The books belong to different orders of literature. The atmosphere of Revelation, speaking generally, is sensuous, that of the Gospel is spiritual and mystical. The objective and the tangible appear in the one; the speculative, the free initiative of the spirit, in the other. Many strands of evidence go to strengthen the opinion that the two books, although they have affinities, are not the product of one mind, but the strongest evidence is of a subjective, psychological character. Dr Peake finds it "easier to be confident as to negative than as to positive conclusions. That the Revelation was not written by the Apostle John nor by the author of the Fourth Gospel, and that it is not pseudonymous, are results which can claim a high probability. But beyond this it is difficult to go with any assurance."

It is when we come to the interpretation of the book that we are launched on uncharted seas. Völter, a pupil of Weizsäcker, originally propounded a redaction theory which met with no acceptance. Afterwards he modified this by combining it with a source hypothesis. Vischer, a pupil of Harnack, published in 1886 his theory that the Revelation was merely a Jewish writing worked over by a Christian author. Harnack was at first dubious as to this, but after hearing the arguments he described their effect on him by saying: " There fell from my eyes as it were scales." It is probable that, in addition to actual history and tradition (both from Jewish and mythical sources), there is in this book the record of a real spiritual experience. After criticism has done its best (or worst) to sift the sources of the writer's materials it remains that the book takes its present form by the will of its author, and in response to a deliberate desire to give expression to a definite design. It is a literary unity.

The references to contemporary history cannot be traced easily. The explanation of the wounded beast as referring to Nero Redivivus is to be traced to the Jesuit, Juan Mariene. Protestant expositors have learned from him the way to cultivate this field of topical allusion. Only in their interpretations they have generally turned against their teacher. It is evident that a great conflict is about to break out between Christianity and the Roman State religion. The book is full of glowing hope for the triumph of right. It seeks to inspire to courage those who are in danger of giving way to despair. When darkness seems about to descend the seer looks from the vantage point of heaven upon the world and declares that at eventide it shall be light. But this is not all. There are references to great Christian principles, although it is too much to say that these are always conspicuous, or always clear. There is a hardness that reveals the deteriorating influence of an age of persecution. The rough common sense of Luther seized upon this aspect of the book, " He cannot see that it was the work of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he does not like the commands and threats which the writer makes about his book, and the promise of blessedness to those who keep what is written in it, when no one knows what that is, to say nothing of keeping it, and there are many nobler books to be kept." Of course, this attitude misses much that is valuable in the Revelation, but on the whole it is more helpful than the many attempts that have been made to conjure with its mysteries. Yet there is even more than this that reveals the spirit of the age in which the book was written. The enemies of goodness are regarded with an unconcealed hatred—without pity or relief of any kind. The reformers were on the right track in finding in it conflicting elements: mingled with much that is Christian there is much that is only cruel. Dr Peake refers to this in plain terms: " It is regrettable that a Christian writer should have permitted himself either to write or to borrow the description of the river of blood, which pours from the winepress till it is so deep that it reaches to the bridles of the horses and extends for a distance equivalent to the length of Palestine." Yet, even here, there is this to remember: " It is obvious that in the human sphere the spiritual movement is no quiet development, no unresisted advance, but a severe conflict, not only with external difficulties, but against resistance from within; in the conflict the victory is often to the lower, which may even attach spiritual forces to itself, alienate them from their true purpose and work their destruction." In the long run, however, the spiritual proves imperishable.

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It may be that if we could have the quotation marks of modern literature in the Revelation, the task of interpretation would have been simplified. Some of the sentiments of his sources may not convey the writer's considered judgment. Yet evidently the writer had a way of his own in facing the problems of his own age, and the immediate acceptance of his book speaks eloquently for his success in the purpose he assayed. The border line between fact and figure has worn thin for us moderns. To some it seems all a puzzle.

> "For there is nothing in it as it seems
> Saving the King; tho' some there be that hold
> The King a shadow, and the city real."

Symbol there is, but how much symbol may be safely allowed is too large a question to discuss here.

There is nothing else in the New Testament literature to compare with this book. More than the letters of Paul or the Gospel of John, it is "an embodiment of average beliefs and hopes. . . . It expresses the faith and the temper of Christianity in the early years of its conflict, its struggle for existence against a hostile world." And it holds its own. Writers, such as Thomas Hardy, who describe the life of the common people bear eloquent though often unconscious testimony concerning its vogue among the vulgar. Its solution of the problem cannot be accepted. Plainly its predictions did not prove true. The poetic description of the New Jerusalem will not bear too literal dissection. It is not a picture of a heavenly consummation that utterly displaces earth's tragedy and disappointment. No sin is to enter it, but there are earthly kings who bring their treasures into it, and the wicked are just outside its gates. If any future is to be made worth while this vision must be left behind. It is a solution for an emergency, not a goal for humanity.

Dr Peake's book can be heartily commended. It reveals grip of the meaning and the message of the writing he sets out to interpret; knowledge of the vast literature of the subject; and sound exegetical skill. What one misses is arrogant dogmatism, and the Revelation of John has suffered too much and too often from this. As Tennyson said in reference to some dogmatic summary: "That is the quick decision of a mind that sees half the truth."

J. C. MANTRIPP.

COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

Les Mystères Païens et le Mystère Chrétien. Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris: chez Émile Nourry, 62 Rue des Écoles. 1914.—Pp. 368, 8vo.

ALTHOUGH delayed in its appearance by five years of war, this book cannot fail to influence deeply the thought of all students of Christian origins. It was complete on August 1, 1914, as its title-page indicates, but was actually published only in 1919. Nevertheless, it has more than mere freshness. It is the work of a great scholar, profoundly qualified for his task by years of marvellous industry in biblical research, later widened into the field of the general history of religion, and now bending all his powers to the supreme problem of comparative religion—the triumph of Christianity in its struggle with the mystery-religions for the prize of Græco-Roman civilisation.

The subject is no longer new. Since Reitzenstein and Cumont we have had a whole series of discussions, ranging from some leaders of English scholarship down to popular works more or less partisan in their treatment. That of Loisy needs no apology for its late appearance. It treats the whole subject with the grasp of a master hand. Especially will the careful reader be grateful for the copious citation in the original, in abundant footnotes, of the often recondite sources on which our knowledge of the mystery-religions depends. Loisy shows here, as in his great commentaries, that he is not content to take his information at second hand. Successively in chapters ii. to vi. he analyses for their content of religious ideas, the mysteries of Dionysus and Orpheus, of Eleusis, of Cybele and Attis, of Isis and Osiris and of Mithra. Thereafter follows in chapters vii. to x. Loisy's critical conception of the Gospel of Jesus and of the Risen Christ, the Gospel of Paul, the Christian Initiation (by which is meant the significance attached by the early Church to its two sacraments), and the Conversion of Paul and Birth of Christianity.

We owe a debt of gratitude to the clear, discriminating mind and the persuasive pen which can set before us in its most convincing light the debt of Christianity to the mystery-religions. There will be few unprejudiced minds to deny that the debt is great. The gospel of Jesus conquered by becoming "the mystery of the kingdom of God," as it is explicitly called in our oldest Gospel. Nevertheless, the more completely and effectively the evidence is marshalled in the effort to prove that "Paul found means to transform the sense of the two sacraments" (p. 269) and otherwise remoulded the faith he had formerly persecuted, the further do we find ourselves from admitting Loisy's explanation of the transition from the Galilean gospel *of* Jesus to the Pauline gospel *about* Jesus to be adequate. He has made the utmost of the Hellenising influences which to some extent must in reality have affected Paul, but he has failed to observe that fundamentally the glorified Saviour to whom Paul's allegiance is given is not conceived in the image or likeness of any of the saviour-gods of the mystery-religions, but fundamentally and directly on the Exalted Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, who suffers death to achieve Israel's mission of "justifying many," whose life is made an offering for sin, but thereafter "divides the spoil *of* the strong" (LXX.), is exalted and made very high, "to make intercession for transgressors." According to Loisy (p. 328, n. 4), "Paul does not found his theory of redemption in any way upon this text" (Is. lii. 13–liii. 12). It was only through the Hellenistic Jews whom he had encountered in his persecuting career far away from Jerusalem that he became acquainted with the doctrine of propitiation through the death and resurrection of Jesus to make intercession with God. In spite of what Paul says regarding the agreement of his gospel with the teaching of the Galilean apostles in 1 Cor. xv. 1–11, and of the implication of his challenge to Peter in Gal. ii. 16, Loisy maintains that this entire element, indeed everything that goes beyond a mere nationalistic reformed Judaism, is an importation by Paul from foreign sources into the simple teaching of Jesus and his Galilean followers. "Honest Peter will not have known what to make of Paul's outbreak in Gal. ii. 15–21."

It is not strange that Loisy should adopt the extreme view of Professor Percy Gardner regarding the "Origin of the Lord's Supper," treating the description of the ritual in 1 Cor. xi. 23–25 as based, not on the traditional practice of all the churches "from (ἀπό) the Lord," but upon a special revelation of his own. The "transformation" is thus made more conceivable. But how can we conceive the original conversion of Paul himself to a gospel and a Messiah so uncongenial to a Hellenistic Jew of his culture and propensities? If we strip the religion Paul persecuted of every element which could make appeal to one whose religious experience was such as his letters describe, we make it impossible to account for his conversion otherwise than as an arbitrary act of divine intervention.

The key to the great transition is certainly the religious experience of Paul, and Loisy does well to so arrange his material as to lead up to this as its culmination. But the explanation falls short of producing conviction. A great factor is felt to be wanting. It will not be supplied until more adequate consideration is given to the Jewish side of Paul's nature and training. We need more light upon the later development and influence of the Isaian doctrine of the Servant, along such lines as those pursued by Oesterley in his *Jewish Doctrine of Mediation*. After we have studied what Paul calls "the gospel of reconciliation" committed to every preacher of Christ in its whole development from Deutero-Isaiah through the Wisdom literature and Apocalypse down to the rabbinic, we shall be better prepared to appreciate at its true value the modicum of influence exerted upon primitive Christianity by the mystery-religions.

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Rousseau and Romanticism. By Irving Babbitt.—Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919.

THIS is not an ordinary book on Rousseau. There are certainly a large number of references to him, but there is no attempt to give a systematical treatment. Rousseau is taken as a convenient representative, especially as the imitator of a type of romanticism. Literature, and indeed mental activity generally, have been permeated since Rousseau's time with a Rousseauistic philosophy of life. Mr Irving Babbitt pays Rousseau a high compliment when he emphasises his influence, and at the same time tells us that the total tendency of the Occident is at present "away from rather than towards civilisation." "Everything," said Rousseau, "is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man." Here we have the manifesto of modern naturalism, especially as it appealed to the new romanticists of France, Germany, and England at the end of the eighteenth century and through the nineteenth century. It is, then, this naturalism of Rousseau, rather than Rousseau himself, that Mr Babbitt submits to a searching criticism of about 400 pages. The particular form of naturalism with which he specially concerns himself to deal faithfully is that of "emotional naturalism." Therein he finds the very essence and certainly the logical development of modern Romanticism in literature and in art, as it derives from the Rousseauistic basis.

Mr Babbitt, it should be stated, is the Professor of French Literature in Harvard University. The philosophical influence exerted by such thinkers as William James and Josiah Royce has created in Harvard an atmosphere far beyond the range of their immediate subjects of teaching. Both these philosophers sought to bring philosophy into direct touch with life, and with all the subjects bearing upon the life of thought. Harvard writers accordingly tend to become much more than mere specialists in their subjects. They often attain to the high distinction of taking up the attitude towards their subjects of philosophical specialists. This is the case of Professor Irving Babbitt. He is Professor of French Literature at Harvard, but his book on *Rousseau and Romanticism*, whilst it is informed with a rare mastery of not only French literature, but also of European literary authors (and indeed keeps an alert outlook on the literature of the East), is yet essentially a philosophical treatise. For it attempts to bring literary tendencies, in their final form, to their underlying human implications, and to bring them under the teleological searchlights of philosophy. Nor is it only in the more philosophical significance of literary tendencies that Professor Babbitt shows his deep interest. The whole book is characterised by the desire to bring literary and artistic activity into the domain of psychological as well as philosophical reflection. As Pestalozzi declared his desire to "psychologise" education, Professor Babbitt brings psychology to the interpretation of mental aspects of literature, both as individual and as national mental products, and indeed as world mental products. His whole treatment is synthetic—in the direction of inducing a unifying of critical judgment as to the aims of life, and of thought, and of the expression of thought in literature. If there be "ends" in life, in thought, and in expression, and if all knowledge be one, then a unity will be discoverable in literature, in art, and in all the concrete products of thought. Romanticism has endeavoured to pursue one of these aims, in detachment, viz. "emotional naturalism," and this aim in Professor Babbitt's view is entirely unsound and against the interests of all that is best in man. It is a form of sectionalism in literature, as a trades union is in social life, and must never be accepted as an interpretation of the whole aim of life. His book is, therefore, a comprehensive inquiry into the modern developments of the tendency, and includes a presentation of an enormous variety of modern literary subject-matter, of keen attractiveness alike to the literary man, the philosopher, and the general reader. It is a philosophical and psychological inquiry, based on a wide exercise of criticism and a collection of literary material of all kinds. It is a strenuous essay combining critical, philosophical, and especially psychological judgments on a great ingathering of the results of wide and constantly thoughtful reading. It is an attempt to combine the concrete with the abstract outlook, and it certainly is calculated to stimulate the reader to the exercise of both attitudes. The book both moves and lives in a psychological atmosphere. The author thinks psychologically about literature, and requires the reader to do the same. To put it at its least, the literary man may get some insight into what is meant by psychology, and the psychologist may get a new impulse towards literature.

It will be seen, then, that Professor Babbitt's attitude towards the special subject of his inquiry—the "emotional naturalism" which he associates with the name of Rousseau (though he is clearly more concerned with its manifestations in our midst to-day)—is emphatically negative. It might be thought that his main characteristic would be that of destructive criticism. This, no doubt, is so, at any rate superficially. But his positive aim so constantly shines through his attacks on the chaotic vagaries of uncurbed individualistic tendencies that Professor Babbitt is no impartial spectator of the literary scene. The contest is the old one (however varied the forms of literary criticism)—that of Classicism versu Romanticism. The following passage will show Professor Babbit's lin of sympathy:—

> "To follow nature in the classical sense is to imitate what is norm and representative in man, and so to become decorous. To be natur in the new sense, one must begin by getting rid of imitation an decorum. Moreover, for the classicist, nature and reason are synonym ous. The primitivist, on the other hand, means by nature th spontaneous play of impulse and temperament, and inasmuch as th liberty is hindered rather than helped by reason, he inclines to loo on reason not as the equivalent, but as the opposite of nature."

This is excellently put, and constantly, in substance, kept before th reader in a way which may be said to express the negative of Romanticisn of the emotional type, whilst the underlying suggestion of the correlati position calls for constructive consideration which the reader is uncon sciously drawn into contemplating. The thorough-going criticism o Romanticism is provided for by the following chapters: Romanti Genius, Romantic Imagination, Romantic Morality: The Ideal; Romanti Morality: the Real; Romantic Love; Romantic Irony: Romanticism an Nature; and Romantic Melancholy.

Professor Babbitt offers many surprises. For instance, Browning ca pass as a prophet only with the half-educated person, "the person wh has lost traditional standards and failed to work out with the aid of th ethical imagination some fresh scale of values, and in the meantime live impulsively and glorifies impulse." On Browning's poem, *Summum Bonun* with its "Brightest truth, purest trust in the universe—all were for m In the kiss of one girl,"—Professor Babbitt remarks, "the supreme goo it would appear is identical with the supreme thrill." The author ready with his apophthegm in his treatment of materialistic naturalisn "It makes man efficient without making him ethical." And again, h sums up the effect of science on human progress: "If scientific disciplin is not supplemented by a truly humanistic or religious discipline, the resu is unethical science, and *unethical science is perhaps the worst monster th has been yet turned loose on the race*"!

Professor Babbitt, as a critic, must look for some fierce criticism o himself. He considers some of William James's views as "romant fallacies," and of Bergson he says he, "more than any living Rousseauis reminds one of the German romantic philosophers." Professor Babbit at any rate, is a "live man," and his criticisms on literary men an philosophers abound in warmth and colour. And, in the cause of "positive and critical humanism," as opposed to an emotional romanticis in literature, art, and life, he is full of conviction.

The book is very unequal. Yet sometimes it is worth waiting to g some uncommonly suggestive ideas. Thus, a notion of Professor Babbit treatment of his subjects may be got from such a passage as t following:—

> "What binds together realism and romanticism is their comm repudiation of decorum as something external and artificial. 'On get rid of decorum, or, what amounts to the same thing, the who body of 'artificial' conventions, and what will result is, accordi

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